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Preface
This book is the outcome of the many years that I have journeyed in the
field of migration research and policymaking. Being a policy scientist, I
entered this field as a relative outsider. The thorny issue of immigrant inte-
gration challenged many of the lessons I had been taught as a student of
public policy. It defied much of what I had learnt about rationally defining
social problems, organising processes of policymaking and evaluating pol-
icy programmes. Somehow, much of the traditional policy scientist’s toolk-
it did not make sense when confronted with the ‘wicked policy problem’.
This became even more evident when, just after the turn of the millennium
in the midst of my schooling in public policy and public administration,
immigrant integration emerged forcefully onto the Dutch public and politi-
cal agenda. In spite of decades of policy, the Dutch approach was now
being declared a ‘failure’. Furthermore, the credibility of those experts who
had been closely involved in the making of these policies was now pub-
licly on the line. Clearly, the role of scientific experts in the making of
Dutch immigrant integration policies was changing.
This is precisely what motivated me to undertake research on the rela-
tions between migration research and policymaking in the Netherlands.
Culminating in my dissertation entitled ‘Constructing immigrant policies:
Research-policy relations and immigrant integration policymaking in the
Netherlands’, I completed my PhD in January 2008 at the University of
Twente in Enschede, the Netherlands. The entire process was an adventure
into the very lively and dynamic field of Dutch migration research. After
immersing myself in migration literature and policy documents, I talked to
many key scholars and policymakers and visited the most relevant insti-
tutes in the field. This lifted the lid on a complex, dynamic and, at times,
contested area. Making sense of this controversial domain that I had ven-
tured into required me to review the many traditional ideas I held about the
role of research in policymaking. As a policy scientist, this has shaped my
understanding of how policymaking works in practice and how the divi-
sion of labour between research and policy is actually produced and
reproduced.
Since obtaining my PhD, I have continued working on the reconceptua-
lisation of research-policy relations in this specific policy domain. This led
to an international conference in May 2008 entitled Research-Policy
Dialogues on Migration and Integration in Europe, which I organised to-
gether with Rinus Penninx, who has been involved in such research-policy
dialogues for decades, both in the Netherlands and at a wider European le-
vel. The gathering was graciously hosted by the University of Twente’s
Department of Social Risks and Safety Studies, where I held an assistant
professorship. It was supported by the IMISCOE Research Network con-
cerned with, as its acronym suggests, international migration, integration
and social cohesion in Europe and by the Institute for Governance Studies
(IGS). The conference created an opportunity for policymakers and migra-
tion scholars to engage in dialogue on their mutual relations. It also al-
lowed me to broaden the scope of my interest in research-policy dialogues
beyond the Netherlands, posing questions such as whether or not it is an
exceptional case, or if there is something more general that we can learn
from the Dutch experience?
This book is the product of my broader reflections on the dialogue be-
tween migration and migration policymaking. With it, I intend to contri-
bute to a better empirical and theoretical understanding of research-policy
dialogues on intractable policy controversies such as immigrant integration.
In this respect, I consider immigrant integration a revelatory case as it re-
presents a policy domain in which traditional ideas about policymaking
and the role of social research within it have been seriously challenged.
Furthermore, I intend to contribute to shaping more reflective research-pol-
icy dialogues in this field in the future. Clearly, both governments and re-
searchers are struggling to come to terms with the ‘wicked’ problem, yet
there appears to be little progress in terms of taming the ongoing contro-
versies on immigrant integration. This study may not necessarily provide a
resolution for the problem of immigrant integration, but it does bring about
more reflexivity in the related dialogues.
This study would not have been possible without the attention and help
of various people, whom I cannot thank enough for getting me acquainted
with the world of migration research. Rinus Penninx has not only been an
invaluable source of information, but also a great motivator throughout my
research; without him there would have been no Research-Policy
Dialogues conference and no book about it either. The Department of
Social Risks and Safety Studies honed my skills as a researcher and, in
particular, my promoters Bert de Vroom and Romke van der Veen dealt pa-
tiently with my uncertainties and shortcomings as I developed as a social
scientist. Han Entzinger, one of the supervisors of my Master’s thesis, was
a tremendous inspiration and instructor from early on, and he has contin-
ued to be there for me, meticulously reviewing various drafts of this book.
Christina Boswell and Virginie Guiraudon were of enormous assistance in
broadening the scope of my research interest beyond the Dutch case and
reviewing parts of the international comparative chapter. Rob Hoppe has
been my guide in the world of science studies and helped me develop my
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PhD dissertation into this book. Let me thank Leo Lucassen from Leiden
University and Elke Winter from the University of Ottawa for their rigor-
ous reviews and constructive comments on its latest versions. I also wish
to thank Anna Yeadell and Karina Hof for their unwearied reviewing of
the final text.
Finally, much gratitude is due to my young family, who had to live with
this evolving manuscript for at least four summers. My wife Amal and our
children Safae and Ilyas have been a huge support, remaining endlessly pa-
tient and indulgent. It is to them, therefore, that I dedicate this book.
Rotterdam, April 2011
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Abbreviations
Abbreviation Name in full English name
ACOM Adviescommissie Onderzoek
Minderheden
Advisory Committee on Minorities
Research
BAMF Bundesamtes für Migration und
Flüchtlinge
German Federal Office for Migration
and Refugees
CBS Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek National Statistics Office
CAZ Commissariat van Ambonezenzorg Commissioner’s Office for Welfare of
Moluccans
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appel Christian Democratic Appeal Party
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CRER Centre for Race and Equality
Research
D66 Democraten 1966 Liberal Democratic Party
DCIM Directie Coördinatie Integratie
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Research
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LAO Landelijk Advies en Overleg Orgaan
voor Minderheden
National Advisory and Consultation
Structure for Minorities
LISW Landelijk Inspraakorgaan van
Surinaamse Welzijnsinstellingen
Foundation of Surinamese Welfare
Organisations
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn Pim Fortuyn Party
Abbreviation Name in full English name
Ministry of CRM Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en
Maatschappelijk Werk
Ministry of Culture, Recreation and
Social Work
NCB Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders Dutch Centre for Foreigners
OVB Onderzoek en Verificatie Bureau Research and Verification Office
PSI Policy Science Institute
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Social Democrat Party
REMPLOD Project voor de Reintegratie van
Migranten en Bevordering van
Locale Kansen en Ontwikkeling
Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower
and Promotion of Local
Opportunities and Development
Project
RMO Raad voor Maatschappelijke
Ontwikkeling
Council for Social Development
ROB Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur Council for Public Government
SCP Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau Social and Cultural Planning Office
(also Institute for Social Sciences)
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Temporary Scientific Committee for
Minorities Policy
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie
Liberal Party
VWJ Verwey-Jonker Instituut Verwey-Jonker Institute
WODC Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-en
Documentatiecentrum
Scientific Research and
Documentation Centre of the
Department of Justice
WRR Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid
Scientific Council for Government
Policy
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1 Introduction
Dutch society has long been held up as an exemplary case of successful
multiculturalism. Yet, the ‘multicultural model’ is now widely – and some-
times wildly – rejected by large parts of the population. The controversies
about this model have become a symbol of how contemporary govern-
ments struggle to tame complex, heated issues such as immigrant integra-
tion and, more generally, how they cope with rapid societal transformation
as the result of seemingly unstoppable phenomena like globalisation, mi-
gration and cultural diversification. The incorporation of migrants has
evolved into a major social and political concern for contemporary Dutch
society. Now that the modernist belief in rational societal steering has sig-
nificantly decayed, how can governments respond to the challenges of our
time?
Since the late 1970s, when governments first developed policy efforts
aimed at immigrant integration, there has been an explosion of social
science research in this area. Initially, a relatively small network of re-
searchers – mainly anthropologists and sociologists – focused on the social
and cultural position of migrants or ‘ethnic minorities’ in Dutch society. In
particular, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Advisory Committee on
Minorities Research (ACOM) played a key role in stimulating and coordi-
nating research on this issue. At that time, ACOM held a rather exclusive
position in this field. However, since the late 1980s, the research network
has broadened extensively, with a variety of social science disciplines be-
coming involved, as well as an increasing institutional fragmentation of the
research field. Today, immigrant integration research takes place at almost
all universities in the Netherlands, and a variety of specialised institutes
has evolved, for instance, in the production of quantitative data on the inte-
gration process, studying integration processes at the local level and pro-
viding science-based policy advice.
Social science research has, at various stages, played a major part in the
development of Dutch immigrant integration policy. Particularly in its in-
fancy, ACOM’s research had a direct relation with the science-based policy
recommendations from the Scientific Council for Government Policy
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR) and develop-
ment of the Dutch ethnic minorities policy of the 1980s and the integration
policy of the 1990s. Social researchers in this period played a central role
in the production of the multicultural model for which the Netherlands has
become so well known.
However, the participation of social researchers and research institutes in
policy development has become fiercely contested. Whereas the research-
policy nexus had been one of the key axes for policy development in the
1980s, during the 1990s the nexus was gradually dismantled and by 1992
ACOM was discontinued. WRR, whose reports were the main precursors
of policy change from the late 1970s to the 1980s, issued two reports in
2001 and 2007 that remained largely ignored. Furthermore, the credibility
of social researchers was publicly put on the line. The association between
researchers and the Dutch multicultural model became particularly contro-
versial once this model was publicly rejected. At the same time, political
developments after the turn of the millennium, including the rise of Pim
Fortuyn and other populist politicians, such as Geert Wilders, contributed
to immigrant integration becoming highly politicised. Rather than ground-
ing their policies in scientific recommendations, the politicians’ objective
was to show that they had a distinct political vision that took the concerns
of ‘ordinary people’ very seriously. Finally, the emerging political cynicism
towards scientific expertise seems to have been fuelled further by manifest-
ing conflicts of knowledge among researchers. The consensus that once un-
derpinned the multicultural model now made way for several competing
discourses, which contributed to growing uncertainty about which knowl-
edge claims to select.
A recent episode vividly illustrates how research-policy relations in this
domain became contested. In 2003, following what was dubbed the ‘long
year of 2002’ in Dutch politics – characterised by the rise and subsequent
assassination of Fortuyn – Dutch Parliament established an investigative
committee to enquire why the country’s integration policies showed little
signs of success. This committee commissioned an extensive study by a
well-known research institute to evaluate the effects of past policies.
However, the study concluded that the integration process had been rela-
tively successful in some aspects. In the fields of education and labour par-
ticipation, the committee recorded significant progress – this was seen as
indication of the successful integration of immigrants into Dutch society.
Researchers apparently understood integration in terms of the participa-
tion of immigrants in these domains. Yet, this definition of integration was
not broadly shared in government or politics. Disagreement emerged over
what immigrant integration actually meant. The researchers and the parlia-
mentary committee were highly criticised in public and political debates.
Leading politicians discarded the conclusions of the researchers as naïve
and biased, and held on to their original conclusion that the policy was a
failure. Government referred to crucial areas such as social cohesion, reli-
gion and criminality, which the investigative committee had ignored. The
government could agree that the policy was partially successful, but also
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insisted that it was unsuccessful in the aforementioned areas. Clearly, in-
stead of providing a new impetus for immigrant integration policy, this re-
search and the parliamentary investigative committee added yet another
episode to the ongoing controversies surrounding the issue.
This episode illustrates the difficulties that researchers and policymakers
face when the very definition of an underlying problem is contested.
Researchers, politicians and policymakers involved in this episode focused
on different facets of immigrant integration, and had differing ideas about
how the integration process should be evaluated. Their various understand-
ings led them to select different truth claims and interpret available evi-
dence differently so as to come to an evaluation of either policy success or
failure.
Furthermore, the dialogues put the division of labour between research
and policy at stake. The credibility of the concerned researchers and re-
search institutes was called into question because of their alleged multicul-
tural bias and their involvement in developing the policies that they were
now supposed to evaluate. In addition, the committee’s decision to ask re-
searchers to evaluate the policy received scathing criticism, as it was con-
sidered the task of government to provide a new policy approach, not that
of researchers. The year 2002 was a vexing one in Dutch politics. It led to
wide rejection of what was considered an elitist way of policymaking, re-
flecting a perceived interference by scientific expertise and systematic poli-
ticisation. The disagreement in this episode was not only about the defini-
tion and understanding of immigrant integration, it was also about how re-
search-policy dialogues should be organised in this social process of
problem definition.
This book aims to unravel how and why changes in the research-policy
nexus were connected to changing definitions of immigrant integration in
policy and research. It does not seek to explain how and why these
changes in definitions took place, but rather to discuss the role the re-
search-policy nexus has played in these changes. From a sociological and
policy science perspective, it aims to explain that nexus by analysing its
changing make-up over the past decades, as well as by analysing how and
why its consequently varying shapes influenced the definition of immigrant
integration in policy and research. Explored, too, will be the extent to
which the patterns of research-policy relations in the Dutch case are un-
ique, or whether they represent a broader prototype that can also be found
in other European countries – namely, France, Germany and the United
Kingdom. In other words, is there a Dutch exceptionalism? Or are there
more general patterns in how the research-policy nexus contributes to the
rise or fall of specific problem definitions?
This book also aims to contribute to a better empirical and theoretical
understanding of research-policy relations in the field of immigrant integra-
tion. Although it is commonly recognised that research is a driving factor
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in how immigrant integration policies are instituted across Europe, the
research-policy nexus has been – surprisingly – overlooked as an object of
empirical examination. There are a few notable exceptions, such as
Boswell (2009) and Favell (2001) who emphasise the importance of the re-
search-policy nexus for the development of immigrant integration research.
Favell even speaks of a strong correlation between the development of in-
tegration policies and what he describes as an ‘integration paradigm’ in im-
migrant integration research. To develop a better understanding of the past
development of immigrant integration research and to further develop this
subject as an autonomous research field, it is crucial to understand how
their nexus affects both policies and research.
In theoretical terms, the book borrows insights from policy sciences,
sociology and science studies. A typology of different forms of research-
policy nexus (enlightenment, engineering, bureaucracy, technocracy) will
be applied to interpret and compare research-policy relations in different
periods and across countries. The endeavour here is to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of how research-policy dialogues can be organised in
such a way that ‘dialogues of the deaf’ (Van Eeten 1999) – where frame
differences inhibit constructive dialogues, as in the immigrant integration
scenario described above – can be averted. Further, under what conditions
can the research-policy relations contribute to critical dialogues between re-
search and policy at the level of problem definition?
1.1 Immigrant integration: An intractable social problem
The Netherlands has become known worldwide for its multicultural ap-
proach to immigrant integration. In both national and international litera-
ture, there is a prevailing description of the Dutch approach in terms of a
national ‘multicultural model’. This model is characterised by a tendency
to institutionalise cultural pluralism in the belief that the cultural emancipa-
tion of immigrant minorities is the key to their integration into Dutch so-
ciety. It is frequently connected to the Netherlands’ history of pillarisation,
which yielded an institutional differentiation of large sections of society
into different national minorities (Catholics, Protestants, socialists, liberals).
Upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that several discourses or
‘models’ of integration have coexisted and competed in the Netherlands
over the past decades. Alongside multiculturalism, there has also been a
more social-economic discourse, which stresses participation in areas such
as education and labour, as well as a more cultural assimilationist dis-
course, which emphasises the importance of national identity, norms and
values and social cohesion in relation to immigrant integration (Entzinger
2005). In fact, the idea of cultural assimilation has become more prominent
over the past decade, as Dutch policy experienced the same ‘assimilationist
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turn’ observed in many other European countries in this period (Joppke &
Morawska 2003).
It seems, then, that rather than one dominant multicultural model’s pre-
sence, it is a persistent uncertainty regarding how to model the approach to
immigrant integration that characterises Dutch policymaking in recent dec-
ades. Indeed, a multiplicity of models marks the struggle to come to terms
with this intractable social problem. Dutch society has struggled with var-
ious facets of immigrant integration for some time. This includes the arri-
val and position of migrants in society, as well as the wider effects on so-
ciety itself. When migrants started to arrive in the Netherlands following
World War II, the Dutch had a tradition of spreading themselves across the
globe rather than being faced with migration at home. There were rela-
tively early experiences with immigration, such as the influx of Protestants
(Huguenots) from France. However, from the second half of the twentieth
century onwards – roughly parallel to decolonisation – the Netherlands
met a growing scale of migration.
Various categories of migrants can be traced. Firstly, colonial migrants
arriving from Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and the Moluccas. This group
also included so-called repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies
(Schuster 1999). Secondly, in the 1960s, labour migrants began arriving
from, in particular, the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia,
Greece, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey). Thirdly, family migrants could be
distinguished, incorporating both the reunion and formation of families by
migrants who had already settled in the Netherlands. Finally, especially
from the 1990s onwards, refugee migrants have come to the Netherlands
from Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Far East.
At the beginning of the new millennium, migration’s consequences were
becoming increasingly obvious in Dutch society. In 2005, the Netherlands
was home to 3.1 million immigrants (defined as people born outside the
Netherlands, or those with at least one parent born outside the country).
This amounted to 19.2 per cent of the Dutch population.1 For the same
year in the major cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, immigrants com-
prised as much as 34.2 per cent and 35.1 per cent, respectively, of the mu-
nicipal population.2 The largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, as
defined by national origin, are Turkish (320,000), Surinamese (309,000)
and Moroccans (272,800).3 In addition to the country’s traditional migrant
groups – including Moluccans, Southern Europeans, Chinese, Antilleans
and Arubans – new migrant groups have arrived, including Iraqis, Iranians,
Pakistanis, Afghans and Syrians. An indication of the Netherlands’ flour-
ishing cultural and religious diversity is found in the numbers – in 2004,
Muslims in Dutch society reached a total of 944,000, or 5.8 per cent of the
Dutch population.4 Only recently did this immigration trend break, notably
due to the rise in emigration figures.5
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In spite of this migration history, it has often proven difficult to define
the consequences of migration for Dutch society and, in turn, to develop
appropriate strategies for coping with these consequences. Although immi-
grant integration is commonly defined as a social problem, its meaning has
remained unclear, uncertain and even contested. Some commentators speak
of emancipation or ‘integration with retention of identity’, while others re-
fer to adaptation, participation or segregation. In fact, the notion of integra-
tion has been subject to controversy in academic literature as well as in po-
litical debates because of its presumed normative bias. In addition, policy
approaches to immigrant integration by various countries have diverged
strongly over the past decades. Whereas the French have adopted an assim-
ilative approach, the Germans have stressed social-economic participation
and the British have followed their own national form of multiculturalism.
It can appear that the only given in immigrant integration is the migrants
themselves. However, the definition of what a migrant is has also proven
to be a complex and, at times, controversial issue. Migrants can be divided
into various categories, as mentioned above, and also into national or eth-
nic groups or communities (e.g. Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan). They
can also be placed into one broad category of individuals (non-natives or,
as called in Dutch, ‘allochtonen’6). Any method for defining ‘migrants’
leads to questions about why some groups or categories are included while
others are not. For instance, Chinese migrants and migrants from Western
European countries who are resident in the Netherlands are not defined as
minorities that need to be ‘integrated’. Furthermore, a distinction is often
made between first-, second- and even third-generation migrants, depend-
ing on whether an individual or one parent or grandparent is born outside
the Netherlands. Moreover, there has been controversy over whether mi-
grants must be defined at all. More and more migrants are becoming natur-
alised as Dutch national citizens, while sometimes also maintaining their
original nationality. Attempts to specify those migrants who need to be in-
tegrated (versus those who do not) has incited criticism about the labelling
effect this process has on them and its adverse effect on their integration
(Rath 1991).
Even if migrants are defined in general terms, there is no general theory
of how immigrant integration is to be achieved. The position of migrants is
multifaceted. A distinction is often made in the literature between the so-
cial-economic, social-cultural and political-legal position of migrants
(Fermin 1997: 19). This concerns social-economic issues such as educa-
tional achievements, labour market participation and housing; social-cultur-
al issues such as cultural organisations, discrimination, racism and social
cohesion; and political-legal issues such as naturalisation regulations, dual
nationality, equal treatment regulations and voting rights. As the investiga-
tive committee from 2003 illustrated, different actors will deem differing
facets of the position of migrants as being most central to integration. For
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instance, in spite of the progress observed in social-economic domains
such as education and labour, other members of the committee held on to
the conclusion that integration had failed because of insufficient progress
in, primarily, the social-cultural domain.
Finally, how immigrant integration is defined draws on many broader
societal values. Immigrant integration is a value-laden notion that has often
been connected to specific normative conceptions of the nation-state. In
fact, it is the nation-state that defines international migration and that de-
fines immigrant integration as a social issue. For many countries, the defi-
nition of a migrant and consequent approaches to immigrant integration are
correlated with nation-state conceptions (such as foreigners in the exclu-
sionary ethnic German state, racial minorities in multiracial British society
and mere immigrants in the inclusive French Republic). In the
Netherlands, too, immigrant integration has become associated with nation-
building legacies such as the history of pillarism and tolerance for religious
and cultural differences. Moreover, at the turn of the millennium, immi-
grant integration became an important issue for the Netherlands’ revision
of its national imagined community in the context of globalisation as an
ongoing social process.
Thus, immigrant integration is a far from self-evident notion. Although
‘integration’ has become broadly accepted in academic and policy dis-
course in the Netherlands, as in many other European countries (Favell
2001: 3), its meaning has been weakly articulated. Rather, as the Dutch
case will reveal, there is a multiplicity of models – or ‘frames’, as I will
describe them – that provide a specific meaning to integration. This multi-
plicity marks immigrant integration as a so-called ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel
& Webber 1973) or an ‘intractable controversy’ (Rein & Schön 1994).
These are problems that seemingly defy definition and resolution and
which involve a multiplicity of problem definitions, also referred to as
‘frames’. Moreover, they are seemingly resistant to resolution through
studying the underlying facts, as the facts are themselves often selected
and interpreted very differently.
1.2 The co-evolution of immigrant integration research and
policies in the Netherlands
The multiplicity of problem frames that characterises these intractable con-
troversies is reflected in immigrant integration policy and research in the
Netherlands. Both have struggled over the past decades to come to terms
with this complex social problem. Rather than there being one dominant
national model of integration, as is often suggested in national and interna-
tional migration literature, previous decades have witnessed the rise and
fall of several models of integration.
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In fact, neither research nor policy spoke of immigrant ‘integration’ until
the 1990s. Before then, terminology referred to emancipation, the eventual
return of temporary migrants or ‘international commuters’. Since the
1990s, the meaning of integration has remained contested, as the example
of the investigative committee discussed above illustrates. In addition, mi-
grants have been defined inconsistently over the years – as guest labourers,
as ethnic or cultural minorities, as allochthonous or as newcomers and
‘oldcomers’. Immigrant integration has also endured various explanations,
for instance, in terms of structural impediments to the emancipation of par-
ticular groups or citizenship on the part of migrants themselves. It has been
categorised in different normative perspectives, such as cultural equality in
a multicultural society, social-economic equity in a viable welfare state and
national social-cultural cohesion in an age of globalisation.
These diverging interpretations have contributed to a series of shifts in
Dutch immigrant integration policies in recent decades (Entzinger 2005).
The development of this policy area has followed a rifted pattern at times
(Scholten & Timmermans 2004). Until about the 1970s, only ad hoc wel-
fare measures existed for temporary migrants. In the 1980s there was a
minorities policy, the 1990s saw an integration policy and, since 2003,
there has been a shift towards an integration policy ‘new style’.
Throughout these policy episodes, immigrant integration was defined in
different and sometimes conflicting ways (Snel & Scholten 2005; VWJ
2004). For instance, policy in the 1970s was aimed at preventing integra-
tion so as to facilitate return migration. This contrasts with later policies
endeavouring to promote integration. Furthermore, the minorities policy of
the 1980s provided various facilities to groups, as opposed to the subse-
quent integration policy, which instead focused on individual migrants.
Changes in terms of how immigrant integration has been defined have
also occurred in immigrant integration research. In the 1970s and espe-
cially the 1980s, there was a dominant minorities paradigm (Bovenkerk
1984; Rath 1991). This paradigm has since been challenged by other ways
of understanding immigrant integration that have evolved since the 1990s.
Later research invoked the citizenship or integration paradigm, as well as
perspectives seeing immigrant integration as linked to processes of interna-
tionalisation and globalisation (Entzinger 2002; WRR 2001b; Van
Amersfoort 2001) or to rising concerns about national identity and social
cohesion (Koopmans 2003; SCP 2003). The disagreements on how to de-
fine and understand immigrant integration show that research on the issue
has been a far from coherent enterprise. Rather, it has been subject to con-
troversies about what integration means, how it should be studied and what
the role of research about integration should be.
The aim of this book is to analyse empirically the dialogues between re-
search and policy in the construction of these frames of immigrant integra-
tion, as well as to contribute to theory-building on how these mutual
20 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
dialogues affect developments in both policy and immigrant integration re-
search. There are important indications that the research-policy nexus has
been pivotal in shaping policies and research in the Netherlands over the
past decades. The literature on immigrant integration policymaking con-
tains many references to the prominent role that research institutes, advi-
sory bodies and particular experts have played in this domain (Entzinger
1984, 2003; Penninx 1988b, 2005). For instance, several reports by the
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) have had a major impact
on policy turning points in recent years (De Jong 2002; VWJ 2004).
Various other institutes on the research-policy nexus, including ACOM and
the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) have also had an important
influence on policy developments. The status of the research-policy nexus
as a venue for policy development has also invoked harsh criticism. It has
been argued, for instance, that scientific expertise has interfered with ethnic
expertise (Penninx 1988b: 27; Van Putten 1990: 361). Scientific expertise
has also been said to have facilitated the depoliticisation of this issue, of-
fering an alternative venue for policymaking that allowed avoiding open
political debates (De Beus 1998; Rath 2001; Van Amersfoort 1984).
Furthermore, the research-policy nexus influenced the development of
specific problem definitions in scientific research. For instance, govern-
ment research programming and the establishment of ACOM for the coor-
dination of research contributed to the development of a minorities para-
digm that defined immigrants as ethnic minorities characterised by social-
economic deprivation and social-cultural deviance (Rath 1991). In addition,
government-associated institutes, such as SCP, coordinated their selection
and acquisition of scientific data on the position of migrants according to
government demands for information. After the turn of the millennium,
public and political discourse put more emphasis on social-cultural issues.
In response, SCP (2002: 13) started to pay more attention to social-cultural
integration. Researchers and research institutes were often strongly oriented
towards, or associated with, national government institutes (Favell 2001:
10). Critics have argued that the policy involvement of research in this area
contributed to the rise of specific problem definitions and the exclusion of
alternatives (Rath 2001: 140). Moreover, the alleged ‘symbiosis’ (Van
Amersfoort 1984) between research and national government institutes
contributed to a highly national orientation in terms of research on immi-
grant integration. Only during the last ten years, as a result of the research-
policy nexus rising on local and European levels (Geddes 2005), has the
national orientation been challenged by more international or post-national
perspectives.
The research-policy nexus’s indelible contribution to shaping problem
understandings in research and policy is indicated by a number of obvious
parallels during the periods in which each domain underwent change. At
the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, both research and policy came
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to view immigrant integration in terms of social-cultural emancipation and
social-cultural participation of ethnic minorities (the aforementioned mino-
rities paradigm and minorities policy). Later, at the end of the 1980s and
especially in the early 1990s, the problem framing in both fields changed
towards a more individualist orientation regarding citizenship and social-
economic participation (i.e. the citizenship paradigm and integration pol-
icy). Finally, after the turn of the millennium, policy and research went
through another period of significant change, though this time not entirely
in the direction of a shared understanding on immigrant integration (i.e.
transnationalism, assimilationism and the integration policy ‘new style’).
This suggests that immigrant integration research and policy have, at least
to some extent, co-evolved in terms of the ways in which they define and
understand immigrant integration (Timmermans & Scholten 2006).
There was, however, no single given or fixed research-policy nexus.
Different actors participated during different periods, including ACOM,
WRR, SCP, the Department of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, the
Department of Home Affairs and various others. Whereas the nexus was
distinctly institutionalised in the 1980s, later it became more institutionally
fragmented (Penninx 2005). Different scientific disciplines, such as anthro-
pology, sociology, economics and political science, were involved at var-
ious times. An array of expertise was provided, such as conceptual policy
recommendations by WRR and ACOM, but also more quantitative data by
SCP. That policymakers generally believed in the contribution social
sciences could make to the rational feasibility of social problems also
played an important role (Blume, Hagendijk & Prins 1991). This belief has
made room for a more sceptical attitude towards scientific expertise in re-
cent decades, as illustrated by controversies surrounding the parliamentary
investigative committee on integration policy. There has also been a grow-
ing number of disagreements about what constitutes proper scientific re-
search. Examples include the struggles between ACOM and WRR in the
early 1990s concerning proper research methods and proper relations with
policymakers; the commotion surrounding international comparative re-
search’s methodological premises following an article by the researcher
Koopmans (2003), which compared Dutch integration policy with German
policies; and furore about the alleged multiculturalist bias of Verwey-
Jonker Institute (VWJ) researchers who carried out a policy evaluation
study for the parliamentary investigative committee on integration policy.
There has been significant variation in the shape of the research-policy
nexus in this field over the past decades. The nexus did not adhere to one
of the often-formulated clichés of the research-policy nexus such as
‘science speaking truth to power’ or ‘politics on top, science on tap’. In
fact, the shape of the research-policy nexus seems to have been subject to
plenty of uncertainty and controversy, just like the problem definition of
immigrant integration. The nebulous problem definition combined with
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institutional incertitude about how research and policy could tame this com-
plex social issue makes immigrant integration an intractable controversy.
This book seeks to unravel the connection between the research-policy
nexus’s reshaping over time and the changing manner of defining immi-
grant integration as a social problem. It reaches beyond a mere suggestion
that the research-policy nexus played an important role in policy and re-
search developments by analysing how and why it was structured in speci-
fic ways over the past decades and how and why it has affected the defini-
tions of immigrant integration in research and policy. Rather, the endea-
vour is to explore the extent to which the research-policy nexus’s varying
shapes have structured how immigrant integration has been interpreted in
both research and policy.
1.3 Research-policy dialogues on immigrant integration
Apart from the recognition that research-policy dialogues were important
for research and policy developments, another issue concerns the role these
dialogues had in resolving the intractable social problem of immigrant inte-
gration. The persistent controversies associated with a multiplicity of inte-
gration models in policy and research suggest that it is far from resolved.
Furthermore, disagreements about the shaping of the research-policy nexus
indicate how difficult it is to conduct fruitful dialogue between research
and policy in the context of developing a fundamental understanding of
immigrant integration – not least, who is involved, how it should be
approached and why it would be a problem in the first place. In fact, pol-
icymakers have been criticised for being overly selective, simply cherry-
picking from those strands of expertise that fit their problem definitions
(Penninx 2005). Moreover, researchers have been challenged for being un-
able to reflect critically on their own problem definitions due to their en-
twinement with policy (Rath 2001).
This book pursues a better understanding of how the research-policy
nexus could contribute to critical reflection concerning how to define im-
migrant integration. In this case, reflection means taking the models of in-
tegration as objects of analysis rather than as a starting point for research.
Through an empirical analysis of research-policy relations and their effects
on policy and research, it hopes to overcome a dreaded dialogue of the
deaf at the level of problem definition and to generate insights about how
to organise critical exchange between research and policy on how to define
immigrant integration. This book will not resolve the ongoing debates by
providing a new and superior ‘model of integration.’ Rather, it takes a step
back to focus instead on the structure of the research-policy nexus. It will
analyse how and why the research-policy nexus was structured in specific
ways and how and why its different structures had certain effects on
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problem understandings in policy and research. Furthermore, this study
will not determine what has or has not constituted proper scientific re-
search. It will make no claims about the scientific character of institutes or
researchers. Rather, it will take a more empirical approach to studying a
myriad of research-policy nexus structures and to determining the extent to
which they contributed to or inhibited critical reflection.
To encourage reflection, it is necessary to step beyond objectivist and re-
lativist perspectives on the research-policy nexus. Objectivist perspectives
further a belief that scientific research that follows proper scientific meth-
ods and norms can tame intractable controversies by producing objective
knowledge about the nature of a particular social problem and countervail
the irrationality of politics. This provides the foundation of the normative
model of the research-policy nexus as ‘science speaking truth to power’
(Wildavsky 1979), which has been very influential in the social sciences
overall and the policy sciences, in particular (Radin 2000). It has, however,
been harshly criticised for its idealised image of science as a producer of
objective knowledge claims, as well as for ignoring the many contingen-
cies among scientific practices and policymaking (Ezrahi 1990; Hoppe
2005; Latour 1993; Mulkay 1984; Nelkin 1979). Objectivist methods
ignore, for example, that running parallel to the scientification of politics is
a politicisation of science (Weingart 1999). Conversely, relativism requires
a more cynical take on the role of scientific research in intractable contro-
versies. In this perspective, the contingency of scientific practices and the
inherently normative character of scientific knowledge are stressed to such
an extent that the role of scientific research in resolving controversies is
considered negligible (Knorr-Cetina 1995; Latour 1993). Relativism often
stresses the role of political ideas or the institutional interests of scientists,
and argues how the production of scientific authority would be primarily a
matter of discourse (Gieryn 1999).
This book adopts an empiricist approach to understanding social rela-
tions between policymakers, researchers, policy and research institutes. It
also evaluates how such exchanges have promoted critical reflection on de-
fining immigrant integration. Thus, ‘research-policy dialogues’ are spoken
of as a way to incorporate the diverse methods for organising research-
policy relations. Instead of adopting an ex ante model of the research-
policy nexus, a way is sought out to empirically reconstruct the framework
of the research-policy nexus during the periods that the research and policy
perspectives on immigrant integration changed. Based on an empirical re-
construction of the research-policy nexus’s role in these changes, an analy-
sis is made as to how and why this nexus did or did not contribute to
reflection at the level of problem definition. Moreover, it focuses on the
correspondence between the research-policy nexus’s structure and the defi-
nition – the framing – of immigrant integration. The attempt is to unravel
to what extent the nexus was structured to contribute to critical reflection,
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or whether it played a different role in the changing problem definitions in
policy and research.
Through empirical analysis of the research-policy nexus’s role in policy
and research developments, this book will generate insights about how the
nexus can be structured so as to promote critical dialogues between re-
search and policy at the level of problem definition. Alas, it will not re-
solve the controversies over immigrant integration by developing a new
definition of integration or creating a normative model of the research-pol-
icy nexus. Rather, it aims to contribute to the ‘situated’ resolution of such
controversies by actors within the structural settings of research and policy.
This will be done by offering insights into how actors might organise the
research-policy nexus in a way that is characterised neither by objectivism
nor relativism, but rather by an effort to engage in a critical dialogue on
how to define immigrant integration.
1.4 Dutch exceptionalism?
Although it seems plausible that social researchers played a central role in
the construction of the Netherlands’ models of immigrant integration, the
Dutch case says little about how research can contribute to the rise or fall
of specific models. In other words, is there a Dutch exceptionalism in what
seems to be the co-evolution of immigrant integration research and policy
over the past decades? Or, does the Dutch case reveal patterns in research-
policy dialogues that can be found in other countries as well? In addition,
what lessons can be drawn from the organisation of research-policy dialo-
gues in other countries? Inevitably, any international comparison will run
into problems, for the simple fact that integration policy and research in
various countries have developed in such divergent social and political
contexts and in the face of frequently differing patterns of immigration.
Consequently, it is difficult to isolate factors that may be common to differ-
ent nations. For instance, Germany’s immigrant integration issue has been
connected to its own specific twentieth-century history, which witnessed
the nation’s splitting into two separate states. In the UK, however, it has
been connected to a national history of world-dominating colonialism
(Joppke 1999b). That said, there are some commonalities that justify inter-
national comparison and may provide applicable insights for the Dutch
case.
One commonality is that immigrant integration has become an issue of
high politics in many Western European countries over the past decade
(Geddes 2003). Just as in the Netherlands, immigrant integration is an in-
tractable policy controversy in Germany, the UK and France. All these
countries have recently experienced contention about their ‘national models
of integration’. Germany, after finally being recognised as a country of
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immigration, is gradually replacing its differentialist approach with a more
citizenship-oriented approach à la française (Joppke 1999b). The UK, after
persistently holding on to a typical British multiculturalism-on-one-island,
is now gradually moving towards a more assimilative approach (Joppke
2003). France, with its clearly articulated republican model and long being
considered the cradle of assimilationism, has been gradually introducing
more multiculturalist elements in its policy approach. This is, in part, a re-
sult of the growing problems in the banlieues of its major cities (Favell
1998b; Schain 1995). Despite a slow but gradual process of Europeani-
sation, particularly in the fields of migration and anti-discrimination poli-
cies, there are persistent national differences in the approach to immigrant
integration (Favell 2001). Though integration is inherently connected to is-
sues of globalisation and cultural diversity, most policy responses seem to
be driven by specific ‘national models of integration’.
Moreover, in many of these countries, social research also seems to have
been integral to the construction of these national models of integration.
There has been, as Favell (2001) described, an undeniable association be-
tween national policy models and national research paradigms. For in-
stance, in the UK, researchers played a crucial role in the so-called ‘race
relations industry’ closely tied into the British colour-oriented approach to
immigrant integration. Mirroring the situation in the Netherlands, various
research institutes in the UK have had significant influence on policy de-
velopments across the country, including the Centre for Race and Equality
Research (CRER), the Institute for Race Relations Research (IRR) and the
Policy Science Institute (PSI). In line with the differentialist approach, re-
searchers in Germany have been key to the development of a denizenship
status for migrants, which means that while migrants are not recognised as
full citizens, they do enjoy most social rights. In France, despite sharp poli-
ticisation of the public debate on immigrant integration, the republican
model has been sustained by several ‘public intellectuals’. However, this
republican model has become increasingly contested in recent times, as has
the nexus between intellectuals and politicians. This is most evident in ty-
pical rivalries about whether social researchers in France should be allowed
to gather statistics about ethnic categories. This controversy about statis-
tiques ethniques seems to be at the heart of the controversy surrounding
the French Republican model, as well as the French way of organising re-
search-policy dialogues in this domain.
Much debate in migration literature concerns an ‘assimilationist turn’
that has been taking place throughout Europe since the turn of the millen-
nium (Joppke 2003; Joppke & Morawska 2003). Rather than convergence
by Europeanisation, the turn is compelled by internal policy dynamics in
the countries themselves and, in particular, by the politicisation of immi-
grant integration. At the same time, there are indications of dissatisfaction
with research-policy dialogues on immigrant integration throughout
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Europe. In addition to the Dutch example of questioning the credibility of
immigrant integration researchers, the policy orientation of public intellec-
tuals in France has been contested and, in the UK, the race relations indus-
try is being replaced by a more centralised policy regime. There seems to
be a correlation between the ongoing politicisation of immigrant integra-
tion and a growing disenchantment with the policy role being played by
social researchers. One of the aims of this book’s international comparison
thus is to identify ways to organise research-policy dialogues in a more
fruitful manner. How can we remedy disenchantment with and in these dia-
logues? And, furthermore, how can we create a more reflective dialogue
on how to shape migration policies and immigrant integration research for
the future?
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2 Research-policy dialogues and the framing
of immigrant integration
The focus of this book is on how research-policy dialogues have contribu-
ted to the rise and fall of specific frames of immigrant integration. It re-
nounces the historical-institutionalist tradition of ‘models thinking’. Instead
of studying the genesis and persistence of national models of integration
per se, this study focuses on the much more dynamic ways researchers and
policymakers frame immigrant integration in a setting characterised by a
multiplicity of models of integration. Furthermore, this book focuses on the
diverse ways in which research-policy dialogues can be organised within
the dynamic process of problem framing. Although it is widely recognised
that the research-policy nexus has been an important vector for both policy
development and the development of immigrant integration research, there
has been surprisingly little empirical research into how and why the nexus
has played such a role. The aim here is to contribute to theory-building on
how research-policy dialogues influence the process of problem framing.
‘Research-policy dialogues’ are consciously spoken of in order to capture
the often dynamic ways in which research-policy relations can be
configured.
The theoretical framework on which this study rests will incorporate in-
sights from various disciplines – namely, sociology, science studies and
policy sciences. This melding will be based on the theoretical groundwork
of Bourdieu’s structuralist-constructivist perspective. Incorporating insights
from the more generic disciplines in the study of immigrant integration po-
licies is a deliberate choice; it minimises chances for contamination be-
tween the theoretical perspective of this study and the various frames and
research paradigms present in the field of immigrant integration research.
Furthermore, it contributes to opening up the thriving yet, at times, closed
field of immigrant integration research by connecting it to the more generic
theories developed in the academic disciplines of sociology, science studies
and policy sciences.
2.1 Structuralist-constructivism: Beyond ‘models thinking’ and
radical constructivism
Before elaborating on the conceptual framework of the structuralist-con-
structivist perspective, it will first be positioned within broader contempor-
ary literature from migration studies.
2.1.1 Beyond ‘models thinking’ in immigrant integration research
The structuralist-constructivist perspective parts with more historical-insti-
tutionalist ones that have acquired great resonance in contemporary migra-
tion literature. This has manifested itself most obviously in the so-called
‘models’ literature, which discusses the genesis and persistence of, mostly
notably, national models of integration. A classic reference in models
thinking is Brubaker’s 1992 book Citizenship and nationhood in France
and Germany. Juxtaposed here are the models of citizenship that provided
the foundations for the integration policies in these countries: an assimila-
tionist approach in France and a differentialist approach in Germany.
Whereas the Germans stressed exclusive membership of the German com-
munity based on ethnic ties (ius sanguinis), the French adopted a more in-
clusive model oriented towards full citizenship for everyone born on
French soil (ius soli). As a true historical-institutionalist, Brubaker shows
how the historical conditions in both countries led to the construction of
these national models: a well developed cultural and apolitical sense of na-
tional belonging in Germany versus the state-centric tradition of nation-
building in France.
Models thinking has resonated widely in migration studies. Take, for in-
stance, the work of Joppke (1995) who has used the national model as a
starting point for comparative studies of immigrant integration, although
his more recent work has become more explicit about how countries are in-
creasingly deviating from their traditional models. Or Ireland (1994) who,
in a comparative study of France and Switzerland, posits that national insti-
tutional conditions provide the best explanation for the type of policies de-
veloped. In his Dutch-German comparison, Koopmans (2003) takes the
differences in national models as a point of departure for evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the Dutch and German approaches. The notion that
Germany denounces the Dutch multicultural model as a failure can also be
found in the work of Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2005).
One of the reasons models have gained such wide acceptance in migra-
tion studies (and in other sectors) is that they reduce complexity. Models
can simplify the otherwise highly complex and contested matter of immi-
grant integration. They can also help construct international comparative
studies to assess processes of convergence or divergence between various
European countries. Furthermore, by comparing ideal-typical models with
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specific periods, modelling can provide insights into a country’s history. In
this context, Castles and Miller (2003) and, in their footsteps, Koopmans
and Statham (2005) have extended Brubaker’s dichotomy into a fourfold
typology of integration models: civic-assimilationism, cultural pluralism,
ethnic-differentialism and civic-republicanism. An important distinction in
Brubaker’s historical-institutionalist modelling is that it concerns ideal-
types that can be used for studying country cases, rather than models to be
seen as representative of national approaches per se.
That said, the danger of models is that they are not just taken as tools
for international comparison or for understanding historical periods. When
a model begins to shape our understanding and beliefs about policies it be-
comes more than just a model – it becomes a historical reconstruction of
policy rather than a model of it. Models then take the place of adequate
historical analysis. In social science literature, this has often led to in-
stances where a model is ‘blamed’ for the success or failure of a particular
policy approach. For example, various authors have blamed the Dutch mul-
ticultural model for the alleged failure of immigrant integration in the
Netherlands (Koopmans 2003; Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007).
In addition, models tend to oversimplify policies and overemphasise the
alleged coherency and consistency of these policies (Bertossi &
Duyvendak 2009). Policy practices tend to be far more resilient and diverse
than most policy models would suggest. For instance, in Dutch as well as
in French literature, there have been many references to differences be-
tween how policies are formulated at the national level and how they are
put into practice at the local level; some even talk of the decoupling of na-
tional and local policies in this respect (Favell 1998; De Zwart 2007;
Poppelaars & Scholten 2008). In fact, even when policymakers claim to
operate according to a specific policy model, their reasons for doing so
may be more pragmatic and flexible than the policy model itself in its
ideal-typical form. For instance, the reason some politicians in the 1980s
framed immigrant integration in terms of the multicultural model may have
more to do with their fear of anti-immigrant parties playing the race card
than with their multicultural policy beliefs (Penninx 1988; Scholten 2007).
A structuralist-constructivist perspective gives way to a much more em-
pirical and dynamic approach to immigrant integration. Here, the so-called
‘models of integration’ are the object of empirical analysis, rather than sim-
ply a starting point for analysis. In fact, the association between researchers
and certain models of integration is one of the central issues that will be
problematised in this book. Thus, models are taken as specific frames that
may emerge in policy and research, and the primary objective of this study
is to analyse how and why these frames rise and fall, rather than to estab-
lish whether a particular frame is true or false. In short, this book appreci-
ates the dynamics behind the models more than the theoretical value of the
models themselves.
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This does not, however, imply a radical-constructivist approach to immi-
grant integration. Such would deny the possibility of defining immigrant
integration in any meaningful way and deny any empirical relevance of
models of integration. However, it cannot be ignored that international mi-
gration and growing cultural diversity have been affecting contemporary
societies in the Netherlands and other European countries in very real
ways, or that governments have made very real efforts to develop policies
for coping with these social effects. Indeed, immigration has had an impact
on key social institutions, such as the welfare state, and has been challen-
ging social cohesion and traditional ideas about national identity. In some
cases, it has led to an ethnicisation of the underclasses. In fact, immigrant
integration has now become an urgent policy concern for most European
countries. In this sense, the structuralist-constructivist perspective adopted
in this book is not so much meant to deconstruct immigrant integration po-
licies as mere discourse but rather, to develop better understanding of how
and why specific discourses emerge and change over time.
2.1.2 Outline of a structuralist-constructivist perspective
Structuralist-constructivism goes a step beyond models thinking and relati-
vism in the study of social structures and social problems. It combines a
constructivist view on social structures, such as science and policy, with a
structuralist perspective on the construction of problems like immigrant in-
tegration (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 11). It adopts an empirical position
when examining how scientific research and policymaking are constructed
in actual social relations and the practices of actors in these fields. It also
takes an empirical approach to how these structured fields influence the
way actors socially construct the world around them, for instance, how
they define social problems like immigrant integration, or how they con-
ceptualise the research-policy nexus.
Structuralist-constructivism is based on specific ontological and metho-
dological premises. In terms of ontology, it sees the research-policy nexus
and problem frames as products of structured social relations. This means
that the distribution of power and the rules of the game manifested in deal-
ings between actors in a certain domain are considered explanations for
how and why these actors construct the research-policy nexus and frame
problems. In terms of methodology, structuralist-constructivism promotes
an empirical approach to the study of the research-policy nexus and pro-
blem framing. Only by studying the social practices of actors and the social
relations between then can we begin to understand how and why the re-
search-policy nexus is shaped the way it is and how and why resulting pro-
blems are framed as they are. In short, structuralist-constructivism neither
nullifies nor reifies the research-policy nexus or problem framing; rather, it
32 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
defines both as ‘relational’, being products of actual social practices and re-
lations (Bourdieu 1975; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992).
Two literatures will be combined to study the research-policy nexus in
terms of problem definition. The first was developed by Rein and Schön to
study how actors frame issues in inherently selective and normative ways.
This perspective recognises that social problems are not merely ‘out there’
and dictated by facts but rather, that they are socially defined or ‘made
real’. Problem situations – especially those that are complex, multifaceted
and deal with various normative issues – are often characterised by a multi-
plicity of possible realities or ‘frames’ (Goffman 1974; Rein & Schön
1994). A problem frame will require naming specific facets from problem
situations and an inherently normative way of framing them into cognitive
stories about what is going on, who is involved, why it is going on and
what could or should be done to provide a solution. For instance, different
frames of immigrant integration can focus on different problem facets (e.g.
social-economic or social-cultural issues) and different groups or categories
(e.g. foreigners or minorities); they can tell different stories to explain what
is going on (e.g. discrimination or inadequate citizenship); and they can
make different normative leaps from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ (e.g. preserving social
cohesion or facilitating cultural diversity).
Rein and Schön’s approach to problem framing takes a relational per-
spective, which recognises the influence of the structural setting in which
framing takes place. They refer to frames as being connected to particular
institutional forums that induce actors to name and frame a problem situa-
tion in a specific way (Rein 1986: 12). Their discussion of frame reflection
raises a crucial question: when do the structures of such forums and the
connections between them influence actors to reflect on the frames or on
possible alternatives? Rein and Schön argue that such structures must gen-
erate an openness towards alternatives, empathy towards other frames, a
critical attitude of one’s own frame and a willingness to adapt when neces-
sary, as well as a certain degree of trust among the actors involved in criti-
cal frame reflection (Rein & Schön 1994: 37).
Framing, however, does not provide a relational perspective on the insti-
tutional forums themselves to explain how and why they are structured in
specific ways. In fact, the notion of institutional forums is used rather
loosely in the works of Rein and Schön. Moreover, it does not hone in on
research and policy as institutional forums. Consequently, the frame per-
spective applied in this book will be combined with a more developed rela-
tional perspective on research and policy and on the structure of their mu-
tual relations. This book adopts Bourdieu’s interpretation of science and
policy as ‘fields’ of structured social relations that are constantly at stake
not only within the fields themselves, but also in between them. This no-
tion of field has been developed more fully in the institutional sociology of
science (Hess 1997: 52). Here, literature has evolved on ‘boundary work’,
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which examines how actors within certain positions demarcate a field and
coordinate its social relations with other fields. Fields and boundary work
are closely related in a structuralist-constructivist perspective: what is at
stake at the boundaries of a field will also impact the field itself. For in-
stance, structural changes within a field can be affected by changes along
the boundaries with other fields and vice versa, such as when an institute
obtains authority or funding for doing research, which will, in turn, rein-
force its position within the field.
Boundary work and ongoing processes of redefining field structures in
research and policy can combine in various ways, producing different
structural nexuses between both fields. These ‘boundary configurations’
are a structural product of boundary work and structural developments
within fields. They can also be a source of change within both fields, as
specific relations are established between them and they generate different
degrees of autonomy. Various theoretical models of boundary configura-
tions are distinguished, such as enlightenment, bureaucratic, engineering
and technocratic configurations (Hoppe 2005; Wittrock 1991). In this re-
spect, the literature clearly departs from objectivist approaches that stick to
one universal standard model of research-policy relations, as well as from
relativist approaches denouncing the idea that we can speak of boundary
configurations, field autonomy and structural relations among the fields in
any meaningful terms.
The literature about fields and boundary configurations will be con-
nected to Rein and Schön’s ideas about problem framing and frame re-
flection. As the authors have argued, boundary configurations can be a
consequence, as well as a source, of changes in field structures. They can,
for instance, either challenge or reinforce the structures or institutional for-
ums in which a particular frame is embedded. They can generate either po-
sitive feedback towards change or negative feedback to induce stability
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993). As such, boundary configurations can offer
strategic opportunities for change in research as well as policy, as sug-
gested in Fischer’s (1993) analysis of the politics of expertise, showing
how research-institutes or think tanks play a role in the war of ideas among
different political groups. Furthermore, the structural effects of boundary
configurations can generate structural conditions that challenge susceptibil-
ity to a particular frame. For instance, Guiraudon (1997) has shown how
keeping policymaking behind closed doors – in research institutes – has
contributed to a policy framing that allowed for the extension of migrant
rights in various countries.
Frame reflection requires boundary configurations to be structured in
specific ways. This involves what Rein and Schön (1994: 165) describe as
‘design rationality’, which can be productively applied to the structure of
research-policy relations. In order to meet the demands of design rational-
ity, boundary configurations have to generate openness, empathy towards
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alternative frames, critical reflection on these frames, a willingness to adapt
frames if necessary and a certain amount of trust in order to engage in criti-
cal debates. If these criteria are met, boundary configurations can lead to
critical frame reflection at the level of problem framing. If not, they can
still influence frameshifts, though in a way other than frame reflection.
Through the concept of framing, however, such non-reflective interaction
between research and policy is perceived as a dialogue of the deaf.
Finally, problem framing and the construction of boundary configura-
tions in the domain of immigrant integration cannot be divorced from the
broader social context. From a structuralist-constructivist perspective, con-
text is not merely an external constraint on problem framing and boundary
work. The selective and normative manner in which actors frame an issue
also involves selective and normative ways of perceiving the social con-
text. For instance, developments in the problem situation do not simply de-
termine problem framing, but will be mediated through the problem frames
of actors, who then select and interpret the developments in certain ways.
Furthermore, the boundary work practices of actors can be affected by
structural developments beyond the scope of immigrant integration re-
search and policy. For instance, macro-institutional developments in the
structure and culture of politics and policymaking can affect the boundary
work of actors within the domain of immigrant integration, though they
can also be mediated by changes in their positions within the research and
policy fields.
2.2 Framing immigrant integration
As controversies in the Netherlands over immigrant integration demon-
strate, there is persistent disagreement about what immigrant integration is,
why it is important, who is involved, who is to blame and what is to be
done about it. In contrast to the traditional belief in objective and rational
problem definitions, this issue appears to be characterised by a multiplicity
of problem frames. How, then, can we grasp those situations, theoretically
and conceptually, when the problem framing itself is contested?
2.2.1 The sociology of social problems
The frame concept has its theoretical roots in the sociology of social pro-
blems. Goffman (1974) was one of the first to develop this idea and did so
within a more symbolic interactionist strand of theory. He studied how ac-
tors construct answers to the question ‘What is going on here?’ within ac-
tual social practices, such as everyday interactions with other actors. He
coined the term ‘frame’ to describe how actors attribute meaning to reality
and how they position themselves in it. Through frames, actors create a
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subjective order out of an ambiguous and complex reality. Frames also al-
low actors to understand what their position in this reality is and how their
actions in response to it should be guided.
Rein and Schön (1994) elaborate the frame concept by putting it into a
more cognitive and structuralist perspective. They position frames on a
cognitive level in terms of how actors have learned to define and under-
stand a situation. They do, however, acknowledge that human cognition is
inherently entwined with more subjective images and normative apprecia-
tions. Rein and Schön thus define frames as ‘underlying structures of be-
lief, perception and appreciation’ (ibid.: 23). Frames are generally ‘tacit’ or
unknown to actors themselves (ibid.: 34). However, they do play an impor-
tant role in actual social practices: to provide a ‘way of selecting, organis-
ing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guide-
posts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting’ (ibid.: 32).
Furthermore, Rein and Schön (ibid.) argue that ‘framing [...] always
takes place within a nested context’. This nestedness involves various
structural or institutional forums, each with their own rules of the game
and a distribution of social roles (Rein 1986: 13). In fact, they argue that
this affects how actors will frame an issue; ‘the institutional context may
carry its own characteristic perspectives and ways of framing issues [...] or
it may offer particular roles, channels and norms for discussion and debate’
(ibid.: 12). Varying institutional forums elicit different ‘criteria by which
judgments are made about the legitimacy of participants and their standing
as participants in the policy conversation’ (ibid.: 13). This approach resem-
bles Gusfield’s (1980) sociology of social problems, which focused both
on what he described as ‘the culture of public problems’ and ‘the structure
of public problems’. For example, in his research on car accidents,
Gusfield (ibid.) demonstrated how the structure of this problem – involving
a dominant National Safety Council, insurance companies and industries –
influenced the culture of this problem – focusing on unsafe drivers (‘the
drinking driver’) rather than on unsafe cars or roads. This is reminiscent of
Schattschneider’s (1960) dictum that every structural organisation involves
a selective mobilisation of bias.
2.2.2 Naming and framing reality
So, ‘What is going on here?’ The literature on the sociology of social pro-
blems is tasked with distinguishing several facets of how problem situa-
tions are made sense of in problem framing. This involves the use of speci-
fic discourse or language for naming the problem situation, defining the
groups or categories that are involved, a causal story to explain the pro-
blem and a normative perspective for suggesting what could and should be
done about it.
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First, frames name an issue in terms of concepts and metaphors. Naming
– wording – reality is the first step to framing reality. Language is more
than a neutral description; it not only describes but also makes reality.
According to Edelman (1988: 9), ‘the language that interprets objects and
actions also constitutes the subject’. Concepts can give social meaning to
particular situations, especially when their historical usage has allowed
them to develop a ‘loaded’ meaning that is widely recognised. They can
make subjects ‘tangible’ or ‘real’ by referring to meanings that are more
commonly used (Parsons 1995: 180). Concepts can therefore become cen-
tral carriers or devices in the ‘dynamics of knowledge’, transferring mean-
ing among various issue domains (Maasen & Weingart 2000). They can
become ‘generative’ metaphors (Rein & Schön 1994; Stone 2002 [1988])
as they project a particular historically developed meaning onto a new si-
tuation. Furthermore, specific concepts and metaphors can play a central
role in the framing of policy problems. In fact, as Edelman (1977, 1988)
has argued, the construction of symbolic meaning can become the centre
of the ‘political spectacle’ rather than actual problem solving. For instance,
as politicians try to convey positive images about particular policy frames,
and despite opponents highlighting the deficiencies of such policies, it is
quite possible that words will succeed where policies actually fail
(Edelman 1988).
Secondly, naming issues involves the social classification of relevant
groups or categories (Yanow 2000). Defining whose problem it is, and
why it is a problem, is an important aspect of issue framing. Social classifi-
cation involves defining groups using a particular group structure or cate-
gories that share a set of characteristics. For instance, it can make a great
difference whether integration concerns specific ethnic or cultural groups
(e.g. Turks or Muslims) or specific categories (e.g. guest workers, foreign-
ers or aliens). As Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997) have shown, the clas-
sification of groups or categories is a far from unambiguous or neutral pro-
cess. They draw attention to how social classification conveys public
images and perceptions of power positions of specific groups or categories.
For instance, it can pose both significant political risks or opportunities in
terms of burdening the advantaged and independent or, in constrast, pro-
viding benefits to contenders and deviants.
Thirdly, the framing of a problem situation requires not only that rele-
vant facets and groups and categories be named, but also that the names be
inserted into an intelligible, convincing story of how an issue can be ex-
plained. According to Rein and Schön (1994: 26), stories ‘construct a pro-
blem out of the vague and indeterminate reality’. Stone (1989) has elabo-
rated this, explaining the concept of causal story as a narrative about what
causes a problem (responsibility) and the extent to which a problem can be
tamed (control). In this respect – and debates about whether reality is caus-
ally determined aside – it is important that these stories socially construct
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causality in a way that should be comprehensible and convincing rather
than empirically accurate. The stories arise from social struggles over
causality.
Finally, frames are not only about what ‘is’ but also about what ‘ought
to be’. Rein and Schön (1993: 148) label this the ‘normative leap from is
to ought’. Frames, then, influence not only knowledge and understanding,
but also social action. The normative leap will often involve core values
that resonate broadly in society and that can be ‘communicated directly
and simply through image and rhetoric’. Core values include equality,
equity, liberty, progress, solidarity and patriotism (Baumgartner & Jones
1993: 7). Fischer and Forester (1993) posit frames not only as constructing
a reality, but also a call for action upon this reality. This has been referred
to as the performative function of frames. For instance, framing society as
a multicultural society will also appeal to values such as cultural equality
and equity and elicit a call for action to effectuate such values. In contrast,
framing society with values like patriotism compels a vastly different nor-
mative leap from what is to what ought to be.
2.2.3 Frames of immigrant integration
As argued above, there has been a preponderance of studies of ‘national
models of integration’ in contemporary migration literature. In this book,
these models will be conceptualised as ideal-typical frames rather than as
supposedly empirically valid depictions of actual policies. For the empiri-
cal analysis of the attributes of frames of immigrant integration (terminol-
ogy, social classification, causal theories and normative perspective), the
models employed are those developed by Castles and Miller and elaborated
further by Koopmans and Statham. Castles and Miller (1993) distinguish
three models: differentialist, assimilationist and multiculturalist models.
Koopmans and Statham (2000) added a universalist model to this frame-
work. Furthermore, in a recent publication, Castles and Miller (2003) also
distinguish transnationalist and post-nationalist models, which reach be-
yond the scope of the nation-state.
Assimilationism
Assimilationism, together with multiculturalism, is one of the most written
about models of immigrant integration. It has its roots classical sociology
and, in particular, in Park’s Chicago School of Sociology and his race rela-
tions cycle, which distinguishes between several ‘stages’ of assimilation
(Park 1928).
Assimilationism names and frames immigrant integration mainly
through how migrants adopt the culture of native society (Gans 1997; Park
& Burgess 1921). It phrases the problem situation primarily in terms of the
‘social-cultural adaptation’ of immigrants and the preservation of ‘social
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cohesion’. Classifying the groups or categories involved is an inherent di-
lemma in assimilationism. On the one hand, it tends to name groups in cul-
turalist or ethno-cultural terms, as is the case for the German definition of
the national Volksstaat (Brubaker 1992). On the other hand, the identifica-
tion of culturally deviant groups may lead to the reification, rather than
bridging, of cultural differences. This reification can be avoided if immi-
grants are defined using social categories (for instance, as newcomers)
rather than groups. Conversely, public discourse is more likely to empha-
sise ethno-cultural groups. In causal terms, immigrant integration is framed
as a process in which social-cultural adaptation is a condition for preser-
ving national social cohesion, as well as for the amelioration of the social
position of migrants in their new societies. Therefore, migrants should be
willing to adopt national norms and values and national institutions should
be effective in terms of including migrants. Concerning its normative per-
spective, assimilationism frames immigrant integration in terms of national
identity and national social cohesion in relation to the viability of the na-
tional community.
Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is generally posited as the opposite of assimilationism, as
it stresses cultural pluralism and a more culturally neutral, open form of ci-
tizenship (Koopmans & Statham 2000). However, an important point of
convergence between assimilationism and multiculturalism lies in their fo-
cus on the nation-state. In multiculturalist theory, the nation-state is rede-
fined in terms of the recognition of being a multiculturalist state (Vertovec
2001). This is best illustrated by the British form of ‘multiculturalism-on-
one-island’ (Joppke 1999).
Multiculturalism names immigrant integration in terms of cultural diver-
sity and the need for emancipation of groups of varying cultural back-
grounds. Whereas adaptation involves finding commonalities between indi-
viduals in society, multiculturalism searches for compatibilities between
groups and for tolerance of those facets of social life that groups do not
have in common. Groups are socially constructed based on their cultural,
ethnic, religious or racial traits, to name a few. Political theorists Kymlicka
(1995) and Parekh (2000) have argued that accommodation of cultural dif-
ferences between groups may even require the diversification of social and
political rights for distinct groups. The causal theory that underlies most
multiculturalist thinking is that the only way to accommodate cultural plur-
alism is to recognise cultural diversity and to differentiate policies for parti-
cular cultural groups (Taylor 1992). As an example, group-specific policies
have to be developed in various spheres, including general policy spheres
such as education and labour. Finally, multiculturalism contains a norma-
tive perspective that cultural diversity is a value in itself – a facet of the
ongoing process of modernisation – and that government interference
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should be limited (i.e. states should be tolerant) as the cultures themselves
will determine the identities of cultural group members.
Differentialism
The third model, differentialism, is also known as ‘ethnic segregationism’
(Castles & Miller 1993) and it involves the institutionalisation of differ-
ences – in a way, ‘living apart together’. Cultural diversity is institutiona-
lised in the form of parallel societies, similar to the South African apartheid
regime, the Indian caste structure or the Dutch history of pillarisation
(Lijphart 1968). Aside from these radical variants of differentialism, the
model has been applied in more subtle forms, as in the accommodation of
temporary foreign labourers in many Western European countries.
In this model, immigrant integration is named primarily in terms of ac-
commodating differences between groups that are, as much as possible,
autonomous or sovereign within their own community. In fact, the term
‘integration’ is unlikely to be used in this model, as integration is to be
achieved only in those domains where coordination between groups is ne-
cessary. This model classifies migrants in ways that stress their status as
distinct national, ethnic, cultural or religious groups. In Germany, for ex-
ample, migrants have long been labelled ‘Ausländer’, thus being defined
by national origin so as to emphasise their non-German status. The causal
story that underlies differentialism stresses either the absence of a need to
integrate (e.g. because migration is considered temporary) or the unfeasibil-
ity of integration (e.g. because of essential differences between migrants
and natives). In respect to the latter, France has witnessed zealous discus-
sions on the ‘unassimilabilty’ of migrants – Muslim migrants, in particular
– thus advocating differentialist policies similar to those in Germany.
Finally, values and norms found in the differentialist model are not unlike
those of assimilationism. Both favour the idea of organic communities and
stress bonding with the community. In the assimilationist model, this oc-
curs in the national community; with differentialism, bonding occurs with-
in the separate community.
Universalism
Koopmans and Statham (2000) distinguish a ‘universalist’ or ‘civic-repub-
lican’ model that adopts a more liberal egalitarian view on immigrant inte-
gration. It differs from both multiculturalism and assimilationism (espe-
cially in its meaning of acculturation) in that it is not culturalist; the focus
is not on either commonalities or compatibilities between groups in cultural
pluralist societies. In fact, it is adverse to the institutionalisation of both
majority and minority cultures. Civic republicanism is more oriented to-
wards individual citizenship in a (culturally neutral) society.
In this model, immigrant integration is named in colour-blind and indi-
vidualist terms, such as ‘citizenship’ or ‘participation’. Furthermore,
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universalism focuses primarily on the social-economic and political-legal
spheres of integration rather than the social-cultural ones. Culture and reli-
gion are considered issues belonging to the private realm. In the public
realm, stress is put on individual participation in spheres such as labour,
education, housing, health and other colour-blind sectors. Migrants are de-
fined as categories of individuals, for instance, immigrés in France or al-
lochtonen in the Netherlands, thereby letting the culture of these groups
recede into the background. The causal theory underlying universalism
underscores the need for migrants to be able to stand on their own feet as
citizens of society, especially in terms of social-economic participation. In
this respect, combating discrimination and the effectiveness of institutions,
such as education and labour, at including migrants are important issues in
universalism. In normative terms, universalism contains a liberal egalitarian
perspective on society, whose core values are good citizenship and
equality.
Transnationalism and post-nationalism
In contrast to the models described thus far, transnationalism and post-na-
tionalism do not focus primarily on the nation-state. Nonetheless, these
models can be used by actors to frame how migrants are to be incorporated
into society. Transnationalism links migration and integration to the pro-
cess of internationalisation, studying, for instance, the formation of transna-
tional migration ‘bridges’ and the formation of transnational migrant com-
munities (Faist 2000; Kivisto 2001). This is manifested in areas like the
common European migration policy that has been formulated over the past
decades. Post-nationalism represents a more cosmopolitan school of
thought, linking migration and integration to globalisation, including dis-
cussions of the transformative effects on nation-states (Jacobson 1996;
Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994).
These models often name and frame integration in non-national terms,
such as transnational or post-national citizenship. Moreover, they often
stress transnational developments such as links between countries of origin
and destination and the development of a universal human rights discourse.
Migrants are defined in terms of groups extending beyond the scope of
one national state, such as transnational communities that straddle two
worlds, or as universal categories, such as universal personhood. Types of
causal theories developed in these models include ideas that migration is
posing a challenge to the nation-state and that new (non-national) modes
of integration are being invented. Through these perspectives, immigrant
integration generally also involves the adaptation of national society and
its central institutions to the emergent realities of cultural diversity and mi-
gration. For example, the models challenge dominant ideas about national
citizenship, questioning the issue of exclusive loyalty to one nation.
Finally, the normative perspective of transnationalism and post-nationalism
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is oriented towards internationalisation and globalisation as facets of the
normative process of the modernisation of societies. Concerns about migra-
tion and integration are simply manifestations of the process.
2.3 The research-policy nexus
The social construction of problems is considered inherently related to the
situational setting in which framing takes place. This book focuses pre-
cisely on the nexus between immigrant integration research and policy as
part of that structural setting. Required thus is a placement of problem
framing in the context of the structural setting of social relations within
and between research and policy. Or, to use Gusfield’s (1980) terms, we
have to pay attention to the culture and structure of public problems – in
this case, the structure of research, policy and their relations.
2.3.1 Social research and policymaking as fields
From a structuralist-constructivist perspective, both social-scientific re-
search and policymaking are defined as fields of structured social relations
(Bourdieu 1975, 2004; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). The actors’ positions
and the rules of the game within a field involve distributions of power –
‘capital’ – among actors. This can involve economic capital (resources), as
well as social capital (networks), cultural capital (knowledge) and symbolic
capital (authority, legitimacy) (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 17). According
to Bourdieu, the distribution of capital defines a field’s structure, as it de-
termines the distribution of positions among actors and determines the
rules of the game. From this point of view, a field is not a level playing
field: it contains a specific distribution of capital. For instance, in his study
of intellectuals, Bourdieu (1988) shows how actors are driven by the deter-
mination to distinguish their position as intellectuals from other actors
(non-intellectuals) and define the rules of being a good intellectual in such
a way that it provides them with symbolic capital (authority) within the
structure of the intellectual field.
Field structures are inherently dynamic. They provide spaces of conflict
and competition that advocate change as well as stability. Some actors will
be driven to change a field structure, while others will be more inclined to
reproduce it, depending on the distribution of capital within. Some actors
will be driven to construct a field structure so that it includes and excludes
specific actors. Thus, the boundaries between one field structure and that
of other fields are constantly at stake within the field itself (Bourdieu &
Wacquant 1992: 97-104).
It is important to note that, from a structuralist-constructivist point of
view, field structures do not exist beyond the actors in a field. Rather, ‘it is
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in the relationship between the various agents that the field and the rela-
tions of force that characterise it, are generated’ (Bourdieu 2004: 33). This
means that a field structure is not seen as an exogenous constraint on actor
relations, but as their endogenous product. Field structures constrain and
enable social relations through what Bourdieu (1988) describes as rela-
tively enduring dispositions – the ‘habitus’ of actors. Habitus does not in-
volve a form of conscious rule-following but rather, a sort of ‘feeling’ or
‘sense for the game’. It is in the regularities of the actors’ habitus that field
structures exist. Furthermore, the habitus reflects the capital an actor pos-
sesses. For instance, becoming an ‘intellectual’ would require an intensive
conversion of economic capital (resources, time) into social, cultural and
symbolic capital in order to obtain a position within the intellectual field
and to get a sense of the game. Once such a position within the field is ob-
tained, the habitus of the actor will constrain inclinations to transform the
field structure in a way that would produce negative outcomes in terms of
the distribution of capital.
In this way, the field perspective shifts attention from how actors within
these fields frame issues, such as immigrant integration, to their habitus,
their structural positions and their affinity to the rules of doing research
and making policies. The habitus and accompanying field structures can
only be established through empirical analysis of the actual social relations
or practices of the actors within both fields. They cannot be assumed as is
the case in objectivist analyses, or ignored as occurs in relativist analyses.
The focus is on scientific research and policymaking as ‘crafts’ or ‘arts’
(ibid.: 38).
The pure universe of even the purest science is a social field like
any other, with its distribution of power and its monopolies, its
struggles and strategies, interests and profits, but it is a field in
which all these invariants take on specific forms. […] As a system
of objective relations between positions already won (in previous
struggles), the scientific field is the locus of competitive struggle, in
which the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific
authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity and social
power, or, to put in another way, the monopoly of scientific compe-
tence, in the sense of a particular agent’s socially recognized capa-
city to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an authorized an authorita-
tive way) in scientific matters. (Bourdieu 1975: 19)
The policy and research fields are characterised by their own distinct forms
of capital, often described as political capital and scientific capital (ibid.:
34). Both are forms of symbolic capital that require recognising the author-
ity and legitimacy of actors to make policies or to be recognised as ‘scien-
tific’. As forms of symbolic capital, they are ‘based on knowledge and
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recognition […] which functions as a form of credit, presupposing the trust
or belief of those who undergo it because they are disposed to give credit,
belief’ (ibid.). Depending on a field structure, some actors will be more ef-
fective in terms of defining scientific and political capital in a way that
works in their favour. Or, there will be those ‘who manage to impose the
definition of science that says what the most accomplished realization of
science consists in having, being and doing what they have, are and do’
(ibid.: 63). As such, policy and research can be perceived as a ‘structured
field of forces’, characterised by ‘struggles to conserve or transform this
field of forces’ (Bourdieu 2004: 33). In other words, ‘the definition of what
is at stake in the scientific struggle is one of the things at stake in the
scientific struggle’ ibid.: 63).
This structuralist-constructivist perspective on research and policy also
involves a structuralist-constructivist perspective on how problems are
framed or how ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ are produced within these fields.
Truth is defined in relational terms, which means that what passes as objec-
tive knowledge is what gets defined as such in the context of the structure
and the distribution of power in a field. ‘The objective truth of the product –
even in the case of that very particular product, scientific truth – lies in a
particular type of social conditions of production, or, more precisely, in a
determinate state of the structure and functioning of the scientific field’
(Bourdieu 1975: 19). The epistemological and social characteristics of
knowledge production are considered inherently entwined. ‘Epistemological
rules are nothing other than the social rules and regularities inscribed in
structures and/or in habitus, particular as regards the way of conducting a
discussion […] and settling conflict’ (Bourdieu 2004: 71). Thus, struggles
over the structure of field structures are considered inherently related to
struggles over what is framed as ‘the truth’ within these fields.
2.3.2 The co-evolution of research and policy
Fields are inherently dynamic, as the positions in a field and its rules of
the game are constantly at stake. Moreover, the dynamics in field structures
are related to the dynamics in other fields. Bourdieu argues that changes in
a field structure may be difficult to achieve from within because the posi-
tions and rules that define it carry a particular distribution of capital that
tends to resist change. Interaction with other fields therefore constitutes an
important driver of changes in a field structure. There are, however, no
‘transhistoric laws of relations between fields’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant
1992: 109-110). The connections between fields must be studied empiri-
cally by analysing the actual social relations among the actors from the
fields in question.
The theoretical notion of ‘boundary work’ was coined by the institu-
tional sociology of sciences to refer to social practices occurring on the
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boundaries of fields. Stressed is the fact that these boundaries are not a gi-
ven. Examined here is how actors create social boundaries in their social
practices to distinguish one field (its structural positions, rules of the game
and species of capital) from others. Gieryn (1983: 782) defined boundary
work as the attribution of ‘selected characteristics to the institution of
science (i.e. to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and
work organisation) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that dis-
tinguishes some intellectual activities as “non-science”’. This notion allows
for an empiricist study of relations between fields, studying actual bound-
ary work practices instead of doing boundary work with ex ante models or
‘laws’ governing relations between fields such as science and policy.
However, boundary work is more than a recognition of fields through a
distinguishing of field structures. It does not simply mean dividing up
fields like science and politics to different degrees, as the somewhat one-
dimensional term ‘boundary’ may suggest. Shapin (1992) and Halffman
(2003) have drawn attention to the dual nature of boundary work as some-
thing that requires not only delineating fields, but also coordinating their
mutual relationship – a coordination that will necessarily result in the de-
marcation of roles and tasks. Elaborating on a definition from Shapin
(1992: 335), Halffman (2003: 241) defines boundary work as follows:
Boundary work defines a practice in contrast with other practices,
protects it from unwanted participants and interference, while at-
tempting to prescribe proper ways of behaviour for participants and
non-participants (demarcation); simultaneously, boundary work de-
fines proper ways for interaction between these practices and makes
such interaction possible and conceivable (coordination).
Whereas Shapin and Halffman refer to boundary work as the demarcation
and coordination of practices, this book slightly adapts the definition to ap-
ply to the demarcation and coordination of fields. The structuralist-con-
structivist perspective adopted here focuses more on the structural proper-
ties of fields and their relations (such as cause and effect) to how bound-
aries with other fields are constructed. Shapin and Halffman have a more
symbolic-interactionist conception of boundary work, although they do
(more so than Gieryn) extend their analysis of boundary work beyond the
realm of discourse.
Boundary work reveals an important facet of the transformation of field
structures precisely by demarcating and coordinating relations with other
fields. In this context, much has been written about the co-production or
co-evolution of science and politics (Ezrahi 1990; Jasanoff 2004;
Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons 2001; Shapin & Schaffer 1985). Nowotny et
al. (2001: 245) referenced the increasing transgression of science-politics
boundaries and the contextualisation of science, which means that science
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not only speaks to society but society also speaks back to science.
According to Shapin and Shaffer (1985: 332), there is a ‘conditional rela-
tionship between the nature of the polity occupied by scientific intellectuals
and the nature of the wider polity’. Ezrahi (1990) has described the rise of
modern science in relation to modern societies’ growing demands as an in-
strumental means to sustain administrative control; in this regard, science
is an important political resource for depersonalising and depoliticising
ideological state control, thereby legitimising modern liberal democratic
politics.
In this context, Bourdieu points to the conversion of scientific capital
into other sorts of capital in the relations between the fields of research
and policy. This concerns a conversion into economic, social or cultural ca-
pital (Bourdieu 1975: 25), as well as other sorts of symbolic capital
(Bourdieu 2004: 55). Apart from ‘strictly scientific authority’ (Bourdieu
1975: 57), there would also be scientific capital that is more profoundly re-
lated to other sorts of capital, or capital that involves ‘power over the
scientific world which can be accumulated through channels that are not
purely scientific [...] and which is the bureaucratic principle of temporal
powers over the scientific field such as those of ministers and ministries,
deans and vice chancellors or scientific administrators’ (ibid.). This can re-
fer to, for example, the accumulation of scientific capital through the ac-
quisition of research funding or a scientific expert exercising policy influ-
ence rather than performing scientific research.
Organisations that have found a niche in the interaction between the
fields of scientific research and policy often play a central role in the
boundary work and co-evolution of these fields. These ‘boundary organisa-
tions’ (Guston 2000; Miller 2001) can come in many shapes and sizes, in-
cluding think tanks (Stone 1998) and so-called ‘universities without stu-
dents’ (Weaver 1989), as well as certain foundations with combined social
and scientific purposes, private consultancy firms or government contrac-
tors, government research bureaus (Stone & Garnett 1998) and advocacy
think tanks (Abelson 2002). Though these organisations are often portrayed
as ‘bridges’ or ‘transmission belts’ between research and policy, they gen-
erally take a more active role (and interest) in boundary work. They are
generally hybrids of the structures of both fields, combining elements of
both science and politics (Miller 2001). However, they derive much of
their credibility from clearly demarcating science and politics and by posi-
tioning themselves somewhere in between.
Their credibility is grounded in the ‘two worlds’ metaphor. [...] [I]t
is in the interest of think-tanks in general to maintain the myth of
the distinction between knowledge and scholarship on the one hand,
and politics, policy and interests on the other. If policy research in-
stitutes are ‘above’ politics they are not a threat to democracy.
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Portrayed passively as a bridge or a transmission belt from the scho-
larly domain, the metaphor of two worlds gives them a safe distance
from politics and protects their credibility and charitable status.
(Stone 1998: 121)
Boundary organisations are able to occupy this niche because they have a
capacity to convert scientific and political capital. They often hold posi-
tions within both fields and also must find ways to functionally blur the
rules of the game within both fields in a way that allows for interaction be-
tween them. For instance, a scientific advisory body has to possess author-
ity in both politics and science in order to be able to provide counsel that
is considered simultaneously useful in politics and credible in science.
Internally, boundary work also involves a degree of balancing, in an effort
to maintain authority within both fields. In relation to the broader fields of
research and policy, boundary organisations can constitute an important
part of the institutionalisation of the research-policy nexus. Every boundary
organisation will adopt a particular method for demarcating and coordinat-
ing research and policy that, once the boundary organisation is established,
tends to institutionalise. Clearly, in this process of institutionalisation,
boundary organisations not only play a central role in research-policy rela-
tions, but also in organising them.
2.3.3 Boundary configurations of the research-policy nexus
Similar to the structures of fields, the research-policy nexus – or ‘boundary
configuration’ – will have its own structural distribution of positions and
roles on both sides of the boundary, as well as its own structural rules of
the game concerning relations across the boundary. As such, a boundary
configuration structures the interaction between fields in a highly specific
manner, giving primacy to actors on either side of the boundary and divid-
ing their roles in various ways.
Structural patterns organise research-policy relations in a way that puts
primacy on the side of either research or policy. An array of models has
been described in the literature in which either science or politics has rela-
tive primacy. For example, Weber (Weber, Owen, Strong & Livingstone
2004) was very clear on the political primacy in science-policy relations.
The task of the expert – generating knowledge – is distinctly separated
from the task of the politician – deciding what to do with knowledge.
Political decision-making involves choices in terms of values, goals and
needs, which cannot be left to the rationality of the expert. Rather, science
is drawn into the political administration dichotomy as a service of the ra-
tional development of policies based on politically set goals and values; it
is politics ‘on top’ and science ‘on tap’. This model has been described as
the decisionistic model, as science helps politics make decisions.
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Habermas (in Outhwaite 1996) has a very different conception of the re-
lationship between science and policy, which is closer to the traditional
model of ‘science speaking truth to power’. He claims that, in modern so-
ciety, this relationship is often structured in such a way that the rationality
of the expert dominates political decision-making and reduces value
choices and goal-setting to technical and rational issues. This has been de-
scribed as the technocratic model. In a technocracy, the politician ‘becomes
the mere agent of a scientific intelligentsia, which [...] elaborates the objec-
tive implications and requirements of available techniques and resources as
well as of optimal strategies and rules of control,’ leaving the politician
‘with nothing but a fictitious decision-making power’ (ibid.). According to
Habermas, science has thus taken over relative primacy from politics.
Besides distributing relative primacy through their structure, boundary
configurations have intrigue a number of sociologists, scientists and policy
scientists for another reason. The structure of research-policy boundaries
also involves specific rules concerning mutual relations – ‘conditions of
exchange’ (Halffman 2003: 64). These conditions are not separate from the
distribution of primacy, though they can be analytically distinguished.
According to Wittrock (1991: 336), they are inherently connected to how
research and policy are demarcated in patterns of boundary work: ‘Any
conceptualisation of [the research-policy] relationship ultimately rests on
an assumption about the analogy between the operational modes of the
realms of research and of policy’. Thus, depending on their demarcation,
boundary configurations can involve rules of the game that establish a
sharp division of labour between research and policy, or rules of the game
that bring about more convergence in the roles of research and policy.
Therefore, the rules structure either a divergence or convergence between
the roles.
This focus on how the demarcation of research-policy relations are insti-
tutionalised in the rules of the game extends to the models of boundary
configurations developed by Weber and Habermas. Weber’s decisionistic
or ‘bureaucratic’ model not only assumes political primacy, but also as-
sumes clear-cut rules concerning the division of labour between research
and policy. In this model, research would be drawn into the fact-value di-
chotomy that is also applied in the relationship between administration and
politics, with science in the role of producing the facts and politics in the
role of determining political values. In Habermas’ technocratic model, the
operational modes of science and politics are assumed to be more analo-
gous or diffusely demarcated; science not only deals with the facts but also
with values and, as such, it determines the political decision-making pro-
cess. This means that in their theoretical conceptualisation of boundary
configurations, the bureaucratic and technocratic models seem to be oppo-
sites in terms of the distribution of relative primacy, as well as the structur-
al conditions of exchange.
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In addition to Habermas’ technocratic model (scientific primacy, conver-
gence) and Weber’s bureaucratic model (political primacy, divergence),
two other models of boundary configurations can be noted as possible the-
oretical combinations of primacy distribution and conditions of exchange.
Wittrock (1991) and Hoppe (2005) have further distinguished an enlighten-
ment model (scientific primacy, divergence) and an engineering model (po-
litical primacy, convergence) to offer other logical possibilities, which are
depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1 Theoretical models of boundary configurations, based on Wittrock (1991)
and Hoppe (2005)
Coordination of field relations
Scientific primacy Political primacy
Demarcation
of field
structures
Divergence Enlightenment model Bureaucratic model
Convergence Technocratic model Engineering model
Enlightenment
In the enlightenment model, the research-policy nexus is structured in a
way that establishes scientific primacy and sees divergence between the
roles of scientific research and policy. It closely resembles the standard
model of science, in which science is considered ‘exceptional’ because of
its objective norms and methods. It contains a modernist hope that science
will ‘enlighten’ supposedly irrational politics and policies. Science is to be
as autonomous as possible, and policy development should be rationalised
through its reliance on scientific evidence instead of political argument.
In this model, the sharp demarcation of science and policy also implies
an absence of any pronounced institutional relationships. This means, on
the one hand, an absence of policy interference in the field of research; the
boundary between research and policy is heavily protected so as to main-
tain scientific autonomy. On the other hand, research is not directly in-
volved in the field of policymaking; rather, the pervasive rationalisation of
science will be largely indirect, through what Weiss (1977, 1991) has
called a gradual ‘knowledge creep’. That is, scientific knowledge finding
its way into all facets of society. Scientific advisors, in this respect, are
meant to speed up the diffusion process in the direction of government and
politics.
These conditions of exchange in favour of protecting scientific autono-
my are strongly connected to the distribution of primacy. The focus on
autonomy reveals a value orientation that contains a fervent belief in scien-
tific rationality and progress. Science is expected to deliver the conceptual
and analytical tools as well as the technologies that steer policy and poli-
tics so as to, in turn, ‘tame’ the irrationality of politics. Thus, the rules
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concerning a sharp division of labour are clearly related to the idea of an
enlightenment based on scientific research that is credible and independent.
Technocracy
As with the enlightenment model, science also enjoys relative primacy in
the technocratic model, which posits that government and politics should
be rationalised by science. However, the conditions of exchange between
research and policy are more lenient in the technocratic model, creating a
setting of convergence between the two domains. Technocracy involves
scientists playing a direct role in policy development by virtually (possibly
even literally) taking over the tasks of policymakers and politicians. In this
respect, the technocratic model not only asserts that science ‘speaks the
truth’, mirroring the enlightenment model, but also that science actually
‘speaks truth to power’ (Wildavsky 1979). For instance, scientific policy
advice becomes more than a mechanism to speed up ‘enlightenment’; it is
also a mechanism for scientists to be more directly involved in policy
design.
In this model, the research-policy nexus not only protects scientific
autonomy (for speaking the truth), but also encourages involvement of
science in the practice of policymaking and political decision-making.
Rather than remaining in its ivory tower, science is meant to come down
and translate its knowledge into policy practice. The development of a
markedly institutionalised research-policy nexus can be an important mani-
festation of such structural convergence. Furthermore, this structural con-
vergence is aimed at establishing scientific primacy, as technocracy con-
tains a strong belief in the development of rational policies based on scien-
tific rather than political involvement.
Bureaucracy
In the bureaucratic model, policy – or rather politics – retains its primacy.
It is politics that decides what values and goals are set and how they are to
be pursued in government policies. The bureaucratic model consists of
clear-cut rules concerning the division of labour between scientific research
and policy, defining the role of research as the production of facts and data
as input for the political decision-making process. This way of creating di-
vergence between the roles of research and policy is also meant to safe-
guard against a technocratic reduction of value choices to mere technical-
scientific resolutions; politics should have primacy in dealing with norma-
tive issues.
A strong emphasis on political primacy in the bureaucratic model is
compelled by the fact-value dichotomy that rules the exchange between re-
search and policy. Another structural condition for exchange between re-
search and policy in this model is that scientific research will often be
drawn into the government administrative apparatus. On the one hand, this
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means that a firm institutional nexus between research and policy is cre-
ated, for instance, in the form of a system of advisory bodies and planning
offices closely associated with, or even part of, government. On the other
hand, the fact-value dichotomy will remain an important condition for ex-
change between research and policy; instrumental research in this model is
necessarily drawn into the politics-administration dichotomy. As with pub-
lic administration, scientific research has to be responsive to the primacy
of politics and refrain from normative involvement in policymaking, which
is primarily the responsibility of politics.
Engineering
Finally, the engineering model also involves political primacy, allthough it
defines the roles of research and policy in a more convergent way. As in
the bureaucratic model, here it is ‘politics on top and science on tap’.
However, in the engineering model the fact-value dichotomy does not offer
the possibility for exchange between research and policy. Rather, scientific
research can be involved in the rational design of policies and the rational
resolution of policy problems in a way that will also involve inherently
normative facets. ‘Engineering’ is an apt name for the model because
science becomes more closely involved in the rational engineering of so-
ciety based on political priorities (in contrast to the technocratic model,
where society is structured according to scientific beliefs).
Whereas the conditions for exchange in the engineering model involve
more convergence between the roles of research and policy than in the bu-
reaucratic model, the nexus between research and policy will be less insti-
tutionalised. In this case, the institutional relations between government or
politics and scientific recommendations can be described as a principle-
agent relationship, in which the principle decides and the agent is deployed
in service of the principle. Salter and Levy (1998) refer to this type of
scientific research, which is produced in this model of boundary configura-
tion, as ‘mandated science’. Here, politics selects or commissions those
models of scientific expertise that are considered useful. In the engineering
model, research often acquires a prominent role in social engineering; how-
ever, the relations between research and policy tend to be provisional.
Depending on the prevailing political values and goals, different sources of
expertise can be mobilised; therefore politics as a principle can, at any
time, change its dealings with specific agents.
2.4 Research-policy dialogues and critical frame reflection
Boundary configurations have various effects on the framing of issues like
immigrant integration. They can either sustain or challenge the structural
monopolies or ‘iron triangles’ within both fields (Heclo 1978), for instance,
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perpetuating a specific policy or research paradigm. They can also help
create the structural conditions within research and policy that allow parti-
cular frames to emerge. However, research-policy dialogues do not neces-
sarily involve the critical frame reflection that, according to Rein and
Schön (1994), is required for resolving intractable controversies such as
immigrant integration. In fact, the literature is rather sceptical about possi-
bilities for reflection on frames in general, particularly about frame reflec-
tion in dialogues between research and policy. This book has thus chosen
to examine, from a structuralist-constructivist perspective, how structures
of the research-policy nexus have influenced frameshifts and problem
framing in research and policy, and to what extent this involved frame
reflection.
2.4.1 Intractable controversies, frameshifts and frame reflection
Rein and Schön (1994: 4, 1996: 240) refer to ‘intractable controversies’ as
being those situations that are characterised by a multiplicity of frames or
‘multiple social realities’. Intractable controversies involve ‘frame con-
flicts’, or ‘struggles over the naming and framing of a policy situation [...]
symbolic contests over the social meaning of an issue domain, where
meaning implies not only what is at issue but what is to be done’ (Rein &
Schön 1994: 29). Such frame conflicts differ fundamentally from disagree-
ments about more structured problems, or problems that are characterised
by a general agreement about ‘problem framing’ (Hisschemöller & Hoppe
1995). They defy resolution by merely studying ‘the facts’, because actors
with their own unique frames tend to select different sorts of factual evi-
dence and, even if they agree on a selection, tend to interpret it differently.
For instance, the relevance of factual evidence on the educational achieve-
ments of migrants depends on the relevance of education as a sphere of in-
tegration in a specific frame. In addition, evidence about educational
achievements can still be interpreted in many ways, for example, as an in-
dication of migrants’ progress over time or as an indication of persisting
relative deprivation in comparison to other social categories.
Frameshifts, then, involve fundamental changes in how actors define
and understand problem situations. They constitute ‘reality shifts’ (Fischer
2003: 155), rather than merely different ways of perceiving a problem.
Social science literature is brimming with references to the difficulties of
achieving such frameshifts. For instance, both Hall and Sabatier question
the capacity of individuals to become aware, reflect on or even alter their
most fundamental beliefs, as this would be similar to religious conversion.
They believe that ‘learning’ on a cognitive level could only lead to rela-
tively minor adjustments of frames (Hall 1993; Sabatier 1987; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123). Frameshifts, rather, would be the consequence
of changes in the institutional context or, as Sabatier describes them,
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‘external perturbations’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 118), involving
broader cultural changes (‘mood swings’), social-economic developments,
political shifts and constitutional changes. These institutional changes
would lead to frameshifts by changing the power relations (distribution of
resources, capital) between actors with different frames, rather than bring-
ing about mere awareness of different frames. Agenda-setting theory is also
rather sceptical of opportunities for actors to become aware of their tacit
frames. It hypothesises frameshifts as the consequence of agenda-setting,
something which, according to Baumgartner and Jones (2002: 15-23), is
achieved primarily by shifting attention to other problem facets, rather than
by reflecting on a frame (attention shifts or non-contradictory argumenta-
tion) or through the social process of mimicking (unreflectively adopting
the ideas of others). Agenda-setting theory also refers to the relevance of
the aforementioned ‘external perturbations’, such as the occurrence of fo-
cus events (Kingdon 1995: 94).
In contrast, Rein and Schön (1994: 37) believe that actors can become
aware of their own frames and critically reflect on them. This calls for cri-
tical reflection on a frame’s internal consistence and coherence, as well as
on its relationship to developments in a problem situation and to society at
large. Actors therefore would be able to reflect critically on the extent to
which their frame offers a convincing story about a problem situation,
whether it fits the evidence and whether it gels with the broader normative
perspective.
Starting with the analysis of controversy as frame conflict, we pro-
pose that human beings can reflect on and learn about the game of
policymaking even as they play it, and, more specifically, that they
are capable of reflecting in action on the frame conflicts that under-
lie controversies and account for their intractability. In our view,
human beings are capable of exploring how their own actions may
exacerbate contention, contribute to stalemate, and trigger extreme
pendulum swings, or, on the contrary, how their actions might help
to resolve the frame conflicts that underlie stubborn policy disputes.
We believe that hope for human reason in the chaotic, conflictual
world of policy-making lies in a view of policy rationality that gives
a central place to this human capability for reflection ‘within the
game’. (ibid.: 37-38)
Frame reflection is, according to Rein and Schön, always ‘situated’. This
means that there is no universal law for how frame reflection can be
achieved. How and to what extent it can be achieved will depend on the
institutional setting (situational context). Thus, frame reflection could lead
to the ‘situated resolution of frame controversies’ (ibid.: 176). Such a belief
marks the difference between relativist approaches that discard the
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possibility of frame reflection and objectivist approaches that see framing
as a consequence of structural developments rather than reflection. It also
deviates from Habermas’ (in Outhwaite 1996) perspective on how to
achieve reflection beyond relativism and objectivism by establishing a so-
called ideal-free speech situation in which a power-free social context is
created in order to reflect on frames. Indeed, Rein and Schön believe that
frame reflection must be achieved within the structural setting of a problem
situation, rather than by creating a setting that is removed from the actual
structural setting of the actors involved.
2.4.2 Boundary configurations and frameshifts
Boundary configurations can contribute to frameshifts through their effect
on the field structures of social science research and policymaking. These
field structures provide the structural setting in which problems are framed.
Boundary configurations can contribute to change by reinforcing either the
pressure to enforce stability or the pressure to enforce change. Baumgartner
and Jones (1993: 19) have referred to situations in which field structures
manage to reproduce themselves as ‘structure-induced equilibria’. They
emphasise how these equilibria are ‘structure-induced’ in that they are con-
sequences of historically developed structures that resist change. This can
involve lock-in effects of past developments or path dependency (Pierson
1994), as well as the structural distribution of specific species capital that
generates interests for at least some of the actors in preserving the prevail-
ing structure (Baumgartner & Jones 1993: 19; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:
105). For instance, once a particular boundary configuration is institutiona-
lised and has created subsequent boundary organisations, the organisations
will have an interest in preserving this configuration in order to maintain
their structural position.
By reinforcing such structure-induced equilibria, boundary configura-
tions can generate ‘negative feedback’ in relation to the ongoing dynamics
in field structures (Baumgartner & Jones 1993: 16). This means that the
ongoing dynamics is affected in a way that inhibits change and induces sta-
bility. For example, this may occur when research-policy relations give le-
gitimacy to established policy institutes or when policy institutes fund es-
tablished research institutes. However, boundary configurations can also in-
fluence the dynamics in a field by mobilising ‘positive feedback’ (ibid.).
Positive feedback means that ongoing dynamics are affected in a way that
promotes change and challenges the status quo. There are no universal
laws for how and when the research-policy nexus could or should contri-
bute to negative or positive feedback. Its role in field dynamics is highly
dependent on the structural setting of ongoing dynamics in the fields and,
of course, on the structure of the research-policy nexus.
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In structuralist-constructivist as well as institutionalist literature, it has
been observed that structural patterns of negative feedback in support of
structure-induced equilibria tend to be occasionally interrupted by positive
feedback and dramatic breakthroughs. Institutionalists have argued that
once negative feedback mechanisms are disrupted, change will occur in a
‘ruptured manner’ that is ‘episodic and dramatic, responding to institu-
tional change at the macro level, rather than incremental and smooth’
(Powell & DiMaggio 1991: 10-11). This pattern of punctuated equilibrium
with episodes of relative stability as well as ruptures of dramatic change
has been described in terms of ‘punctuations’ (Baumgartner & Jones 1993)
or ‘paradigm shifts’ (Hall 1993). Although such a pattern has been ob-
served primarily in studies of policy developments, it can reasonably be
extended to the study of research developments, at least from a structural-
ist-constructivist perspective that defines both policy and research as fields
of structured social relations.
By affecting the field structures of research and policy, boundary config-
urations will affect the structural setting in which problem framing takes
place. As such, they not only contribute to the structural conditions for fra-
meshifts, but also to the structural conditions for the emergence of specific
problem frames. As Schattschneider (1960: 71-73) has observed, every
structure or every form of organisation necessitates a ‘mobilisation of bias’.
Thus, any way of changing a field’s structure also involves a change in this
selective mobilisation of bias.
Baumgartner and Jones further developed this idea of selective mobilisa-
tion of bias in their conception of how problem images interact with parti-
cular institutional venues. Their central premise is that some structural set-
tings are more susceptible to some frames than others. As such, actors will
seek those structural settings that are most receptive to their frames. This
has been described in the literature as ‘venue shopping’ (Baumgartner,
Green-Pedersen & Jones 2006; Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Guiraudon
2000a; Pralle 2003). Thus, venue shopping can motivate actors in either re-
search or policy to seek access to the other field when the field structure is
considered more receptive to a specific problem frame. For instance, re-
searchers who are relatively marginalised in the scientific field can seek
support from policymakers if they think their ideas match those of particu-
lar actors in the policy field. Moreover, actors can try to change the struc-
ture of their fields so that it becomes more receptive to their frames.
However, as observed earlier, such structural changes are also often
achieved through interaction with other fields, rather than as a consequence
of internal changes. In both respects, boundary configurations can play an
important role in searching for structural settings that are receptive to spe-
cific frames.
Although, again, there is no universal law for how and why structural
settings promote problem framing, there have been numerous studies about
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how different structural boundary configurations can affect problem fram-
ing. Nelkin (1979) observed how structural settings with deep policy invol-
vement by researchers, or even those that limit participation to a network
of researchers, tend to create technical-scientific problem frames. This
would have occurred notably in the domain of environmental policies,
where technical matters often dominate regulatory policies, thus obscuring
ethical aspects of the environment.
Regarding migration and immigrant integration, Guiraudon (1997) has
drawn attention to a correlation between the scale of the debate on these is-
sues and the extent to which frames were adopted that supported the exten-
sion of migrant rights. Experts and research institutes often limited the
scale of debate, which – thanks to the lack of much mass media or political
attention – facilitated the extension of migrant rights. The same would ap-
ply for administrative bodies and legal venues that limited participation.
Guiraudon (2000a) also showed how national governments ‘shopped’ for
intergovernmental venues on a European level, seeking to get their ideas
on restrictive immigration policies accepted beyond the influence of na-
tional venues that might have opposed such policies.
2.4.3 Frame reflection
Boundary configurations may contribute to frameshifts and problem fram-
ing, but this does not necessarily involve frame reflection. Rein and Schön
(1994: 37) believe that actors are able to reflect on their usually tacit
frames in actual social practices. They believe that ‘hope for human reason
in the chaotic, conflicting world of policy-making lies in a view of policy
rationality that gives a central place to this human capability to reflection
“within the game”’ (ibid.: 338). While they focus primarily on reflection in
policy practices, Bourdieu (2004) looks more to reflexivity in the scientific
enterprise. This refers to ‘the systematic exploration of the unthought cate-
gories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought
as well as guide the practically carrying out of the social inquiry’
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 40). Along with Rein and Schön, Bourdieu
refers to reflecting on structures or institutions as well as reflecting on the
framing of reality, or as Bourdieu and Wacquant (ibid.) describe it in the
context of the scientific field: ‘the collective scientific unconsciousness em-
bedded in theories, problems and (especially national) categories of scho-
larly judgement’.
From a structuralist-constructivist perspective, these scholars have dis-
cussed the structural conditions for achieving reflectivity. In scientific stu-
dies, Bourdieu has pointed to how structural dependencies between the
scientific field (or the academic/intellectual field) and developments in
other fields have obstructed reflexivity or the progress of scientific reason.
Throughout his work, there has been expression of a particular concern
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regarding the autonomy of the scientific field. Within well-articulated bor-
ders, emphasising control over entry and the logic of the scientific field,
Bourdieu (2004: 54) argues as follows:
The fact that producers tend to have as their clients only their most
rigorous and vigorous competitors, the most competent and the
most critical, those therefore inclined and most able to give their
critique full force, is for me the Archimedean point on which one
can stand to give a scientific account of scientific reason, to rescue
scientific reason from relativist reduction and explain how science
can constantly progress towards more rationality without having to
appeal to some kind of founding miracle.
Rein and Schön (1994: 176) have given further thought to how to achieve
such critical reflection. They argue that frame reflection could lead to what
they call the ‘situated resolution of frame controversies. Frame reflection
would thus most likely be achieved within a situational setting charac-
terised by ‘design rationality’ (Rein & Schön 1994: 166-187). Several
structural conditions can be derived from their discussion of design ration-
ality, that would lead to critical frame reflection.
Firstly, Rein and Schön (ibid.: 182) posit a communicative imperative.
This means that actors involved in a disagreement must be willing and able
to communicate openly with one another, and should not exclude specific
actors from the frame conversation. Frame reflection must therefore be an
open social process. Secondly, actors must be able to identify alternative
frames and try to understand how actors within such frames make sense of
problem situations (ibid.: 176). This means that they must be capable of
empathy. Thirdly, actors must become aware of their own frames, possibly
in interaction with the identification of alternative frames (ibid.: 174). This
creates the possibility to reflect critically on one’s own frame and to search
for possible design flaws, such as internal inconsistencies or incoherencies
within that frame. The same applies to incompatibilities with new informa-
tion or knowledge of problem developments that may contradict a frame.
Fourthly, actors must not only reflect on their own frames and alternative
frames, but also be willing and able to act when design flaws are traced or
when the confrontation with alternative frames produces undesirable results
(ibid.: 186). This requires a certain pragmatism – not in terms of the fram-
ing itself but of an unbiased willingness to adapt one’s frame if necessary.
Finally, frame reflection usually requires mutual trust (ibid.: 179). Without
trust, necessary capacities such as communication, empathy, being able to
correct one’s own frames and pragmatism are unlikely to thrive.
In sum, boundary configurations can contribute to frame reflection by
satisfying these five structural conditions – openness, empathy to alterna-
tives, critical reflection, pragmatism and trust. This means that to achieve
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critical research-policy dialogues, research must extend its role beyond that
of the traditional model of ‘speaking truth to power’, in which researchers
dictate how problems are framed. In addition, politics must move beyond
the positivist belief in scientific truth as well as the relativist predicament
that science is nothing but politics by other means. Rather, to achieve
frame reflection, scientific research should help politics make sense of the
issues (Hoppe 1999; Rein & Schön 1996). Instead of producing knowledge
that is robust in its scientific methodological foundation, research has to
produce ‘socially robust knowledge’ that is founded on critical debates
about problem framing (Nowotny et al. 2001: 166).
2.5 Research design
As already stated, this book takes an empiricist approach to research-policy
relations and problem framing. It empirically studies boundary work and
boundary configurations rather than doing boundary work and constructing
boundary configurations. This epistemology emanates from the structural-
ist-constructivist perspective, which focuses on how actors make sense of
research-policy relations in actual social practices and how they make
sense of problem situations within specific structural settings of social
relations.
This book avoids an ex ante theoretical position concerning the framing
of immigrant integration. It takes a step back from the ongoing controver-
sies over the framing of this issue to analyse instead controversies over
problem framing. It is not the framing of immigrant integration that is the
subject at hand but rather, the structural settings in which this framing pro-
cess takes place. Avoided here as well is an ex ante theoretical position
concerning the configuration of research-policy relations. Instead, this book
will provide an empirical reconstruction of how actors produce and repro-
duce boundary configurations in their actual social practices. Boundary
work is studied empirically by analysing that which is carried out by ‘real-
world’ actors (Gieryn 1995: 394). Philosophical arguments will not be gi-
ven in favour of one model of research-policy relations, but provided in-
stead are empirical arguments on how and why actors came to relate in
specific ways and what empirical effects this has had in terms of problem
framing.
This study thus seeks to contribute to reflection on the part of those ac-
tors actually involved in research-policy relations and problem framing in
this domain. With an empirical analysis of boundary work and problem
framing in actual social practices, it aims to raise awareness about these so-
cial processes among actors in the domain. Through such awareness, an
empirical reconstruction could contribute to learning how to structure
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science-policy relations in order to promote critical dialogues between re-
search and policy at the level of problem framing.
Research questions
This book’s fundamental question is thus: what part did the research-policy
nexus have in research and policy frameshifts concerning immigrant inte-
gration in the Netherlands over the past decades? Logically following, how
can this be explained? And to what extent did the research-policy nexus
contribute to critical frame reflection? This formulation positions this study
as an enquiry into the role of the research-policy nexus in problem fram-
ing, rather than a study of immigrant integration research, immigrant inte-
gration policy or, for that matter, a study of immigrant integration per se.
The research question will be further elaborated based on the structuralist-
constructivist perspective and theoretical concepts discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 focuses on what frames have emerged and what frameshifts have
taken place in Dutch immigrant integration research and policy over the
past decades. This research builds on other studies that have shown how
the framing of immigrant integration has changed significantly over the
past decades (Entzinger 2005; Snel & Scholten 2005). Such frameshifts are
generally understood to be an indication of the intractability of a topic.
Thus, the intractability of immigrant integration is considered a starting
point (rather than an empirical outcome) and, as will be discussed later,
one of the core reasons for formulating this research question and selecting
this case study. This chapter will provide a reconstruction of the intractabil-
ity of immigrant integration by identifying the frameshifts that have taken
place over the past decades. It is of great importance for the study, as it se-
lects the research-policy frameshifts that will be analysed in more detail.
Subsequently, in chapters 4, 5 and 6, a number of questions will be
raised further concerning the relations between research and policy in the
three main frameshifts to have taken place in Dutch immigrant integration
policies over the past decades. This requires, firstly, an analysis of what
kind of research and which policy actors were involved, what were their
frames and what positions did they hold in the fields of research or policy.
The emphasis here is on those actors involved in the frameshifts to be
identified in response to the first question. It involves an analysis of the
context in which this frameshift took place so that relevant research and
policy actors can be identified. A reconstruction of the actors’ frames will
consequently follow. Discussions concerning actors and context will be en-
twined because, from a structuralist-constructivist perspective, the role of
context is considered to be mediated through actor frames and the positions
that actors hold within their research or policy fields. For every period that
a frameshift is identified, this second question will depict the actor setting
and the contextual setting. Within this playing field, more questions will
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focus in greater detail on the research-policy nexus and its role in these
frameshifts.
Secondly, an analysis will be made of how these actors define the rela-
tionship between research and policy and how this can be explained. This
question is likely to produce different answers depending on the periods in
which the frameshifts took place. It draws attention away from problem
framing and towards how the actors defined the relationship between re-
search and policy, thus clearly adopting an empiricist approach to the ana-
lysis. Furthermore, informed by the structuralist-constructivist perspective,
it asks how actors’ positions within the field structures of immigrant inte-
gration research and policy may provide an explanation for how they de-
fined research-policy relations.
Thirdly, this book will solicit what structural research-policy configura-
tions can be identified. This will also produce answers that vary according
to the different frameshifts. Here, attention is transferred from actors to the
structural setting of research-policy relations. There is also an attempt to
identify the more structural boundary configuration that was produced and
reproduced by actors from both fields.
Finally, an analysis is made of the role these boundary configurations
have had in frameshifts in research and policy. Specially, what has been
their role in problem framing and/or reframing, and to what extent did their
role involve critical frame reflection? These enquiries call attention to the
effect of boundary configurations on the structural settings of immigrant
integration research and policy and their role in promoting either change or
stability. Furthermore, they raise the issue of how the structural effects of
boundary configurations may have contributed to the rise or fall of specific
problem frames. The two sub-questions address, from a structuralist-con-
structivist perspective, what has been called both the structure and the cul-
ture of public problems. The final element of this question involves the ex-
tent to which this effect on problem framing involved frame reflection, or
whether reframing was (as predicted in the literature) a consequence of fac-
tors other than reflection.
Following these case chapters, in chapter 7 a comparison will be made
of findings from the Dutch case and those from Germany, France and the
UK. The aim of this comparison is to find out whether there are more gen-
eral patterns in research-policy dialogues or whether the Dutch case is, in
fact, characterised by exceptionalism.
Case study design
This book adopts an ‘embedded, single-case study design’ (Yin 1994: 42).
It is a single-case study because it analyses the role of the research-policy
nexus in problem framing in one case: the issue of immigrant integration
in the Netherlands over the past four decades. It is ‘embedded’ because,
although it involves one object of analysis – actors involved in research-
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policy relations in the domain of immigrant integration – it involves two
embedded units of analysis: research-policy relations and immigrant inte-
gration policy frames.
A strength of this design, as it is applied here, is that it allows for an in-
depth look at the role of the research-policy nexus in problem framing with
full appreciation of the situational setting where this nexus is constructed
and problem framing takes place. An empirical epistemology requires that
boundary work and problem framing be studied within their ‘real-life con-
text’ (ibid.: 14). Many variables will result and the requirement of gather-
ing as much data as possible on as few variables as possible (King,
Keohane & Verba 1994) cannot be met. The research-policy nexus and
problem framing cannot be defined beforehand in a way that will create
clear-cut ‘boundaries between phenomenon and context’ (Yin 1994: 14).
This is because, from the perspectives of framing and boundary work, the
construction of what passes as context is considered endogenous to these
social practices (ibid.). According to Yin (ibid.), this is one situation in
which research would best be served by adopting a case study design.
Therefore, an in-depth, single-case study is the most suitable for gathering
sufficient data (for instance, for triangulation) within the scope of this re-
search and in order to be able to say anything meaningful about boundary
work in research-policy relations and its correlation to problem framing.
It is important to observe that single-case studies do have limitations in
terms of opportunities for generalisation. They provide in-depth knowledge
of the specifics of one case, without much analytical leverage in terms of
explaining other cases; their external validity is inherently limited. While
there is potential for analytical generalisation and theory-building, a single-
case study does not lend itself to empirical generalisation in the context of
research-policy dialogues on migration and integration in other countries,
or in other issue domains. As such, this research design contains a com-
parative analysis in which findings from the Dutch single-case study are
compared with available evidence on research-policy dialogues on migra-
tion in other European countries. This comparison involves so-called pat-
tern matching: examining whether the configurations of research-policy
dialogues that have been uncovered in the Netherlands can also be found
in the other countries. For instance, this study finds how a technocratic re-
search-policy configuration contributed to the rise of multiculturalism in
the Netherlands in the early 1980s. Through comparison, one aim would
be to discover whether such relations in other countries have also been
configured in a technocratic manner and, if so, whether this similarly con-
tributed to the rise of multiculturalism. Although a full comparison of re-
search-policy dialogues between all countries is not made, this study does
support extending empirical generalisation from the Dutch case to the
others.
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The countries for international comparison were selected according to
renowned differences in research traditions in the field of immigrant inte-
gration. In sharp contrast to the Netherlands, France has been known for
its sensitivities surrounding social-scientific research on immigrant integra-
tion (the taboo on statistiques ethniques), as well as for the deep political
engagement of researchers with, often, a political or philosophical back-
ground. In Germany, despite its persistent denial of being a country of im-
migration, social researchers have concentrated primarily on social-eco-
nomic issues like education and labour market participation, rather than the
more political concerns with cultural assimilation dominant in France. The
UK has been characterised by a much more institutionalised research-pol-
icy nexus in which sociologists and anthropologists were heavily involved
in a more colour-oriented British approach. This book seeks to discover
whether these unique ways of organising research-policy dialogues have
also led to the construction of different frames.
The combination of an in-depth study of the Dutch case and pattern
matches between several other cases provides a sound basis for analytical
generalisation. Analytical generalisation concerns generalisation of theore-
tical propositions, using techniques for developing ‘grounded theory’
(Glaser 1992) – which need not be exclusive to the field of immigrant inte-
gration. More generally, this book will offer insights into how research-pol-
icy relations are configured and how research can contribute to critical
frame reflection on intractable policy controversies. In this respect, immi-
grant integration represents a ‘showcase’ or ‘revelatory case study’ (ibid.:
40); the framing of immigrant integration as well as the structure of re-
search-policy relations in this domain have become fiercely contested in
the Netherlands in recent decades. As such, this book strategically provides
a window through which to study the role of the research-policy nexus in
problem framing.
Building a valid and reliable chain of evidence
Central to a sound research design is constructing a valid and reliable chain
of evidence involving the key concepts and theoretical relationships. The
first step in this chain of questions in chapter 3 is to uncover the extent to
which immigrant integration has been an intractable topic in research and
policy. This means looking for changes in problem framing in research and
policy. In order to ensure validity, the frame concept has been operationa-
lised into four attributes: terminology, social classification, causal theories
and normative perspectives. The search for indicators of frameshifts in-
volves an analysis of policy documents and secondary literature on immi-
grant integration research and policy developments in the Netherlands over
the past decades. For the policy field, policy memoranda constituted a va-
lid and reliable source of problem framing. Changes in policy contours are
the main reason why a new policy memorandum is issued in the first place.
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Such key texts are not available for the scientific research field. Abundant
secondary literature about changing perspectives on immigrant integration
was therefore examined for this study, in order to create a reconstruction of
changes in terminology, social classification, causal theories and normative
perspectives, so as to ensure the validity of the use of the frame concept in
this respect.
The second step in building a chain of evidence is to zoom in on the ob-
jects of analysis – the actors involved in the research-policy nexus. Actors
who played an important role in research and policy developments (e.g. ex-
perts, research institutes, advisory bodies, policy departments, political in-
stitutes) naturally turn up in the literature describing the above-mentioned
first step. Emphasis thus is on the frames of the identified actors and their
reconstructions of the contextual setting of problem framing. The frames
will be studied by scrutinising the documents they produced (e.g. research
reports, advisory reports, government documents). Furthermore, the con-
textual setting in which these frames emerged will be analysed by recon-
structing their positions within the research or policy fields, specifically by
looking for background knowledge on their positions (formal positions and
roles, resources and informal relations and networks) and the rules of the
game within both fields (social norms of doing science or making policies,
methodological paradigms, etc.). Furthermore, these developments are
placed in the context of macro-institutional developments in scientific re-
search and policymaking.
The third step focuses not on these actors’ frames, but on their social
practices and positions within the broader fields of research and policy.
Analysed here is the boundary work of these actors by studying their ‘lit-
erary, social and material technologies’ (Shapin & Schaffer 1985), also
known as ‘boundary discourse’, ‘boundary relations’ and ‘boundary ob-
jects’ (Halffman 2003: 63). Interviewing constituted the primary method in
this regard. The interviews were semi-structured, following a list of topics
that was deduced from the central research questions. Triangulation was
used as a methodological strategy for enhancing reliability, involving data
triangulation (using multiple sources of data) as well as methodological tri-
angulation (using multiple research methods) (Yin 1994: 90). Interviewing
was combined with analysis of primary documents, such as minutes, re-
cords and notes that were kept by actors themselves (e.g. from the
Scientific Council for Government Policy and the Department of Home
Affairs, as well as records of parliamentary hearings) and secondary
sources like media records and scientific literature.
The fourth step in building a chain of evidence shifts attention from the
actors to the structural setting of research-policy relations or boundary con-
figurations. Indicators of such configurations can be found in the patterns
of interaction between research and policy actors. Indicators of how rela-
tive primacy was configured can be found in instances where either the
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research actors determined policy developments or policy actors deter-
mined research developments. Indicators of convergence or divergence can
be found in the extent to which research and policy interacted either di-
rectly (close mutual relations) or more indirectly (at a distance). These in-
dicators will be studied using the same methods and sources employed for
the analysis of boundary work practices in the third step.
The fifth step of this research design connects evidence from the struc-
tural setting of research-policy relations to that in which the frameshifts
took place. Firstly, this requires an examination of how the research-policy
nexus strengthened the position (in terms of legitimacy, authority and re-
sources – or ‘capital’ in general) of specific research and policy actors who
advocated either change or stability in terms of problem framing.
Indications of such effects can be found in references to how the research-
policy nexus provided capital to specific actors, both within interviews
with these actors and within secondary literature about frameshifts.
Secondly, the step involves an analysis of how boundary configurations
played a role in the rise or fall of specific problem frames. An indication
of such influence would be the exclusion of actors within specific frames
from the field structures. This requires an examination not only of how the
positions of actors are altered, but also how these changes affected actors
within different frames. Finally, this step involves an analysis of the role of
boundary configurations in frame reflection. In this regard, the data that
was gathered for the role of boundary configurations in frameshifts and
framing is discussed in relation to the aforementioned attributes of frame
reflection – openness, empathy, critical reflection, pragmatism and trust.
Finally, the sixth step (in chapter 7) involves an international compari-
son, or more precisely, a pattern-matching between findings from the
Dutch case and the available evidence on research-policy dialogues in
Germany, France and the UK. This section is based primarily on an exten-
sive review of the international literature on immigrant integration policy,
research and their mutual relations in these countries. Although few studies
have made the research-policy nexus in this domain the object of their ana-
lysis, there are a number of excellent studies that, to some extent, discuss
either the development of immigrant integration research or the role of re-
search in policymaking (Guiraudon 1997; Boswell 2009; Bommes &
Morawska 2004; Vasta & Vaddamalay 2007; Favell 2001). The compara-
tive analysis in this book has been shaped by a series of informal inter-
views with researchers and policymakers from the respective countries
over the past years. These interviews helped provide access to relevant
information on the countries and to find pertinent sources. An important
occasion for this was the international gathering mentioned in the intro-
duction, the Research-Policy Dialogues on Migration and Integration in
Europe conference held in 2008 in Enschede, the Netherlands, which
brought together policymakers and researchers from various countries. The
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sessions held during this special conference provided material that has been
used throughout this book. Furthermore, the comparative chapter was dis-
tributed to, and discussed with, various country experts.
2.6 Conclusion
This book attempts to capture the dynamics of how immigrant integration
has been framed and reframed in recent decades. It develops a structuralist-
constructivist perspective to get beyond the predominant focus on ‘national
models of integration’, thus honing in on the dynamic ways in which im-
migrant integration is framed. Each frame involves a different terminology,
a different way of classifying involved groups or categories, different cau-
sal stories as well as a different normative perspective.
Revealed, too, are the structural settings in which problems are socially
constructed or framed, specifically the configuration of the research-policy
nexus. Both immigrant integration research and policy are analysed as dis-
tinct fields of structured social relations, each with unique positions, rules
of the game and a distribution of capital. Problems are framed against the
background of these structural settings. Field structures are produced and
reproduced, using different ways of demarcating themselves from other
fields and coordinating relationships with other fields. This boundary work
affects the shaping of field structures and relations. As such, boundary
work can also play a role in producing specific structural settings in which
problems are framed in research and policy.
As this book shows, institutionalised patterns of boundary work can cre-
ate structural configurations of research-policy relations. Boundary organi-
sations have a structure of their own, coordinating relations between both
fields in specific ways and also demarcating the roles of both fields with
specific rules of the game. To reiterate, four theoretic models of boundary
configurations are distinguished: enlightenment, technocracy, engineering
and bureaucracy.
Boundary configurations form part of the structural settings in which
problems are framed. They can either reinforce the structural dynamics to-
wards change (positive feedback) or reinforce prevailing structure-induced
equilibria (negative feedback) within the fields of scientific research and
policymaking. As such, they can stimulate and inhibit frameshifts. In addi-
tion, boundary configurations may contribute more specifically to the rise
or fall of particular frames. Various studies have revealed a correlation be-
tween the involved venues in problem framing and the type of frames that
emerge. However, the role of boundary configurations in problem framing
does not necessarily involve frame reflection. According to extant litera-
ture, frame reflection will only occur when the structural setting promotes
openness, empathy, critical reflection, pragmatism and trust. Boundary
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configurations only contribute to the situational resolution of intractable
controversies through frame reflection when they contribute to these speci-
fic structural conditions.
This book adopts an empiricist methodological approach to answer its
central question: what has been the role of the research-policy nexus in the
frameshifts in immigrant integration in research and policy in the
Netherlands over the past decades? Moreover, how can this role be ex-
plained and to what extent did the research-policy nexus contribute to criti-
cal frame reflection? This approach is founded on an empirical epistemol-
ogy that studies the research-policy nexus and frames of immigrant integra-
tion by examining how actors undertake boundary work and frame
problems in actual social practices. Rather than carrying out boundary
work, the boundary work is studied; and rather than carrying out problem
framing, problem framing is the object of study.
Though a single-case study, this book attempts to achieve analytical gen-
eralisation. The bottom line is that the research-policy nexus does play a
role in problem framing. This study aims to provide theoretical insights
into how the research-policy nexus can be structured to promote critical
frame reflection for the situated resolution of such controversies.
Furthermore, the international comparison provided aims to strengthen the
external validity of this research by matching the patterns of research-
policy relations found in the Dutch case to those in others. In this way, we
can answer a burning question: is the Dutch case is ‘exceptional’? Or, can
more general hypotheses be developed on the relation between specific
types of the research-policy nexus and the rise and fall of specific frames
of immigrant integration.
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3 Frames and frameshifts in Dutch immigrant
integration policy and research
The Netherlands is often seen as being representative of the so-called mul-
ticultural model of integration. Historically, the Dutch have had a tendency
to recognise cultural groups in society and to emancipate them through
structures that reflect the specifically Dutch history of ‘pillarisation’. In
fact, it is because of the alleged success of this multicultural model in ac-
commodating cultural differences in society that scholars and policymakers
from Europe have shown great interest in the Dutch case.
However, there has been surprisingly little empirical research into how
this model of integration evolved or whether there are alternative models
that may apply to the Netherlands. This creates great difficulties when it
comes to debates about the alleged success or failure of this multicultural
model. After the tumultuous year of 2002 in which Fortuyn placed immi-
grant integration at the top of the political agenda, the Dutch multicultural
model was declared a failure. At the same time, there was sharp contro-
versy about whether the Dutch case should be described as multicultural at
all, especially as the 1990s had witnessed the rise of a more social-
economic approach. Furthermore, others, including the Parliamentary
Investigative Committee on the Integration Policy established in 2004, con-
cluded that the emergent Dutch model had been rather successful, espe-
cially in terms of the progress made in social-economic areas such as edu-
cation and labour. To complicate the situation further, the infamous ‘Dutch
multicultural model’ appeared to have become a counter-discourse in pub-
lic and political debate, one used to support an assimilationist turn in
Dutch policies. In contrast to social-economic participation or social-cultur-
al emancipation, social-cultural adaptation was now increasingly consid-
ered to be the core of a new ‘Dutch approach’.
Clearly signified here is the multiplicity of frames that characterises im-
migrant integration in the Netherlands. This chapter will analyse that multi-
plicity, according to an empirical study of the development of immigrant
integration policy and research in the Netherlands. It will reconstruct the
problem frames that have emerged in research and policy and identify fra-
meshifts by examining scientific literature and policy documents and by
looking for changes in the different attributes and indicators of problem
framing – terminology, social classification, causal stories and normative
perspectives.
3.1 The Dutch multicultural model
A key trait of the so-called Dutch multicultural model is its tendency to in-
stitutionalise cultural pluralism. This is based on the belief that the cultural
emancipation of immigrant minorities is the key to their integration into
Dutch society (see e.g. Duyvendak & Scholten 2009). This also reflects a
rather uncontested acceptance of the transformation of Dutch society into a
multicultural society. In fact, a connection is often drawn to the peculiar
Dutch history of pillarisation, referring to the period from the 1920s to the
1960s when most of society was structured according to specific pillars –
religious (Protestant, Catholic) and socio-cultural (socialist, liberal)
(Lijphart 1968).
Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s (2007) book When ways of life collide:
Multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands understands the
Dutch approach in terms of a multiculturalist model. The authors claim that
the labelling of collective identities has inadvertently deepened social-
cultural cleavages in society, rather than bridging differences. They take
the Netherlands as a token case to underpin their claims, rooting the Dutch
approach in the history of pillarisation: ‘The Netherlands has always been
a country of minorities thanks to the power of religion to divide as well as
unite’ (Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007: 13). In addition, the ‘collective
trauma of World War II where the Dutch failed to resist the massive depor-
tation of Jews’ contributed to the fact that ‘immigrant minorities have been
seen in the light of the Holocaust [...] or that critical views of immigrants
are labelled racist and xenophobic’ (Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007: 15).
Given these historical circumstances, a multiculturalist model would logi-
cally take root in the Netherlands.
The German sociologist Joppke also considers the Dutch the most radi-
cal exponents of the multiculturalist model. He describes how the
Netherlands recently changed its policies as a consequence of (allegedly)
multicultural policies being a failure.
Civic integration is a response to the obvious failure of one of
Europe’s most pronounced policies of multiculturalism to further
the socioeconomic integration of immigrants and their offspring.
[...] In a counterpoint to multiculturalism’s tendency to lock migrant
ethnics into their separate worlds, the goal of civic integration is mi-
grants’ participation in mainstream institutions. (Joppke 2007: 249)
The Dutch multicultural model has also found resonance among Dutch
scholars. Koopmans (2002, 2003) roots the Dutch approach to immigrant
integration clearly in the history of pillarisation, when ethno-cultural clea-
vages were stressed in a similar way in multicultural policies. He claims
that the application of this model to new immigrant groups has had major
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adverse effects, as multiculturalism ‘offers new ethnic and religious groups
a formal and symbolic form of equality, which in practice reinforces ethnic
cleavages and reproduces segregation on a distinctly unequal basis’
(Koopmans 2002: 92). Koopmans points, in particular, to ‘path depen-
dency’ in terms of policy practices. Although formal policy discourse and
public discourse seem to have changed, the Dutch have remained accom-
modating in the way they deal with ethno-cultural diversity.
The Netherlands is still an extreme representative of a ‘multicultur-
al’ vision of integration. [...] Outside the limited world of op-eds in
high-brow newspapers, the relation between Dutch society and its
immigrants is still firmly rooted in its tradition of pillarisation […]
[O]rganisations and activities based on ethnic grounds are still gen-
erously supported – directly and indirectly – by the government.
Whether people want it or not, ethnicity still plays an important role
in public institutions and discourse. (Koopmans 2002: 91; author’s
translation)
Rather than examining the Dutch multicultural model, per se, or evaluating
its alleged success or failure, the objective of this book is to study the con-
struction of this type of model. In other words, it is not about the model it-
self, it is about the model as a discourse. By asking why we have come to
talk about the Dutch approach in terms of the multicultural model in the
first place, this study takes a step back from current debates to critically
understand the Dutch multicultural model.
3.2 The rise and fall of policy frames
Empirical analysis of the development of Dutch immigrant integration poli-
cies teaches us that the Dutch case should be described as a succession of
frames, rather than something defined by a single dominant model, as is
often suggested in national and international literature. Immigrant integra-
tion policy appears to have been marked by episodes of stability as well as
periods of dramatic change (Entzinger 2005; Scholten & Timmermans
2004). Various policy frames have come and gone over the past decades.
This makes it difficult to speak of one immigrant integration policy.
Rather, it seems that there have been several immigrant integration policies
over time. An analysis of official policy documents shows that at least four
policy episodes can be distinguished, each characterised by a particular
dominant policy frame and separated by frameshifts: the lack of immigrant
integration policy until about 1978, followed by a minorities policy until
the early 1990s, an integration policy until the turn of the millennium and,
more recently, the integration policy ‘new style’.
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3.2.1 The lack of immigrant integration policy
Until the 1970s, no immigrant integration policy existed in the
Netherlands. It was considered unnecessary, as immigrants were expected
to eventually return to their home countries. The Moluccans, for example,
were to one day return to either an independent Moluccan republic or to
Indonesia itself, and foreign workers were seen as temporary ‘guest work-
ers’, who would go back to their countries of origin when there was no
longer a demand for supplementary labour in the Dutch economy. Two
other major immigrant groups from former Dutch colonies – the
Surinamese and the Antilleans – were not considered permanent immi-
grants either, because they were seen as fellow citizens of the Dutch
Kingdom who could enter and leave the Netherlands as they pleased. In
addition, there was no common framework for policies related to the coun-
try’s various immigrant groups. Policies on foreign workers fell under the
responsibility of the Department of Social Affairs; asylum migration was
coordinated by the Department of Foreign Affairs; and policies regarding
the Surinamese and the Moluccans came under the remit of the Ministry of
Culture, Recreation and Social Work (from herein referred to as CRM).
On the whole, the policies that were developed for these migrant groups
appear to correspond to the differentialist model. In fact, the so-called
‘two-tracks’ policies (Choenni 2000) developed in this period implied that,
though migrants were to be activated in the social-economic sphere, in
other respects they were differentiated from Dutch society. This differenti-
alist frame is primarily manifested in policy and political discourse, under
the slogan ‘Integration with retention of identity’. Initially, this did not car-
ry the permanent connotation that it would acquire later, but rather referred
to the social and economic integration of migrants during their stay in the
Netherlands. This meant that the social and economic well-being of mi-
grants had to be assured for the length of their stay, which had an addi-
tional purpose of maximising their economic participation. Policy towards
foreign workers was:
aimed at, given the existing and expected needs of our economy to
deploy foreign labour, balancing as much as possible the number of
foreigners coming to the Netherlands with the demands of the la-
bour market, given the available or yet-to-become available facil-
ities for housing, reception and training.1
Moreover, the categorisation of migrant groups also reflected differential-
ism. Migrant groups were not named and framed as one category, but de-
fined according to their foreign origins – Surinamese, Antillean, Moluccan,
foreign workers – with the emphasis on the fact that they were not from
the Netherlands. This was also reflected in the fragmentation across various
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departments of policy responsibilities for these groups and the fact that pol-
icy memoranda issued until the late 1970s always concerned one specific
group.2 The categorisation of migrant groups as such maintained links with
the countries of origin and also stressed their different migration back-
grounds (colonial migration, labour migration, family migration, asylum
migration). It highlighted the fact that there was no common framework
for formulating a general immigrant integration policy.
The causal story underlying the policies for the separate groups was
based on the idea that policies aimed at permanent integration could ham-
per return to the home countries. Although it became clear early in the
1970s that the presence of foreign workers would be permanent, it was still
believed that foreign workers would not become permanent minorities.
The phenomenon of foreign workers in the Netherlands has been re-
cognised to be permanent [...] but the change among them is signifi-
cant [...] as most of them return to their home countries after a short
or a longer time.3
The presence of temporary migrants was framed as a product of post-war
economic reconstruction and decolonisation. To facilitate return migration,
migrants would have to be able to preserve, as best as possible, their cul-
tural identities and internal group structures. Whereas integration was pur-
sued in social-economic domains such as labour and income, in the social-
cultural domain, migrant groups were encouraged to keep themselves apart
from Dutch society. For instance, differentiated housing facilities were cre-
ated (e.g. the Moluccan camps and quarters and guest worker barracks)
and education was facilitated through immigrant minority language and
culture classes. In a memorandum on foreign workers, the focus on reten-
tion of identity was phrased as follows:
More than on promoting integration as such, policy must be direc-
ted at providing a group with the chance to retain its identity. This
means that the group is encouraged to develop its own activities. A
group-focused approach is essential to this aim. [...] For foreign
workers, who will generally remain in our country for only a short
time, the emphasis will be mainly on retention of identity.
Reintegration after return to the home country will then be less
problematic.4
Finally, policies towards migrants were framed in the context of powerful
values and norms establishing that the Netherlands ‘was not and should
not be a country of immigration’.5 An important argument raised in this
context was that the country’s demographic situation, described in terms of
‘overpopulation’, would make it undesirable for permanent immigration.6
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The migration that had taken place in the 1960s and the 1970s was seen as
an inadvertent consequence of economic and political developments. This
norm of not being a country of immigration also provided an argument for
not developing a policy for immigrant integration, as the integration of mi-
grants could otherwise be interpreted as positive appraisal of the idea of
being a country of immigration.
3.2.2 The minorities policy
The first official immigrant integration policy in the Netherlands was de-
veloped in the early 1980s, initially as a draft minorities memorandum in
1981 and finally in an official minorities memorandum in 1983. Then, for
the first time, the presence of specific immigrant groups was recognised as
being permanent. ‘The new policy is based on the assumption that ethnic
minorities will remain permanently in the Netherlands [...] thereby distan-
cing itself from the idea that their presence would have been of a tempor-
ary order’.7 Migrants were also named and framed as permanent settlers.
Once guest workers or colonial migrants, they were now categorised as
permanent ‘cultural minorities’ or ‘ethnic minorities’, emphasising their
permanent position within Dutch society. However, immigration as such
was still not seen as a permanent phenomenon, and the Netherlands was
still not considered a country of immigration, since the immigration of
these specific target groups was framed as a historically unique event.
Assimilationism and differentialism were explicitly rejected.8
Assimilationism was at odds with the freedom of minorities to experience
their own cultures. Differentialism had served too long as an excuse for the
government not to create a policy on integration. The frame underlying the
minorities policy had characteristics of both a multiculturalist and a uni-
versalist frame. On the one hand, policy discourse stressed ‘mutual adapta-
tion’ in the context of the Netherlands as a ‘multi-ethnic’ or ‘multicultural
society’.9 On the other hand, this mutual adaptation involved not only the
social-cultural emancipation of minorities and combating discrimination,
but it also enhanced the social-economic participation of members of mino-
rities.10 The merging of multiculturalist and universalist elements is also re-
flected in the combination of a group focus with an individualistic focus.
As seen in the official policy, the aim was: ‘to achieve a society in which
the members of minority groups that reside in the Netherlands can, indivi-
dually as well as group-wise, enjoy an equal position and full opportunities
for development’.11
The major focus of all policy documents since 1979 on the social cate-
gory of ‘ethnic minorities’ signals the more multiculturalist aspect of the
minorities policy. Migrant groups were no longer categorised according to
foreign origin, but rather as permanent populations within Dutch society.
Introduced thus was one common frame of reference for migrant groups as
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a whole, who up until then had been treated separately. However, the gov-
ernment did not provide a definition of ‘ethnic minorities’. Rather, it se-
lected a number of ‘minorities’ who formed the target groups of the mino-
rities policy: Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, foreign workers, gypsies,
caravan dwellers and refugees.12 This list included the main groups that
had emerged from labour, family and asylum migration up until that peri-
od. The selection was legitimised by the argument that the government
was responsible for these minorities because ‘their arrival and settlement in
the Netherlands has been so entwined with the history and economic func-
tioning of Dutch society’.13 Some migrant groups in Dutch society, such as
the Chinese and Pakistanis, were left out.
In terms of the causal theory underlying the minorities policy, an impor-
tant premise was that the social-cultural emancipation of minority groups
would also favour the social-economic participation of their individual
members. This also reflects the combined multiculturalist and universalist
thinking behind the minorities policy. Multiculturalism clearly prevailed in
the policy’s orientation towards specific target groups. Although the slogan
‘General when possible, specific when necessary’ was introduced – refer-
ring to decisions on whether a minority group’s position would be best
ameliorated by means of general policies or targeted group-specific (cate-
gorical) measures only when necessary – the minorities policy was still
mainly directed at specific groups.14 For instance, it was believed that the
social-cultural emancipation of these groups could be furthered by main-
taining group-specific facilities for immigrant minority language and cul-
ture classes. This, in turn, would eventually benefit individual social-
economic participation.15 It was also believed that the democratic voice of
migrants would have to be supported by developing an advisory and consul-
tation structure between national government and immigrant organisations.
However, universalism prevailed as far as an emphasis on the accessi-
bility of societal institutions and on proportionality in terms of social-
economic participation. This meant that:
regulations for all inhabitants [...] are not just formally open to inha-
bitants from minority groups, but that they also effectively benefit
minorities, which would have to be established by examining to
what extent members of minority groups make proportional use of
these regulations.16
Together with combating discrimination, enhancing the accessibility of in-
stitutions would constitute a means for enhancing social-economic
participation.
Finally, the minorities policy was framed in terms of a multi-ethnic, mul-
ticultural society being something positive.17 Immigration was not framed
as a permanent phenomenon, though the presence of ethnic minorities was
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considered permanent. However, this orientation towards multiculturalist
values did not involve much by way of cultural relativism. The slogan
‘Integration with retention of identity’ was now abandoned, at least in
official policy discourse, in favour of a more dynamic conception of immi-
grant cultures. This was also manifest in the emphasis on mutual adapta-
tion. As a result of the asymmetrical relationship between minorities and
the majority, the integration of minorities would inevitably require their
adaptation to Dutch society to some degree. As the minorities memoran-
dum stated, ‘When values and norms of minorities from their original cul-
ture clash with those of the established norms of our pluriform society and
when these are considered as fundamental for Dutch society’.18
3.2.3 The integration policy
The assumptions of the minorities policy stayed relatively stable through-
out the 1980s. Economic depression and rising unemployment levels
among minorities forced an incremental priority shift in the direction of so-
cial-economic participation. Attempts to increase the accessibility and pro-
portionality of minorities’ representation in state regulations were espe-
cially stepped up in this respect. A large-scale project to enhance the num-
ber of minority members in government service (the so-called ‘EMO
plan’) and a project to identify and eliminate instances in which the legal
position of minorities was inferior to those of natives (Beune & Hessels
1983) illustrate this emphasis on accessibility and proportionality.
By the end of the 1980s, the government started to raise doubts about
whether the current approach of the minorities policy should be continued
as, especially in material domains (housing, education and labour), the re-
sults proved disappointing.19 Although there does not seem to have been a
radical break in many concrete policy programmes, the early 1990s saw a
significant change in the discourse, categories, causal stories and values
concerning immigrant integration.20 An important shift took place in a re-
ply memorandum to a report from the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (WRR), offering recognition that immigration would form a perma-
nent phenomenon in Dutch society.21 Although the government still firmly
held onto other elements of the minorities policy – including the norm that
the Netherlands should not be a country of immigration and that specific
minorities for whom government had a special responsibility would be the
targets of the minorities policy – this reframing of the nature of immigra-
tion would have significant consequences. For instance, it raised the ques-
tion of how policy could accommodate a constant influx of new migrants,
beyond those minority groups that were considered the targets of policy.
Moreover, rising doubts about policy effectiveness in material areas led to
a shift in prioritisation from the social-cultural to the social-economic do-
main of integration. As an example, new plans were initiated in the
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domains of education and labour, including plans for an Employment
Equity Act and educational trajectories for newcomers as a first step to-
wards integration.22
During the debates on the ‘Annual report of the minorities policy’ in
1993,23 a parliamentary motion was adopted that asked for a formal recali-
bration of government policies.24 It was argued that the notion of the mino-
rities policy no longer covered the revised policy ideas from previous years
(Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 100).25 This set in motion a process that
would lead to a more universalist type of policy framing. In response to a
parliamentary motion, the government issued the ‘Contours memorandum
on the integration of ethnic minorities’26 in 1994. This would be succeeded
several years later by the memorandum ‘Providing opportunities, seizing
opportunities’ (1998).27 An important change in discourse involved the
switch from the minorities policy to integration policy and emergence of
the ‘citizenship’ concept. The focus on integration instead of emancipation
(Fermin 1997: 211) located immigrant integration more from the perspec-
tive of participation in central societal institutions (education, labour, the
welfare state, politics). Instead of group emancipation, individual immi-
grants would now have to become the unit of integration into Dutch
society.
The Cabinet chooses for citizenship and thereby stresses the integra-
tion of members of minority groups into Dutch society. Hence, we
will no longer speak of a minorities policy but instead of an ‘inte-
gration policy’ for minorities. For some, the past years have given
the impression that policy would only be directed at the recognised
policy target groups. Society on the whole as a target group would
have remained too much out of the picture, at least in their percep-
tion. This is not beneficial for Dutch society. The term ‘integration
policy’ better underlines how the social integration of minority
groups and persons belonging to these groups is a mutual process
of acceptation.28
The universalist character of the integration policy is illustrated by the
social categorisation of migrants as ‘citizens’. Depicting migrants as citi-
zens testifies to the more individualistic way of problem framing. This
frame’s ‘primary goal’ was formulated as ‘realising active citizenship of
persons from ethnic minorities’.29 The 1998 memorandum consistently re-
fers to citizenship as ‘active citizenship’. Now reframed as citizens, minor-
ity members saw their rights, as well as duties, became more central.
On all members of ethnic minorities that stay permanently in the
Netherlands [...] lies the individual obligation to participate in
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education and labour market and, also, the obligation to make ef-
forts to learn the Dutch language and to acquire basic knowledge of
Dutch society.30
Reducing policy target groups to a limited number of minority groups was
not yet officially abandoned, as the targets now became individual mem-
bers of those groups. It was indicated that, from time to time, the selection
of target groups would be reconsidered, because of ‘the differentiation
within and between the target groups’ and the ‘significant progress’ in the
position of specific groups, such as foreign workers of Southern European
origin.31 However, the 1994 contours memorandum announced the devel-
opment of elaborate civic integration programmes for newcomers, as immi-
gration was now considered a permanent phenomenon. This meant that the
target population of this aspect of the integration policy was no longer re-
stricted to the selected minority groups.
The priority shift from the social-cultural to the social-economic dimen-
sion of integration reveals a more significant change in the underlying cau-
sal policy theory. First, integration problems were no longer primarily per-
ceived in terms of accessibility of societal institutions, but now also in
terms of the individual rights and duties of migrants as citizens. As a
result, the slogan ‘Providing opportunities, seizing opportunities’ was intro-
duced. Second, the theory that social-cultural emancipation would even-
tually also benefit social-economic participation was reversed. Social-
economic participation was now considered an important condition for so-
cial-cultural emancipation. For example, immigrant minority language
classes were now legitimised by the argument that mastering one’s own
mother tongue would facilitate the apprehension of a second language.
Third, integration policy was increasingly framed as an intensification of
general policy in specific domains, rather than a specific policy for specific
groups. Specific policies would only be conducted temporarily in specific
domains, such as the employment equity law to promote proportional la-
bour participation of migrants. For the most part, however, integration
would have to be an intensification of general social affairs, labour, educa-
tion, housing and health care policies. In particular, integration policy was
considered to be related to the policy of social renewal, which involved a
clearly decentralised approach to a variety of urban social problems. As
the policy of social renewal shifted to the background in the late 1990s, in-
tegration policy became more closely related to urban policy.
Finally, policy documents show evidence that value of the Netherlands
as a multi-ethnic or multicultural society receded to the background in the
1990s. Although the government still recognised the de facto multicultural
status of Dutch society, it no longer considered the active promotion of
such a society a facet of government policy. This is put in the perspective
of ‘the changing role of the government’ and recognition that ‘more parties
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than just government are responsible for the dilemmas of the multicultural
society’.32 Rather, government policy was to be restricted to the sphere of
social-economic participation, not least because of rising concerns about
the viability of the welfare state in relation to immigration. A deteriorated
economic climate, the permanent immigration of new immigrants and too
little attention for the problems of socio-economically deprived native citi-
zens has made mutual adaptation and the support for an integration policy
less obvious.33
3.2.4 The integration policy ‘new style’
The universalism of the integration policy allowed for a more assimilation-
ist type of policy framing after the turn of the millennium. Once again, a
significant change took place in the discourse, categories, theories and va-
lues used for depicting the issue of immigrant integration. In the memoran-
dum ‘Integration in the perspective of immigration’, the government indi-
cated that integration policy would have to be recalibrated in the context of
recent events (such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and a broad national debate
on immigrant integration triggered in the media by a newspaper article by
Paul Scheffer), which had fuelled concerns about public support for the in-
tegration policy.34 As a first step to policy reframing, this memorandum es-
tablished a more systematic connection between immigration and integra-
tion policy. Immigration would have to be adjusted as far as the extent to
which immigrants would be effectively integrated in Dutch society, with ci-
vic integration courses acting as a crucial link between immigration and
integration.
A memorandum in response to a report from the Social and Cultural
Planning Office (SCP) in 2003 marked a significant frameshift.35 In this
memorandum, the minister of immigration and integration described the
contours of a so-called integration policy ‘new style’, which involved a
turn from universalism towards assimilationism. The philosophy of this
policy would be elaborated further in a reply memorandum to an advisory
report from a temporary parliamentary research committee on the integra-
tion policy.36 Whereas integration policy had focused primarily on social-
economic participation, the focus now shifted towards social and cultural
distance between migrants and Dutch society.37 This complicated issues
because ‘when groups are put up against each other – as societal institu-
tions are not sufficiently effective for ethnic groups and as large parts of
the minority population do not actively participate in the economy – the
continuity of society is at stake’.38 In order to support ‘the continuity of so-
ciety’, focus must be on the bridging of differences rather than on ‘the cul-
tivation of one’s own cultural identities’.
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The integration policy has always put great emphasis on the accep-
tance of differences between minorities and the native population.
There is nothing wrong with that, but it has often been interpreted
as if the presence of allochthonous minority groups in itself would
have been valuable, an enrichment tout court. One disregards that
not everything that is different is also valuable. With the cultivation
of one’s own cultural identities it is not possible to bridge differ-
ences. The unity of our society must be found in what the members
have in common. That is, [...] that they are citizens of one society.
Common citizenship for allochthonous and autochthonous residents
is the goal of the integration policy. [...] Common citizenship means
that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to basic Dutch
norms.39
In terms of social classification, categorisation of a limited number of
minorities was now abandoned. All newcomers as well as long-term resi-
dent migrants, so-called ‘oldcomers’, were to be target groups of the inte-
gration policy, regardless of ethnic or cultural origin. All newcomers were
obliged to follow ‘civic integration programmes’ after their arrival in the
Netherlands. The tone regarding immigrants, however, had become in-
creasingly negative, as demonstrated by the statement that ‘not everything
that is different is also valuable’ (see quotation above). In other words, the
social construction of migrants a as target group became more and more
negative. Citizenship remained the primary means for categorising minori-
ties. However, the focus shifted from ‘active citizenship’, with a strong
universalist implication, to ‘common’ or ‘shared citizenship’, with a more
assimilationist meaning. Common citizenship involves a form of citizen-
ship based on common values and norms; it involves ‘speaking Dutch and
complying with basic Dutch norms, [such as] doing your best to provide
for your own life support and observing laws and regulations’. It brings
with it a willingness for ‘taking care of the social environment, respecting
physical integrity of others, also within marriage, accepting the right of
anyone to express one’s opinion, accepting the sexual preferences of others
and equality of man and woman’.40 Also, it maintains some of its univers-
alist traits, i.e. that citizens are individually responsible for their participa-
tion in society.
Rather than social-cultural emancipation being a condition for social-
economic participation (as assumed by the minorities policy) or social-
economic participation being a condition for social-cultural emancipation
(as assumed by the integration policy), the new causal story stated that so-
cial-cultural differences could form an obstacle to social-economic partici-
pation. Diminishing social and cultural distances between migrants and na-
tives would support the participation of migrants in society and would
eliminate problems such as criminality and rising social tensions in
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neighbourhoods with high concentrations of immigrants. Just as with the
integration policy, the individual migrant remained the main unit of analy-
sis. ‘A lot would depend on the own efforts’ made by the immigrants.41
What was to be avoided was immigrants becoming a ‘welfare category’.
Integration policy runs the risk of treating minorities as a population
category that is more or less in need of help, as a welfare category.
That can happen when the emphasis is too much on providing facil-
ities and offering regulations and arrangements. The Cabinet is de-
termined to make important changes on this point. A new division
of responsibilities has been made between national government, lo-
cal government, civil society and individual native, allochthonous
citizens.42
No mention is made of the notion of the Netherlands as a multicultural so-
ciety. Instead of interpreting growing cultural diversity as a sign of a multi-
cultural society, cultural differences are now framed as problematic cultural
distances.43 It is argued that ‘a too large proportion of minority groups live
at too great a distance from Dutch society’. In this context, the goal is to
‘diminish the distance between minorities and the native population in so-
cial, cultural as well as economic respects’.44 Immigrant integration was
now not merely about ameliorating the position of migrants within society,
but also about the consequences of migration and integration for ‘the conti-
nuity of society’. In other words, the normative perspective underpinning
integration policy ‘new style’ had more to do with concerns about national
social cohesion and national identity than earlier policies.
3.3 Frames in immigrant integration research
Research on immigrant integration in the Netherlands has followed a de-
velopment path that is, on many counts, strikingly parallel to that of poli-
cies. Since the 1970s, a thriving field of research – a ‘research industry’ –
has evolved, situated not just in various centres or institutes, but also in nu-
merous government-oriented advisory bodies. In this regard, several mod-
els or problem frames can be discerned, rather than there being just one
dominant model. However, an important difference between policy dis-
course and research is that the latter seems characterised by a growing
fragmentation between frames of immigrant integration, rather than by a
succession of models.
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3.3.1 The birth of immigrant integration research
Until about the 1960s, the presence of immigrants attracted little attention
from researchers (Penninx 1988b: 255; Rath 1991: 274). Like policymakers,
researchers named and framed immigrants as temporary migrants. Lucassen
and Köbben (1992: 84), two pioneers in this field, would later observe how
this showed that ‘policy makers as well as researchers are part of the same
society and are both subject to the same general if not ideologically influ-
enced ideas’. For instance, in a study of foreign workers, Wentholt (1967)
depicted migrants as ‘international commuters’. Or, in a study commis-
sioned by CRM on migrant groups in the Netherlands, the term ‘immigrant’
was avoided and deleted from the study’s working title to prevent percep-
tion that these migrants would be permanent (Van Amersfoort 1984: 148).
Instead, the study employed ‘allochthonous’(Verwey-Jonker 1971), a con-
cept to later acquire a somewhat different meaning.
Initially, the causal story regarding the position of migrants in the
Netherlands also reflected the idea of temporary residence. For example,
one of the largest government projects, involving many researchers, was
aimed at examining the possibilities for linking return migration to the de-
velopment of the countries of origin (the Reintegration of Emigrant
Manpower and Promotion of Local Opportunities and Development
Project, REMPLOD). Many researchers who played a major role in the de-
velopment of the immigrant integration research field were initially in-
volved in this project (including Penninx and Bovenkerk). Another exam-
ple concerns a study by the Dutch Statistics Foundation (Statistiek 1971)
that failed to calculate the economic effects of permanent immigrant settle-
ment, thus leading to positive recommendations about the economic effects
of labour migration (Tinnemans 1994: 104). Also, studies of the position
of migrants during their stay in the Netherlands often stressed the psycho-
logical and social difficulties they experienced when arriving in the
Netherlands from a very different social-cultural context, calling for forms
of social assistance to help migrants ‘acclimatise’ to the Netherlands (Van
der Velden 1962 in Rath 1991: 152).
Finally, an important characteristic of the values held by researchers in-
volved in the initial development of this field was the strong sense of en-
gagement with the position of minorities. For instance, Köbben and
Penninx, who would later become key figures in immigration policy, were
engaged in organisations that aimed to alleviate and ameliorate the position
of minorities. Köbben and Mantouw led a committee to discuss the posi-
tion of Moluccan migrants in the late 1970s, while Penninx held action
groups for foreign workers.45 Another prominent researcher, Bovenkerk
carried out extensive work to uncover patterns of discrimination in Dutch
society (Bovenkerk 1978).
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3.3.2 The minorities paradigm
In the 1970s especially, immigrant integration began attracting attention
from researchers in a variety of disciplines, such as anthropology, sociol-
ogy and social geography. A landmark study for the development of this
domain was published by Van Amersfoort in 1974. Entitled ‘Immigration
and minority formation’, it defined immigrants for the first time as ethnic
or cultural ‘minorities’, reflecting American sociological literature on
minorities. Van Amersfoort referred to ethnic minorities as social groups or
‘collectivities’ who had strong internal bonds, problems with political parti-
cipation and weak social positions. In this respect, he called for govern-
ment intervention to prevent what he dubbed as ‘minority formation’. This
meant that specific policies would be needed for specific collectivities so
as to circumvent their forming a minority. Defining minorities and minority
formation in this way provided the basis for research on minorities in the
1970s. The framework was as follows:
1. A minority forms a continuous collective within society. The con-
tinuity of a minority has two aspects: (a) the minority encompasses
multiple generations; (b) belonging to a minority has priority over
other social bondings.
2. The numerical position of a minority hampers effective participa-
tion in political decision-making.
3. The minority takes in an objectively low social position. (Van
Amersfoort 1974: 37)
In the mid-1970s, more studies and articles emerged to raise doubts about
the differentialist frame that had prevailed thus far, calling instead for a dif-
ferent frame and approach to immigrants. In addition to Van Amersfoort’s
(1974) study on minority formation, an article by Entzinger (1975) on
norms versus facts of being an immigration country and a study by
Bovenkerk (1974a), raised doubts about the feasibility of return migration.
Köbben (1986: 157) observed that the ‘minorities’ concept had become the
common denominator for the various minority groups from the second half
of the 1970s onwards. Thus, Van Amersfoort’s study provided the funda-
mentals for a ‘minorities paradigm’ (Penninx 1988a: 23; Rath 1991: 173)
that was elaborated on by researchers, particularly those with an anthropo-
logical or sociological background, such as Penninx, Bovenkerk, Köbben
and Entzinger. Rival paradigms, such as nationalist and Marxist perspec-
tives on immigrant integration, had become marginal by the end of the
1970s (Bovenkerk 1984; Rath 1991). The establishment of the govern-
ment-associated Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM),
which united most of the researchers in the then still relatively small field,
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would play an important role in research coordination and distribution of
research funding (Penninx 1988a; Rath 1991; Van Putten 1990).
The naming and framing of ethnic minorities was closely related to an
underlying causal theory of minority formation. Elaborating on Van
Amersfoort’s pioneering work, Penninx (1988a: 55) defines minority for-
mation as a process involving ‘position attribution’ by structural factors in
society and ‘position acquisition’ by migrants. Position attribution involves
issues such as discrimination and accessibility of institutions, whereas posi-
tion acquisition involves educational and labour market qualifications and
cultural orientations of migrants. The central explanation for minority for-
mation in this model is that the social and cultural ‘otherness’ of minority
groups can negatively impact position acquisition and attribution for mino-
rities. For instance, a study by Veenman (2001) observes that the weak so-
cial position of Moluccans tends to be reproduced by weak educational
achievements. Or, the cultural ‘otherness’ of foreign workers would trigger
systemic discrimination that would lead to negative position attribution. A
central characteristic of the minorities paradigm is that position acquisition
and attribution are examined primarily on the level of migrant groups; the
social-economic and social-cultural characteristics of minorities are be-
lieved to determine the position of minority group members.
Finally, mirroring the rise of the immigrant integration field, research in
this period generally carried a value orientation that closely engaged with
the position of minorities. For instance, in the late 1970s, researchers
played a leading role in calling for a minorities policy that would recognise
the permanent status of minorities and ameliorate their social position in
Dutch society (Entzinger 1975; Scientific Council for Government Policy
1979). The very notion of ‘minorities’ emphasised migrant groups’ perma-
nent position in Dutch society, rather than being commuters or guest work-
ers. Also, researchers generally accepted, with little debate, that the
Netherlands had become a de facto multicultural or multi-ethnic society.
Their goal was to promote the cultural emancipation of minorities within
this multicultural society by describing and analysing the process of minor-
ity formation and drawing attention to the relation between group charac-
teristics and processes of position acquisition and attribution (Rath 1991:
36).
3.3.3 The integration paradigm
Although the minorities paradigm did not disappear, it was challenged by
rival paradigms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its dominant position
was undermined by 1992’s discontinuation of ACOM, which had a central
role in the field structure. The most significant rival paradigm has been de-
scribed as the ‘citizenship paradigm’ or ‘integration paradigm’ (Favell
2005: 46). Once again, we see how this paradigm named and framed the
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integration of migrants as ‘citizens’ in key societal institutions, such as
education and the labour market. To some extent, this line of research had
already been present for a considerable time, though had remained quanti-
tatively less important than the more cultural-anthropological line of re-
search (Choenni 1987).
The integration paradigm first gained prominence in a WRR report.
Entitled ‘Allochtonenbeleid’ (1989), it suggested replacing the concept of
‘minorities’ with ‘allochthonous’, so as to avoid putting too much empha-
sis on the group dimension of integration. The report also called for more
proactive social-economic participation by immigrants in order to prevent
them from becoming welfare categories. Migrants would have to be able to
stand on their own feet instead of being dependent upon government facil-
ities (WRR 1989: 17). Although the notion of ‘citizenship’ was not yet em-
ployed in this report, it would become the central concept in later studies
from a similar perspective (Engbersen & Gabriëls 1995b; Van der Zwan &
Entzinger 1994). In the early 1990s, the Social and Cultural Planning
Office (SCP) also attributed more systematic attention to the social-
economic position of migrants. In this period, SCP measured the social-
economic position of migrants using generic data and also determined the
proportionality of migrant participation in direct comparison with data
about social-economic participation in society at large. This differed from
research undertaken by the Institute for Social and Economic Research
(ISEO), which gathered specific data about migrant groups by using certain
quantitative methods that SCP would go on to adopt at a later date.46
The focus on citizenship and social-economic participation also revealed
the changing underlying causal story. Not being able to be self-sufficient
was now considered the main explanation for integration problems, and the
welfare sensibility of the minorities policy was blamed for creating this
relationship of dependency. This can be interpreted as a shift away from
the group to the individual level, as well as a shift from structural factors
in society affecting the position of migrants to the individual qualities of
migrants (i.e. from position attribution to position acquisition). In the litera-
ture, this new paradigm has been described as a form of ‘new realism’, be-
cause of its realist tone on issues of integration (Prins 1997). The minori-
ties paradigm addresses issues of immigrant integration head-on, with im-
migrants being called to live up to their civic responsibilities.
The call for new realism in the Netherlands can be seen as a re-
sponse to, on the one hand, a Dutch governmental policy of ‘care’,
motivated and initiated since the 1970s by Christian and social-de-
mocratic governments, and, on the other hand, the demand for poli-
tically correct representations of social reality from the radical left.
The advocates of new realism think these standpoints are often too
soft on members of minority groups, and that they put an unjustified
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taboo on critically questioning their different habits, cultures and
beliefs. (ibid.: 118)
New realism also points to an important normative element of the citizen-
ship paradigm. It calls for full and equal citizenship of migrants, without
treating migrants too much as ‘dependents’ and without taboos that would
complicate the study of immigrant integration. Prins (ibid.: 117-142) lists
several characteristics of new realism, including the assertion that immi-
grant integration should be treated with courage instead of care. This new
realism claims to represent the voice of the common people that, thus far,
had been left unheard. It claims that by engaging in serious debates about
integration and cultures, immigrants are taken more seriously. As such, this
perspective sought to eradicate alleged taboos surrounding the debate on
social-economic participation of minorities and on the role of their social-
cultural backgrounds.
3.3.4 Transnational frames versus national frames
The immigrant integration research field was becoming increasingly frag-
mented around the turn of the millennium. Alternative frames emerged to
breach the ‘academic provincialism’ (Rath 1991; Van Amersfoort 1984)
that had characterised research to this point, by bringing the state ‘back in’
and stretching the perspective beyond the borders of the nation-state. More
and more, research in the Netherlands, as well as in many other countries,
acquired a pronounced European dimension (Geddes 2005). A criticism of
the integration (and minorities) paradigm concerned its confinement to the
context of the nation-state without questioning the nation-state – that re-
search had focused primarily on the integration of immigrants as citizens
within nation-states (Favell 2005). In this respect, national research para-
digms were often associated with nation-building legacies (Lavenex 2005).
By the end of the 1990s, the national dimension was increasingly ques-
tioned in a growing body of literature that adopted transnationalist or post-
nationalist frames (Council for Public Government (ROB) 2001; Council
for Social Development (RMO) 2005; Entzinger 2002; Entzinger & Van
der Meer 2004; Scientific Council for Government Policy 2001b; Snel &
Engbersen 2002; Van Amersfoort 2001). For instance, WRR adopted a
transnationalist frame by naming Dutch society an ‘immigration society’.
It drew attention to the formation of transnational communities and
causally linked migration and diversity to the transformation of society.
Furthermore, the council adopted a normative perspective that migration
and diversity were inescapable facets of the ongoing process of modernisa-
tion that should benefit the receiving countries (WRR 2001b). Entzinger
(2002) also drew attention to the formation of these transnational commu-
nities and to the emerging reality of dual identities among migrants. Snel
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and Engbersen (2002) describe transnational citizenship as a new form of
citizenship that bonds migrants to both their countries of origin and their
destination. Finally, Entzinger and Van der Meer (2004) draw attention to
how immigrant integration involves an adaptation of the host society’s in-
stitutions, for example, the adaptation of welfare state arrangements.
Transnationalist problem framing can be clearly observed in this literature,
which stresses the formation of transnational ties (migration links, dual na-
tionalities, dual identities), defining migrants as transnational citizens, ex-
plaining immigrant integration in terms of both participation and the trans-
formation of national institutions in response to migration and, finally, link-
ing immigrant integration to normative processes of internationalisation
and globalisation.
The turn of the millennium also saw a rise in studies with a more assimi-
lationist problem framing. This included SCP studies that gradually shifted
from universalism to assimilationism. At this time, SCP simultaneously
pointed to the progress that would have been made in the social-economic
domain and drew increasing attention to the lack of progress in what it de-
scribed as ‘social-cultural integration’ (SCP 2003). Moreover, it rejected
the claim that the Netherlands would have become a multicultural society
and started to look at more social-cultural explanations for immigrant inte-
gration, such as criminality, gender equality, residential segregation, social
contacts and language proficiency (SCP 1998, 2002). Along with SCP,
other researchers, such as Koopmans (2003; Koopmans et al. 2005), were
at odds with the emerging transnationalist perspectives. According to
Koopmans, immigrant integration remained primarily a national process, as
there was little evidence of transnational claims being made by migrants
themselves. He also believed that the absence of an effort to achieve
social-cultural integration – for instance, because of resilient pillarist ten-
dencies to accommodate cultural differences – would serve as one of the
explanations for stagnating integration. In contrast to the transnationalist
literature, these studies name and frame immigrant integration in terms of
social-cultural integration and social cultural issues. They define migrants
as transnational citizens; they focus on the social-cultural adaptation of mi-
grants instead of the adaptation of national institutions and, finally, they
place integration within a normative perspective of preserving national so-
cial cohesion and national identity in an era of globalisation and
internationalisation.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how immigrant integration developed into an in-
tractable controversy in research and policy over the past decades. Both
immigrant integration research and policy were increasingly marked by
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uncertainty in terms of problem framing. In immigrant integration policy,
the problem framing changed about once every decade: from a differential-
ist frame until the 1970s, to a multiculturalist frame with universalist traits
in the 1980s, a universalist frame in the 1990s and, finally, a more assimi-
lationist frame after the turn of the millennium. This illustrates the incon-
sistency of policy in this domain. Furthermore, the policy frames often dif-
fered and even conflicted in various ways. For instance, the differentialist
policies of the 1970s were clearly at odds with the more integration-or-
iented policies of later periods. Or, the policy directed at emancipation of
ethnic minorities was at odds with the more universalist approach of the
1990s, as well as with the assimilationist approach from after the turn of
the millennium.
No doubt there has been a growing fragmentation in problem framing in
immigrant integration research. Although the scarce research on this topic
up until the 1960s regularly followed a differentialist frame, in the 1970s a
dominant minorities paradigm was established that contained a multicultur-
alist problem framing with some traits of universalism. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, a rival perspective emerged (the integration or citizenship
paradigm) that contained a more universalist problem framing. Finally, in
the late 1990s and after the turn of the millennium, transnationalist and
post-nationalist frames exacerbated the fragmentation. At the beginning of
the twenty-first century, no dominant research frame existed, thus strength-
ening the observation that, in the research field as well, immigrant integra-
tion had become an intractable controversy.
Furthermore, the frameshifts in research and policy seem to have over-
lapped. In both research and policy, a multiculturalist problem framing be-
came dominant from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. This period would
have been notably affected by the minorities memorandum (1983) and
ACOM and WRR reports. Later, more universalist frames emerged in both
research and policy during the same period, between the end of the 1980s
and the early 1990s. In policy, a new memorandum marked this shift in
1994; in research, this period involved various reports, including a second
report by WRR in 1989. Finally, the rise of transnationalist and assimila-
tionist frames in research and the rise of assimilationism in policy also
seem to have been more or less parallel developments, primarily taking
place around the turn of the millennium and immediately after. In this peri-
od, two government memorandums on the integration policy ‘new style’, a
report from a parliamentary investigative committee, several reports by
SCP and a third report by WRR appear to have played important roles.
The following chapters will zoom in on each of the periods during
which frameshifts took place and new frames emerged in immigrant inte-
gration research and policy. They will analyse empirically how and why
these frameshifts occurred in research and policy, particularly looking to
explain the role that the research-policy nexus served in these shifts.
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4 Technocracy and the construction of
the Dutch multicultural model (1978-1983)
The preceding chapter illustrated how a multiculturalist problem frame
emerged in both policy and research during the end of the 1970s and the
early 1980s. The approach was to become internationally renowned –
termed the ‘Dutch multicultural model’. This chapter will venture into the
strategic and symbiotic co-evolution of this frame in policy and research.
More precisely, it examines the minorities policy and the minorities re-
search paradigm.
As will be seen, the configuration of research-policy relations in this per-
iod played a major role in keeping the Dutch debate on immigrant integra-
tion ‘behind closed doors’ (see e.g. Guiraudon 1997). Indeed, as the litera-
ture reveals, during this period the configuration of research-policy rela-
tions was highly technocratic. What has yet to be analysed is how and why
this technocratic research-policy nexus evolved at this time and how it con-
tributed to the construction of the Dutch multicultural model. This techno-
cratic nexus is often associated with a tendency for depoliticisation. The
situation, however, is more nuanced, as shown by the strong convergence
between researchers and policymakers at this time in terms of their belief
in rational societal steering. Furthermore, the nexus created a very specific
logic of problem framing that provided the structural basis for a multicul-
tural model.
4.1 The rise of a multiculturalist model
Primary questions to be addressed at this point are: how did the shift from
differentialism to multiculturalism take place? Which research and policy
actors were involved in it? And what were the positions and frames of
those actors? This analysis will reveal how even at the point in time when
the now famous Dutch multicultural model emerged, a multiplicity of
frames existed. Being advocated by varying actors at the time, the many
frames complicated the debate on immigrant integration. Moreover, in the
context of research-policy dialogues, the selection and interpretation of re-
levant research findings differed greatly among the actors. In fact, the rise
of the Dutch multicultural model was far less self-evident than has been
suggested. As will be discussed, a very particular configuration of the
research-policy nexus was to play a central role in taming the ongoing
frame controversies and construction of the first dominant policy and re-
search paradigms in this field.
4.1.1 From differentialism to multiculturalism
Until well into the 1970s, a differentialist framing of migration accounted
for both the absence of a minorities policy and of more significant research
interest in this issue. There was a belief in both the policy and research do-
mains that an immigrant integration policy was superfluous, as (most) im-
migrants would return to their home countries. Researchers showed little
interest in immigrant integration (Penninx 1988b: 18-20). Early 1970s
memoranda originating from those policy divisions responsible for specific
groups of ‘temporary’ migrants – such as the Department of Social Affairs
(guest labourers), Department of Culture, Recreation and Social Work
(Surinamese, Moluccans) and Department of Foreign Affairs (asylum ap-
plicants) – state clearly that the Netherlands was not and should not be a
country of immigration.
However, a series of developments took place in the 1970s that would
prompt a number of actors to question this differentialist frame. Firstly,
even after the active recruitment of foreign labour had been halted follow-
ing the oil crisis of 1973, immigration continued. The oil crisis marked the
beginning of an economic reconstruction that would significantly affect la-
bour intensive industries (textiles, mining) in which many immigrants were
employed (De Beer 1998: 242). However, many foreign labourers did not
return to their home countries and, instead, brought their families over to
the Netherlands. Notably between 1977 and 1981, family migration led to
a steep growth of specific migrant groups, including Turks and Moroccans
(Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 26). On top of this, the independence of
Surinam brought two more waves of immigration to the Netherlands: one
in 1975 at the time of the country’s formal independence and one in 1980
when Surinamese were given a final opportunity to qualify for Dutch na-
tionality. The end of the 1970s consequently marked a period with unpre-
cedented immigration levels.
Secondly, the growing presence of migrants in Dutch society contributed
to a series of events that would bring attention to the issue of immigrant in-
tegration. For the first time since those that took place in the region of
Twente in the 1960s (Groenendijk 1990b), ethnic riots occurred in 1972
and 1976 in the cities of Rotterdam and Schiedam (Donselaar & Wolff
1996). The simultaneous emergence of several anti-immigrant and ex-
treme-right parties in the early 1970s caused considerable public arousal.
Among those was the Dutch National People’s Union, which put candi-
dates up for the municipal elections in The Hague in 1982. Another ex-
treme-right organisation called the Centre Party caused much consternation
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by gaining wide support in Almere, not only in the neighbourhoods pri-
marily populated by labourers where extreme-right parties traditionally find
approval, but also in the city’s middle-class areas.
Furthermore, a series of terrorist acts was committed by Moluccan mi-
grants in the 1970s. At that time, the Moluccan community had already
been living – ‘temporarily’ – in the Netherlands for over a quarter century,
without any clear prospect for either return or integration. Since the 1950s,
their position had deteriorated from one of stagnation, to one of marginali-
sation and radicalisation (Smeets & Veenman 2000). The terrorist acts in-
volved two train hijackings in 1955 and 1957 and, in the same year, the
hostage-taking of an Indonesian consulate and an attempt to kidnap the
Dutch queen. In 1958, Drente’s provincial offices were also taken hostage,
though the most notorious action may have been that year’s hostage-taking
of a class at a primary school, which received widespread attention and re-
sulted in a great deal of public and political debate (Bootsma 2000). In re-
sponse, the government decided to review its policy towards Moluccans
(Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 12). A memorandum issued in 1978 illus-
trates the government’s efforts to integrate Moluccans.1 The impact of the
events included raising a general awareness of how various immigrant
minorities were positioned in Dutch society (Lucassen & Köbben 1992:
84-85). In addition to a number of negative effects, such as declining levels
of tolerance in society and waning support for the political aims of the
Moluccans, the terrorist acts had a series of positive effects, such as in-
creasing awareness about the deplorable position of minorities, the multi-
ethnic character of Dutch society and the demonstrative effect that a new
approach towards the Moluccan community could have on other minority
groups (Köbben 1979).
Subsequently, various actors cited a growing ‘tension between norm and
fact’ regarding whether or not the Netherlands was a country of immigra-
tion (Entzinger 1975). In addition, researchers began to pay systematically
more attention to minorities in Dutch society. In 1978, ACOM was estab-
lished to advise on research programming and to coordinate research on
minorities. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the committee provided an
important stimulus to the development of research in this domain
(Entzinger 1981; Penninx 1988b; Van Putten 1990). ACOM was affiliated
to CRM and, despite reluctance on the part of other government depart-
ments, CRM was leading the way in advocating a changed perspective on
immigrant integration. Welfare and migrant organisations also played an
important role as representatives of the involved minority groups in the late
1970s. These organisations also called for more systematic attention for
minorities, although they less emphasised the commonalities of various mi-
grant groups’ social positions. Furthermore, the events and developments
of the 1970s placed immigrant integration firmly on the political agenda.
In 1978, a parliamentary motion was issued calling for a general policy on
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the integration of ethnic minorities. In response, the government estab-
lished a directorate, led by Henk Molleman, for the coordination of a
minorities policy at the Department of Home Affairs. According to
Köbben (1979), the Moluccan terrorist acts had a direct influence on the
establishment of this directorate.
A report by WRR, entitled ‘Ethnic minorities’, was a direct stimulus to
the development of a minorities policy by Molleman’s directorate (1979).
The contours of the minorities policy were specified for the first time in
the 1980 reply memorandum to this report, which was elaborated into a
draft minorities memorandum a year later. Ultimately, after consultation
with welfare and migrant organisations, this became the final minorities
memorandum in 1983. These memoranda developed a multiculturalist per-
spective on immigrant integration, in contrast to the differentialist approach
of the 1970s. At the same time, in the field of research, ACOM and WRR
were advocating a more multiculturalist approach.
This brief reconstruction indicates the involvement of several research
and policy actors in this period. Firstly, in the field of research, ACOM
and WRR seem to have played an important role. Both published reports
(ACOM 1979; WRR 1979) that are often seen as turning points in this do-
main (Entzinger 1984: 95; Penninx 1988b: 22). Secondly, in the field of
policymaking, there were various policy departments engaged with this is-
sue, including CRM and the Departments of Social Affairs, Foreign
Affairs and Home Affairs (Entzinger 1984: 107). Welfare organisations can
also be distinguished as a group of actors who were involved in policy-
making. This calls first for an analysis of these actors’ positions within
their fields and their problem frames of immigrant integration and, subse-
quently, an evaluation of their boundary work.
4.1.2 The Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM)
ACOM2 was formally established in 1978 to advise the Dutch government
on research coordination and funding. Established by CRM, it was a direct
product of government efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to strengthen its role
in research programming, which was also manifest in other domains (Van
Hoesel 1984). ACOM consisted, primarily, of ‘independent experts’. This
came in contrast to other research committees that often had a ‘tripartite’
character, composed of researchers and the representatives of involved
groups and government departments (Entzinger 1981). ACOM had a full-
time secretary, whose position was financed by CRM. In addition, a civil
servant from CRM acted as an observer at ACOM meetings and functioned
as a trait-d’-union to the department. By nature, ACOM was a ‘technical-
scientific committee’ (Penninx 1988b: 22). Its role was to advise CRM on
research programming, on the scientific quality of research proposals, to
coordinate research relations between research projects, to monitor the
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progress of these projects and to provide policy advice based on research
(Entzinger 1981: 108).
ACOM enjoyed a rather exclusive position within the field, as it brought
together almost all those researchers involved in the immigration domain.
It consisted of nine experts from different disciplines. Köbben was one of
the experts to enhance the authority of ACOM. Taking a central role in the
committee’s establishment and serving as its chair (Van Putten 1990),
Köbben enjoyed respect among policymakers and researchers alike. This
was borne from his prior involvement in a special commission set up in
the 1970s to discuss the Moluccans in the Netherlands – the Köbben-
Mantouw Commission – as well as his pioneering work in immigrant inte-
gration research.
In its first report, ‘Minorities research advice’ (1979), ACOM provided
both government research programming and more general policy advice
(Entzinger 1984; Penninx 1988b). The report was a departure from the pre-
vailing differentialist problem framing of government policy. It named the
Netherlands a ‘de facto country of immigration’ and a ‘multi-ethnic so-
ciety’, and it adopted the social classification of immigrants as ‘cultural
minorities’ or ‘ethnic minorities’, a classification developed by Van
Amersfoort (1974) several years before. This document presented a causal
theory: if the Dutch government were to take no specific measures to pro-
mote the emancipation and social-economic participation of cultural mino-
rities, then minority formation – or the development of an ethnic under-
class – would prove inevitable. From a normative perspective, the leading
principle should be that each individual and every group have equal oppor-
tunities for participation within the context of the law and the correct appli-
cation of existing (and, if necessary, new) rules (Van Amersfoort 1974: 7).
ACOM developed this frame in the context of what it saw as a growing
tension between norm and fact concerning the status of immigrant settle-
ment. In contrast to the norm that immigration should be temporary, it saw
migrants settling permanently as fact. Whereas from a differentialist
perspective, the growing presence of migrants was seen as a temporary
phenomenon (as in the case of guest labourers), from a multiculturalist per-
spective, the migrants were framed as permanent ethnic or cultural minori-
ties within society. Entzinger, who was then secretary of ACOM and one
of the authors of the 1978 report, had drawn attention to this tension in an
influential article several years before during his role as an administrator
for CRM. The article claimed that:
the Netherlands, partly due to government intervention, has become
a country of immigration, while that very same government believes
it should not be, [presumably out of] fear of overpopulation and fear
of minority problems on a scale comparable to some European
states and the US. (Entzinger 1975: 327)
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4.1.3 The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)
Another actor that played an important role during this period was WRR.
The council was established in 1972 with the ambitious task of designing
‘a future vision for society for long-term policy development […] identify
problem areas [...] that necessitate prioritisation [and] coordinate govern-
ment scientific institutes [...] so as to avoid overlap and lacunae’ (Van
Veen in Hirsch-Ballin 1979: 13).3 WRR was to provide scientific advice
on a variety of policy topics from a multidisciplinary perspective and with
a long-term time frame. Initially, WRR was created on a temporary basis;
however, in 1976 it was formally established through legislation.
WRR’s position – straddling scientific research and policy – was a re-
flection of more general cultural and structural developments within Dutch
social sciences and politics in the 1960s and early 1970s. On one hand, the
Dutch social sciences were fairly attuned to the needs of policymaking and
to the country’s political culture (see e.g. Blume et al. 1991; Gastelaars
1985). There was a concerted effort among social scientists to ‘become
more closely involved in government policy’, in a way that would not only
provide scientific information, but also address fundamental policy ques-
tions (Adriaansens 1997: 23-26). For instance, the Royal Dutch Academy
of Sciences was majorly involved in the institutionalisation of the social
sciences in policy formulation.
Yet, on the demand side of policymaking, there were structural and cul-
tural factors favouring scientific involvement in policymaking. In structural
terms, the fragile coalitional character of Dutch politics and its structural
imperative of consensus-seeking contributed to scientific research being an
impartial and objective source of expertise in policymaking (Den Hoed
1995). This structure of consensus-seeking did not, for example, allow for
the establishment of a WRR that would be too closely associated to a parti-
cular government department, as this would contribute to asymmetry
among various political leaders. What it did allow for, however, was estab-
lishment of an independent and ‘scientific’ WRR, which, relying on an ex-
ternal source of expertise, was more distanced from government and could
support consensus-seeking. Using social science for consensus-seeking has
often gone hand in hand with Dutch pillarism; scientific expertise was reg-
ularly applied to depoliticise issues that could threaten inter-pillar stability
(Lijphart 1968). In cultural terms, there was a strong belief in the policy re-
levance of social sciences. This was illustrated by the so-called ‘committee
on the preparation of research for the future structure of society’ (also
known as the De Wolff Committee), which, in 1970, advised establishing a
planning council – the future WRR – for ‘the scientific preparation of poli-
cies aimed at the establishment of systematic and consistent policies’. This
would ‘contribute to the rationalisation of the debate about policy pro-
blems’ (De Wolff in Hirsch-Ballin 1979: 10-12).
92 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
By the time WRR decided to take up the issue of ‘ethnic minorities’ in a
report to the government, its task had been somewhat modified in response
to Parliament’s criticism of its allegedly impure, technocratic role in Dutch
politics (Hirsch-Ballin 1979: 140). As a result, WRR would no longer pro-
vide ‘advice’ but only ‘scientifically sound information on developments
that affect society on the long term’.4 It was considered ‘the task of the
Cabinet to prepare a consistent policy […] not a task of the WRR’.5 WRR
would, however, provide information ‘to the aid of government policy’,
opening up possibilities for relations with Parliament (Hirsch-Ballin 1979:
168; Scientific Council for Government Policy 1977: 14). Finally, a regula-
tion was passed that required the government to respond to WRR studies
within a maximum of three months, so as to enhance the transparency of
how policy utilised these reports and increase the possibilities for parlia-
mentary control on government application of WRR reports (Hirsch-Ballin
1979: 177).6 As research has shown, WRR adopted a rather moderate role
in the 1970s. On the whole, it accepted and followed the general contours
of policy and provided scientific information within them (Hirsch-Ballin
1979).
As a boundary organisation, WRR’s delicate relation to broader develop-
ments in research and policy is also reflected in its internal organisation
(Adriaansens 1997: 39). For instance, council members are selected based
on disciplinary background as well as political affinity. In this way, the
council reflects the spectrum of political parties and of various scientific
disciplines. While appointment of the council chairman is a political
choice, it is based on scientific authority.7 The decision to replace the en-
tire council every five years encompasses an element of proximity as well
as distance to politics and science. It creates a certain discord within the
four-year cycle of Dutch politics, allowing members to maintain closeness
to the scientific field, but also adapt to the changing social and political en-
vironment. Furthermore, whereas WRR’s research agenda is formally
decided upon by the council itself, in practice, it is discussed with the
Prime Minister. Research topics are selected according to scientific and po-
litical criteria, such as whether an issue lends itself to political intervention
(WRR 1988: 5-6). The government can also issue advisory requests to
WRR, though WRR is not obliged to indulge them. Moreover, there are in-
ternal structures for resolving disagreements and conflicts that could threa-
ten unanimity of support for a report in the council. Council members can
choose to take a minority position, which can also be a way of putting
pressure on the council to adopt specific changes. There is a hierarchical
relationship between the council and WRR staff and, finally, the chairmen
and secretaries of specific projects often play an important role in ensuring
that agreements be reached.
In 1978, just after establishment of the second council of this then still
relatively young organisation, WRR decided to take up the issue of
TECHNOCRACY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DUTCH MULTICULTURAL MODEL 93
immigrant integration. Like ACOM, WRR reframed immigrant integration
in multiculturalist terms in its report ‘Ethnic minorities’, published in
1979. This report stated that migrants had become permanent minorities
becoming what was now an ‘open, multi-ethnic society’ (ibid.: XX). It ar-
gued that:
the assumption that minorities would remain only temporarily in
our country has proven to be wrong [...] [and] policy should take
into account the possibility of permanent residence in the
Netherlands, [...] accepting the fact that in Dutch society ethnic and
racial diversity have increased permanently. (ibid.: XXXIX)
Like ACOM, WRR would play an important role in the social construction
of minorities and advocacy for a general minorities policy. It stressed the
‘common and shared nature’ of the problems that ethnic minorities faced,
especially ‘social deprivation, maintaining their own cultural identity and
contact with a different kind of society’ (ibid.: VIII). A specific policy for
minorities would be required as ‘the distinctive nature of [their] problems
lies in the fact that many people belonging to ethnic minorities experience
them cumulatively; such an accumulation does not apply in the case of
members of other economically weak groups in society’ (ibid.: VIII).
Unlike ACOM, WRR did not elaborate a definition of ‘ethnic minorities’.
It followed a more pragmatic approach, focusing only on those immigrant
groups that had already been the object of government intervention (ibid.:
7). This included the Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans, as
well as foreign workers.
The policy slogan ‘Integration with retention of cultural identity’ was
explicitly denounced by WRR, which believed it would divert attention
away from the integration of immigrants in society. The goal instead would
be to achieve ‘cultural equality’ within a multi-ethnic society (ibid.: XX).
Without resorting to cultural relativism, WRR adopted a more dynamic or
interactionist view of immigrant cultural identities, stressing the need for
mutual adaptation.
The question of separate identity needs to be considered in the light
of a plural society, in which the majority and minorities are recep-
tive towards one another’s views and take account of the essential
cultural values of each other’s cultures, while at the same time ac-
knowledging that active participation in society by minorities will
require a change in attitudes on both sides. (ibid.: XXXVI)
In this context, WRR also clearly posits boundaries to its multiculturalist
perspective. Immigrants would have to respect the rule of law and, in cases
of cultural confrontations where no compromise seemed possible, the
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council saw no option other than to protect ‘the achievements of our cul-
ture’ (ibid.: XXII).
Besides mutual adaptation in terms of identity development, WRR em-
phasised the importance of social-economic participation as a condition for
the emancipation of members from minority groups. It elaborated a causal
theory, which stressed that ‘the positive enjoyment and development of a
separate culture in freedom would only become possible if a number of ba-
sic living requirements are adequately met’ (ibid.: XXVI-XIX). Priority
should therefore be given to combating social-economic deprivation. ‘An
active policy to combat social deprivation should [...] be seen as a neces-
sary condition both for the minorities’ desire to preserve their own culture
in an atmosphere of freedom and for the majority’s idea of equality in a
multicultural society’ (ibid.: XX). An amelioration of the social position of
minorities would contribute to ‘tolerance of minority cultures by the cultur-
al majority, as the image formed by the majority of a minority and its cul-
ture proves to be related to the social status of the bearers of that culture’
(ibid.: XX).
4.1.4 Government departments
Various government departments were involved in the domain of immi-
grant integration during this period. However, they framed immigrant inte-
gration in different ways. Firstly, various departments were still involved in
the differentialist policies targeted at specific migrant groups. This institu-
tional fragmentation reflected the differentialist problem framing that these
departments carried until well into the 1970s. It stressed the specificity of
the problems experienced by each group, rather than some common de-
nominator to be found across these groups. In accordance with the differ-
entialist perspective, there was no general immigrant integration policy up
until this point. Groups were also not bundled under a single generic cate-
gory (‘minorities’) but rather, listed specifically by their national origin
(Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans). The underlying theory here
was that each minority group had a unique position, thus requiring a
group-specific approach. Concrete elaboration of this purpose would de-
pend on the group’s particular circumstances and characteristics. Foreign
workers thus fell under the responsibility of the department that coordi-
nated labour affairs (the Department of Social Affairs), Surinamese and
Antilleans fell under the responsibility of the department that coordinated
the organisation of welfare to cultural groups (CRM) and refugees were
covered by the department that coordinated international affairs (the
Department of Foreign Affairs).
The normative premise of this differentialist frame seems to have been
especially pronounced: that the Netherlands was not and should not be a
country of immigration. This was sustained by economic arguments
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(migrants as a temporary labour reservoir), concerns about the international
division of labour (brain drain in countries of origin) and demographic ar-
guments (the Netherlands as an overpopulated country).8 The foreign
workers memorandum of 1970, developed by the Departments of Social
Affairs and CRM, stated clearly that:
It must not be forgotten that the demographic situation in the
Netherlands is not such that there would be any reason to promote
immigration [...] The Netherlands is definitely not a country of im-
migration. With every understanding for its human aspects, one can-
not conclude otherwise than that our country needs labour power
from other countries nor new families from other countries.9
Actors framed the problem of immigrant integration in a way that stressed
the allegedly temporary character of migration and immigrant settlement.
Although the term ‘integration’ was used in this period in the policy slogan
‘Integration with retention of identity’, it did not imply permanent integra-
tion in Dutch society but rather, social-economic integration as one facet of
the so-called ‘two-tracks policies’ in operation at this time. The other
‘track’ involved preservation of group structures and cultural identities to
help facilitate return migration. Rather than interpreting prolonged immi-
grant residence as an indication of the settlement of minorities, it was seen
as an indication of the need to step up efforts to stimulate return migration.
In fact, there were fierce political debates in the 1970s about financial in-
centives for return migrants, which were cynically labelled ‘get-lost bo-
nuses’ (Entzinger 1984: 89). Projects were also elaborated with the
Department of Development Aid to stimulate return migration with a view
to furthering growth in countries of origin through the REMPLOD
endeavour.
However, not all government departments supported this problem fram-
ing in the second half of the 1970s. CRM, for example, seems to have
adopted a somewhat different frame whereby the presence of migrants was
seen through the lens of their social position in Dutch society. Prior, in the
late 1960s, this department had begun paying more attention to foreign
workers as a permanent phenomenon in Dutch society, in response to,
among other events, the Twente riots between foreign workers and natives
(Groenendijk 1990a: 48; Lucassen & Köbben 1992). However, this in-
volved recognising the permanency of temporary labour migration rather
than the permanent status of migrants themselves. This perspective appears
to have changed in the second half of the 1970s, as indicated by CRM’s re-
naming and upgrading of its department on migrant groups to a higher le-
vel directorate on cultural minorities (Penninx 1988a: 20). Not only did up-
grading to a directorate suggest the issue had gained greater impetus, but
the new nomenclature also defined migrants’ presence as permanent,
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unlike previous forms of social classification that stressed their foreign or
temporary status.
Furthermore, terrorist acts by Moluccan migrants in the 1970s triggered
a change in the institutional embedding of policies towards this group. In
1976, the coordination of policies relating to Moluccans shifted to the
Department of Justice; in doing so, the matter acquired higher political sta-
tus, as the Minister of Justice was also Deputy Prime Minister. However, it
also implied a ‘law-and-order’ attitude towards the matter at hand
(Entzinger 1984: 107). In 1977, policy coordination shifted towards the
Department of Home Affairs, as the Minister of Home Affairs became
Deputy Prime Minister in a new government coalition. This switch sig-
nalled the rise of a governance approach to Moluccans, which would pro-
vide the basis for more extensive change in government policies towards
minorities.
4.1.5 A political entrepreneur
One political entrepreneur in particular, Molleman, would play a central
role in the field of policymaking during this period. Political parties only
began to formulate their positions on an immigrant integration policy in
the early 1980s (Fermin 1997: 77). The Liberal Party and the Christian
Democratic Party made no mention of ‘minorities’ in their election mani-
festos until 1981 (ibid.: 84, 121). Only the Social Democrats, one of the
three largest parties in Dutch politics, had paid any attention to this issue.
This was seen in a special committee on cultural minorities (ibid.: 101) es-
tablished in 1977 and led by Molleman, a young parliamentarian who be-
came a spokesperson for cultural minorities.
In the same year, during parliamentary debates on the latest instances of
Moluccan terrorism, Molleman had called for a more all-encompassing ap-
proach to cultural minorities (Molleman 1978; Van Kuik 1986). An inter-
departmental committee formed to revise Moluccans policy advised the
Minister of Home Affairs (then responsible for Moluccans) that measures
taken with regard to this specific group within various government depart-
ments should also apply to other minority groups (Van Kuik 1986: 118).
However, the minister declined on the grounds of limited administrative
capacity. In 1978, Parliament discussed a new government memorandum
that revised government policies towards Moluccans,10 and Molleman is-
sued a parliamentary motion in which he called for a revision of govern-
ment policy towards all ‘ethnic minorities’.11 He called for a ‘coherent set
of measures concerning education, housing, employment, health and so-
cial-cultural welfare, not just for Moluccans, but for all ethnic and cultural
minorities’ (Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 14). Although Molleman was
forced to withdraw his motion because of formal objections from his
Social Democratic Party, the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Home
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Affairs, who was responsible for coordinating Moluccan policy, decided to
adopt the motion. Subsequently, Molleman was invited by the minister to
take charge of the development of the Minorities Policy Directorate within
the Department of Home Affairs.12
An article by Molleman (1978) provides important indications of how
he framed immigrant integration.13 He rejects the policy slogan
‘Integration with retention of identity’ on the grounds that the image it por-
trays of cultures is too static and that it ignores the dilemmas that can be
associated with retaining one’s identity when migrants prove to be perma-
nent settlers (ibid.: 33). Rather, he calls the Netherlands a ‘multi-ethnic so-
ciety’, and adopts an ‘interactionist’ perspective on immigrant integration,
which involves a ‘process of ongoing interaction in a network of [...] social
relations between groups in a receiving country’ (ibid.: 334). He defines
migrants as cultural groups, or ‘cultural minorities’. This added a crucial
argument to the extension of the new approach towards not only the
Moluccan group in Dutch society, but also other minority groups, such as
Surinamese, Antilleans and foreign workers.14
Molleman further argues that, in addition to general measures that would
affect minorities, a specific approach to minority groups was required. He
refers to policy measures to ameliorate the position of these specific groups
as well as the need to promote the ‘emancipation’ of these groups. In the
aforementioned parliamentary motion, called for is a structure of represen-
tation and consultation with migrant groups themselves. Finally, being a
Social Democrat, Molleman (1978: 328) attributes the most importance to
the social-economic deprivation of migrants, and takes a normative posi-
tion on the transformation of Dutch society into a multi-ethnic society.
According to Molleman (1978: 335): ‘We must learn to share our historical
claims to living on our territory with groups whose cultures deviate sharply
from ours [...] We must learn to accept them, as they are, as people with
their own cultures’.
This focus on cultural minorities, the call for specific group measures
and a normative perspective on a multi-ethnic society indicate that
Molleman’s was a multiculturalist frame. However, an emphasis on the in-
teraction between groups and prioritising an amelioration of the position of
minorities in social-economic domains reveals that his frame also con-
tained some universalist traits. This frame was further developed in the re-
ply memorandum to the 1979 WRR report, the draft minorities memoran-
dum and the final minorities memorandum, all of which were developed
under Molleman’s directorship of the Minorities Policy Directorate. The re-
ply memorandum explicitly stated that the Netherlands had become a ‘mul-
ti-ethnic and multicultural society’.15 Assimilationism as well as segrega-
tionism (or differentialism) were explicitly discarded as models for a mino-
rities policy.
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The acceptance of ethnic minorities as equals excludes the possibi-
lity that they are forced to adopt Dutch culture [...]. [O]n the other
side, if the term ‘society’ is to have any meaning, being separated
from each other [segregationism] must also be denounced.16
Instead, the policy goal was formulated as ‘mutual adaptation in a multi-
cultural society with equal opportunities for autochthonous [natives] and
allochthonous’.17 Also, the reply memorandum concurred with WRR,
stressing the need to ameliorate the social position of minorities as the pri-
mary condition for integration.18 A cultural relativist position is avoided by
acknowledging that in some cases ‘minorities will not escape adaptation to
Dutch society’, especially in situations where the freedom of individuals is
involved.19
These contours would remain largely intact in the 1981 draft minorities
memorandum and 1983’s final minorities memorandum, despite elaborate
and lengthy consultations with various organisations involved in this issue
domain (Urbanus 1983). The aim of this minorities policy was to ‘achieve
a society in which the members of minority groups that reside in the
Netherlands can each, individually as well as group-wise, enjoy an equal
position and full opportunities for development’ (Urbanus 1983: 12). A
shift in focus, towards a more group-specific approach, did occur in the
draft minorities memorandum, demonstrating a move from universalism to
multiculturalism. More so than in the reply, the draft minorities memoran-
dum stressed that group identities and structures can help migrants acquire
a stronger position in Dutch society.
It must be seen in a positive light how a migrant in a situation that
is both new and uncertain will be committed to maintaining his
norms, values and certainties and will search for support primarily
from companions.20
However, in the final minorities memorandum, the government seems to
have stepped back from this more multiculturalist stance (Entzinger 1984:
133), warning against group-specific measures that ‘failed to represent
minorities in general policies on an equal footing with all other
inhabitants’.21
4.1.5 A political entrepreneur
Finally, attention must be given to those actors involved in the various wel-
fare and migrant organisations set up to represent the interests of minority
groups. On the whole, members of these organisations were not representa-
tives from minority groups, rather they were led by natives acting on be-
half of migrants – the so-called fiduciaries or zaakwaarnemers (Köbben
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1983; Tinnemans 1994). These organisations included the Dutch Centre for
Foreigners (Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders, NCB), the Foundation of
Surinamese Welfare Organisations (Landelijk Inspraakorgaan van
Surinaamse Welzijnsinstellingen, LISW) and the Consultation Body for
Welfare of Moluccans (Inspraakorgaan Welzijn Molukkers, IWM). Only
the IWM had significant representation from the Moluccan community it-
self. In addition, the interests of migrants were often represented by general
organisations from civil society that showed a special concern for immi-
grants, such as church foundations. These organisations and their staff also
took on the role of fiduciaries. Often they received support in the form of
funding from the Department of Culture.
Despite differences between the various welfare organisations estab-
lished for different groups, they framed immigrant integration in similar
terms. Fermin (1997: 168), in an elaborate analysis of documents relating
to these welfare organisations from the early 1980s, has shown that these
organisations framed immigrant integration in terms of a collective emanci-
pation process that was to take place from within the various groups. In
this respect, their framing was distinctly multiculturalist, as they named im-
migrant integration in terms of collective emancipation of migrant groups
defined as cultural minorities. In causal terms, the underlying theory was
that social-cultural emancipation is a condition for integration also, for ex-
ample, in the social-economic sphere. In this theory, group structures (in-
cluding group organisations) and group identities would fulfil a central role
in the integration process. In some respects, this multiculturalist framing
also contained some differentialist traits. The collective emancipation strat-
egy emphasised autonomy within a group’s own community by reinforcing
the unique cultural community and cultural identity (ibid.: 171). Whenever
possible, the organisations resisted what they saw as paternalistic govern-
ment interference in the cultural sphere (ibid.: 175), arguing instead for a
more prominent role of group organisations and rejecting the idea of ‘inte-
gration’ per se, as it would mean ‘mutual adaptation’ between migrant
groups and native society (Urbanus 1983: 13). Most organisations held on
to the idea of retaining their own cultural identity and some even cherished
the prospect of return migration, still very vivid among migrants at this
time (ibid.).
These welfare organisations selected and interpreted the problem context
somewhat differently than other actors. For instance, they did not take the
Moluccan terrorist acts as ‘evidence’ that a general immigrant integration
policy was needed as a way of preventing migrants from committing such
acts but rather, the acts were seen as an indication that migrants and their
representatives were not being taken seriously. More generally, these orga-
nisations did not interpret evidence of ongoing immigration and immigrant
settlement as indications that the government should develop an immigrant
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integration policy; instead, they saw the Netherlands becoming a nation of
communities that should be given a say in various domains of government.
In sum, research and policymaking in the late 1970s and early 1980s
was, at least initially, characterised by a multiplicity of frames. Some ac-
tors, including the Department of Social Affairs, most political parties until
the early 1980s and, to some extent also, the welfare organisations framed
immigrant integration in a differentialist way. This meant that there should
be no integration policy and that differences between cultural groups were
to be institutionalised and, according to some, that return migration had to
be facilitated. Adopting a more multiculturalist frame were other actors, in-
cluding CRM in the second half of the 1970s, ACOM, WRR, policy entre-
preneur Molleman and, to some extent, welfare organisations. This meant
that immigrants were defined as ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘cultural minorities’,
whose integration would be achieved via a combination of general and spe-
cific measures for certain groups to promote social-cultural emancipation
and social-economic participation. It also placed integration in the norma-
tive perspective of the transformation of Dutch society into a multi-ethnic
or multicultural society.
These frames also involved different ways of selecting and interpreting
evidence about the problem context. In a multiculturalist frame, ongoing
immigration and absence of return migration on any significant scale were
interpreted as evidence that migrants had become permanent minorities.
Along these lines, furthermore, the Moluccan terrorist acts became foci of
the deplorable social position of minorities and a significant argument for
developing a general immigrant integration policy, so as to prevent such
events from recurring. In a differentialist frame, however, select evidence
was based on demographic and economic arguments and ideas about inter-
national relations (e.g. brain drain). Signs of immigrant settlement and on-
going immigration were interpreted as indications that efforts to stimulate
return migration had to be stepped up.
4.2 The construction of a technocratic nexus
The rise of the Dutch multicultural model of integration appears to have
occurred within a setting initially characterised by a multiplicity of frames.
How and why did this multiculturalist model become dominant between
the period from 1978 to 1983? What was the role of research-policy dialo-
gues in this frameshift? And how were these dialogues organised in this
defining period for Dutch immigrant integration policy and research?
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4.2.1 The field of scientific research
In the field of scientific research, several actors played a key role in the
frameshift from differentialism to multiculturalism. Among the most re-
markable were ACOM and WRR.
Boundary work and the ‘holy fire’ of ACOM
ACOM consisted of a number of researchers that represented almost the
entire immigrant integration research domain in this period.22 Although at-
tention for immigrant integration was rapidly growing in the 1970s, not
least due to increased research funding by CRM (Penninx 1988b: 21), the
number of researchers involved in this field remained limited. Because of
its central position, ACOM was able to play a major role in the demarca-
tion of the structure of this evolving field while at the same time obtaining
a focal position in terms of research-policy relations and particularly with
CRM, with which it was associated.
In terms of demarcation, several leading members of ACOM had distinct
ideas about what was considered proper ‘minorities research’. This demar-
cation involved a choice for specific research methodologies and, related to
this, also a specific ethos. There was a preference for field research meth-
ods, inspired by cultural anthropology, in which the researcher became clo-
sely involved with immigrants as research objects in order to uncover their
inner world.23 According to Bovenkerk and Bunk (1983: 67), this involved
choosing specific ‘methods and techniques for gathering first-hand infor-
mation, and to the effects of these methods on relations between the re-
searcher and the people who are part of the processes, situations and events
being studied’. Standard techniques of sociological research would be in-
adequate since ‘one is confronted with groups of people and social issues
and phenomena that cannot be studied with any degree of verisimilitude by
means of standardised questionnaires, official documents and reports or by
controlled laboratory experiments’ (ibid.). Bovenkerk argues that research-
ers should choose methods in which they ‘spend a long period of time with
a group of people in everyday situations [although this is] often not the
path of least resistance’ (ibid.). The approach adopted by Bovenkerk
(1978) and others was revealed in a series of studies that tried to retrieve
patterns of discrimination by actually putting the researcher in the shoes of
immigrants. Van den Berg-Eldering (1978), for example, studied
Moroccans by travelling to Morocco to work with families, learning their
language and staying in their homes. Penninx adopted a similar approach
doing fieldwork in Turkey and North Africa, for which he learnt Turkish
and Arabic.24
Köbben, a leading anthropologist at this time, describes this as the ‘holy
fire’ that researchers must possess in order to unravel the living world of
immigrants, despite possible resistance from the involved groups or from
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government institutes (Köbben 1980). He contrasts this with research that
has been conducted ‘in haste […] from a desk [and] with a preference for
numbers and tables, [...] the research tradition of a broad group of sociolo-
gists’ (ibid.: 10). The ‘holy fire’ approach allows researchers to better per-
form their societal function of deciphering the world of immigrants and
communicating the results to a broader public. It also involves drawing at-
tention to processes of ‘minority formation’, for instance, due to
discrimination.
This methodological preference was related to an ethos that required re-
searchers to identify themselves with immigrants, who were often defined
as the ‘underdog’.25 For instance, the researcher’s ethic would dictate un-
covering patterns of racism or discrimination, regardless of opposition from
involved parties or criticism from other researchers.26 This was manifest in
the strong anti-racist and anti-discrimination norm characterising scientific
research in this period.27 In fact, many studies were oriented towards unco-
vering patterns of racism. A consequence of such focus, however, was that
research in this domain showed signs of being ‘fixated’ on cultural
differences.28
This demarcation of immigrant integration research was related to the
prominent role of anthropologists in this field (Entzinger 1981: 106).
Anthropologists such as Köbben, Bovenkerk and Penninx were among the
first to engage in research in this domain and later obtained central posi-
tions in organisations such as ACOM. Previously involved in the study of
cultures abroad, in places such as the former Dutch East Indies, anthropol-
ogists now turned their attention to immigrant minority cultures in the
Netherlands (Bovenkerk & Brunt 1983: 67). This explains why some of
their methods (field research) and their ethos (engaging in ‘alien’ cultures)
inspired minorities research in this early period and, according to some,
why there was such a strong fixation on the cultural factors of immigrant
integration (Choenni 1987).
In terms of coordination, some of ACOM’s leading experts advocated
that researchers deeply engage with ongoing policy developments.
Penninx, one of the researchers closely involved in developing the minori-
ties policy, had a background in social activism, including participation in
the Action Group for Foreign Workers, which at this time still advocated a
critical, Marxist perspective on immigration.29 Penninx was part of a group
who believed that scientific research should have a societal function.
Anthropology, they said, was useful for the transformation of society.30
Their activism concentrated mainly on the housing of foreign workers and
language courses. According to Penninx (in De Hart & Prins 2005: 183),
this type of activism was typical for the social sciences in the 1970s.
Köbben revealed his social engagement by participating in government
commissions on the status of the Dutch Antilles and Aruba and the posi-
tion of Moluccans in the Netherlands. In this context, he also reflected on
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the difficulties of such political engagement, recognising that politicians
would be unwilling to accept unwelcome messages (Bovenkerk, Buijs &
Tromp 1990; Köbben & Tromp 1999).
This policy orientation was also manifest in how ACOM interpreted its
formal role as an advisory body on research programming and policy de-
velopment for CRM. Already in the form of the 1979 report ‘Minorities re-
search advice’, ACOM had clearly extended its advisory role into CRM’s
domain. ACOM (1979: 3) believed that ‘in anticipation of developments in
the direction of a more integral approach’, it should draw in ‘many other
policy areas where specific mechanisms currently affect the position of
[minorities]’. In this period, ACOM openly assumed an advocacy role for
the development of a general minorities policy. Furthermore, it established
criteria for research priorities that would ensure that the supported research
would provide relevant insights into policy development. ACOM tried to
ensure policy relevance by establishing criteria for research prioritisation in
its publication. These criteria indicated that research should be of ‘social
relevance’, which meant that researchers had to concentrate on the most
important questions concerning the position of minorities that were on the
agenda (ACOM 1979: 70-72). In addition, research should be ‘practically
feasible’, with a preference for ‘large numbers of small studies that do not
take relatively long periods of time, rather than a limited number of long
research projects’ (ibid). Finally, research should focus primarily on those
themes that, up until that point, had received little attention.
Thus, the boundary work of ACOM appears to have involved a habitus
of engagement. It was twofold: being committed to social issues in order to
better the position of minorities (guided by an anthropological ethos and
methods) and staying engaged with ongoing policy developments.
Between advising and informing: WRR’s boundary work
Although WRR is not devoted to the field of immigrant integration, per se,
it did play a role in the relationship between research and policy in this
period. Its first report on immigrant integration in 1979 would mark the be-
ginning of a ‘tradition of involvement’ in this domain (Meurs & Broeders
2001) that would award it great authority in this research field in
particular.
WRR’s boundary work was closely related to that of ACOM. WRR co-
ordinated the development of its report with ACOM in various ways. It
consulted ACOM from an early stage in the process of discussing whether
or not to formulate a report on immigrant integration for the government.31
Subsequently, the project began by commissioning a preparatory study on
the state of the art in immigrant integration literature, with which ACOM
was again closely involved.32 For the study, WRR consulted with Köbben
and Van Amersfoort, the two prominent ACOM members.33 They, in turn,
recommended Penninx, who had also been a member of ACOM since its
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inception. Penninx (1979: 8) based his research primarily on prior studies
and interviews with researchers who were involved with ACOM.
Furthermore, ACOM members were invited on several occasions to attend
council meetings and discuss draft texts of the WRR report.34 These points
of contact also served to avoid overlap between ACOM and WRR, under
the agreement that ACOM would concentrate on coordinating research on
the position of minorities and WRR would concentrate on the relations be-
tween minorities and Dutch society at large in the context of developing
the minorities policy.35 The final WRR report stated that ‘close contact
was maintained with the Advisory Committee in the preparation of this re-
port’. Referring to ACOM’s advisory report, which was published in the
same week as the WRR report,36 WRR stated ‘it is reasonable to expect
that the orientation of this report and the research programme will dovetail
with one another’ (ibid.).
In this way, WRR incorporated the demarcation of proper minorities re-
search by ACOM, including its habitus of engagement. Moreover, two
WRR staff members who played an important role in this WRR initiative
had been previously engaged in this issue domain. Both had been involved
with immigrant groups in their former careers as civil servants.37 One of
them had been the head of a directorate for foreign workers at the
Department of Social Affairs. The fact that this person was now working
on a report that would provide the foundation for a general minorities pol-
icy, something that had been heavily opposed by the Department of Social
Affairs, stresses the frameshift that had taken place within WRR. Both staff
members had maintained an interest in this issue and both believed that the
events that had taken place in the late 1970s signalled a breakthrough.
Moreover, they believed that WRR could have an input in these matters.38
In terms of coordinating science-policy relations, WRR exhibited a style
of policy engagement similar to that adopted by ACOM. Although it
stressed its independence and scientific authority, it also attempted to stay
‘close’ to the administration so as to be relevant to the ongoing policy de-
velopments – keeping the administration close but out. In fact, it was
ACOM that encouraged WRR to take up this issue in an effort to reinforce
its claims for a general minorities policy. WRR’s scientific and political ca-
pital – ‘its central position and expertise’ – would make the argument for a
minorities policy more convincing.39 Although the WRR council did in-
deed decide to take up this issue in a report to the government,40 some
council members were hesitant about the need for the frameshift being ad-
vocated by ACOM.
Chairman of ACOM: [...] [I]t is very necessary that in addition to
ACOM, another institute engage itself with the minorities issue.
The departmental research organisations are less suitable to this
aim. WRR could be the proper institute for this, because of its
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integrative and long-term tasks. In addition, WRR is centrally lo-
cated and enjoys a certain prestige.41
The Secretary of ACOM ‘refers in this respect to the poor coordination on
the part of the government’.
WRR Council member: ‘[I] am still not convinced that in Dutch
government policy a framework would have to be developed for a
minorities policy.’
Chairman of ACOM: ‘[I] consider this necessary, although I could
make comments on the feasibility of this problem.’
Penninx: ‘[I] think that a policy must be developed for all ethnic
minorities, so as to guarantee that all groups be offered equal oppor-
tunities.’ 42
WRR’s engagement with the development of a minorities policy was also
manifest in the timing of the report in relation to ongoing policy develop-
ments. WRR had taken up this issue at a time when the government had
already accepted the need for a minorities policy and had set in motion the
process of developing such a policy by establishing a Minorities Policy
Directorate with Molleman at the helm. To be of relevance to these on-
going developments, WRR tried to advise more rapidly than usual, in just
over one year. It also maintained contacts with Molleman, who received a
draft text of the WRR report before it was published.43 In fact, WRR expli-
citly oriented itself around these ongoing policy developments at an early
stage of developing its report, indicating that its goal was to reflect on pol-
icy aims in the context of ongoing changes in the perception of the posi-
tion of minorities.
The desirability of a general policy for ethnic minorities has already
been recognised by many. [...] Also in policy, a – modest – shift in
focus towards an integration aim can be discerned. This new realisa-
tion demands reflection on the official aims of policy [...] in the
context of permanent residence in our society.44
Furthermore, WRR’s coordination of relations with policy was charac-
terised by a strong belief that by providing policy-relevant knowledge and
expertise, it could contribute to the rational resolution of this social pro-
blem.45 There was a belief within WRR that the social problem of immi-
grant integration could be effectively resolved if the government, informed
by its advice, could bring immigration to a halt and adopt a variety of so-
cial measures to promote social-economic participation and social-cultural
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emancipation. This positivist belief in the feasibility of the social problem
was also manifest in WRR reports on other contemporaneous social issues.
According to one of the staff members involved in WRR’s ‘Ethnic minori-
ties’ report from 1979:
This report fits very well in its epoch. [...] There was still the idea
that, in terms of social positions and social deprivation, a lot could
be done. That optimism of WRR can be found in many reports from
this era. [...] We had the feeling that it was a very clever report,
stopping immigration, and step-by-step integrating minorities in
Dutch society, and then [resulting in] their social position improv-
ing, and the problem being resolved.46
The boundary work of engaging with ongoing policy developments was re-
lated to concerns about the positioning of WRR. At this time, WRR was
still a relatively young organisation (the legislation on WRR was passed in
1976). The second council, inaugurated in 1978, would prove to be espe-
cially ambitious in terms of establishing WRR’s position.47 In this context,
it wanted to take hold of the issue, showing how WRR could really ‘mat-
ter’ as an institute that could deal with complex social issues and provide
useful policy advice to government.48
Efforts to position WRR not just in the field of research, but also in the
field of politics are also revealed in a boundary struggle that emerged dur-
ing creation of WRR’s 1979 report. The struggle concerned the issue of
whether the role of WRR was to provide ‘scientifically sound information’
or to provide ‘scientific policy advice’.49 Fears of an overly technocratic
WRR had formally restricted the organisation’s role in the 1970s to provid-
ing ‘scientifically sound information’ only. This raised the question of
whether or not WRR should add its own analysis to the preparatory study
by Penninx. The preparatory study was considered to be of such ‘quality’
and ‘significance’ that the council decided to publish this study together
with the WRR’s report to the government (WRR 1979: VII). This excep-
tional formula had never been used before.
On one side, there were proponents for providing an advisory report to
the government in which the council could formulate its own position
based on Penninx’s preparatory study and put forward specific policy re-
commendations. Arguments were made stating ‘it is the task of WRR to
provide advice, to deliver publications that are of use for policy organisa-
tions’, ‘it is important that the council test its own competencies’ and ‘a
problem-exploration would risk running into the same water as ACOM’.50
On the other side, there were proponents for a more explorative ‘problem
orientation’, in which WRR would only publish Penninx’s preparatory
study or expand it with only a brief informative WRR report. This was
supported by arguments that providing advice would be ‘too risky and
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suggestive [...] as it is no longer entirely based on available information
[that] WRR has an informative role and that its advisory task is still con-
tested’, and that publication of the preparatory study ‘is perhaps not of too
much use for government, but it can be of significant importance for so-
ciety, which is also a task of WRR’.51
The outcome of this struggle was decided in favour of the advisory alter-
native exhibiting a deep policy engagement. WRR wanted to show that it
could really matter by exploring the limits of its advisory role and ‘testing
[its] working methods, and [its] abilities to advise on the short term’.52 In
addition, the council considered itself obligated to add its own position to
the preparatory study ‘because of the nature of the study – a policy de-
scription and evaluation’ (WRR 1989: VII). The expectation was that most
people would actually read the WRR report and then selectively read parts
of the preparatory study à la carte.53 The choice for the advisory alternative
was also made in the hope that WRR would exploit the policy window of
opportunity that had opened up in this period, with policy in a deadlock
after having conceded that a minorities policy was needed in 1978 follow-
ing the Molleman motion.
It seems possible to develop a proper recommendation within a rea-
sonably short period. The first variant [...] will be taken as a point
of departure for this recommendation. It is, however, still possible
that in doing so, WRR will trigger irritation from the policy depart-
ments. We are, however, faced with a situation where policy is cur-
rently in a deadlock. As a result of the public debate that will follow
our study [...], there is a possibility that policy priorities can be
changed.54
The project on ethnic minorities marked a broader change in WRR’s role.
Whereas in the 1970s, WRR consented to a model of ‘moderate decision-
ism’, one in which it provided scientific information as input to political
decision-making (Hirsch-Ballin 1979), the project on minorities appears to
have been a precursor for a change in WRR’s role to provide more norma-
tive policy advice.55 In this context, WRR’s approach shifted from ‘a
broad approach in which many different topics of government policy for
the long-term were dealt with [...] towards an in-depth approach in which
only several, essential aspects of government policy are examined [...]’
(WRR 1992: 140; author’s emphasis).
In sum, ACOM and WRR demarcated and coordinated research-policy
relations in rather similar ways. The demarcation of minorities research in-
volved a habitus of engagement with minorities as ethnic or cultural groups
who experienced specific problems and, to some extent, a certain cultural
fixation. This was influenced by the prominent role of anthropologists in
the evolution of this research field, who now held central positions within
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the research field – ACOM, in particular – and had distinct preferences in
terms of research methods and ethos. The coordination of relations with
policy also revealed a habitus of engagement in both ACOM and WRR.
Both were strongly oriented towards ongoing developments concerning
government plans for a minorities policy, and they also coordinated their
efforts to influence these developments. However, this policy engagement
had different structural origins for ACOM and WRR. For the former, this
way of coordinating policy relations was related to how it demarcated
minorities research in terms of engagement with cultural minorities, some-
thing which motivated researchers to engage with policy developments that
would affect this position. For WRR, it was rather related to its positioning
in the broader context of research and politics in the Netherlands. In fact,
producing the 1979 report was part of a repositioning of WRR towards a
more policy-oriented advisory role, beyond its formal role of merely pro-
viding scientifically sound information.
4.2.2 The field of policymaking
The preceding section’s analysis revealed the variety of actors involved in
research-policy relations during this formative period of the Dutch multi-
cultural model. This section looks into what role the actors played in con-
structing a research-policy nexus.
The boundary work of no immigrant integration research: Government
departments and welfare organisations until the 1970s
The relatively late development of immigrant integration research was not
only due to an absence of interest in this issue on the part of researchers,
but also to the lack of government demand and funding for such research
(Penninx 1988b). Although the Department of Social Affairs was responsi-
ble for foreign workers, being one of the largest categories of migrants, it
was hardly involved in encouraging research into the position of these
groups. This lack of interest stemmed from the department’s position,
which took a labour market perspective on immigration. From this posi-
tion, it framed immigrant integration in differentialist terms, focusing on
the buffer function of foreign workers as a reserve in times of labour
shortages. This voided the need for systematic research into the social posi-
tion of migrants in Dutch society, as these migrants were expected even-
tually to return to their home countries. In fact, one of the few research
projects in which it was involved was REMPLOD (together with several
other departments), which explored the prospects of engaging migrants in
development of their home countries.
Most research funding in the late 1960s and 1970s came from CRM,
which was responsible for providing facilities to migrants during their resi-
dence in the Netherlands, for example, in the spheres of housing and
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welfare (ibid.: 19). Although this department did not engage in systematic
research programming at that time, it did finance various studies on the so-
cial position of migrants (ibid.: 18). For instance, it commissioned a 1971
study on the position of migrant groups by the late Hilda Verwey-Jonker –
the inspiration for the eponymous institute – joined by a group of research-
ers including Van Amersfoort and Van Praag.
Furthermore, welfare and migrant organisations were known, on occa-
sion, to have prevented research on their groups. A case in point is the
Commissioner’s Office for Welfare of Moluccans (Commissariat van
Ambonezenzorg, CAZ), which averted research among Moluccans for a
considerable time (Penninx 1988b: 17). This discouraging attitude towards
research was related to the perceived threat that research would pose to the
structural position of these organisations. In particular, research on minori-
ties would form an alternative means for formulating government measures
relating to these groups, without the involvement of the communities them-
selves (Penninx 1988b: 47). In this respect, the relation between welfare
and migrant organisations and research bodies, like ACOM, was tense at
times.
The absence of steady research interest into the position of migrants
must also be considered a consequence of a distinct sort of boundary work
during this period. This involved demarcating research and policy in such
a way that themes not on the policy agenda were ignored or even discour-
aged. The absence of a common understanding was of great relevance for
government policy of the social position of migrant groups. Based on its
structural position and its differentialist framing, the Department of Social
Affairs had no interest in researching minorities; rather, it sought research
concerning return migration. Welfare and migrant organisations also had
no interest in researching minority positions, because doing so could inter-
fere with their structural positions as representatives or fiduciaries of mi-
grant groups vis-à-vis the government.
This way of demarcating research and policy was related to the coordi-
nation of mutual relations. Indications of this are provided by the few occa-
sions when the actors were confronted with research on the social positions
of immigrants. When CRM commissioned a study by Hilda Verwey-Jonker
and enlisted a group to research the position of various migrant groups,
controversy emerged over use of ‘immigrant’ in both the title and actual
text of their report. The term would suggest that the groups included per-
manent immigrants, whereas the government had stated clearly in its 1970
memorandum on foreign workers that the Netherlands was not a country
of immigration. As a result, the term ‘immigrant’ and the title ‘Immigrants
in the Netherlands’ were abandoned in favour of the term ‘allochthonous’
and the title ‘Allochthonous in the Netherlands’. According to Van
Amersfoort (1984: 138), one of the authors involved in this publication:
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[...] CRM had given us an assignment to produce the book
Allochthonous in the Netherlands. However, the suggested title
Immigrants in the Netherlands was confronted with insurmountable
objections. [...] The government had just [in 1970] declared in its
foreign workers memorandum that the Netherlands was not a coun-
try of immigration. [...] The Netherlands had many things…. but
not ‘immigrants’, so it was ‘allochthonous’.
Furthermore, when Entzinger published an article in a special issue of the
journal Beleid & Maatschappij on tensions between the norm and the fact
that the Netherlands is not a country of immigration, he was met with criti-
cism from CRM (Entzinger 1975). Although he wrote this article indepen-
dently, he was still a civil servant at the Research and Planning Group of
CRM, which at that time still held on to the assumption of temporary mi-
gration.56 This shows how the boundary work of these actors, aimed at
ignoring if not preventing research on minorities, was clearly related to the
position of these departments in the prevailing two-track policies and the
government’s reluctance to concede to being a country of immigration. In
the case of migrant organisations, the boundary work was related to their
position as representatives for these migrant groups.
Missionary boundary work: The Department of Culture, Recreation and
Social Work (CRM)
As described above, the position of CRM changed during the 1970s. This
was due, in part, to developments in the groups that fell under its responsi-
bility – the Moluccans and the Surinamese.57 Furthermore, this department
was confronted with the norm versus fact issue as far as the Netherlands
not being a country of immigration, as a result of its responsibility for pro-
viding welfare facilities to the growing number of temporary migrants
(Penninx 1988b: 20). As such, change was catalysed not only in how this
department framed the issue of immigrant integration, but also in its
boundary work practices in the emerging field of immigrant integration
research.
CRM altered its discourse on, and relations with, immigrant integration
research during the 1970s. By the early part of this decade, the department
had formed a Research and Planning Group that would pay significant at-
tention to issues of immigrant integration. This group was to be the main
source of immigrant research in this period. It also provided a cradle for re-
searchers (e.g. Van Praag and Entzinger) who would play an essential role
in this research domain for decades to come. Furthermore, since 1976, the
department was advised on an informal basis by a group of minorities re-
searchers (Rath 1991: 172). The change in discourse not only involved a
change in mutual relations, but also in the demarcation of research and pol-
icy. For the first time, the department showed systematic interest in
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research on cultural minorities. In 1978, what was once an informal net-
work became formalised through ACOM’s establishment. Within this
boundary organisation, CRM created a boundary object that, on one hand,
demarcated its specific interest for research into minorities within Dutch
society and, on the other, coordinated relations between research and pol-
icy in terms of the acquisition of more systematic knowledge for the devel-
opment of government policies towards the minorities.
In terms of demarcation, CRM now showed a specific, systematic inter-
est in acquiring knowledge and expertise on cultural minorities. It now ex-
plicitly sought knowledge about migrants as permanent minorities.
Furthermore, there was a demand for policy-relevant knowledge to develop
policies for these groups. ACOM was to promote ‘coherence and accumu-
lation of knowledge for policy formulation and implementation’ (Penninx
1988b: 21). It was not an aim to encourage fundamental research. During
ACOM’s instatement, the CRM minister stated that ‘pure scientific re-
search must be considered a luxury that we can hardly afford’ (see Van
Putten 1990: 359). Instead, research was to provide instrumental insights
for policy developments. ‘Knowledge on the position of the various cate-
gories of cultural minorities’ would in itself be ‘insufficient’. There was a
specific need for ‘studies and reports of high quality that must direct, sti-
mulate, support or – when necessary – correct government policy’ (ibid.).
This way of demarcating a specific demand for research that provides
policy-relevant insights into the position of minorities was closely related
to ACOM’s own desire to coordinate research and ongoing policy develop-
ments. CRM’s boundary work involved a ‘political manoeuvre’ to gain le-
gitimacy for its new policy ideas.58 After all, CRM was a relatively weak
department that had little means or power to convince other departments
that a minorities policy was necessary. It consequently had to shop for al-
ternative venues to propagate its new frame and to overcome the negative
feedback from persisting iron triangles. Stimulating scientific research
about minorities by founding ACOM in 1978 was, according to Entzinger
(1981: 111) – its first secretary, a former civil servant in CRM and future
key figure in this research field – a sort of ‘missionary project’ by the de-
partment. Research paved a path for CRM to ‘convince other ministries of
the necessity for a policy on “cultural minorities”’ (ibid.).59 This also ex-
plains why ACOM was able to extend its role beyond that of an advisory
committee on research programming for CRM. The idea that ACOM could
support the idea of a general minorities policy encouraged its expansion
into other relevant domains, such as labour, housing, healthcare and educa-
tion (ibid.: 109). ACOM would not constrain itself to advising on research
programming and clearly also advised on policy issues (Penninx 1988b:
21-22).
The change in CRM’s boundary work practices was certainly related to
the changes in its position within the field of policymaking at this time.
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Faced with specific problem developments in the groups that fell under its
responsibility and, at the same time, meeting reluctance from other depart-
ments to respond to these developments, CRM developed a specific inter-
est for policy-relevant research into cultural minorities (demarcation) as a
way of convincing other departments of the need for a more systematic ap-
proach towards these groups (coordination). This demonstrates a clear con-
nection between CRM’s boundary work and the more structural aims of
this department.
Politics: Positivism and belief in societal steering
The Moluccan terrorist acts and the growth of ethnic tensions had created
a sense of urgency in Dutch politics about immigrant integration.
However, the boundary work practices of political actors in this period re-
veal that immigrant integration was not defined as a political issue. Rather,
research and policy were demarcated in a way that resulted in research
gaining a primary role in policy formulation.
This demarcation involved a demand for policy-relevant knowledge and
expertise for the development of an immigrant integration policy. Despite
the emergent sense of urgency, there was a structural deficiency in terms of
knowledge and expertise on how to conduct a policy aimed at immigrant
integration.60 The government now realised that it had to develop a minori-
ties policy, but lacked the relevant knowledge and expertise to do so.
There were few prior experiences with immigrant integration that were
considered relevant for this period. For instance, the assimilation approach
adopted towards repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies – although
often qualified as a ‘silent success’ (Surie 1971) – was considered unfit for
the new minority groups who were of non-Dutch origin. Assimilationism
for these new groups was considered inappropriate, whereas for repatriates
it was considered suitable since they were defined as returning compatriots.
There was also little opportunity for learning from other countries, as the
Netherlands was among the first countries to develop a general minorities
policy and certainly the first to coordinate it at the level of national govern-
ment (Penninx, Schoorl & Van Praag 1993). This sense of urgency, com-
bined with a lack of relevant knowledge and expertise, meant that the gov-
ernment became very susceptible to research findings that could contribute
to policy development.61
Boundary work defining immigrant integration as a non-political issue
was related to specific structural traits of political involvement in policy-
making at this time. The positions of the various political parties on immi-
grant integration were, with the exception of the Social Democratic and
extreme-right parties, not well articulated until the early 1980s. In his ana-
lysis of the positions of political parties, Fermin (1997: 243) has shown
that, although political parties often differed in how they defined immigrant
integration, these differences led to minimal open political conflict or
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disagreements. Underscoring this was the fact that Molleman, initially a
parliamentarian for the Social Democrats, was asked to direct the develop-
ment of a minorities policy by Minister of Home Affairs Hans Wiegel,
himself a member of the Liberal Party. This political consensus was
deemed to have an adverse effect on the rise of extreme-right parties in the
late 1970s (Penninx 1988a: 168). Rather than successfully putting immi-
grant integration on the political agenda, the rise of these anti-immigrant
parties seems to have reinforced the political consensus between the main
political parties. To prevent parties that would ‘play the race card’ from
benefiting too much, a veritable culture of avoidance was cultivated among
the main parties of the political establishment (De Beus 1998; Penninx
2005). What is important is that this culture of avoidance emerged in a per-
iod when the public mood was still highly sensitive to alleged discrimina-
tion or racism (Tinnemans 1994).
Demarcating immigrant integration as a ‘non-political’ issue was closely
related to the extent to which political actors wanted to be involved in co-
ordinating relations between research and policy. Characteristic of this peri-
od was a general positivism and belief in the feasibility of social problems
such as immigrant integration.62 It was believed that by developing a ra-
tional approach towards immigrant integration – bringing further migration
to a halt (immigration was still seen as a historically unique event at this
time) and adopting rational measures in various domains such as education,
labour, housing and welfare – the integration of present groups could be ef-
fectively achieved. Thus, an immigrant integration policy would constitute
a historically unique effort.63 Molleman, head of the Minorities Policy
Directorate, argued that immigrant integration should be kept a non-politi-
cal issue. He believed that a rational approach, based on knowledge and
expertise, should be adopted. Furthermore, this consistent policy approach
should receive broad political support and be maintained for the length of
time necessary to achieve the desired effects, and that it should be free of
political conflicts or disagreements. According to Molleman:
It was still not a party-political issue then, and I have always at-
tempted to gain the widest possible support from Parliament. […]
My opinion has always been that this is not a party-political issue.
[...] With political arguments you will not be able to achieve broad
support for policy in this area. This is a policy that has to be devel-
oped and that has to remain for years. And therefore it must not be
associated with a particular party so that later on other parties can
dissolve it once again. Then a yo-yo effect would be created, that in
some cases can be good, but not with this type of policy.64
This positivist belief in research’s role in developing a rational policy ap-
proach was also reflected in the government’s emphasis on ‘research as an
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instrument for the development of a coordinated minorities policy’.65
Significantly, the government called not only for research within the var-
ious policy domains and funded by various departments, but also for re-
search of an interdepartmental character.66 A budget was made available
for such interdepartmental research. Furthermore, this positivist boundary
work was manifest in the emphasis the government put into its discourse
on the independent and objective status of the 1979 WRR report. In a letter
Molleman sent to various actors, which accompanied a number of issues
raised by the reply memorandum to the WRR report, great stress was put
on the independent status of WRR, a body unrelated to both government
and minorities organisations.
WRR is an independent organisation. [...] The government [...]
takes great pleasure in the fact that the council has issued its advice
on this complex issue. Given the attempts made to develop a better-
coordinated policy on this issue, such a report is very welcome at
this moment. Neither government and Parliament nor minorities and
minority organisations have been involved in the development and
formulation of this WRR report. Also in that perspective, this is an
independent report. This makes it possible for minorities, as well as
for government and other involved parties, to take complete liberty
in sharing their judgements on this report.67
According to Van Amersfoort, this way of coordinating relations between
research and policy reflected the pillarist tradition of taming controversial
topics with instrumental research. In a pillarised society, state policies were
to be religiously and socially neutral, so as to be acceptable to all pillars.
Technocracy was therefore essential for the functioning of the state: ‘the
task of politicians was to construct structures in which the religious com-
promise is established, so as to leave actual policy formulation to experts’
and the task of experts was ‘to reach technocratic compromise for practical
policy problems, which are presented as much as possible as objective,
technical solutions’ (Van Amersfoort 1984: 122). Although Dutch society
had been de-pillarising since the 1960s, it seemed to have reverted to this
‘traditional ploy’ of technocratic compromise in the case of the minorities
policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Hoppe 1993; Rath 2001).
Immigrant integration was considered ‘too hot to handle’ for the Dutch po-
litical establishment, fearing it could unbalance the fragile coalition system
and possibly fall into the hands of extremist parties that could play the race
card.
It was common practice not to make a hot issue of something; sen-
sitive subjects were usually resolved by a technocratic compromise.
In that process, experts had acquired a dominant, if instrumental,
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role. Hence, a type of social science research had arisen with strong
politically-directed traits, and a type of researcher who saw their
task primarily as one of ‘service to the community’. [...] Particularly
in the late 1970s and 1980s, the time when the ethnic policy was
still under construction, the common opinion among leading politi-
cians was that immigration and the incorporation of immigrants was
too sensitive to make a hot issue of it. So, they reverted to the tradi-
tional ploy; resolving the issue by developing a technocratic com-
promise, in the process of which social scientific researchers ac-
quired a dominant role. (Rath 2001: 150-151)
In fact, this boundary work undertaken by political actors involved a coor-
dination of close relations between researchers and policymakers, rather
than between research and politics. The Minister of Home Affairs, who
was responsible for the development of the minorities memorandum be-
tween 1981 and 1983, even remarked that there had been very little sub-
stantial political debate on this memorandum, for instance, within the
Council of Ministers.
Issues concerning minorities were always dealt with in the margins
of the Council of Ministers during my period as a Minister. [...] It
was always in the sphere of procedures and competencies. I cannot
recollect substantive debate about the minorities policy within the
Cabinet or the Council of Ministers. It may be that, in this, I am
doing an injustice to all those civil servants that were already very
substantively involved in these issues. (Van Thijn 1985: 5)
There was, then, important differences in the boundary work of actors in
the field of policymaking. Specific departments, such as the Department of
Social Affairs, as well as welfare and migrant organisations, demarcated
and coordinated research-policy relations in a way that either showed little
interest for, or even obstructed research about, ethnic minorities. This
boundary work was related to the structural positions of these actors who
had, respectively, a structural labour market focus on migration or per-
ceived research as a threat to their position as representatives of migrant
groups vis-à-vis the government. In contrast, CRM defined research-policy
boundaries in terms of active acquisition of policy-relevant knowledge and
expertise on minorities that would provide support to the development of a
minorities policy. In this respect, by establishing ACOM and promoting re-
search as an instrument for convincing other departments of the need for a
minorities policy, CRM seems to have engaged in missionary boundary
work. Finally, political actors in this period demarcated immigrant integra-
tion as a non-political issue and coordinated research-policy relations in a
way that expressed a positivist belief in the contribution of research to the
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development of rational policies and in a way that would avoid political
conflicts over this sensitive topic. Thus, this analysis not only reveals im-
portant differences in boundary work practices, but also how they related
to the different structural positions of these actors in the field of
policymaking.
4.2.3 A technocratic research-policy nexus
Having analysed how key actors defined research-policy relations, the next
step would be to analyse how the boundary work undertaken by actors
from the fields of politics and research synergised to produce a specific
‘boundary configuration’. In other words, reaching beyond the actor-level,
what structure of research-policy dialogues can be identified between re-
search and policy actors?
The convergence of research and policymaking
There was a very explicit connection between the reports published in
1979 by ACOM and WRR and the development of the minorities policy
between 1980 and 1983. First, both ACOM and WRR were explicitly or-
iented towards influencing policy and advocating a minorities policy.
Although the former observed that ‘it is not the task of ACOM to develop
a policy vision concerning minorities’ (ACOM 1979: 3), it clearly went
further than advising only on research programming. In fact, several of its
reports were ‘veiled policy advices’.68 Its report ‘Minorities research ad-
vice’ from 1979 included extensive passages on the position of ethnic
minorities in the Netherlands (chapter 2); ‘government policy in the past,
present and future’ (chapter 3); and the relevance of the ‘cultural orienta-
tion of minorities’ (chapter 4). The ‘Ethnic minorities’ report was also
highly policy-oriented. In addition to several chapters containing problem
analysis, it contains chapters on ‘the general contours of a minorities pol-
icy’ (chapter 4); on ‘the contents of a minorities policy in headlines’ (chap-
ter 5); and on migration policy (chapter 6). Six out of seven major conclu-
sions directly concerned government policy. Moreover, WRR commented
on newly taken policy measures, saying, for instance, it: ‘positively values
the decision to attribute this function [coordinating minister for the minori-
ties policy] to the Department of Home Affairs, as it expresses how this
not only concerns social-cultural issues but also other sorts of policy is-
sues’ (WRR 1979: XXV).
Molleman and his Minorities Policy Directorate made direct use of these
documents for the development of a minorities memorandum. The reports
were well timed with the policy developments that had taken place since
the parliamentary debates of 1977 and the motion put forward by
Molleman that led to establishment of a Minorities Policy Directorate in
1979.69 They were taken as a starting point for the formulation of a
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minorities policy. An interdepartmental committee for the coordination of a
minorities policy was established to write the reply memorandum to the
WRR report. The Council of Ministers established this committee, which
included secretary-generals and general directors of various departments,
after having received the WRR report.70 In writing the reply memorandum,
the committee followed the structure of the WRR report, discussing its var-
ious conclusions in a series of meetings.71 Consequently, the structure of
the WRR report was also reflected in the draft of the minorities memoran-
dum. Note how the chapters of the reply memorandum reflected those of
the WRR report.
Chapters from the reply memorandum:
1) Immigration and its meaning
2) The situation of minorities
3) Policy assumptions
4) Amelioration of the situation of minorities
5) Means for realising policy
6) Restrictive migration policy
Chapters from the WRR report:
1) Introduction
2) Short sketch of the issue
3) Expected developments
4) Policy assumptions
5) Contents of a minorities policy in headlines
6) Future migration policy
7) Conclusions
There were also immediate relationship between the research and policy
actors. Not only was there a close network of personal contacts, there also
seems to have been a regular exchange of actors between the fields. An
important illustration of this was obvious in the various roles Penninx ful-
filled for ACOM and WRR, as well as in development of the minorities
memorandum. As one of the founding members of ACOM, Penninx wrote
the influential preparatory study for WRR and was also involved as a civil
servant at CRM during development of the draft minorities memorandum,
having acted upon a request made by Molleman, director of the Minorities
Policy Directorate. In addition, Penninx remained an ACOM advisory
member on behalf of CRM during the 1980s (Rath 1991: 172), and took
office at CRM immediately after completing his study for WRR.
On the same day as I had concluded my preparatory study for
WRR, on October the 1st of 1978, I took office at the department
[CRM]. So, at the same moment the WRR report itself was
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published, I became a civil servant. After the reply memorandum
was published in 1980, a department was established at the
Department of Home Affairs for the coordination of the minorities
policy. The director of this minorities department then asked me [...]
to write the minorities memorandum. In this context, I was hired
from the department [of CRM] for the Department of Home
Affairs. [...] In this respect, I switched hats from researcher to civil
servant. Of course, my name is not at the top of these policy docu-
ments. However, he [the director of the minorities department]
wanted to really move ahead, now that his new department was es-
tablished, and wanted to develop a draft memorandum very quickly,
and the quickest way to do so was to hire the civil servant who al-
ready knew everything about the issue.72
There are indications that Penninx’s personal relationship with the gov-
ernment was not atypical for research-policy relations at the time. For in-
stance, another pioneer of immigrant integration research, Entzinger, was
not only ACOM’s first secretary, but had also been a civil servant at CRM.
Several other ACOM members had also already conducted research that
had been commissioned by CRM (Verwey-Jonker, Van Amersfoort,
Köbben). In terms of structural relations, the boundaries between the fields
of research and policy were apparently very permeable.
Primacy of scientific research
Indications show that scientific research found primacy by fostering mutual
relations with the policy field. Developments in policymaking were
strongly influenced by the ACOM reports and, to a greater extent, those by
WRR. In fact, the extent to which WRR’s 1979 report was ‘silently’ and
‘directly’ taken up in government policy was rather exceptional compared
with its other reports (WRR 1987b: 44).
The major impact on policy developments also involved ACOM, which
had not only collaborated on this report, but also, more generally, occupied
a central position in the field of immigrant integration research. Molleman
indicated that his ideas about a general minorities policy were greatly influ-
enced by the works of Entzinger (1975), Van Amersfoort (1974) and var-
ious publications by Köbben. Their research convinced Molleman that mi-
grants had become permanent ethnic or cultural minorities and that a differ-
ent policy approach was needed.73 Furthermore, Penninx admits that he
‘had never been as influential as he was during the period between 1978
and 1981’,74 when he was not only involved in ACOM and played an im-
portant role in the 1979 WRR report, but also helped develop the minori-
ties memorandum in response. It is no surprise, he notes, that the draft
minorities memorandum reflected his own preparatory study from 1979 in
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many ways: ‘It is difficult to expect that a memorandum you ask me to
write now would be very different from something I wrote one and a half
years earlier as a researcher.’75
The primacy of these research actors is also indicated by the concrete
way in which the Interdepartmental Committee for the Development of a
Minorities Policy responded to these reports. This committee decided that
the reports by WRR and ACOM raised such a sense of urgency and ad-
dressed such a sensitive issue, that the committee had to announce concrete
policy measures in response; simply announcing further research would
not suffice.
Because of the urgency and sensitivity of the minorities issue, it
seems politically undesirable for the Cabinet to proclaim only
further research. The questions that are posed to the Cabinet in the
documents in question are already too concrete for this. [...]
Unrealistic, too high expectations should not be raised, but neither
should the first response give evidence of too much reservation. [...]
Announcing concrete measures seems very appropriate.76
Molleman was familiar with the recent publications by Entzinger and Van
Amersfoort, as well as with some of Köbben’s work. He was convinced
that migrants had become permanent ethnic or cultural minorities.77
Already by 1977, during parliamentary debates on the spate of Moluccan
terrorism, Molleman had called for expanding the debate beyond that of a
narrow focus on Moluccans (Van Kuik 1986). In that same period, an inter-
departmental committee for the revision of the Moluccans policy advised
the minister responsible for this group that current measures in place in
various departments for the Moluccans should also apply to other minority
groups.78 However, the minister declined, believing that his administrative
capacity would be too limited for this aim.79
Thus, the structural configuration of research-policy relations in this per-
iod was characterised by convergence between both fields (through direct
mutual interaction) and by primacy of research in policy formulation
(scientific primacy). Suggested thus is that the research-policy nexus in this
period was a technocratic boundary configuration. Indeed, the research-pol-
icy relations seem to approximate a model of ‘science speaking the truth to
power’. This technocratic configuration of mutual relations, however, must
be held up against the backdrop of its actors’ structural positions. In parti-
cular, the configuration was produced by a mutually reinforcing pattern of
boundary work by ACOM, WRR, CRM and the Minorities Policy
Directorate under Molleman. On one hand, there was the boundary work
of ACOM and WRR, which involved demarcating the role of research as
producing policy-relevant knowledge about ethnic minorities and coordi-
nating its relation to policy in terms of policy engagement. On the other
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hand, there was CRM’s boundary work and Molleman’s directorate, which
had both missionary and practical needs for policy-relevant knowledge on
minorities, and wanted to coordinate research-policy relations in a way that
allowed for the development of a minorities policy without politicising the
sensitive issue. In this respect, the technocratic way of configuring re-
search-policy relations involved a structural symbiosis between both fields.
4.3 Technocracy and the rise of the multicultural model
As we have just seen, research-policy relations from this era are best char-
acterised as the technocratic type of research-policy nexus. Yet, this nexus
does not explain precisely why a multiculturalist frame of immigrant inte-
gration emerged. It does not account for why a frameshift occurred in the
first place, or why, more specifically, the multicultural model emerged, or
whether critical reflection about this model took place. Thus, the next step
is to analyse the role of the nexus in the research and policy frameshift
during this period, its contribution to the rise of multiculturalism in particu-
lar and, finally, the extent to which the nexus did or did not contribute to
critical frame reflection.
4.3.1 The structural effects of technocracy
The technocratic research-policy nexus can also have effects on the struc-
tural properties of both the research and the policy fields. In what way,
thus, did this nexus affect the position of key actors in both fields? And
how did this contribute to a pronounced frameshift during this formative
period in the fields?
The structural symbiosis between research and policy
The technocratic research-policy nexus strengthened the structural position
of specific actors in research and policy. In the field of research, it pro-
vided a boost to the WRR’s institutional authority, which, as a result of its
direct significant effect on the development of the minorities policy, was
able to show that it could ‘matter’ as an institute in such complex and sen-
sitive domains. It demonstrated to WRR that a more in-depth approach to
specific issues and a stronger orientation on policy advice – instead of
merely informing policy – could be successful. Together with other reports
from this period, 1979’s ‘Ethnic minorities’ is illustrative of a broader
structural change in WRR, whereby it extended itself beyond its moderate
decisionist role of the 1970s (as described by Hirsch Ballin (1979)) to a
more technocratic role the following decade. This first report marked the
beginning of a tradition of WRR involvement specifically in the domain of
immigrant integration.
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Furthermore, the technocratic boundary configuration strengthened the
position of ACOM. ACOM stayed central in the research-policy nexus and
its role in the ‘dynamic networking’ between researchers and policymakers
during this period proved crucial for development of what has been de-
scribed as the ‘minorities research industry’ (Essed & Nimako 2006). Not
only did the amount of funding for research coordinated by ACOM in-
crease, but the technocratic boundary configuration also enabled ACOM to
be closely involved in policy developments and the societal translation of
its research in accordance with its habitus of engagement.
In the field of policymaking, the technocratic nexus also strengthened
the position of CRM. The influence of ACOM and, to some extent, WRR
in the development of a general minorities policy suggests that this govern-
ment department’s missionary boundary work was successful. Indeed, its
intention to use scientific research as a way of convincing other depart-
ments of a need for policy aimed at the integration of cultural minorities
was realised. However, the coordination of this minorities policy remained
outside the responsibility of this department. It was assigned to the Deputy
Prime Minister, who was then Minister of Home Affairs and had already
been made responsible for the coordination of policy for the Moluccan
community. The department was also majorly involved in the interdepart-
mental elaboration of this policy. As a result, CRM’s structural position
only partially benefited from the technocratic boundary configuration.
The influence of another actor in the field of policymaking – Molleman
and the Minorities Policy Directorate – was more considerable. This tech-
nocratic boundary configuration provided the directorate with the required
policy-oriented knowledge and expertise for developing a minorities pol-
icy. It also enabled Molleman to develop a minorities policy without politi-
cising the issue and without involving the welfare and migrant organisa-
tions that were so closely linked to the differentialist policies of the 1970s.
Positive feedback: Breaking the iron triangles of differentialist policies
The structural symbiosis between the positions of ACOM, WRR,
Molleman’s directorate and, to some extent, CRM, described by several
authors as a ‘technocratic symbiosis’ (Rath 2001: 153; Van Amersfoort
1984: 132), was a source of positive feedback on the changes advocated
by these actors. It strengthened the structural positions of those actors in
support of a minorities policy and weakened the position of those who op-
posed it. The Department of Social Affairs was left out of this symbiosis,
although it did remain one of the departments involved in the interdepart-
mental coordination of the minorities policy. However, eventually this de-
partment also changed its differentialist frame towards a more multicultur-
alist one. In addition, political parties that opposed a minorities policy were
forced aside by the technocratic symbiosis. In fact, the role of political par-
ties overall was rather marginal. This was largely because of their still
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minimally articulated positions on immigrant integration, but also because
they supported a technocratic approach to policy development as a means
of avoiding politicisation that could possibly benefit extreme-right parties.
Furthermore, the technocratic boundary configuration had a negative ef-
fect on the structural position of the prevailing welfare and migrant organi-
sations in policymaking. These organisations, together with the Department
of Social Affairs, CRM and specific political parties, fulfilled a central role
in the differentialist or ‘categorical’ policies of the 1970s. Now, their role
in policy formulation was marginalised by ACOM’s and WRR’s prominent
positions. This is indicated primarily by the marginal role that welfare and
migrant organisations played in the development of the minorities memor-
andum. The process of formulating the memorandum began with the reply
to the WRR report, followed by the draft minorities memorandum that was
written by Molleman together with Penninx and others. It was only at this
stage that welfare and migrant organisations were consulted about their
ideas. Even then, their ability to influence changes in this draft text seems
to have been limited (Van Kuik 1986). For instance, the final minorities
memorandum put less emphasis on collective emancipation as a strategy
for integration than the draft minorities memorandum, which was one of
the central aspects of the frame of these welfare organisations (Fermin
1997 178). In the media, these organisations are often recorded as claiming
that policy was being made ‘about’ them, not ‘with’ them.80
Molleman was one of the entrepreneurs to break the iron triangles
formed by these welfare organisations. From a multiculturalist perspective,
he favoured the policy involvement of migrant organisations; however, he
believed that this should come out of migrant self-organisation rather than
the fiduciary organisations known as zaakwaarnemers that were then
dominant. By proposing a general minorities policy for all immigrant com-
munities, Molleman broke from the established structures that advocated a
more differentialist approach. In doing so, he was met with significant ne-
gative feedback from the actors within.
I issued a motion for developing a minorities policy for all the dif-
ferent groups. I did that without notifying the chairman of our party
in any way [...] At one point, the chairman found out and was not
at all pleased. The chairman was a CRM man. [...] Also in the area
of welfare work, there was an iron triangle: those were civil ser-
vants, politics, especially the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party that was then being established, and the
people in welfare organisations. They all held on to each other. So,
what I was doing was breaking into established patterns. [...] [T]he
fear was then, and not without cause, that that pattern was to be
broken. [...] So, I had to withdraw that motion. But [the Minister of
Home Affairs] had already taken notice of the motion and found it
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a good case; he was way ahead of his time. Then he said to me: ‘I
want to take over your motion anyhow, but you will have to come
over and implement it. You’ll have to become minorities director
and then I will arrange things in the Cabinet so that this is the way
it will be done.81
The establishment of ACOM as a technical-scientific committee also
formed an important factor in terms of generating positive feedback regard-
ing a break with established structures. Whereas advisory bodies for re-
search programming generally involved tripartite bodies in which target
groups, scientific experts and government were represented, in this case,
the responsibilities of these three actors were clearly separated (Entzinger
1981). In this context, Penninx argues that ‘this choice is not derived from
experience with research programming but is rather a consequence of a
choice for separated responsibilities in the development and implementa-
tion of [...] policy’ (1988b: 26). This political choice – not to involve eth-
nic expertise in the technical-scientific ACOM – was related to a certain
cynicism concerning the ethnic expertise that these welfare organisations
claimed to represent.82 As previously noted, these organisations mainly
consisted of native Dutchmen who represented the interests of migrants,
the so-called zaakwaarnemers. Their expertise was criticised by some as
‘white expertise’ rather than ‘ethnic expertise’ (Choenni 1987). In the 1979
WRR report, as well as in the 1980 reply memorandum,83 critical remarks
were made about the need to enhance the representation of migrant
organisations.
At the same time, welfare organisations opposed the plans for a techni-
cal scientific ACOM. They put forward practical objections, such as the
fact that they had hardly been consulted in the process of establishing
ACOM, but also more substantial objections, particularly that ACOM
would mainly represent ‘white expertise’ in contrast to the welfare organi-
sations able to draw upon the ‘ethnic expertise’ of immigrant groups.
Furthermore, they protested that the establishment of ACOM undermined
the position of their organisations, which had traditionally had an important
role in differentialist policies (Van Putten 1990: 360).84 In 1980, when a
‘research programming cycle’ was set up, minorities organisations were gi-
ven an advisory role, alongside ACOM. This cycle entailed, firstly, that
ACOM and minorities organisations advise on research programming; sec-
ondly, that the Interdepartmental Committee on Minorities Research would
formulate a draft research programme; thirdly, that the minister ask minori-
ties organisations and ACOM for comments on this research programme;
and finally, that the government establish the research programme
(Penninx 1988b: 26). In practice, their influence on research programmes
was rather limited.
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4.3.2 The technocracy of multiculturalism
The technocratic research-policy nexus involved a structural symbiosis be-
tween specific research and policy actors that created a powerful actor con-
stellation in favour of a frameshift. But why did this involve a frameshift
from differentialism to multiculturalism? Put another way, why did this
technocratic symbiosis produce the multicultural model for which the
Netherlands would become famous?
The minorities paradigm in research framing
The technocratic boundary configuration and the active role played by
ACOM and WRR in this configuration, appears to have contributed to a
paradigmatic status of one particular problem frame in immigrant integra-
tion research. ACOM’s central position, which was reinforced by this tech-
nocratic symbiosis, had significant influence on problem framing in immi-
grant integration research. This relates to ACOM’s influence on research
programming, its central position in terms of government and also its ex-
clusive position within this research field. In this context, Penninx (1988b:
37) refers to critiques of ACOM: ‘in some circles of researchers ACOM
was seen as a biased group of advisors that function as gatekeepers to [...]
research funding and attributed no or insufficient attention to specific sub-
jects or disciplines’ (1988b: 37).
There are indications that in the late 1970s one frame became dominant,
the so-called minorities paradigm, with its heavy-handed multiculturalist ap-
proach (Rath 1991). This paradigm framed immigrant integration in terms
of the emancipation of ethnic or cultural minorities in social-economic and
social-cultural domains by means of a group-specific approach, as well as
within the normative perspective of transforming society as a whole into a
multi-ethnic society. Rath (2001: 152), following Bovenkerk (1984: 35),
observes how
the development of political-economic theory on guest workers in
the Netherlands was interrupted quite suddenly, precisely at the mo-
ment that the state incorporated researchers into the bureaucratic ap-
paratus and initiated wide-scale funding for politically relevant
research.
This is especially striking because of a strong presence of the critical tradi-
tion in this field until the 1970s (as evident in the careers of, for instance,
Penninx) and also because of the importance of Marxist perspectives in
other countries, most notoriously in the UK (Miles 1987). However, this
form of race-critical research would prove to be short-lived in the
Netherlands (Essed & Nimako 2006). As a result, the development of a
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technocratic nexus between immigrant integration research and policy co-
incided with the disappearance of specific knowledge claims.
Researchers claim that ACOM significantly affected immigrant research
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Penninx (1988b: 35) concludes that ‘the
influence of ACOM in its first phase of existence has been very signifi-
cant’. Nearly all of the projects that ACOM proposed in its first report to
government, the ‘Minorities research advice’ (1979), were eventually im-
plemented with government funding. Entzinger (1981: 116), then ACOM
secretary, concluded that the function of this advice, to ‘stimulate research
to attribute more attention to the issue of immigrant integration’, ‘has cer-
tainly succeeded’. ACOM would have been ‘overwhelmed’ with research
proposals and claims on particular research themes, while ‘the principles,
design and goals of the ‘Minorities research advice’ were rarely or never
subject of discussion’ (ibid.). Entzinger adds that this lack of debate around
the ACOM report may have been caused by researchers’ fear of criticising
the organisation that would later advise government on whether or not to
allocate funding to specific research programmes. Given this relationship,
any criticism of ACOM could be detrimental (ibid.: 117).
The logic of minorities in policy framing
The technocratic boundary configuration seems to have contributed to a
dominant logic of problem framing in the field of policymaking. A predo-
minantly multiculturalist problem frame emerged in this field. This in-
volved an emphasis on minorities as the main object of policy. Not only
were research actors, such as ACOM and WRR, heavily focused on mino-
rities, but CRM and the Minorities Policy Directorate had a minority focus,
too. Although they framed immigrant integration using the normative per-
spective of Dutch society becoming a multi-ethnic society, the focus was
more on minorities as policy objects than considering society at large. By
shaping a structural symbiosis between a specific network of actors that
shared this primary focus on cultural or ethnic minorities, the technocratic
boundary configuration divorced the debate about ethnic minorities from
larger debates about the transformation of Dutch society into a multi-ethnic
society. It seems to have reinforced the logic of minorities in the framing
of immigrant integration policy.
This logic of minorities surfaced within a certain reluctance, if not taboo,
though with a clear idea of relating immigrant integration to broader social
issues, such as national identity and social cohesion (Tinnemans 1994:
256). The sociologist Vuijsje (1986) attributes this reticence to a post-war
sensitivity about discussing ethnic differences. The legacy of World War II
created what Vuijsje describes as a vermoorde onschuld (‘murdered inno-
cence’) in dealing with ‘weak’ minorities and with cultural differences. At
that time, discussing ethnic differences in relation to their influence on na-
tive society led all too easily to accusations of discrimination, racism or
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fascism (Tinnemans 1994: 253). The consequence of this was the emer-
gence of a political correctness in dealing with minorities that was to per-
sist for a considerable period (Werdmölder 2003).
This reluctance was reinforced by growing concern about the extreme
right and the alleged rise of racism in Dutch society, which appeared to be
fostering a strong anti-racist movement in Dutch society and politics.
Furthermore, it promoted a particular sensitivity for issues that revealed
discrimination, racism or fascism, concepts that were often used inter-
changeably. A case in point involves public statements made by
Couwenberg (1982), a professor of constitutional law, who posed the ques-
tion: ‘How many foreigners can a European cultural people bear without
losing its identity?’85 In this context, he called for a restrictive migration
policy in the interest of national demographic and cultural politics, arguing
that similar claims made by those such as the extreme right of the Centre
Party at least be considered legitimate. These statements triggered broad in-
dignation, leading to accusations that Couwenberg was in fact racist and
fascist.
In sum, the technocratic symbiosis contributed to the development of a
minorities paradigm in immigrant integration research. In the same period
that ACOM and WRR played an active role in shaping the technocratic
boundary configuration, this paradigm rose to a hegemonic status while
other paradigms (such as critical Marxist and nationalist frames) fell into
disuse. Furthermore, it contributed to the consideration of minorities in pol-
icy framing. It confined policy development to a limited network of actors
that shared a specific focus on minorities and also advocated a specific ap-
proach to minorities. Consequently, it divorced the issue of how to achieve
the integration of minorities from the larger issue of the transformation of
society into a multi-ethnic society. In fact, there seems to have been a cer-
tain reluctance, if not taboo, in linking ethnic differences to broader na-
tional issues.
4.3.3 Technocracy and frame reflection?
Thus, the technocratic research-policy nexus contributed to both the struc-
tural and substantive conditions that gave rise to a multicultural model in
Dutch immigrant integration policy and research. Yet, did it also contribute
to critical reflection on this model? For example, did research-policy dialo-
gues actually involve critical reflection about this model in comparison
with alternatives; or did the nexus push this model in different ways?
Technocratic opportunities and constraints for frame reflection
The technocratic boundary configuration offered some structural opportu-
nities, as well as constraints for a critical dialogue between research and
policy. Firstly, it contributed to opening up a first form of debate between
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research and policy on immigrant integration. The boundary work of speci-
fic actors played an important role in breaking the iron triangles that held
on to a differentialist approach. The positivism and missionary boundary
work of certain policy actors (CRM, Molleman) in combination with an
engagement in the position of minorities and the involvement of certain re-
search actors (ACOM, WRR) in policy development, created a structural
symbiosis between the actors that advocated a different, more multicultur-
alist approach to immigrant integration. As a result, this technocratic sym-
biosis became a source of positive feedback on the positions of these actors
in their fields. However, the symbiosis also imposed a new constraint on
the dialogue between research and policy, as it limited it to the small group
of actors involved in the structural symbiosis. For instance, it excluded
welfare and migrant organisations, keeping this issue out of open political
debate and also seeming to have limited the openness of debate on the re-
search side of the nexus.
Secondly, technocracy contributed to the development of an alternative
multiculturalist frame alongside the prevailing differentialist approach. Yet,
it simultaneously contributed to the exclusion of other frames. For specific
actors, namely CRM and Molleman’s directorate, technocracy provided a
way of developing an alternative and scientifically legitimate frame that
would evade the sensitivity, or even taboos, arising from concerns about
the politicisation of this issue. The confrontation between research actors
involved in the development of the new multiculturalist frame and those
actors that advocated the differentialist approach also led to the articulation
of these two models. This was manifest in, for instance, ACOM’s and
WRR’s reports, which clearly addressed the level of problem framing, but
also in influential publications such as Van Amersfoort’s study (1974), an
article by Entzinger (1975) about norms versus facts of not being an immi-
gration country and a study by Bovenkerk (1974b) expressing doubts about
return migration. At the same time, technocracy also contributed to the ex-
clusion of alternative models, such as Marxist frames in research and na-
tionalist (extreme-right) frames in politics and combinations of multicultur-
alist and differentialist frames as advocated by welfare organisations.
Thirdly, and closely related to the second point of selective inclusion
and exclusion of frames, is that the technocratic boundary configuration
does not appear to have contributed to critical reflection about problem
framing. In fact, it seems to have been designed as a strategy for getting
the multiculturalist frame on the agenda. Both ACOM and WRR were or-
iented towards ongoing policy developments in order to advocate one spe-
cific (multiculturalist with universalist traits) approach. They made no
attempts to foster critical reflection about problem frames; instead, they sti-
mulated diffusion and elaboration of a particular multiculturalist frame. In
fact, this analysis has shown that both organisations took this problem
frame as a starting point for their involvement in this domain rather than as
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an outcome of reflection. This absence of interest in reflection about alter-
native frames was also manifest in the practices of policy actors such as
CRM and Molleman’s Minorities Policy Directorate. Both institutions re-
garded research as a means (i.e. CRM) of convincing other actors of the
need for a more multiculturalist policy approach, or as the source (i.e.
Molleman) of practical knowledge and expertise required for developing
such a multiculturalist policy approach. Thus, the actors involved in the
technocratic symbiosis between research and policy took a multiculturalist
frame for granted rather than recognising that they had encouraged critical
dialogues about this and other alternative frames.
Fourthly, instead of a pragmatic willingness by actors to adopt their
frames in response to reflection, there was a certain reluctance, sensitivity
even, in both research and policy to discuss their multiculturalist frames
critically. On one hand, there was a social engagement in immigrant inte-
gration research with the position of minorities. This was not only ex-
pressed in a methodological preference for field research but also in an
ethos that urged researchers to put themselves in the shoes of the migrants,
with the distinct aim of contributing to an improvement in their position.
On the other hand, there were also important normative facets in immigrant
integration policymaking that hampered a pragmatic attitude towards pro-
blem framing. This created reluctance to discuss ethnic differences vis-à-
vis broader societal developments.
Finally, technocracy did generate trust within a relatively small network
of actors involved in the technocratic symbiosis. However, the other side
of the coin seems to have been a distrust of other actors. This included a
suspiciousness towards welfare organisations with questionable representa-
tion as well as a general distrust of extreme-right parties and politics, with
whom potential conflicts could unfold, thus threatening the development of
a rational, consistent approach to immigrant integration.
A moment of reflection?
The role of the technocratic boundary configuration in generating dialogue
between research and policy seems to have been rather limited. It was not
designed to stimulate critical reflection about problem framing but rather,
to generate a structural symbiosis between actors that advocated a multicul-
turalist framing. To the extent that frame reflection did take place, it pri-
marily involved a confrontation between this multiculturalist approach with
the prevailing differentialist model, rather than a systematic analysis of var-
ious alternative frames.
Thus, the technocratic boundary configuration was designed to establish
the multiculturalist-with-universalist-traits frame rather than to promote cri-
tical frame reflection. The 1979 WRR report seems to have played a key
role in getting this frame accepted. It provided a synthesis of available
knowledge and expertise through coordination with ACOM and others.
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Furthermore, it served as a direct precursor to the reply memorandum, the
first to elaborate policy contours, and the final minorities memorandum.
This, then, justifies a closer look at whether frame reflection did play a
more prominent role within WRR.
Throughout the course of developing the 1979 WRR report, a small but
important frameshift was taking place. First drafts of the WRR report
adopted a problem frame that was predominantly multiculturalist, or as one
of its authors names it, ‘interactionist’.86 This concerned references in the
report to the Netherlands as an ‘open, multi-ethnic society’ and a discus-
sion of mutual adaptation between minorities and natives. In later drafts,
references were added to define the limits of such an interactionist ap-
proach. For instance, there were passages on ‘elements of other cultures
where no or almost no compromise with Western possibility is possible’
and those that ‘leave no other possibility than to defend the achievements
of our culture against contending claims’, and about ‘the need and space
for many adaptations in laws and regulations at government and private in-
stitutes to the situation of a multi-ethnic society, without affecting the cul-
tural achievements of our society’ (WRR 1979: XXII).
These revisions were a product of a debate within WRR about the inter-
actionist/multiculturalist frame formulated in the first drafts.87 The author
of those sections of the first drafts relating to Dutch society and cultural di-
versity advocated a perspective that allowed for open interaction between
minorities and natives, without the latter exploiting its dominant position
to enforce cultural assimilation.88 Thus, this author, a staff member, raised
concerns about the asymmetrical relationship between minorities and na-
tives and called for the kind of open, multi-ethnic society that would allow
such interaction.
At the same time, several council members raised doubts about an inter-
actionist perspective. In particular, they expressed concerns about the rela-
tion between cultural diversity and the rule of law. They argued that the
rule of law contained codifications for cultural achievements with which
one could not interfere.89 For example, one council member worried about
the compatibility of Islam with the rule of law and the conflicting values
and norms that could arise in this context.90
This posed a dilemma for the chairman of the project group: ‘either the
council chooses for interaction based on equality with unlimited involve-
ment of both sides, or the council argues that clashes can occur between
the own culture and potential dangers of minority cultures’.91 The conflict-
ing two perspectives also involved an issue of internal hierarchy. Although
the council formally decides upon the texts of reports, the staff members
who regularly do most of the writing are also given an important voice.
Despite a majority view in the council, the staff member who had fulfilled
an important task in writing the drafts continued to resist a text that would
stress the ‘potential dangers of minority cultures’. In fact, he threatened to
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leave the project, believing that the emphasis on ‘the protection of the own
cultural achievements [….] too strongly suggests [...] that the Dutch major-
ity is with its back against the wall [...] while in fact we have a dominant
position’.92
The chairman (of both the WRR Council and of this particular project
group) played an important role in resolving the internal controversy. It
was important for WRR to present its report unanimously to the outside
world. Failure to do so would call its authority into question. As a result,
the chairman took charge of re-editing the draft texts and attempted to de-
velop compromises that would draw the involved actors back into the pro-
ject. While references to possible cultural clashes were inserted into the
draft texts, they were formulated conditionally. The new wording avoided
assumptions regarding the danger of minority cultures, suggesting instead
that if such dangers or conflicts were to emerge, the cultural achievements
of Dutch society would have to be defended.
After several interruptions [...], the chairman argued that it would
be best if he took over. He then devised formulas that would be
agreeable to the two opponents, leading to several magical formu-
las. [For instance,] in those cases of confrontation where, in prac-
tice, no comprise is possible, no other option is available other than
to defend the achievements of our culture against opposing claims.
(xxii)
The passage above is very conditionally formulated; if this extreme case
occurs, then […]. So, the incompatibility of cultures was not formulated as
the normal situation, but in a more conditional way.93
Despite the ferocity of this conflict and the role that hierarchy played in
it, the clash constituted a crucial moment to allow for critical reflection re-
garding the frame for a minorities policy. The multiculturalist frame that
had emerged in research and policy received criticism concerning its sup-
posedly cultural relativist traits. This issue also sparked fierce controversy
within WRR’s back office. Risk of politicisation and taboos in public de-
bate notwithstanding, WRR provided an ideal context for confronting this
frame with alternatives. It provided a more pragmatic setting for adapting
the problem framing as necessary. Within WRR, the multiculturalist frame
that had emerged among specific research and policy actors in the preced-
ing decade was critically reflected upon, adapted in terms of those ele-
ments that critics found too relativist and formulated into a policy frame
for a minorities policy. This critical debate on the level of problem framing
was to have an important effect on the policy changes to come. In fact, the
government eventually adopted references made in the WRR report to
cases where compromises would be impossible, choosing to reflect, in par-
ticular, the position of the individual in the policy.94
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4.4 Conclusion
Research-policy dialogues clearly played a key role in the construction of
the Dutch multicultural model of immigrant integration in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. This was a formative period for both policy and research
in this domain. For the first time, the government recognised the perma-
nent status of immigrants, while researchers showed increasing interest in
the social position of these minorities. A technocratic research-policy nexus
allowed for significant co-evolution of developments in both fields during
this formative period. In fact, the ethnic minorities policy of the 1980s was
founded directly on reports and studies by WRR and ACOM. At the same
time, the pronounced policy orientation of researchers also contributed to a
dominant position of the so-called ‘minorities paradigm’ in the field of re-
search. This co-evolution brought an end to the initial multiplicity of
frames of immigrant integration and created a powerful institutional frame-
work for a dominant multicultural frame.
The technocratic research-policy nexus was the product of strongly con-
vergent patterns of boundary work in the fields of research and policymak-
ing. Reflected was the then widely shared belief in rational societal steer-
ing, as manifest in many areas of social policy, and the broader tendency
of social scientists to be policy-oriented. An important factor in this do-
main was that WRR was an institutional given, providing science-based
advice to policymaking.
However, there are also important factors that account for the construc-
tion of a technocratic nexus in this specific domain. On one hand, policy-
makers not only believed that this problem could be resolved in a rational
manner within a decade or so with the help of social scientists, but they
also strained to depoliticise the topic. This was manifest in CRM’s mis-
sionary boundary work, which mobilised research in an effort to raise sup-
port for the development of a minorities policy, and the positivist boundary
work of the Minorities Policy Directorate, which endeavoured to define
immigrant integration as a non-political issue that had to be developed on
the basis of rational insights from independent research. On the other hand,
researchers involved in this nascent field felt a strong sense of societal en-
gagement with the position of minorities, something influenced by the
dominant anthropological tradition in this field. This clearly applied to
ACOM, which stressed the societal function of research, as well as to
WRR, which worked hard to prove its societal and political function in this
period. However, the technocratic nexus implied that other sorts of exper-
tise, i.e. ‘ethnic expertise’, would become less influential. This is a marked
contrast with other areas of social policy, where tripartite organisations of-
ten played an important role involving researchers and policymakers, as
well as group representatives.
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The technocratic nexus contributed to the rise of the multicultural model
in a very particular way. It created a structural symbiosis between specific
actors who were advocating a multiculturalist, rather than differentialist,
frame. In this way, it generated positive feedback regarding frameshifts in
research and policy. It did this by strengthening the position of certain ac-
tors involved in this symbiosis (ACOM, WRR, CRM, Minorities
Directorate) and weakening that of others (Department of Social Affairs,
welfare organisations). Furthermore, the symbiotic relationship between a
relatively small network of actors enabled combined focus on what these
actors considered to be specific to minorities – their ethnic and cultural sta-
tus. This created what can be described as the ‘logic of minorities’ in pro-
blem framing, contributing specifically to the rise of a multiculturalist
frame.
However, the technocratic research-policy nexus does not seem to have
been designed to promote a critical dialogue between research and policy
at the level of problem framing. It offered some opportunities for frame re-
flection, in part by breaking open the iron triangles that had formed around
the differentialist approach of the 1970s. At the same time, however, it lim-
ited the debate to a select set of actors, excluded possible alternative
frames, took the multiculturalist frame as a starting point rather than as an
object of reflection, limited pragmatism because of the sensitivities of the
issue and limited trust to a select group of actors. The nexus, then, was a
product of strategies designed to reinforce the structural positions of actors
with a multiculturalist problem frame. Thus, the research-policy nexus in
this period clearly enjoyed an important structural meaning in research and
policy frameshifts, though not in a way involving critical frame reflection.
The rise of the multicultural model was the outcome of strongly convergent
forces in research and policy – forces that supported depoliticisation and
the logic of minorities in problem framing, rather than opening reflection
on various frames.
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5 Enlightenment and the rise of universalism
(1989-1994)
The multiculturalist approach that had been developed in the early 1980s
remained the cornerstone of formal Dutch policies throughout the decade.
This is the period for which the Dutch approach would become so interna-
tionally known as a representative of the multicultural model, although
Dutch policies were rarely phrased in terms of ‘multiculturalism’. In the
1980s, the ethnic minorities policy was institutionalised and many of its
elements implemented. Even though many areas of social policy in the
Netherlands were reformed during this decade due to economic depression
and a stringent politics of welfare state retrenchment, for a long time the
domain was relatively unaffected. In addition, immigrant integration re-
search thrived during this period, with ACOM maintaining its central posi-
tion on the research-policy nexus and an ever larger network of researchers
becoming involved in this field. Immigrant integration research had
evolved into a vast industry.
However, a shift in formal policy discourse did take place in the early
1990s, with the development of the integration policy, which had distinct
universalist traits. Moreover, the dominance of the minorities paradigm be-
came challenged by the end of the 1980s. In this chapter, we will see that
pressure for policy change started to build during the late 1980s, though a
formal policy change took place only years later. In the early 1990s, the fa-
mous Dutch multicultural model was replaced in official policy discourse
by a more universalist approach that phrased immigrant integration in
terms of ‘integration’ and ‘citizenship’ rather than emancipation. It labelled
immigrants as a single category of individuals (‘allochthonous’) rather than
as ethnic or cultural groups (‘minorities’). Furthermore, it chose to explain
immigrant integration in terms of the social-economic participation of mi-
grants instead of the social-cultural emancipation of minorities. In sum, a
liberal-egalitarian perspective came to override any normative focus on
multiculturalism.
This frameshift challenged the established research-policy nexus.
However, it also presents a very interesting case for how research and advi-
sory bodies can provide a venue for putting new ideas on the agenda. In
the depoliticised setting of the 1980s, it was a second report from WRR
that would provide an alternative to the multicultural model on the agenda.
The main focus in this chapter will be to analyse the configuration of
research-policy relations in this period and reconstruct the role of research-
policy dialogues in the turn away from the traditional Dutch multicultural
model.
5.1 The turn towards universalism
The first step is to picture the players, the playing field and the societal
context in which the frameshift from multiculturalism to universalism oc-
curred. It will become evident that new actors with other frames were gra-
dually emerging, beyond the structural symbiosis that had supported the
multicultural model in the 1980s.
5.1.1 Context: Ongoing immigration and welfare state retrenchment
The frameshift towards universalism involved a break from the 1980s’ re-
lative stability in immigrant integration policies. This equilibrium was sus-
tained by the structural symbiosis between research and policy, as analysed
in the previous chapter, which effectively established a structure-induced
subsystem that was relatively insulated from external developments
(Timmermans & Scholten 2006).
However, various contextual developments eventually contributed to a
disturbance of this structure-induced equilibrium. First, an economic reces-
sion during the 1980s led to a surge of unemployment in the society at
large and among immigrants in particular. Migrants were especially vulner-
able to economic decline and were hit hard by the reform of the labour
intensive sectors in which they were often employed. Whereas unemploy-
ment had been relatively low in the 1970s, especially among foreign work-
ers, it skyrocketed in the early 1980s. In 1984, the level of unemployment
among Moroccans and Turks was about double the unemployment among
native Dutch (35.5 per cent and 38.8 per cent, respectively) (Koolen &
Tempelman 2003: 53). In 1987, the differences in unemployment levels
had become starker: 13 per cent for natives, 27 per cent for Surinamese
and no less than 42 per cent and 44 per cent for Moroccans and Turks, re-
spectively.1 In addition, the position of migrants in the educational sphere
appeared to lag behind that of the population at large. This included a rela-
tively low level of education, low educational participation and high levels
of school dropout (WRR 1989: 139-141).
From the 1980s onwards, successive governments conducted a politics
of retrenchment in various policy areas. Retrenchment politics was deemed
necessary to maintain the viability of the welfare state. This involved a so-
called ‘no-nonsense politics’ aimed at cutting back welfare spending by
changing welfare state facilities (cutting back on social benefits, restricting
access to social benefits) and prioritising employment (putting work before
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income). A ‘regulated liberalisation’ of the welfare state took place at this
time, involving a recalibration of the division of responsibilities between
state, civil society and individuals (Van der Veen & Trommel 1999).
Gradually, welfare responsibilities shifted from the state towards the indivi-
dual or the market. The level of unemployment decreased during the
1980s, but stagnated towards the end of the decade at just below 14 per
cent. It remained especially high for immigrants in the second half of the
1980s (Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 73).
The ongoing influx of migrants during the 1980s – and particularly, con-
tinued family migration in the form of family reunion and family formation
– frustrated the expectation that immigration could be effectively brought
to a halt while integrating those minorities that had settled in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, asylum migration in the second half of the
1980s shot up (VWJ 2004: 244). In previous decades, asylum migration
had taken place on a relatively small scale and mainly within Europe.
Now, the waves of asylees included various ‘new’ groups from Sri Lanka
(Tamils), Ghana, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. As a result
of both family and asylum migration, a positive migration balance in the
Netherlands remained throughout the decade – from a positive migration
balance of 53,000 in 1980, numbers decreased to 24,000 in 1985 only to
rise again to 60,000 in 1990.2 Moreover, the number of immigrants or ‘al-
lochthonous’ – defined as persons either born outside of the Netherlands or
who have at least one parent not born in the Netherlands – rose from 1.3
million (9.9 per cent of the total population) to 2.1 million (14.2 per cent
of total population) between 1975 and the 1990s.3 This meant minority
groups that had been formally recognised as policy targets grew signifi-
cantly larger: figures for 1990 show 237,000 Surinamese, 206,000 Turks
and 168,000 Moroccans living in the Netherlands (Martinez & Groeneveld
in VWJ 2004). These groups also became increasingly diverse in terms of
differentiation between first- and second-generation migrants. It is also im-
portant to note that asylum migration led to the arrival of ‘new’ immigrants
who were not recognised as ‘minorities’ in the minorities policy and who
received little attention from researchers.
In response to these developments and particularly to the signs of stag-
nation in the social-economic position of minorities, the government ex-
pressed doubts about whether the current approach was sustainable. An ad-
visory request was issued to WRR for a new report on immigrant integra-
tion, which was published in 1989 (WRR 1989). This report is generally
seen as a turning point in both policy developments (Blok 2004a;
Entzinger 2006; Penninx 2005) and research developments during this per-
iod (Engbersen & Gabriëls 1995b; Timmermans & Scholten 2006). WRR
advised the government to develop an integration policy that would focus
more on the social-economic activation of individual migrants.
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As the reply memorandum to this report indicates, the government did
not immediately adopt this new perspective.4 However, it did mark a shift
in public and political discourse on immigrant integration (Fermin 1997:
82). This shift in discourse was contested by some of the actors that were
involved in the structure-induced equilibrium of the multiculturalist ap-
proach. Molleman, director of the Minorities Policy Directorate until 1990,
reported to the media that he had ‘doubts whether a fundamentally new
policy approach was needed’. He claimed that although the minorities pol-
icy may not have been entirely successful, it could also not be dismissed
as a failure: ‘Policy has not failed; it has only not yet succeeded’.5
Molleman also objected to plans for budget cuts to the minorities policy.
He claimed that, especially in bad economic times, efforts made to achieve
the integration of these groups should not be diminished.6 In addition,
Penninx, a civil servant at CRM and an ACOM observer, wrote a number
of journal and newspaper articles in which he referred to the criticism of
the multiculturalist policy approach as ‘democratic impatience’. He made
the point that the effects of this approach would take considerable time to
pay off (Vermeulen & Penninx 1994).7 ACOM also rejected claims that a
different policy approach was necessary. This is illustrated by a response it
published in the 1989 WRR report whereby it discarded the claim that the
policy had failed (ACOM 1989). Migrant organisations also criticised the
new mode of discourse, sometimes using terms such as ‘forced integration’
or ‘hidden assimilation’ (Blok 2004a: 116-117).
However, the minorities policy gradually shifted from a specific
approach on minorities to an intensification of general policies and, in par-
ticular, (mainly social-economic) policy domains such as labour and educa-
tion (Fermin 1997: 82). Reflecting a more general trend towards decentrali-
sation, municipalities came to have greater power. Due to this functional
and territorial decentralisation, the coordinating task of the Department of
Home Affairs grew weak (Molleman 2003). One of its most important
means for policy coordination was orchestrating research and monitoring
policy efforts and effects in various areas. In this respect, it cooperated clo-
sely with the SCP, which would become an important provider of regular
minorities reports containing data on the social-economic status of
migrants.
In the early 1990s, immigrant integration became an increasingly central
issue in both public and political debate. In 1990, Prime Minister Lubbers
openly expressed his disappointment with the effects of the minorities pol-
icy and called for a more activating approach to immigrant integration.8
Furthermore, following political statements by leader of the main opposi-
tion party Bolkestein, a broad national minorities debate emerged in 1992.
This debate played out in the media (Mariën 1992), in politics (Koolen
2003: 27) and in several conferences organised by the Minister of Home
Affairs.9 It drew attention to social-cultural issues of immigration and to
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concerns about social cohesion. In response to this debate, experts
Entzinger and Van der Zwan wrote an advisory report to government that
elaborated plans for civic integration programmes for newcomers to Dutch
society. These were the same plans that had already been raised in the
1989 WRR report (Van der Zwan & Entzinger 1992). Civic integration
programmes would become an important facet of policy in the 1990s and
their focus on all migrants instead of specific minorities, as well as on the
social-economic proficiencies of migrants rather than their social-cultural
status, clearly indicated a shift towards universalism.
In response to the gradual changes that had taken place in the preceding
period, Parliament called for a ‘recalibration’ of the contours of govern-
ment policy to replace the minorities memorandum. To achieve this, a con-
tours memorandum on the integration of ethnic minorities was presented
by the Department of Home Affairs in 1994. As observed in chapter 4, this
memorandum marked the shift from the multiculturalist (with universalist
traits) minorities policy towards a more universalist integration policy. As
for research, this period also marked the evolution of a more universalist
‘integration paradigm’ alongside the multiculturalist ‘minorities paradigm’.
WRR and SCP seem to have been especially pivotal in this respect.
ACOM, however, was discontinued in 1992.
To recap, various research and policy actors contributed to this frame-
shift. In research, this included WRR, which published a second report on
immigrant integration, SCP as a data provider, experts Van der Zwan and
Entzinger who published a report in response to the national minorities de-
bate as well as ACOM, which appears to have lost its central position in
this period. In policy, this included the Department of Home Affairs, which
remained the coordinating body even though its role changed during this
period, as well as political actors who became more involved in policy-
making at the time.
5.1.2 Established nexus: The Department of Home Affairs and ACOM
The shift towards a more universalist frame of integration took place in a
setting already featuring an institutionalised research-policy nexus. The
technocratic symbiosis of the 1980s formed an important part of the de-
cade’s strongly centralised and unitary structure for policy coordination
(Guiraudon 2000b: 131-134), which was reinforced by the co-optation of
ethnic elites. While the responsibility of welfare organisations was increas-
ingly marginalised, the role of immigrant self-organisations had become
more structural, especially when the National Advisory and Consultation
Structure for Minorities (Landelijk Advies en Overleg Orgaan voor
Minderheden, LAO) was established in 1984. In order to appreciate the
setting of actors in research-policy relations, it is first necessary to sketch
the positions and frames that were developed at the time.
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The Department of Home Affairs
The Department of Home Affairs – more precisely, the Minorities Policy
Directorate within it – was responsible for the interdepartmental coordina-
tion of minorities policy during the 1980s. Headed by Molleman, it initially
held a distinct coordinating position and often undertook new policy initia-
tives, even when they were to be implemented by other policy departments.
However, this task grew problematic the 1980s, as various policy depart-
ments claimed more and more autonomy.10 In fact, during the second half
of the decade, the department became subject to growing political pressure
(Koolen 2003: 25), as a result gradually shifting from a stance of strong to
weak policy coordination (Molleman 2003).11 This meant that instead of
initiating policy programmes across areas, it was now constantly searching
for new ways to convince other departments to accept specific policy mea-
sures. This change in its structural placement was also illustrated by renam-
ing the directorate the Directory for the Countours of the Minorities
Policy.12 In the contours memorandum of 1994, policy coordination was
defined as the ‘shared responsibility’ of national and local governments,
and it was stressed ‘that the centre of gravity in the realisation and imple-
mentation of policy lies mainly with the municipalities’.13
The weaker coordinating role held by the Minorities Policy Directorate
reflected a broader structural trend of territorial and functional decentralisa-
tion. At this time, the government conducted a politics of retrenchment in
various areas, including immigrant integration and welfare state policies.
Also clearly affected was the centralised and unitary structure of the mino-
rities policy, which was increasingly delegated to sector departments, as
well as to local governments. The department’s loss of power was one rea-
son Molleman resigned as director of the Minorities Policy Directorate in
1990 (just after publication of the reply memorandum to the WRR report
from that year).14
In addition to change in the department’s leadership, a different problem
framing was also adopted in this period. It shifted from a multiculturalist-
with-universalist-traits frame to a more universalist one, as demonstrated
by two documents: the reply memorandum to the 1989 WRR report on
‘Allochthonous policy’ (1990) 15 and, to a greater degree, a new memoran-
dum developed by this department on the coordination of the integration
policy, the contours memorandum on the integration of ethnic minorities
(1994).
The reply memorandum was written by the Interdepartmental
Committee for the Minorities Policy, chaired by the Department of Home
Affairs, on behalf of the government coalition that was established in
1990. Not only did it signal this department’s status at the time, but also
the changing political views on immigrant integration that were attached to
it. The reply memorandum maintained the original policy contours set by
the 1983 minorities memorandum (Fermin 1997: 194). It contained, for
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instance, the social classification of immigrants as ‘minorities’ and focused
specifically on a number of selected minorities, with the understanding that
‘Dutch government carried a special responsibility for the admission of
these groups or groups that were connected with the Netherlands through
the colonial past’.16 Furthermore, it argued that the minorities concept was
‘internationally accepted and referring to fundamental principles of demo-
cratic law, especially concerning the principle of respecting minorities’
(ibid.). It also stated that measures aimed at the institutionalisation of cul-
tural differences, such as language classes for immigrants and the Advisory
and Consultation Council for Minorities, were to be maintained.
However, the memorandum also showed signs of a minor shift towards
a more universalist approach. It reiterated the demand for, as the slogan
went: ‘General policy wherever possible, specific or categorical policy
where necessary’.17 In this respect, it proposed measures for functional and
territorial decentralisation, including in the context of the politics of social
renewal in this period. It concentrated more on social-economic concerns
such as education and labour.
Integration does not conflict with identity; it adds a dimension to it,
[...] only those who speak the Dutch language sufficiently, who
have completed an adequate occupational education and who have
learned to stand firm in a hard and competitive society, can effec-
tively participate while retaining one’s own identity.18
The government adopted WRR’s recommendation to develop additional fa-
cilities for newcomers to acquire the necessary educational basis for parti-
cipation in the labour market and in Dutch society at large.19 Furthermore,
it embraced WRR’s suggestions for an Equal Treatment and Equal
Employment Act and also the recommendation to create a legal basis for
dual nationality.
The fact that the Minorities Policy Directorate wrote the contours mem-
orandum20 provides a direct indication of the changing problem frame
within the Department of Home Affairs.21 In the memorandum, the name
of the minorities policy was changed to the integration policy. In terms of
the concept of integration, the memorandum suggested that it would be
‘better that the social integration of minority groups, and persons belonging
to these groups is a mutual process of acceptation’.22 It also adopted a
more liberal-egalitarian perspective on immigrant integration by stressing
the individual obligations of migrants for their integration, stating that:
on all members of ethnic minorities that stay permanently in the
Netherlands [...] lies the individual obligation to participate in edu-
cation and the labour market and also the obligation to make efforts
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to learn the Dutch language and to acquire basic knowledge of
Dutch society.23
More so than the reply memorandum of 1990, the contours memorandum
diminished forms of institutionalised pluralism, for instance, by depriving
the LAO of its advisory function. This arose out of fear that such a func-
tion would interfere too much with its consultative task and that it would
result in a form of relative privilege for ethnic minorities over other groups
in society (Blok 2004a:494).
Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM)
ACOM’s central position in the established research-policy nexus solidified
in the early 1980s and lasted throughout the decade. Its formal mandate
was broadened from advising CRM to providing advice on minorities re-
search to the government as a whole. During this era, it was formally asso-
ciated with the Department of Home Affairs (Van Putten 1990: 362).
However, ACOM’s existence was subject to an establishment regulation
for a set period. This timeframe had to be regularly renewed (standardly
once every four years) in order for ACOM to continue. In 1984, the latest
extension led to debates about whether to discontinue ACOM, in the con-
text of a larger restructuring of government advisory bodies (ibid.: 363).
The Minorities Policy Directorate strongly opposed a discontinuation, illus-
trating the strength of the established research-policy nexus in this
period.24
During the early part of the decade, ACOM’s influence on research pro-
gramming was very significant. Penninx, then working at CRM and acting
as an observer to ACOM, even concluded that almost all of the projects
suggested in ACOM’s 1979 ‘Minorities research advice’ had been adopted
by the government several years later (Penninx 1988b: 35). Furthermore,
ACOM would also have significant indirect effects on this research field at
large, ‘because of the infrastructural work of ACOM and the coordinating
role of its secretariat’ (ibid.: 37). Without doubt, ACOM had enormous in-
fluence on the development of the immigrant integration research field.
ACOM also maintained a multiculturalist problem framing during the
1980s. This meant that its advice often contained a specific focus on min-
ority groups, with particular attention to issues such as the social-economic
status of migrants; deprivation (due to, for example, discrimination); parti-
cipation, emancipation and culture; problem accumulation; and women,
youth and the elderly (ibid.: 32). These were also the topics of government
research programming, which ACOM regularly advised be consolidated.
ACOM’s influence on government research programming included draw-
ing attention to issues of discrimination, as manifested in key advice from
ACOM in the 1980s. It took the form of ‘A fair chance’, a report by
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Bovenkerk (1987) on positive labour market measures for stimulating mi-
grant participation by forcing obligatory measures on employers.
ACOM’s lead changed during the second half of the 1980s. Penninx
(1992) and Van Putten (1990) relate the decline of this body to the institu-
tionalisation of the minorities policy in that period, which diminished the
demand for the type of expertise ACOM could provide and upped demand
for more evaluative research. Penninx (1988b: 36) observes how although
some ACOM reports on policy developments were very influential, others
remained largely ignored. In 1987, significant changes took place (Van
Putten 1990: 365): Köbben resigned as ACOM chair to be replaced by
Bovenkerk, and Van Amersfoort left the committee. At the same time, var-
ious new researchers joined, including several from minority groups.
In 1992, the Department of Home Affairs chose not to extend the man-
date of ACOM and the body was discontinued. It was succeeded by a
Temporary Scientific Committee for the Minorities Policy (Tijdelijke
Wetenschappelijke Commissie Minderhedenbeleid, TWCM), though
TWCM differed significantly from ACOM in a number of respects. Firstly,
it was not, like ACOM was, a technical-scientific committee; instead, it
was bipartite, consisting of researchers and policymakers. Secondly, it was
primarily intended to further the translation of existing research and exper-
tise for the purposes of policy practice. TWCM was dissolved in 1996.
Migrant self-organisations
Last but not least, the centralised and unitary structure in this issue domain
during the 1980s also involved migrant self-organisations. The importance
of welfare organisations, or so-called zaakwaarnemers, diminished in the
early part of the decade to be replaced by a new structure of migrant self-
organisations. Formed in 1984, the LAO served in an advisory capacity
concerning policy formulation at the Department of Home Affairs and held
a consulting role in obtaining insights for government from and about
minorities. These organisations were also involved in providing advice on
research programming, which had become fiercely contested by the end of
the 1980s. However, their influence on research programming seems to
have been rather limited.25
These organisations maintained the multiculturalist frame that formed
the basis for the policy and research structure in this period. For instance,
in a joint response with the LAO to the government’s reply memorandum
to the 1989 WRR report, the migrant self-organisations advocated a conso-
lidation of the broader approach to social-economic deprivation, collective
emancipation and identity, rather than adopting a narrower approach to so-
cial-economic participation (Fermin 1997: 195). Furthermore, these organi-
sations focused attention on issues such as discrimination and structural de-
privation rather than a universalist focus on individual deficiencies of mi-
grants (ibid.: 196). They also continued to frame immigrant integration in
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the context of a normative process of transforming Dutch society into a
multicultural society, rather than adopting a more liberal-egalitarian view
on immigrant integration (ibid.: 199).
These actors from the prevailing research-policy nexus interpreted the
evidence about ongoing problem developments in a way that was different
from other actors. They selected evidence about the multiculturalist ap-
proach’s success rather than its failures. Much, for instance, was made of
the legal and political position of minorities, which had significantly im-
proved during the 1980s, as well as the implementation of a constitutional
right to vote in local and regional elections for long-term resident foreign-
ers. Furthermore, researchers and policymakers both often defended the
Dutch multiculturalist approach internationally, proclaiming that the ab-
sence of any significant racial unrest in the Netherlands during this era was
a sign of its success, in contrast to what several surrounding countries were
experiencing (Vermeulen & Penninx 2000).
At the same time, the persistent deprivation of migrants in social-
economic domains such as labour and education was interpreted not as an
indication that the current approach had failed but rather, as confirmation
of the need to continue currents in the same direction. It was argued that in
periods of overall economic decline, a specific approach to minorities was
even more necessary so as to avert the disproportionate effects that such
trends could have on the status of minorities. For instance, the director of
the Minorities Policy Directorate frequently stated that the integration pol-
icy had not failed, but it had not yet succeeded. Contrary claims were
sometimes rejected as issues of ‘impatience’. This clearly reflected the ‘ne-
gative feedback’ mobilised by the established research-policy nexus from
the 1980s in response to mounting pressure for policy change.
5.1.3 Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR): Ethnic minorities II?
A decade after its first report on immigrant integration entitled ‘Ethnic
minorities’ (WRR 1979), WRR published a second report on this issue,
‘Immigrant policy’ (WRR 1989). During the 1980s, WRR had continued
the more in-depth approach to specific policy themes that it had developed
in the period of its 1979 report. Furthermore, WRR had become increas-
ingly institutionalised during the 1980s, gaining significant authority in the
field of both policymaking and research. This authority was reinforced by
the appointment of former Minister of Social Affairs Wil Albeda as WRR
chairman in 1985. The 1979 report had a direct influence on the authority
gained by WRR, specifically in the fields of immigrant integration research
and policy. It is important to note here the statutory requirement for the ro-
tation of council members every five years. Whereas one of the main
authors of the 1979 report was a WRR staff member who went on to be in-
volved in the development of the second report, there was no direct
144 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
connection between these two reports in terms of council members – the
main author of the second report, Entzinger, had not been involved in the
1979 report, although he was ACOM secretary at that time.
Another important difference is that the second report was a response to
a formal advisory request from the government. A 1988 government docu-
ment entitled ‘Action programme minorities policy’ concluded that insuffi-
cient improvements were being made in crucial areas.26 Reference was
made, in particular, to indications of rising unemployment and persistent
social-economic deprivation among migrants. It was against this back-
ground that the government requested new advice from WRR on immi-
grant integration. The advisory request’s text stated that on ‘material
points’, such as housing, education and labour, ‘too little progress’ had
been made; whereas ‘on a number of, mainly immaterial, points significant
progress has been made’.27 The document raised doubts about ‘whether
the approach that characterised the policy from the minorities memoran-
dum [...] would have to be continued in its current form’. WRR was asked
to provide ‘advice for the prioritisation of future government policy’ so that
‘strategic choices on the future of the minorities policy could be made in
1990 [...]’. Furthermore, it was asked to provide ‘creative and practical
suggestions’ on how to ameliorate the policy design. A remarkable move
for its relationship with WRR at the time, the government set a deadline to
receive this advice before making strategic choices in 1990.
However, this report provided more than just an update of the previous
report in the context of ongoing issue developments. It contained a very
different perspective in various respects. It renamed immigrant integration
in terms of ‘integration’ instead of ‘emancipation’, defining integration as
‘equal participation in societal sectors and institutions’.28 It framed immi-
gration as a permanent phenomenon rather than a historically unique occur-
rence, based on the ‘supposition that the level of migration to the
Netherlands [...] will be sustained for the foreseeable future’.29 It stated
that ‘whereas the council advised in 1979 that the presence of immigrants
in Dutch society should be regarded as a permanent phenomenon, it now
expects that immigration too will be a lasting feature’.30
Rather than being classified as ethnic or cultural groups, migrants were
now defined as a social category. The report also proposed use of the – dif-
ficult to translate – concepts of ‘allochthonous’ (allochtonen) and ‘au-
tochthonous’ (autochtonen), referring to ‘all those who have migrated to
the Netherlands plus their descendants up to the third generation, insofar as
the latter wish to regard themselves as non-indigenous’.31 Based on this
more open definition of immigrants, the policy called for ‘periodical re-
view’ to determine which immigrant groups were in a low social position
and would therefore be eligible as a target group for government policy.
However, critics rejected classifying and selecting specific minorites as
policy target groups, saying it was ‘arbitrary and prompted more by
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historical than by social considerations’.32 Furthermore, because the mino-
rities concept referred only to those groups of a different ethnic or cultural
origin who occupied low social status, it would be ‘too limited a concept’
for describing the social ‘dynamism’ found among immigrants and would
be ‘stigmatising’.33
This reclassifying of migrants reflected the distinct causal theory elabo-
rated in this report. Instead of approaching migrants as separate groups,
WRR considered the position of migrants ‘in significant measure the pro-
duct of general developments’. Therefore, ‘any policy specifically directed
towards minorities should be primarily conceived as an intensification of
general policies in the sectors in question’.34 Integration would have to be
achieved by general policy measures rather than by group-specific mea-
sures. Furthermore, such measures should be aimed at enabling the migrant
‘to stand on his own feet’, or to promote citizenship of migrants on the
whole. The role of government policy would be a facilitating one, as mi-
grants not only have ‘rights’ to entitlements but also ‘obligations’ to parti-
cipate in society. ‘All the state can do is to help ensure that the right condi-
tions exist [...] on the part of immigrants, a commitment is required to
make full use of the facilities on offer’.35 In this respect, WRR also envi-
saged problems for migrants carrying dual nationality, especially should it
encourage the naturalisation of migrants in Dutch society.36
WRR developed a universalist rights-and-duties perspective on immi-
grant integration. On one hand, government should provide conditions for
migrants to be able to participate in society. WRR proposed the develop-
ment of an Equal Treatment Act for combating discrimination and an
Equal Employment Act to exert soft pressure on employers to hire mi-
grants. On the other hand, WRR also pushed the obligation on migrants to
participate so as to remain eligible for government facilities in various
spheres. The belief was that the state should be able to impose ‘penalties
where those opportunities are not exploited’.37 Whereas multiculturalism
focuses on processes of position attribution by processes in society at large,
such as deprivation due to discrimination, this more universalist perspec-
tive emphasises position acquisition by migrants themselves, such as citi-
zenship and participation. In fact, WRR rejected an approach that would
treat migrants as ‘welfare categories’ who are dependent on government
facilities.
[...] [G]overnment tends to view these groups too much in the light
of welfare categories instead of providing them with opportunities
to stand on their own feet. Many members of minority groups have
become directly or indirectly dependent on the state in the form of
social security benefits, welfare services and facilities and
housing.38
146 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
Finally, WRR adopted a different perspective on the multi-ethnic, multicul-
tural character of Dutch society. Rather than seeing multi-ethnic society as
a normative ideal, it accepted it as a ‘social datum’ in which government
should not intervene. Institutional cultural pluralism was rejected. Instead,
culture and ethnicity were attributed to the private sphere beyond the reach
of government policy. In fact, one of the reasons the minorities policy was
so minimally effective is that it remained ‘stuck in a debate on policy
goals’39 with a ‘symbolic’ character, focusing especially on ‘cultural and
morality’ instead of on vital problem areas.40
[...] [T]he institutionalisation of ethnic pluralism need not be re-
garded as an independent objective of government policy. A multi-
ethnic society should be regarded as a social datum and, hence, as a
starting point for policies leaving space for cultural diversity in var-
ious fields. [...] Immigrants who so wish should be able to maintain
and develop their own cultural identity: integration certainly does
not imply cultural assimilation. To an even greater extent than insti-
tutional integration, however, this forms part of the responsibility of
the individual groups. [...] The government’s task is confined to
helping eliminate the barriers experienced by ethnic groupings as a
result of their non-indigenous origins, with a view to enabling them
to participate on a equal footing with indigenous people in a cultu-
rally diverse society.41
5.1.4 Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP)
In the early 1990s, another actor obtained a more central position in the
field of immigrant integration research: SCP. Since this period, the office
has published annual, and later biannual, minority reports containing
mainly quantitative data on the social-economic status of migrants.
SCP has an institutional history similar to that of WRR. Both were es-
tablished in response to recommendations by the De Wolff Committee.
SCP was to counterbalance the economic expertise that was provided by
the more established Central Planning Bureau (CPB) (Halffman & Hoppe
2006). It was formally part of CRM, which takes responsibility for coordi-
nating social-cultural policies. However, like WRR, it enjoys formal inde-
pendence in its work programme. SCP evolved out of the Research and
Planning Directorate of CRM from the 1960s and early 1970s. Despite the
strong orientation of this directorate towards ethnic minorities, SCP attribu-
ted little systematic attention to immigrant integration in the second half of
the 1970s and the early 1980s. For instance, only the 1976 and 1986 edi-
tions of its biannual social and cultural reports contained chapters on ethnic
minorities (Van Praag 1986: 2).
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SCP did get more involved in immigrant integration from the second
half of the 1990s. At the request of the Department of Home Affairs in
1984, it published a report on immigrants’ use of social facilities – for in-
stance, welfare state entitlements (i.e. social security) – in the spheres of
education, labour and housing (Van Praag 1984). This showed that SCP
was primarily focused on the participation of migrants in social-economic
domains. Furthermore, SCP paid significant attention to ethnic minorities
in its ‘Social and cultural report’ from 1986. This report was very critical
of the claim that the Netherlands would become a multicultural society. It
claimed instead that there was no evidence of the development of ethno-
cultural ‘streams’ in Dutch society, which placed primary importance on
minorities’ ethnic or cultural status (Van Praag 1986: 44). Moreover, Van
Praag, who authored a chapter on ethnic minorities in SCP’s 1986 report,
observed in another article that he did not perceive Dutch society as multi-
cultural and believed that the phrase ‘mutual adaptation between minorities
and majority’ written in the 1983 minorities memorandum placed too much
emphasis on the adaptation required from the side of the majority society
(ibid.: 45). Since 1990, SCP has provided the government regular minori-
ties reports containing an evaluation of the status of migrants, mainly in so-
cial-economic domains such as education, labour and housing. Publication
of these reports allowed SCP to take on a more influential position in the
immigrant integration research field.
SCP’s involvement in this period appears to reflect a universalist pro-
blem framing, as illustrated through its focus on, in particular, the social-
economic participation of migrants and its explicit rejection of multicultur-
alism. Furthermore, this universalist problem framing was also manifest in
its methods of data collection that did not involve a differentiation for spe-
cific groups. In fact, until well into the 1990s, SCP studies were based on
generic data that had been derived from various sources within the
National Statistics Office (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS), such
as the Labour Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking, EBB).
5.1.5 The Van der Zwan and Entzinger report (1994)
Another instance where research actors were involved in research-policy
relations in this period was the advisory report published by experts
Entzinger and Van der Zwan. Both had previously helped produce WRR
reports on immigrant integration – Entzinger as one of the authors of the
1989 WRR report and Van der Zwan as a council member who was pivotal
in the development of the 1979 WRR report.
Following the national minorities debate of 1992, Van der Zwan was in-
itially asked by the Minister of Home Affairs to be involved in organising
a series of conferences. In the context of these conferences, Van der Zwan
wrote a memorandum to the Minister of Home Affairs (28 September
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1992) that contained ‘a fairly complete compilation of all possible data on
the position of minorities, including negative aspects, criminality rates and
reliance on social facilities’.42 This report was debated during a special par-
liamentary session of the national minorities debate.43 However, its impact
on concrete policy measures was limited.44
Van der Zwan and Entzinger felt that, although the national minorities
debate had created a political sense of urgency, it tended to focus too much
on cultural aspects of integration (as raised by then leader of the Liberal
Party Bolkestein), and that it had led to insufficient concrete policy mea-
sures.45 When the 1992 memorandum by Van der Zwan also failed to elicit
significant policy consequences, Van der Zwan and Entzinger lobbied the
Department of Home Affairs for more appropriate policy measures. This
led to the two men receiving a formal assignment from the department to
write a new document. It would come to be called the ‘Policy succession
of the minorities debate’, having a significant influence on the develop-
ment of civic integration programmes, which would become a central ele-
ment of the 1990s integration policy (Blok 2004a: 116).
Many facets of the 1989 WRR report were revived in this advisory re-
port, including its universalist way of framing immigrant integration. It
named and framed immigrant integration in terms of integration, civic or
otherwise, among newcomers as new citizens. The rights-and-duties per-
spective and the focus on integration policy as intensified general policy
also took further shape in this report. For instance, it argued that ‘integra-
tion is promoted in the first place through labour market participation’
(Van der Zwan & Entzinger 1994: 1). To this end, the report recommends
temporarily lowering the minimum wage for newcomers, in order to facili-
tate their inclusion into the labour market. This temporary limitation of im-
migrant rights had to be combined with an obligation to provide civic inte-
gration programmes, directed at language and civic skills. Immigrants were
granted access to civic integration programmes that would allow them to
become full members of Dutch society but, in turn, they were obligated to
participate.
From a normative perspective, immigrant integration was framed in the
context of maintaining a viable welfare state. Added to this was a liberal-
egalitarian concern about social cohesion. Van der Zwan and Entzinger
wrote, ‘from the perspective of social cohesion, as well as the stability of
our welfare state, we are facing a fundamental turning point’ (ibid.: 2).
Immigrants’ disproportionate reliance on welfare facilities would threaten
the solidarity required for maintaining a viable welfare state. The report ar-
gued that:
when policy remains unaltered, a mismatch will develop [...] be-
tween supply and demand on the bottom of the labour market,
which can lead to tensions between the established population and
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parts of newcomers and will lead to an increase in demand for facil-
ities of the welfare state, especially by immigrants. (ibid.: 14)
This was put in the perspective of both a broader development in welfare
state orientation and in the rising concerns about cultural relativism after
the second national minorities debate.
The urgency of a solution for this issue [...] is further underlined by
the societal shift, also on a European level [...], in the character of
the welfare state, from ‘soft compensatory’ in the direction of
‘achievement performance’. [...] The willingness of society to com-
pensate for differences declines and the pressure to make a produc-
tive contribution increases. Minorities that do not take part in this
societal reorientation will increasingly acquire an isolated position,
with all the accompanying social tensions. (ibid.: 5)
In 1994, the plans for civic integration programmes were adopted in a coa-
lition agreement of the new purple government that was formed in that
year. However, neither the observations about a more obligatory approach,
nor plans to allow selective lowering of minimum wage levels were taken
up in the coalition agreement. Plans for civic integration programmes also
appeared in the contours memorandum integration policy that was pub-
lished just before the Van der Zwan and Entzinger report. While the mem-
orandum did refer to the 1989 WRR report that had already proposed such
programmes, it did not adopt the obligatory approach.
5.1.6 Politics
Finally, political actors became more involved in policymaking and re-
search-policy relations in this period. Until the 1980s, politicians had
played a relatively minor role in policy developments. As we saw in the
preceding chapter, this was due, in part, to the inarticulate positions of po-
litical parties in this area. There was also a tendency to depoliticise this is-
sue and to adopt a positivist approach to policymaking that, for the most
part, involved researchers and administrators and perceived politics as a
threat to a rational and consistent approach.
Then Prime Minister Lubbers, of the Christian Democratic Party (CDA),
was one of the first to break with the tendency to depoliticise immigrant
integration. As Prime Minister of various successive governments between
1982 and 1994, Lubbers had a significant hand in the politics of welfare
state retrenchment, which had already affected many policy domains but,
as previously mentioned, not yet immigrant integration. In a radio inter-
view that became widely discussed in the media and Parliament, he drew
attention to the relatively high degree of dependence of migrants on
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welfare state facilities and called for ‘less soft treatment’.46 He claimed he
‘was losing his patience’ with minorities and that he wanted a policy revi-
sion that followed the lines of the 1989 WRR report.47 He further argued
that the minorities policy should primarily involve an intensification of
government policies in various (social-economic) sectors and should there-
fore also fall under the remit of those departments responsible for these
specific sectors. In this respect – and also in line with the 1989 WRR re-
port – he claimed that a directorate for the coordination of the minorities
policy would be redundant, as responsibility for migrant policy would shift
towards various sector departments.48
To some extent, his statements reflected the rise of a more economic-
liberal perspective in the party ideology of the CDA (Fermin 1997: 125),
which stressed the responsibilities of citizens, including migrants, to parti-
cipate in Dutch society. This welfare state perspective on immigrant inte-
gration complemented, rather than substituted, the CDA’s stance on achiev-
ing immigrant integration by means of collective emancipation (ibid.: 130).
In fact, in this period Lubbers was still defending ‘pillarism’, a form of in-
stitutional multiculturalism or even differentialism, as a model of immi-
grant integration.49
Another political entrepreneur who had an important effect on policy-
making was the leader of the main opposition party in this period,
Bolkestein of the Liberal Party. Bolkestein made a series of statements at
this time that triggered, unwittingly, the first broad national debate in poli-
tics and the media about immigrant integration. At an international confer-
ence for liberal parties and later in several newspaper articles, he called for
a stricter and more ‘courageous’ approach towards immigrant integration.50
Such an approach should be based on the fundamental principles of a liber-
al society, such as the separation of church and state, freedom of expres-
sion, tolerance and non-discrimination. These principles were non-negoti-
able. It is here that, according to Bolkestein, ‘the multicultural society
meets its limits, that is, when abovementioned political principles come
into play’.51 Bolkestein was particularly sceptical about the compatibility
of Islam and liberal values. He believed that cornerstone liberal values
would have to be defended against immigrant cultures, especially against
Islam ‘not so much as a religion, but as a way of life’.52 In this rejection
of cultural relativism, Bolkestein explicitly referred to the 1979 WRR re-
port, in which it had been claimed that ‘in cases of confrontation where
compromise is practically impossible, there remains no other option but to
defend our cultural against competing claims’.53
Bolkestein’s way of defining immigrant integration was a blend of uni-
versalist and assimilationist thinking. On one hand, he seems to adopt a
universalist definition of integration in terms of promoting a logic of equity
(Mariën 1992: 10) and claiming universal value for specific liberal princi-
ples. In this respect, he also referred to the French Republican definition of
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integration.54 On the other hand, his specific questioning of the relation be-
tween Islam and immigrant integration reveals a more assimilationist fram-
ing, directly linking these liberal principles to European history and civili-
sation. This combination of universalism and assimilationism reflected a
shift from neo-liberal to more conservative-communitarian thinking within
the Liberal Party of the early 1990s (Fermin 1997: 92).
Thus, a frame conflict emerged at the end of the 1980s, in which the
decade’s dominant multicultural model was challenged by an alternative
frame. Involved here, too, was a questioning of the prevailing technocratic
symbiosis, involving actors such as the Department of Home Affairs and
ACOM. This came from new actors from both the fields of research and
policy. WRR published a second report on immigrant integration that must
be seen as disconnected from its first. In addition, there was a growing in-
volvement of research institutes, namely SCP, that produced more quantita-
tive data. Furthermore, Entzinger and Van der Zwan published an influen-
tial report that contained strong universalist elements. Finally, political ac-
tors became more outwardly involved in policymaking during this period,
including Prime Minister Lubbers, who adopted a multiculturalist and uni-
versalist frame, and opposition leader Bolkestein, who sparked a broad na-
tional minorities debate by making statements that reflected a universalist
as well as an assimilationist framing.
This frame conflict involved different ways of selecting and interpreting
contextual evidence about developments in immigrant integration. Actors
with multiculturalist frames referred to policy stagnation in social-econom-
ic domains (e.g. rising unemployment levels) as a sign that the current ap-
proach should be continued to prevent the economic recession from having
disproportionate effects on minorities. Contending claims that the multicul-
turalist approach had failed were interpreted as ‘impatience’, as the emanci-
pation of minorities would take several generations. By contrast, actors
with universalist frames did not select or interpret evidence in a way that
legitimised the prevailing approach; instead, it signalled that a different
one was needed. Ongoing immigration, which created more diverse, larger
target groups, and signs of structural social-economic deprivation among
migrants were enough to evince the need for a more universalist approach
to integration. Furthermore, universalist concerns about social-economic
participation were conflated with concerns about social cohesion, as the
structural social-economic deprivation of migrants would create solidarity
with migrants at risk. From this perspective, the disproportionate effect of
economic decline on immigrant unemployment was problematic. More
worrisome, however, were the effects that relatively high levels of unem-
ployment among migrants, in comparison to natives, could have on social
cohesion and viability of the welfare state.
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5.2 The construction of enlightenment
A reconstruction of the research-policy nexus would be central in this
frame conflict between new and established actors. Once again, however,
research-policy dialogues would be key for a frameshift in this domain,
though in a very different way than a decade earlier.
5.2.1 The field of scientific research
In the field of scientific research, new actors emerged to define research-
policy relations in an unprecedented way. Among them was WRR, which,
in the course of a decade, had transformed significantly in terms of its pro-
blem framing and organisational composition. In fact, as we shall see, a re-
construction of the research-policy dialogues would be a crucial first step
towards the frameshift that was codified several years later.
WRR: Anti-establishment boundary work
Whereas the first WRR report in 1979, ‘Ethnic minorities’, was deliber-
ately associated with ongoing research and policy developments at that
time, the follow-up ‘Immigrant policy’, was meant to deviate from both. In
this respect, boundary work was crucial for contextualising the report and
anticipating its impact on ongoing policy developments.
The formal advisory request issued by the government in 1987 had an
important effect on the demarcation of research and policy in this period.
WRR and the Department of Home Affairs negotiated this advisory request
before it was formally issued.55 In fact, the advisory request was triggered,
if not ‘provoked’, by WRR itself.56 This was facilitated by the personal
networks of Albeda, as WRR chairman and chairman of the report’s work-
ing group, and Entzinger, now a WRR staff member who would be the re-
port’s main author. Albeda had been a minister and was a member of the
CDA, the same political party to which both the Minister of Home Affairs
and the Prime Minister belonged. Entzinger had a strong network on both
sides of the research-policy nexus because of his experience at CRM and
as ACOM secretary and also because of a recent appointment as professor
of multi-ethnic studies at Utrecht University. Also of note is that Entzinger
maintained close contacts with the Cabinet, as the Prime Minister formally
issues advisory requests to WRR.57
The request already specified the substantial areas on which WRR was
to focus and what its role should be in discussing policy measures in these
areas. WRR would have to concentrate on ‘material areas’ in which, as the
text concludes, too few results had been achieved. It was in these spheres
that government ‘had doubts whether the current approach should be con-
tinued’. This demarcated the focus of WRR from that of the established
minorities policy, which also contained a clear ‘non-material’ focus on
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social-cultural issues. Furthermore, WRR’s task was defined as providing
‘creative and practical suggestions’ to government, aimed at changing ‘the
prioritisation of government policy’ in 1990. This meant that the report
would have to be completed within two years.
The formulation of the advisory request led to a boundary struggle con-
cerning the relation between WRR and the government. Objections were
raised about the narrow focus on material areas and the limited timeframe
that was proposed to complete the request. It was argued that in order to
be able to provide scientific advice, WRR should at least be able to put the
research problem into a broader context. WRR would have to do ‘more
than just deliver a toolkit; broader reflection is required, involving a more
general report and a longer advisory period’.58 Central concepts such as
‘minorities’ were to be problematised, and it was argued that the focus
should be not so much on integration policy but rather, on integration as a
social process so that, for instance, value conflicts could also be ad-
dressed.59 A broader scientific approach would also require a longer time
span than the eighteen months that were granted. Otherwise, there would
be little opportunity for the report to reflect critically on current policies.60
Consequently, some minor changes were made to the advisory request’s
text. In particular, a phrase stating that WRR would advise on ‘minorities
policy’ was replaced by ‘policy with regard to ethnic minorities’, thus put-
ting the study into a wider perspective.61
WRR interpreted the advisory request, with its particularised task de-
scription, rather broadly, including the focus on material needs. Such do-
mains were contextualised within the larger scope of developments in im-
material domains. The council stressed that ‘an effective integration policy
in these fields [education, labour, housing] would largely obviate the need
for specific measures to assist immigrants in other fields’ (WRR 1989: 7).
Instead of providing advice clearly concerning material areas and only
coming up with ‘creative and practical suggestions’, WRR ultimately de-
veloped a new policy frame.
Besides defining its role through – interpretation of – the advisory re-
quest, WRR employed a specific mode of discourse to distinguish between
this report and the minorities policy. The concepts of ‘integration policy’
and ‘allochthonous’ were coined, emphasising the difference between
‘minorities policy’ and ‘minorities’, respectively. The concept of an ‘inte-
gration policy’ emerged in a debate on a draft text of the report, question-
ing whether the extent to which the report would call for policy change
had been made sufficiently clear. In order to clarify the fact that WRR
would propose a fundamental turning point, it was suggested that the term
‘integration policy’ be used.62 In addition, ‘allochthonous’ was employed
to highlight the fact that the discourse differed to that regarding ‘ethnic
minorities’. WRR wanted to alter this focus on groups and cultures
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associated with this concept and instead emphasise the social-economic
participation of individual immigrants, or individual ‘allochthones’.
The definition of ethnic minorities meant that only particular groups
were recognised as ethnic minorities, such as the Moluccans, but
not the Chinese. Second, it was not the intention to create ethnic
minorities in this country, or to fix them to the term ‘ethnic minori-
ties’. We actually did not want them to become or remain ethnic
minorities, but to become citizens of Dutch society. Basically, the
only relevant difference is that they were people that came from dif-
ferent places; hence, allochthones. [...] As such, it was a useful ana-
lytical and, above all, more neutral term.63
In terms of boundary discourse, the report’s literary style became an object
of considerable discussion within WRR. On several occasions when dis-
cussing draft texts, council members raised objections to the report, ar-
guing for a more ‘down-to-earth and empirical style of writing’; a ‘less
normative’ and ‘more down-to-earth tone’.64 Therefore, a sharper distinc-
tion had to be made between analytical observations and normative policy
recommendations, for instance, by leaving out phrases such as ‘the council
thinks that’.65 This is a clear example of the type of boundary discourse
that Gusfield (1976) describes as the ‘literary rhetoric of science’.
Choosing a more sober, empirical style and tone would serve to underscore
the report’s objective, scientific status.
WRR not only defined its report apart from the established minorities
policy, but also from established minorities research. In fact, one of the re-
port’s aims was to challenge the dominant focus on immigrants as ‘minori-
ties’. According to Entzinger, this term would have been ‘too unreflec-
tively adopted from American sociological discourse, with too little notion
of its application in the Dutch situation and its reifying effects on minori-
ties themselves’.66 Hence, WRR proposed instead use of the concept ‘al-
lochthonous’, which was believed to have less reifying effects on minori-
ties as groups because it categorised migrants as ‘not from here’, rather
than in more substantial cultural or ethnic terms.67
Furthermore, WRR took a more interdisciplinary perspective than was
customary in the field of immigrant integration research; it placed immi-
grant integration in a broader scientific perspective.68 In doing so, WRR
put itself at odds with the established anthropological habitus in this do-
main, as well as with the research methods (field research) and ethos (spe-
cific engagement with minorities) associated with this habitus. In contrast,
it adopted a more structural-functionalist perspective to immigrant integra-
tion, linking it to participation in societal institutions (instead of engage-
ment with minorities) and adopting different methods such as desk and sur-
vey research (instead of field research).
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Entzinger sees the interdisciplinary composition of WRR as an explana-
tion for why it could raise new issues that were previously taboo, including
a more obligatory approach to immigrant integration. As a professor of mi-
gration studies, with a background in sociology and welfare state research,
Entzinger was the only member of the project team who was a field-speci-
fic expert.69 Albeda, the project chairman, had experience as an economist
and was a professor of social-economic policy.70 Another council member
with a legal background was a significant contributor in strengthening the
universalist perspective of WRR. He objected to initial texts that called for
a ‘multiculturalism policy’ aimed at the cultural sphere in addition to the
‘integration policy’ aimed at the social-economic sphere. From a legal per-
spective, he objected to a policy that would involve ‘the removal of present
material objections for experiencing positive fundamental rights in the do-
main of culture’ that would be specific to minorities and connected to
race.71 He considered this a violation of the legal principle of substantive
neutrality with regard to cultures of specific groups and, as such, a viola-
tion of the neutrality of the rule of law. The council member used his com-
petence to issue a ‘minority position’, asserting pressure to change this ele-
ment of the report. Eventually, the plans were reformulated into a more
modest ‘culture policy’ that would not apply to specific ethnic or cultural
groups but to society as a whole – hence, a ‘generic culture policy’.
The demarcation of WRR’s role from the established minorities policy
and research had to do with how the council coordinated its relations with
both fields. WRR intended to break into the established structure-induced
equilibrium in policy and research. In terms of the former, its aim was not
to provide ‘creative and practical suggestions’ for adapting the minorities
policy; instead, the council interpreted the advisory request in a way that
allowed it to raise a fundamentally new policy perspective.72 To achieve
this, it used the concepts ‘allochthonous’ and ‘integration’ to signal it was
proposing something new. Furthermore, the fact that this report was issued
in response to an advisory request also created commitment for policy
change based on this report. A formally requested report would be more
difficult to ignore.73
The fundamentally new perspective on integration that WRR wanted to
develop was based on its policy agenda regarding welfare state reform. In
this period, under the influence of chairman Albeda (who was still a pro-
fessor of social-economic policy at the time), WRR developed an agenda
for the development of an activating welfare state.74 In a newspaper article
that followed the publication of this WRR study, Albeda clearly established
a link between the 1989 WRR report and this general agenda: ‘our welfare
state renders individuals too apathetic, and has not been activating enough
[...] in the report, the council develops the contours of a more activating
welfare state [...] that offers specific rights, but simultaneously also has a
more obligatory character’.75 In this respect, there was also a clear relation
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between this report and several other WRR reports from the same period,
including ‘An active labour market policy’ (1987a) and ‘Work in perspec-
tive’ (1990).
The idea for this report emerged in the context of a debate we had
about the welfare state. [...] We observed that the problem of immi-
grant policy suffers from all the shortcomings of our welfare state. I
think that this has been one of the most important innovations of
the 1989 report, that it simultaneously addresses the problem of the
welfare state and shows that the issue of immigrant integration is re-
lated to the problems of our welfare state. So, this [perspective]
does not stand on its own, but is connected to the perspective we
developed in the context of that council.76
Another facet of the agenda, related to the first, is that WRR believed the
1979 report had been misinterpreted.77 Several project group members
found that policymakers had given too little credence to the recommenda-
tions on social-economic participation made in the first report and had put
too much emphasis on social-cultural emancipation. According to its main
author, Entzinger: ‘if you take the first report as the middle of the road,
then the minorities policy goes in one direction and the second report goes
in the other direction’.78 With a new report, posited as successor to its first
report, WRR hoped to correct this misinterpretation.79 As every WRR
council only has a mandate for five years, no council can be held accounta-
ble for studies produced by its predecessors. However, there was a clear
sense of institutional involvement with how earlier reports were translated
into policy. Hence, the working title of the second project was initially
‘Ethnic minorities II’.80
Furthermore, WRR wanted to go against the research establishment,
which would have focused too specifically on minorities, rather than put-
ting the position of migrants in the context of broader developments in the
welfare state. Research would have focused too heavily on migrants as ‘the
underdog’, thereby insulating this topic from broader scientific debates
about how migrants could be activated, for instance, in the field of welfare
state sociology, areas in which both Albeda and Entzinger had been
involved.
Thus, the boundary work of WRR, in terms of demarcation and coordi-
nation, was aimed at breaking the structure-induced equilibrium in research
and policy. It clearly defined its task apart from minorities policy and re-
search (with the advisory request, in its discourse) in such a way that rela-
tions with these fields stressed its fundamentally new perspective (an acti-
vating approach, being interdisciplinary). This means, of course, that it
challenged the involved actors’ status in this structure-induced equilibrium,
including the Department of Home Affairs and ACOM.
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ACOM: Expulsionary boundary work
As previously observed, ACOM weakened in the second half of the 1980s.
The WRR report of 1989 further challenged ACOM in terms of its struc-
tural position and the ways it demarcated immigrant integration research
and coordinated policy relations. Whereas WRR had cooperated closely
with ACOM in developing its 1979 report, this time around ACOM was
excluded from government plans for an advisory request to WRR and the
actual WRR report. This led to a period of difficult relations between
ACOM and the Department of Home Affairs.81
Following publication of the 1989 WRR report, ACOM believed its duty
was to comment on the scientific foundation of this report. Since its duty
was to ‘pay attention to the scientific value of research and the value of re-
search for government policy’, ACOM considered it legitimate to write a
report on ‘the scientific argumentation of the WRR advice’ as WRR had
‘founded its advice for a large part on scientific research’ (ACOM 1989).
In the report ‘A better policy?’, ACOM was highly critical, denouncing the
WRR report as insufficiently scientific:
[ACOM] is not positive about its [the 1989 WRR report’s] scientific
value. [...] ACOM regrets that no clear separation was made be-
tween the presentation of scientific material, analysis and policy re-
commendations. Now all these components are intermixed and nor-
mative claims and analysis are indistinguishable. Therefore, it is
more a report inspired by science than a scientific report. (ibid.: 25)
ACOM was also critical about WRR’s rights-and-duties perspective. It pin-
pointed a ‘biased focus on the individual level and for factors in the sphere
of [individual] acquisition of social positions’, rather than on the attribution
of social positions. It argued that there was too little attention ‘for issues
such as discrimination and social marginalisation’, and a certain ‘bias in re-
commendations [...] on sanctions for members of ethnic groups that would
be administered more often than sanctions for employers’. WRR was ac-
cused of measuring with two yardsticks – focusing more on the duties of
immigrants than on the duties of Dutch society, including government and
employers. In other words, it focused too narrowly on deficiencies on the
part of migrants rather than structural factors in society at large, or too
much on ‘position acquisition’ rather than ‘position attribution’ (ibid.).
ACOM also argued that the claim that ‘minorities have been regarded too
much as welfare categories and have become too dependent on government
care [...] is an unproven assumption [...] not empirically founded [...] and
seems to be inspired by a more general opinion on the welfare state’ (ibid.:
25-26). This disagreement revealed differences in the underlying agendas
of ACOM and WRR, with the latter holding onto the premise of the mino-
rities paradigm and the former adopting an activating welfare state agenda.
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The WRR report also received criticism on its first report by the author
of the influential preparatory study, who was now an ACOM advisory
member. Together with another researcher, he published an article in the
leading Dutch journal Migrantenstudies, called ‘Footnotes to the scientific
value of the WRR report’ 82(Muus & Penninx 1989). He concluded that
WRR had used ‘a biased problem definition’ and had ‘made insufficient
use of available scientific knowledge’. Van Amersfoort (1991: 32) also
published an article around this time, in which he agreed that the ‘change
in perspective of WRR is not based on scientific arguments or research re-
sults, but rather on policy arguments’. Furthermore, several researchers
took their boundary struggle about proper immigrant science to the media,
stating among that the WRR report ‘contained small talk’.83
This institutional clash also led to a personal struggle between
Entzinger, the main author of the 1989 WRR report, and his colleagues at
Utrecht University, including ACOM chairman Bovenkerk. In 1990, a con-
flict arose over a professorship in the research group on studies of the mul-
ti-ethnic society (SMES). This position was awarded to Entzinger, much to
the chagrin of some colleagues. The appointment spurred a revival of the
controversy surrounding the 1989 WRR report and media statements made
by Entzinger concerning the permanent nature of immigration.84
This conflict showed that the institutional and personal struggles, both,
were also about different views on how to demarcate and coordinate re-
search-policy relations. Entzinger’s colleagues wrote a letter to the faculty
dean, asking for his resignation due to a lack of ‘intellectual leadership’,
‘insufficient theoretical knowledge of the research field’ and ‘lack of re-
search qualities’.85 Among other shortcomings, Entzinger was said to have
had too little experience and knowledge of the type of field research pos-
sessed by most of his colleagues, making him incapable of leading this re-
search group. This focus on field research reflected the demarcation of im-
migrant integration research advocated by ACOM throughout the 1980s.
In terms of coordination, the combination of being a professor as well as
a WRR staff member would have created a significant dilemma for
Entzinger in terms of both scientific independence and what was described
as being a ‘civil servant’.86 Entzinger was attacked for having a ‘strong
sensitivity to public opinion and policymakers’ that, critics argued, had
been demonstrated by the ‘strong, tough and firm statements’ he had made
in the media.87 In short, his work for WRR and his professorship at
Utrecht University were considered incompatible with one another.
Moreover, Entzinger’s academic colleagues had concerns about the effects
of his statements in the media and his involvement in the 1989 WRR re-
port on the position of migrants. Such statements would ‘not have been di-
rected at combating the hostile mood toward migrants or the combating of
prejudice’ and would, in some cases, even ‘have reinforced this mood’.88
This illustrated the discrepancy between the focus of these researchers on
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issues such as anti-racism and factors in Dutch society that inhibited eman-
cipation, rather than considering those factors on the side of immigrants
that hampered their integration.89 Moreover, such media statements were
considered potentially harmful to the relations between the involved re-
searchers and the minority groups being studied.90
In the months after the WRR report and the letter to the dean, fruitless
attempts were made to reunite this research group. In early 1990, this con-
flict was revealed to the national media, even appearing on the front page
of some leading Dutch newspapers.91 Eventually however, the dean
decided to dismiss Entzinger’s colleagues at Utrecht University and to dis-
solve the SMES research group.92 Entzinger maintained his professorship.
ACOM thus adopted an expulsionary mode of boundary work, attempt-
ing to counter WRR’s denunciation that it was unscientific. It re-empha-
sised its demarcation of immigrant integration research by engaging with
the specific position of minorities (also in terms of methods) and coordi-
nated research-policy relations in a way that involved more distance from
policy. However, the distancing from ongoing policy developments, which
were to a great extent the consequence of the WRR report requested by the
government, and its failure to respond to growing demands for more eva-
luative expertise, gradually undermined ACOM. The controversy surround-
ing the 1989 WRR report contributed further to this process.93 In 1992, the
mandate for ACOM was eventually withdrawn.
SCP: Boundary work of a data provider
Apart from occasional attention for immigrant integration in several docu-
ments from the 1980s, SCP paid more structural attention to immigrant in-
tegration from the early 1990s onwards. In annual and, later biannual,
minorities reports, SCP provided data on the status of immigrants in var-
ious areas, primarily social-economic ones such as education and labour.
These minorities reports were the product of a contract between SCP and
the Department of Home Affairs.
SCP demarcated its role in terms of the provision of quantitative data. It
made secondary analyses of data from the Statistics Office (CBS).94 This
concerned generic data, or data that was derived from general databases
such as the CBS Labour Force Survey (VWJ 2004: 76-77). The data on
ethnic minorities were derived from these generic databases. SCP did not
use specific methods for reaching migrants to gather this data about ethnic
minorities. Only later, in the 1990s, would SCP cooperate with the
Institute for Social and Economic Research (Instituut voor Sociologisch-
Economisch Onderzoek, ISEO) that did employ specific techniques for ob-
taining data on immigrant minorities (Meloen & Veenman 1990; VWJ
2004: 79).95 Thus, SCP’s task was defined as providing ‘hard facts’ on the
social-economic position of migrants.
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In terms of coordination, SCP was to be both instrumental and func-
tional to policy departments.96 Evaluations of the status of minorities in
various areas would enable government departments to assess the effective-
ness of their approach, and to adapt if necessary. Furthermore, the contract
with the Department of Home Affairs gave this department an important
say about the domains that SCP should focus on. In this respect, SCP’s
mandate was government demand-driven.
SCP was careful not to venture beyond its instrumental role in this peri-
od. It did not repeat criticism on multiculturalism from its 1986 ‘Social
and cultural report’ until the publication of 1998’s version. However, Van
Praag, one of the leading researchers at SCP responsible for the studies on
immigrant integration, continued to criticise multiculturalism in his col-
umns for the scientific journal Migrantenstudies. He published under the
pseudonym Vyvary, so as to be able to speak freely and to avoid the risk
that his statements would be taken for views of SCP (Van Praag 2003:
74).97
Van der Zwan and Entzinger: Entrepreneurial boundary work
Both Van der Zwan and Entzinger were known for advocating a different
approach to immigrant integration. As a member of the WRR council that
developed the 1979 report on ethnic minorities, Van der Zwan had already
advocated a more obligatory approach in which labour would be the main
channel for integration.98 Entzinger, as the main author of the 1989 WRR
report, had proposed a similar activating approach to the social-economic
participation of migrants. The national minorities debate that emerged in
1992 following a number of statements by Bolkestein led to a broader pub-
lic and political acceptance of a more activating approach to immigrant in-
tegration primarily by means of labour and education. However, this had
not produced concrete policy changes in this direction. In this respect, Van
der Zwan and Entzinger would be invaluable entrepreneurs in translating
this approach into concrete policy measures.
Van der Zwan and Entzinger defined their roles in a way that stressed
the political and policy relevance of their advice. Their aim was ‘not to
come with lengthy analyses, but with concrete proposals that could be rea-
lised by politics’.99 Furthermore, these concrete proposals would have to
be practically feasible. To make sure the proposals could be put into prac-
tice, the report was subjected to debate in two mini-conferences with var-
ious actors involved in policy practice. As they themselves put it:
this way, we not only made sure that our plans were legally and
economically feasible but also that there was a certain public sup-
port for it, especially among those who were directly involved in
the practice of immigrant integration. (Van der Zwan & Entzinger
1994: 1)
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Furthermore, political support was generated by involving various political
parties in the making of the report. Minister of Home Affairs Dales and
Van der Zwan were both members of the Social Democratic Party. Director
General of the Department of Home Affairs Van Aartsen, who at that time
had an important role in requesting that Van der Zwan and Entzinger write
the report, was a member of the Liberal Party. In addition, Entzinger was a
member of the Liberal Democratic Party. One of the reasons for involving
these three political parties was that it was assumed that they would be in-
volved in the formation of a new government coalition in 1994.
During the preparation of our proposals, we immediately looked at
the support it would raise. Endless debates were held to estimate
how the plans could be received. Entzinger was involved because it
was thought that D66 [Liberal Democratic Party] would be involved
in the next formation. I was involved because of my affiliations to
the PvdA [Social Democratic Party]. The aim was to achieve a cer-
tain acceptance.100
In addition to this orientation on public and political support, it was clear
that Van der Zwan and Entzinger shared ideas about a more obligatory ap-
proach to immigrant integration and that both focused on labour as the
means for achieving integration. They shared a more or less similar
frame.101 In this respect, their way of demarcating their tasks from estab-
lished immigrant integration reflected that of the 1989 WRR report. Both
resisted the tendency to ignore the ‘contraindications’ that illustrated the
deficiencies of the multiculturalist approach.102 Van der Zwan noted:
We knew each other from WRR networks: it is like a family. I
strongly agreed with the tone of the second WRR report [...]. The
report also states clearly that we were unhappy about the practical
consequences that had been given to that WRR report. So, that was
the motivation. We could not name it ‘Policy succession WRR re-
port’, because then it would be too much of WRR and because we
had already had the minorities debate in between. So, there was a
clear link between the second WRR report, the minorities debate
and the report ‘Policy succession minorities debate’.103
In terms of coordination, the Van der Zwan and Entzinger report directly
aimed to influence the coalition formation of 1994. There was a belief that
the minorities debate and the report by Van der Zwan from 1992 still had
too little impact on concrete policy measures. This set the tone for top ad-
ministrators from both the Department of Home Affairs and the Minister
of Home Affairs to seek advice. It was also the backdrop against which
Van der Zwan and Entzinger got involved. The parliamentary elections that
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were held in May 1994 would provide a window of opportunity for achiev-
ing more concrete policy effects. This was especially so because of the pre-
dicted decline of the Christian Democrats, who had led government since
1982 (three cabinets led by Prime Minister Lubbers), and had been consis-
tently involved in government since World War II. The aim was to have an
advisory report that could be used during the formation of a new govern-
ment coalition in 1994, hence the timing of the publication of the report,
May 1994. Furthermore, Van der Zwan and Entzinger were in close contact
with the leaders of the various political parties during these talks to form
the coalition (Van Thijn 1994: 256-257).104
Thus, different boundary work practices were found for different actors
in the research field in this period. WRR strategically demarcated the role
of its report from the established minorities policy, as well as research to
develop a fundamentally new perspective on immigrant integration for both
fields (as part of its broader agenda on welfare state reform). Van der
Zwan and Entzinger also tried to achieve a breakthrough in the structure-
induced equilibrium of multiculturalism through a more entrepreneurial
sort of boundary work. They saw WRR as being meant to ensure feasibil-
ity of the new approach and thus coordinated it directly with ongoing poli-
tical developments, such as the coalition formation in 1994. In contrast,
ACOM responded to the 1989 WRR report with a more expulsionary sort
of boundary work, holding on to the prevailing way of demarcating mino-
rities research, coordinating its relations with policy and minority groups
and denouncing the document as ‘unscientific’. Evidently, these boundary
struggles over the proper division of labour between research and policy
were closely related to the frame conflicts discussed earlier. This clearly
underscores Gusfield’s (1976) premise: the culture and the structure of
public problems must always be seen as inherently connected.
5.2.2 The field of policymaking
Boundary struggles in the field of migration between new and established
actors were also manifest in the field of policymaking. Once again, the
field of research would provide a venue for policy change. However, this
time it did not involve rational societal engineering ‘behind closed doors’,
as had been the case a decade earlier. Rather, it would involve the agenda
setting of new ideas about immigrant integration through authoritative ve-
nues of research that the status quo would find difficult to ignore.
Department of Home Affairs: Changing position, changing boundary work
As coordinating department, the Department of Home Affairs was involved
in the established research-policy nexus from the early 1980s. However,
this changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the department lost
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its coordinating power due to the functional and territorial decentralisation
of the integration policy.
The advisory request to WRR in 1987 was a first sign that the changing
position also led to this actor’s changing boundary work practices. The
Minister of Home Affairs sought new recommendations from WRR in
response to mounting pressure in Parliament regarding the department’s co-
ordinating role. On one hand, the minister felt pressure to fulfil coordinat-
ing duties in the face of inadequate policy effectiveness in mainly material
areas.105 On the other hand, he experienced difficulties in achieving inter-
departmental coordination, as various departments increasingly chose to
follow their own policy lines, in part because of huge budgetary constraints
on them.106 This tension surfaced in 1986 when disagreement emerged in
Parliament about what appeared to be inconsistencies in the budgets pre-
sented by the coordinating minister and those presented by the departments
themselves.107
There was an agreement between government departments that there
would be no budget cuts for the minorities policy. Nonetheless, disagree-
ment emerged about changes in departmental budgets that seemed to reveal
cutbacks on measures taken in the context of the minorities policy (educa-
tion and social affairs, among others) (Koolen 2003: 25). Although the co-
ordinating minister denied that any budget cuts would take place, this dis-
agreement revealed the heightened expectations for the coordinating role of
the Minister of Home Affairs and the alleged difficulties of interdepartmen-
tal coordination.108 The minister faced further constraint on his scope of
action because of the norm that this should be kept a non-partisan issue.
‘[T]here was a sort of unwritten code between political parties not to en-
gage in debates [...] that could lead to stigmatisation of minorities’.109
Together with the problems of interdepartmental coordination, this con-
straint made the annual debates on the action programmes for the minori-
ties policy into ‘annual rounds of beating up on the Minister’.110
In response to this political pressure and constraints on interdepartmental
coordination, Minister of Home Affairs Van Dijk decided to issue an advi-
sory request to WRR. As discussed earlier, this advisory request was for-
mulated together with the Minorities Policy Directorate – still led by
Molleman – and with WRR itself. The advisory request demarcated an in-
terest in a specific type of expertise, specifically on integration in material
areas. According to Van Putten (1990: 366), research manager of the
Minorities Policy Directorate at that time, the department had an interest in
more evaluative research about what kind of approach works and what
does not work. This demand for more evaluative expertise was a conse-
quence of the ongoing process of institutionalisation of the minorities pol-
icy. Now that the minorities policy had been formulated and had entered
the implementation stage, there was more demand for knowledge concern-
ing the effectiveness of policy measures, rather than fundamental questions
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concerning problem framing. In this respect, ACOM would have been left
behind in terms of responding to this changing demand for expertise. For
instance, ACOM failed to respond to the government’s growing demand
for research that could monitor the progress of integration in specific do-
mains, such as the accessibility and proportionality project on monitoring
minority participation in mainly social-economic spheres, which was in
fact eventually given to a new research institute (the ISEO) without con-
sulting ACOM in this decision.111 Whereas ACOM had been closely in-
volved in establishing the minorities policy, it now became more marginal.
In the late 1980s, the Department of Home Affairs would start to play a
more active role in research programming. In fact, ACOM was not even
involved in, or notified about, the advisory request to WRR until a rela-
tively late stage (Van Putten 1990).
In addition, the advisory request held a specific idea about the report’s
coordination with ongoing developments, namely that it should provide
corresponding suggestions for new government policy. The advisory re-
quest offered a clear political statement about the need for a different ap-
proach. This brought the current policy coordination structure to crisis,112
invigorated when WRR, having interpreted the advisory request with broad
strokes, produced a fundamentally new policy perspective in its 1989 re-
port, one which also addressed the Minorities Policy Directorate. Instead
of having a clear-cut coordinating duty, this directorate would only monitor
the contours of the integration policy.
The position of the Minorities Policy Directorate changed significantly
in the late 1980s. For one, this was symbolised by renaming it the
Directorate Contours of the Minorities Policy. Following the 1989 WRR
report and the departure of director Molleman, the coordinating task was
formulated further in 1991.113 Policy responsibility was now located more
clearly with the various departments responsible for specific programmes
in their sectors. In addition, the role for a severely downsized Directorate
for the Coordination of the Integration of Minorities (DCIM) would be to
coordinate the measures taken in various domains by means of monitoring
of policy results (Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 90).114
The changing position of the Department of Home Affairs involved an-
other way of demarcating and coordinating research in policy formulation
than had been customary in the established research-policy nexus of the
early 1980s. Instead of research that provided expertise on the status of
minorities to aid policy formulation, it now had a more specific interest in
more evaluative studies that could be used to assess policies conducted in
various policy sectors. It is in this context that the Department of Home
Affairs came to an agreement with SCP regarding regular minorities re-
ports. In terms of coordinating research-policy relations, this data on the
social position of minorities in various policy sectors (particularly labour,
education and housing) was crucial in the Department of Home Affairs’
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interdepartmental coordination of the integration policy. It allowed this de-
partment to evaluate results in a number of policy sectors and appeal to the
responsible departments to take appropriate policy measures.115
Furthermore, through the open publication of the data gathered by SCP,
the Department of Home Affairs could put issues on the agenda more ea-
sily and encourage policy measures through this venue. The director of
DCIM declared:
At the department, we reflected on what we wanted to know based
on the policy goals. [...] This concerned the groups about which we
want to know things, involving a limited number of target groups
[...]. This also concerned what we wanted to know about these
groups in terms of their position in labour, education and housing
[...]. We wanted to have two types of studies, one annually about
where we stand at that moment and biannual in-depth studies of
specific topics. [...] This means that, for instance, when the depart-
ment of education says it is doing very well with education for
minorities [...] but research initiated by our department showed that
this was not the case, that this issue could then be put on the politi-
cal and public agenda [...]. Consequently, it would be reported to
Parliament or written about in the media, so that the Minister of
Education and his civil servants could be held accountable [...].
This meant that we organised our information position based on
ideas about what precisely we wanted to know for which groups
[...]. This has proven to be a very effective coordination
mechanism.116
The request for recommendations from Van Der Zwan and Entzinger on
the policy succession of the minorities debate also served a strategic pur-
pose for coordination carried out by the Department of Home Affairs. The
national minorities debate created a renewed political sense of urgency
about immigrant integration and the conferences held by the Department of
Home Affairs led to ideas for development of civic integration pro-
grammes. According to the director of DCIM:
The Department of Home Affairs found itself in a difficult position;
it was responsible for coordination but lacked the appropriate
means. So we had been thinking, who can we ask to give advice
with real pragmatic meaning, as much has already been written. [...]
And we found that they had the quality – Entzinger the substance
and Van der Zwan also the means for presentation. [...] So, it really
had to do with strategic positioning. What did not succeed with the
WRR report, and the government reply memorandum was getting
the financial means for a civic integration policy.117
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By identifying this advice as a provision of concrete policy proposals that
could lean on both sufficiently broad support and Van der Zwan’s and
Entzinger’s support, the department hoped to coordinate ongoing political
developments (such as coalition formation in 1994) in such a way as to
provoke concrete policy choices. This particularly concerned the idea of ci-
vic integration programmes, which the Department of Home Affairs
wanted under its own provision as departmental coordinator. Up until then,
the courses were provided on a limited scale by CRM. Entzinger and Van
der Zwan’s report, then, was a strategic initiative to bring these courses un-
der the remit of the Department of Home Affairs.118 Indeed, following the
coalition formation of 1994, civic integration programmes were developed
by this department and, during the late 1990s, would grow into one of the
most important facets of the integration policy.
Thus, the boundary work of this department changed significantly. In
contrast to its role in the established research-policy nexus of the early
1980s, its way of demarcating and coordinating research-policy relations
changed in the second half of the decade. It demarcated a more specific in-
terest in evaluative research, which was coordinated to policy development
in more instrumental and functional terms. This changing boundary work
is particularly manifest in its relations with SCP, but also in the advisory
request to WRR, though WRR would eventually demarcate and coordinate
its role separately. Finally, the minorities debate in the early 1990s seems
to have given rise to more entrepreneurial boundary work by the
Department of Home Affairs, in an attempt to strengthen its coordination
mandate vis-à-vis the increasing sense of urgency and changing public and
political discourse.
Politics: The boundary work of politicisation
In the early 1990s, political actors became more outwardly involved in
public debates about immigrant integration. Notably, the minorities debate
of 1992 created a widespread sense of political urgency. However, prior to
this debate, the Prime Minister had made public statements that hinted at a
different approach to immigrant integration, reflecting the recommenda-
tions of the 1989 WRR report. Fermin (1997: 211) observed a rather gener-
al shift from emancipation to integration in political discourse in this peri-
od. There was also common agreement about the need for additional policy
efforts to achieve social-economic participation (ibid.: 227). Political differ-
ences persisted, mainly on social-cultural issues, though they gradually
shifted to the background.
This politicisation involved a different way of demarcating the tasks of
research and policymaking. The technocratic research-policy nexus of the
early 1980s involved a demarcation of immigrant integration as a non-poli-
tical issue that was delegated to researchers and policymakers who would
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develop a rational policy approach based on policy-relevant knowledge
and expertise. Bolkestein now clearly defined immigrant integration as a
political issue. He stated in the media that he no longer wanted to hide his
party’s position out of fear that extreme-right parties would play the race
card, arguing that ‘when a democratically elected politician fails to put this
major issue crystal clear on the table, then he is functioning inade-
quately’.119 In this context, he called for the eradication of taboos and for
an open debate on this issue, saying:
The integration of minorities is such a complex issue that it can
only be resolved with courage and creativity [...]. [I]n this there is
no space for lack of engagement and for taboos [...], [A] broad de-
bate in which all political parties participate is required [...].120
Bolkestein’s statements, as well as the many responses it provoked, were
not just about the issue of immigrant integration, but also about the demar-
cation of the role of politics in dealing with immigrant integration.
Bolkestein wanted to rid political involvement in this domain of the sense
of ‘political correctness’, which implied ‘that one could not have the cour-
age to name sensitive issues’ as a sort of ‘self-restriction [...] that limited
one’s perception’.121
Prins (1997, 2000) has described this new mode of political discourse as
‘new realism’. This involves, first of all, an eradication of taboos; reality
would have to be represented ‘as it is’, without the burden of taboos or dis-
torting values and interests. This would be a representation of typical
Dutch ‘virtues’, such as honesty, courage and soberness. New realism also
claimed to represent the opinion of the ‘ordinary citizen’ who had thus far
been largely ignored. Instead of avoiding debate and conflict, new realism
meant engaging in debate with immigrants – a signal that these immigrants
are taken ‘seriously’. More precisely, this implied treating them as equals
and not as dependents; immigrants had become citizens and new realism
would appeal to the civic duties of migrants. As such, it reinforced a uni-
versalist problem frame that defined immigrants as equals rather than em-
phasising the specificity of minorities.
In terms of coordination, the politicisation in this period did not mean
that scientific research went entirely ignored. Instead, Bolkestein and
Lubbers made explicit references to the 1979 and 1989 WRR reports. The
one from 1989 also played an important role in the broader public and po-
litical debate. In the parliamentary hearing surrounding this minorities de-
bate, the 1989 report was praised for its contribution to the sober and rea-
list tone of the debate and, in contrast to prior publications, emotions did
not gain the upper hand (Koolen & Tempelman 2003: 94).122 That said, re-
ferences to scientific research clearly became more selective in this period.
Whereas the 1989 WRR report became a benchmark in public and political
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discourse, other studies (such as the 1986 WRR report ‘A fair chance’ and
its 1989 report ‘A better policy?’) seem to have been marginal.
Thus, in the field of policymaking, the pattern of boundary work had
changed in a relatively significant manner when compared to the preceding
period. Instead of demanding policy-relevant knowledge about the status
of minorities for policy formulation, the Department of Home Affairs now
sought more evaluative knowledge and expertise to strengthen its capacity
in interdepartmental policy coordination. Its relations with SCP involved a
more instrumental type of boundary work, whereas relations with WRR
and, later, Van der Zwan and Entzinger involved a more strategic type.
Furthermore, political actors in this period changed their boundary work
from defining immigrant integration as a non-political issue best left to re-
searchers and policymakers, to defining it as a political issue – one politi-
cians should feel free to express their opinions about. In this context, scien-
tific studies that reinforced the changing mode of political discourse and
the 1989 WRR report, in particular, continued to play an influential role.
5.2.3 An enlightenment boundary configuration
Analyses of the fields of immigrant integration research and policymaking
indicate that there were evident changes in the patterns of boundary work.
Yet, how did these developments in both fields combine to punctuate the
technocratic symbiosis that originated a decade earlier? And exactly what
sort of research-policy nexus was produced in this period?
Divergence in research-policy relations
The new episode of research-policy dialogues on immigrant integration
that was initiated by the 1989 WRR report ‘Immigrant policy’ did not di-
rectly lead to policy change. The structural equilibrium originating from
the 1980s had successfully mobilised negative feedback to hold off im-
mediate policy change. In fact, endeavouring to punctuate this equilibrium,
WRR deliberately created more divergence in research-policy relations as
compared with the technocratic symbiosis from the 1980s. Consequently,
its 1989 report, and particularly the proposed new problem frame, were not
directly utilised in government policy. Not only did ACOM respond with
expulsionary boundary work, but the Department of Home Affairs did not
immediately give effect to the new perspective and the consequences it
would have for the coordinating department. Although the reply memoran-
dum adopted various elements of the 1989 document, it did not incorporate
some of its most fundamental elements, such as the definition of ‘al-
lochthonous’ and the rights-and-duties perspective on integration through
labour market and education.
The report did have a more significant impact on public and political
discourse. It attracted broad attention in the national media, as illustrated
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by the many headlines claiming that WRR had shown that the minorities
policy had failed and that the policy ‘coddled’ minorities.123 Several weeks
before the WRR report was made public, it was leaked to the press, who
immediately picked up on its sense of urgency, and produced headlines
such as ‘WRR attacks the minorities policy’ and ‘WRR wipes the floor
with the minorities policy’.124 Although nowhere in the WRR report did it
state that the minorities policy had been a failure, this became the main
point taken up in the media. Despite this, most political parties received
the report positively, and Prime Minister Lubbers referred approvingly to it
when he was one of the first to break the taboos on politicisation in 1990.
The report also indirectly effected changes in the coordinating task of the
Department of Home Affairs and the development of the DCIM, in
particular.
Several years later, the 1989 WRR report received renewed attention
during the national minorities debate to emerge in 1992. During this de-
bate, it became clear that the more activating social-economic approach to
immigrant integration that WRR had proposed had now become more
broadly accepted in public and political discourse. It was in the aftermath
of this national minorities debate that policy was reframed according to the
universalist perspective put forward by WRR.
Scientific research was involved in this reformulation, but not in a struc-
tural way as had been the case in the late 1970s and early 1980s, nor in a
way that involved established research institutes such as WRR or ACOM.
Rather, individual experts (Van der Zwan and Entzinger) were active entre-
preneurs in the diffusion to policymakers and politicians of the perspective
that had been developed in the 1989 WRR report. This involved not so
much further development of this universalist perspective but rather, the
generation of public and political support. It was also an attempt to make
use of the window of opportunity of the 1994 coalition formation to have
this perspective translated into concrete policy initiatives. This involvement
was not structural but rather, an incidental ‘coalition of convenience’ be-
tween the Department of Home Affairs and the experts Van der Zwan and
Entzinger who, after the national minorities debate, both shared a similar
universalist perspective.
In relation to research, there also seems to have been more divergence
than in the early 1980s. Whereas ACOM was central to the provision of
policy-relevant knowledge for policy formulation, this institutional nexus
was dissolved when ACOM was discontinued in 1992. During the 1980s,
as the minorities policy became increasingly institutionalised, government
demand for expertise changed. It honed a new interest in more evaluative
expertise, which had more indirect relations with policy development.
Instrumental data provided by SCP was only indirectly related to policy
development as a means for interdepartmental policy coordination. The
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information offered a tool for monitoring policy results across the board
rather than a direct means for influencing policy development.
In contrast to this divergence in policymaking and research, there seems
to have been some convergence – in terms of personal networks – among
those experts involved in the 1989 WRR report and politicians. Like
others, Albeda, who served as chair of both WRR and the working group
for the second WRR report, had a political background. He was Minister
of Social Affairs from 1977 to 1981 and maintained close contacts with
the incumbent Prime Minister who belonged to the same Christian
Democratic Party. Furthermore, Entzinger, one of the main authors of the
1989 WRR report, maintained close ties with the Minorities Policy
Directorate, as well as with the Cabinet. These contacts seem to have been
pivotal in formulating the advisory request to WRR. As such, the diverging
role between WRR and pre-established research and policy was a product
of WRR’s deliberate design in the context of ongoing political
developments.
Scientific primacy
There are signs in this period of scientific primacy as well as a modest po-
litical primacy. An important indication of the former was the 1989 WRR
report’s considerable influence on the development of integration policy.
Although, as we have observed, it did not immediately trigger policy
change, it did catalyse public and political debates that would eventually
lead to policy changes. It punctuated the structure-induced equilibrium in
both research and policy by making immigrant integration an issue of
broader scientific and political debate, thereby creating a setting in which
policy change and progress in research could become possible. This in-
volved challenging both the structural position of established researchers
(ACOM) and of established policy actors (Minorities Policy Directorate).
Furthermore, the influence of WRR on policy developments also con-
cerned the activating welfare state perspective on immigrant integration.
Many aspects of the 1989 WRR report were adopted in the contours mem-
orandum of 1994, including its more all-encompassing way of categorising
migrants and its causal theory of achieving immigrant integration by acti-
vating migrants in the social-economic spheres of labour and education.
At the same time, there was also growing political primacy. The politici-
sation incited by the national minorities debate reveals how political actors’
participation in this domain was intensifying. The debate put immigrant in-
tegration firmly on the political agenda, punctuating the norm of depolitici-
sation in this field. In addition, the duty of SCP and its relation to govern-
ment since the early 1990s provides some indications of growing political
primacy. The Department of Home Affairs gradually took a more active
part in research programming during the 1990s, especially in terms of en-
couraging more evaluative research (Van Putten 1990). Its agreement with
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SCP on providing quantitative data on the position of minorities was a
concrete manifestation of policy’s influence on developments in research.
In this respect, the major role of research actors (ACOM) in research pro-
gramming made way for stronger politicisation in this area.
The changes in the policy field in the early 1990s seem to have been
conditional, depending on the politicisation that occurred during the na-
tional minorities debate, following Bolkestein’s statements about the need
for a more courageous approach towards the integration of migrants.
However, when we look at the actual relations between research and policy
actors in this period and their influence on policy developments, a more
primary role for research emerges. Political actors such as Bolkestein and
Lubbers founded their political claims on WRR reports, particularly
1989’s. Furthermore, the national minorities debate itself seems to have
had little direct effect on policy developments; the political ideas about
policy change seem to have remained abstract rather than concrete.125 At
this stage, Van der Zwan and Entzinger were crucial for the translation of
the universalist perspective into concrete policy choices. The influence of
the WRR report on policy developments was also manifest in the contours
memorandum that was issued by the renewed Minorities Policy Directorate
in this period.
Thus, beyond the veneer of politicisation, a more primary role for re-
search emerged. It was WRR that first put immigrant integration on the
agenda in 1989, opening up debate at the level of problem framing about a
new perspective on immigrant integration and challenging the structural
equilibrium in this field. The politicisation after the national minorities de-
bate moved this discussion into the political arena, but did not effectuate
specific policy change. It did create a political environment for policy
change in which many ideas from the 1989 WRR report were revived. In
terms of policy reframing, the changes that were to come in the early
1990s reflected the ideas put forward in the report. In fact, the translation
of this new perspective into concrete policy plans was aided by Entzinger
and Van der Zwan’s efforts.
This analysis shows a divergence flourishing between the task of re-
search and policy at this time. Moreover, there was a modest scientific pri-
macy in their mutual relationship. The effect that the 1989 WRR report
had – and its influence on policy developments in the early 1990s –
reflects a model of gradual enlightenment in government and politics based
on scientific research.
The enlightenment nexus was the product of very specific factors within
and beyond the field of immigrant integration. First, it was a consequence
of the political agenda of WRR, seeking to introduce a new problem per-
spective as part of its strategy to punctuate the structure-induced equili-
brium in immigrant integration research and policy during the 1980s.
Furthermore, it was influenced by developments in the broader political
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setting in this period. During the 1980s, a politics of welfare state retrench-
ment had been conducted in many policy areas, even though for specific
reasons – such as the taboos surrounding an activating approach to immi-
grant integration and the idea that minorities were especially vulnerable be-
cause of the overall economic decline – this had not been the case for im-
migrant integration. Construction of an enlightenment nexus offered a le-
gitimate way to connect this political discourse to immigrant integration
and thereby also punctuate the established structure-induced equilibrium in
this domain.
5.3 Enlightenment and frameshifts
As we have seen, the construction of the enlightenment nexus was the out-
come of specific factors within and beyond the fields of immigrant integra-
tion research and policy. However, how did this nexus influence the frame-
shift from multiculturalism to universalism, and to what extent did its role
involve critical frame reflection?
5.3.1 The structural effects of enlightenment
The enlightenment model comes close to the standard model of ‘science
speaking truth to power’ in terms of research-policy dialogues. Whereas
technocracy means that research is very much involved in power, enlight-
enment strongly suggests that research provides new policy ideas that are
to impact policy developments in a more indirect manner. How, then, did
this ‘enlightenment’ function of research-policy dialogues impact on the
heavily institutionalised status quo that had evolved in the fields of immi-
grant integration research and policy from the 1980s?
Enlightenment as a source of positive feedback
The enlightenment type of boundary configuration had a disturbing effect
on the structural symbiosis between established research and policy actors
in this domain. In particular, WRR’s boundary work was strategically
aimed against the established minorities policy as well as research. The
universalist approach that framed integration policy as an intensification of
general policy – which WRR had put on the agenda – weakened the posi-
tion of the Minorities Policy Directorate, which advocated a multicultural-
ist approach to ethnic minorities. It also challenged ACOM’s status, which
had thus far maintained a central position in the immigrant integration
field, by excluding the committee from this WRR project and adopting an
individualist and activating welfare state approach to immigrant integra-
tion. This approach contrasted sharply with focus on the status of ethnic
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minorities and issues such as discrimination and emancipation, as propa-
gated by ACOM.
As previously observed, these actors involved in the structural symbiosis
mobilised significant negative feedback for the 1989 WRR report. ACOM
denounced the WRR report as ‘unscientific’, based on its own demarcation
and coordination criteria of minorities research. Furthermore, the
Minorities Policy Directorate initially refused to give full credence to the
WRR report, arguing that the minorities policy had not failed though had
merely not yet succeeded.
The enlightenment boundary configuration was primarily a product of
WRR’s boundary work and political actors. For WRR, the report consti-
tuted a success story in achieving its agenda on welfare state reform.
Although it initially led to debates about WRR’s scientific status, espe-
cially in relation to its breaking alleged taboos on discussing the rights and
duties of immigrants, the report eventually boosted WRR’s authority in
dealing with controversial policy topics (Hirsch-Ballin 1997: 116). For the
second time, WRR had issued a document that would mark a turning point
in immigrant integration policy.
For political actors, the enlightenment boundary configuration provided
a way of punctuating the structure-induced equilibrium that had so long in-
sulated this policy area from broader political developments. The politics
of welfare state retrenchment that had already affected many social policy
domains now also penetrated immigrant integration policy. Significantly,
the enlightenment configuration, supported by WRR’s scientific authority,
and the experts involved in the 1989 report, provided a legitimate venue
for connecting this issue to broader concerns about the welfare state, as the
taboos surrounding this topic and the norm of depoliticisation blocked
other venues from raising such a perspective. Even when Lubbers and
Bolkestein encouraged broader politicisation of this issue, they often re-
ferred to WRR as an authoritative source for their political claims.
The negative feedback of a new structure-induced equilibrium
Thus, the enlightenment configuration, with major involvement by WRR,
was successful in changing public and political discourse and altering the
roles held among involved actors. With the establishment of the universal-
ist approach, there was growing need for more practical and instrumental
expertise that could help construct a new structure-induced equilibrium
around it. In the policy field, this involved a structural repositioning of the
Department of Home Affairs, in which the roles of SCP, Van der Zwan
and Entzinger were of great importance. In the research field, this involved
a structural positioning of SCP and, until 1996, TWCM.
The Department of Home Affairs and, in particular, the drastically re-
formed DCIM, attempted to strengthen its structural position within the
new universalist approach by organising its information position in relation
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to other departments. The minorities reports produced by SCP provided an
instrument for the interdepartmental coordination of the integration policy.
With these reports, the Department of Home Affairs could influence the
policies of other departments by presenting data on the position of minori-
ties in areas that fell under the responsibility of specific departments.
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the minorities debate, the Van der Zwan
and Entzinger report served as an important strategic initiative for bringing
the provision of civic integration programmes under the remit of the
Department of Home Affairs. This move would prove to have a great ef-
fect on the position of this department in the integration policy of the
1990s. However, the department continued to cope with problems of inter-
departmental coordination. This is illustrated aptly by a passage in the
memoirs of former Minister of Home Affairs Van Thijn regarding interde-
partmental debates about the contours memorandum that was to be pub-
lished in 1994.
The interdepartmental debate on the contours memorandum ends up
in a battle. From all sides, severe objections are made. [...] When I
see his [Minister of Education’s] notes I become very angry. He
suggests getting rid of almost all the plans that fall in his domain.
[...] The content of the memorandum suffers severely under these
debates. The formulations that had made this memorandum so
powerful had been severely tuned down. There is no longer ques-
tion of a re-calibration of policy, which had been asked for [...]. The
word ‘recalibration’ has been systematically deleted. (Van Thijn
1994: 115-120)
In the field of research, SCP now, for the first time, obtained a more cen-
tral position. During the 1990s, it became the most important provider of
data on the position of minorities in various domains. However, no organi-
sation during the 1990s obtained a central position within the field of im-
migrant integration research that was comparable to the position ACOM
had held during the 1980s. For some time, the bipartite TWCM was impor-
tant for the dissemination of research findings towards policy practices, but
it was dissolved in 1996.
Thus, by disturbing the structural symbiosis between established actors
in the fields of research and policy (ACOM, Minorities Policy Directorate)
and strengthening the position of other actors in this period (WRR, politi-
cal actors, Department of Home Affairs or DCIM after 1990) the enlighten-
ment configuration provided an important source of positive feedback. The
fact that the research-policy nexus was structured according to an enlight-
enment type of nexus was of great relevance, as this created a legitimate,
effective way of punctuating the structure-induced equilibrium from the
1980s, which involved such a powerful symbiosis between specific actors
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and powerful taboos and norms of depoliticisation. When this equilibrium
was successfully punctuated, a new structural equilibrium was achieved
that involved a more instrumental, strategic role for research (with actors
like SCP, Van der Zwan and Entzinger).
5.3.2 Enlightenment and universalism
The enlightenment nexus was clearly configured to challenge the multicul-
tural model that had been dominant in the Netherlands in the decade be-
fore; it provided the structural conditions for a frameshift. However, did it
also contribute to the rise of a universalist frame in particular? Did it also
challenge the ‘logic of minorities’ that had supported the multiculturalist
frame in the 1980s?
The integration policy: From the logic of minorities to the logic of equity
An important consequence of the enlightenment nexus was that immigrant
integration was now, finally, connected to broader societal issues, particu-
larly concerns in policy and politics about the welfare state. Thus, the poli-
tics of welfare state retrenchment that had affected many social policy sec-
tors in the 1980s, but from which the field had been successfully insulated,
now penetrated immigrant integration policies as well. This issue linkage
meant that migrants would be increasingly perceived (and categorised) as
citizens. Like all other citizens, migrants would have the same rights and
duties to participate within Dutch society. Such a perspective on citizenship
introduced the logic of equity rather than the logic of minorities, thereby
contributing to the rise of universalism and the fall of multiculturalism.126
Paying attention to specific characteristics of minorities – for instance, their
ethnic or cultural status – now receded more to the background.
A concrete illustration of the logic of equity versus the logic of minori-
ties concerns one of the central issues in this period: the interpretation of
data on immigrant unemployment. As detected from the logic of minori-
ties, immigrant unemployment is explained in relation to specific traits of
minorities. This concerns their ethnic or cultural status and the problems of
discrimination that this could raise, or their social position and the pro-
blems associated with specific sectors in which migrants are employed
(low-wage, low-education, labour-intensive industries). From this perspec-
tive, therefore, immigrant unemployment requires a specific approach to
the specific situation of minorities. In contrast, as perceived from the logic
of equity, immigrant unemployment is compared with levels of unemploy-
ment among natives. Higher unemployment among migrants would mean
that migrants perform weaker on the labour market because of specific de-
ficiencies in comparison to natives. Consequently, an approach would have
to be developed to counter these deficiencies, rather than one that takes
these deficiencies into account as is the case with the logic of minorities.
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The logic of equity was clearly manifest in the focus on citizenship that
emerged in integration policy, as well as in the functional decentralisation
of such policy to various sector departments. This illustrated how the inte-
gration policy was more general than the specific minorities policy.
Furthermore, an important facet of this logic of equity was its emphasis on
breaking taboos concerning immigrant integration. These alleged taboos
would have prevented migrants from being treated as equals with Dutch
natives. In the early 1990s, the politicisation triggered by Lubbers – who
was ‘losing his patience with minorities’ (Het Parool 26 March 1990) –
and Bolkestein – who stressed the importance of universal liberal princi-
ples – broke these taboos. A new realist discourse emerged, championing
openness in the debate about immigrant integration, including negative fa-
cets such as criminality and reliance on welfare state facilities. This shift
towards the logic of equity in part reflected a more general trend in gov-
ernment policies. The politics of welfare state retrenchment involved a
broader trend from ‘soft-compensatory’ to ‘achievement-based’ policy
measures.
Minorities research: Scientific habitus at stake
Also in the field of scientific research, the enlightenment configuration
posed a challenge to the established logic of minorities. Although it did
not alter the structure of the field of scientific research to the same extent
as the policy field (the minorities paradigm was not dissolved, but structu-
rally challenged by a rival citizenship paradigm), it, too, contributed to a
different logic of framing immigrant integration in this field. The enlighten-
ment configuration challenged the established way of studying immigrant
integration, which was highly influenced by the anthropological tradition.
This involved specific research methods (field research) and a specific
ethos (engagement with minorities). The enlightenment research-policy
nexus created an opportunity for developing an alternative research per-
spective, beyond the established field structure and ACOM’s role in that
respect.
WRR was notably central in this respect. Because of its structural posi-
tion beyond the scope of the immigrant integration research field and its
central position in relation to government, WRR provided an effective ve-
nue for experts such as Albeda and Entzinger who advocated an alternative
perspective on immigrant integration. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary
composition of WRR played an important role in developing a broader
scientific perspective on immigrant integration. This was illustrated by the
involvement of, besides Entzinger, experts from other specialisations.
This structural position and multidisciplinary composition enabled WRR
to punctuate the dominant logic of minorities in the field of immigrant inte-
gration research. It was not institutionally involved in the research of mino-
rities alone but, as we have seen, carried a broader agenda on welfare state
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reform in this period. Furthermore, because of its multidisciplinary compo-
sition, its perspective on immigrant integration was adopted from disci-
plines, such as economics and law, that are generally colour-blind – or at
least blind to the relevance of ethnic or cultural factors. In fact, involving a
council member of a legal background majorly influenced the making of
the 1989 WRR report and in developing a principle of ‘substantive neutral-
ity’, indicating that the government should observe constraint in cultural
policies.
Thus, in both fields, the enlightenment configuration contributed to a
more generalist focus on minorities, shifting the specificity of the status of
migrants to the background. By connecting immigrant integration to broad-
er concerns about welfare state reform and citizenship, the logic of equity
replaced the logic of minorities in policy development. In research, too, a
logic of equity emerged, a consequence of the WRR’s multidisciplinary,
multi-sector scope.
5.3.3 Enlightenment and frame reflection?
Enlightenment contributed specifically to the fall of multiculturalism and
the rise of universalism in both research and policy in the Netherlands in
the early 1990s. However, did it also contribute to critical dialogues be-
tween research and policy on the new universalist model of integration? In
other words, did these research policy dialogues involve openness, empa-
thy, critical reflection, pragmatism and trust?
Opportunities for frame reflection
In specific respects, the enlightenment boundary configuration did contri-
bute to frame reflection. First, it had an important effect on the openness
of debate in terms of putting immigrant integration back on the policy
agenda. The relative insulation of this policy domain, supported by scienti-
fic involvement, had hampered critical reflection of the underlying problem
frame. Expanding this issue and drawing more actors into the debate on
immigrant integration promoted the first condition for frame reflection –
openness. Immediately following the 1989 WRR report, the debate became
more open in terms of public discussions, but also in terms of debate with-
in the scientific field. Following the national minorities debate, the discus-
sion became more open in the political domain as well; this marked the
first time the domain had become politicised.
Furthermore, the enlightenment configuration put an alternative problem
frame on the agenda, a frame of the universalist type, which conflicted in
fundamental respects with the dominant multiculturalist frame. This punctu-
ated the monopoly of the multiculturalist frame. By developing an alterna-
tive frame, the debate on immigrant integration – in research as well as pol-
icy – was lifted to the fundamental level of how the problem was framed. It
178 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
also broke with some of the prevailing taboos on alternative frames that had
hindered frame reflection. For a long time the multiculturalist frame was
imperative, as other frames were often criticised for stigmatisation and min-
orisation. Now the formulation of an alternative frame – one not emphasis-
ing the risks of stigmatising minorities but rather, approaching migrants as
equals – created opportunities for free reflection on different frames.
Thirdly, and highly related to the aforementioned point on formulating
an alternative frame, the enlightenment boundary configuration contributed
to critical reflection. The rise of an alternative frame on the agenda pro-
voked frame conflict, thereby making both frames more explicit. The emer-
gence of frame conflict within both the policy and the scientific field
forced involved actors to reflect upon their own frames, instead of taking
them for granted. The amassing sense of urgency following the 1989 WRR
report and the national minorities debate contributed even further to this
structural condition for critical reflection.
Constraints on frame reflection
Although the enlightenment boundary configuration did provide some of
the structural conditions required for frame reflection, it did not contribute
to frame reflection in some other respects. This concerned, primarily, the
sense of pragmatism that is required for gradually adapting one’s frame in
response to critical reflection. Instead, such pragmatism was obstructed by
the open conflict that emerged in policy as well as research. On one hand,
WRR, supported by the Minister of Home Affairs, stressed the fundamen-
tal difference between the new frame that they advocated and the prevail-
ing multiculturalist frame, rather than advocating pragmatic adaptation be-
tween both frames. For instance, the aim was confronting the status quo,
rather than reflecting on it or providing a pragmatic adaptation of frames.
This was achieved by, among other things, deliberately defining immigrant
integration in terms of allochthonous, integration and citizenship, so as to
mark the difference with the prevailing minorities policy. On the other
hand, criticism by actors involved in the status quo hardly indicated a
sphere of pragmatism. This criticism was often moralistic with, for exam-
ple, accusations that the WRR report would cause stigmatisation. It was
also personally directed towards the Prime Minister after his statements in
the 1990s and, later, to Bolkestein. The nature of this censure often con-
tributed to confrontation instead of reflection. This is also true for the per-
sonal attacks of character experienced by Entzinger and his involvement in
the 1989 WRR report, aimed to discredit his ‘intellectual leadership’ be-
cause of his different way of perceiving and approaching the issue of im-
migrant integration.
Secondly, the enlightenment configuration did not provide the trust
among involved actors that is required for frame reflection. It evolved in a
context of progressive distrust in this policy domain, between actors
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supporting the status quo and actors that advocated policy change. In fact,
the enlightenment configuration seems to have been a deliberate design for
breaking the monopoly of the status quo. The official demand for scientific
advice from the authoritative WRR created an alternative venue for policy
change. In the preceding analysis, we saw that this process went largely
beyond the actors involved in the policy status quo, such as ACOM and
the Minorities Policy Directorate.
Whereas the enlightenment boundary configuration set some conditions
for frame reflection, it also obstructed reflection in other respects. Putting
immigrant integration back on the public and political agendas, developing
an alternative frame and forcing a critical revaluation of the prevailing pol-
icy frame encouraged reflection on problem framing. However, this oc-
curred in a confrontational, distrustful context rather than one of pragma-
tism or, much less, trust. In fact, the enlightenment configuration created a
venue for problem framing beyond the scope of actors engaged in that of
the prevailing status quo, sometimes leading to sharp conflicts of a moral
and personal nature.
5.4 Conclusions
Contrary to the dominant image in migration literature that the Dutch mul-
ticultural model persisted long after the 1980s, a new model of integration
had already emerged (at least in formal policy discourse and in research)
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. While social researchers were cru-
cial in constituting the multicultural model of the 1980s, now they played
a major role in putting a new frame of immigrant integration on the agen-
da. However, the precise configuration of research-policy relations majorly
differed. The technocratic symbiosis of the 1980s included the close invol-
vement of researchers in constructing the structural monopoly that sus-
tained the multicultural model. This continued to insulate the domain from
broader societal developments throughout the 1980s. Now, a more enlight-
enment type of research-policy nexus created a legitimate way to punctuate
this monopoly, linking immigrant integration to broader social and political
developments, such as the politics of welfare state retrenchment and devel-
oping stricter ‘universalist’ policies. In the field of research, this reconfi-
guration of research-policy relations also allowed for the rise of an integra-
tion paradigm that challenged the dominant minorities paradigm.
This episode in research-policy dialogues on migration and integration
clearly reveals how the configuration of these dialogues is itself very much
an object of strategic interaction. For a long time, the structural equilibrium
of the 1980s had been maintained through effective processes of negative
feedback (including depoliticisation, taboos, consensus on specific mea-
sures in times of economic recession). Yet, WRR’s authority, the framing
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of its 1989 report ‘Immigrant policy’ and its perspective on welfare state
reform, proved crucial in setting the agenda of a new problem frame.
Furthermore, for a number of politicians who were unhappy with the lack
of reform in integration, WRR furnished a venue to put a more universalist
approach to integration on the agenda, in a way that would be considered
legitimate and authoritative.
Thus, the enlightenment nexus was a clear product of strategic design,
made in an effort to punctuate the structural equilibrium of multicultural-
ism that emerged in the 1980s. Although this enlightenment, in accordance
with the enlightenment ideal type, did not immediately lead to policy
change, it did alter political and social discourse. It generated policy feed-
back and it also invited negative policy feedback, particularly from those
research and policy actors involved in the technocratic symbiosis of the
1980s (such as ACOM). When policy developments gained more momen-
tum after the 1991-1992 national minorities debate, many elements of the
1989 WRR report were revived and adopted in the new integration policy.
Even in this period, experts who had been involved with the WRR reports
continued to play a central role in ensuring that policy change was effectu-
ated. However, after policy reframing took place, more political primacy
emerged in research-policy relations. In particular, the Department of
Home Affairs became a more prominent participant in the coordination of
instrumental research that was provided by SCP. This suggests that follow-
ing the establishment of the universalist frame in policymaking in the early
1990s, a more bureaucratic boundary configuration emerged.
The enlightenment nexus ended the relative insulation of this policy
field from broader developments, connecting immigrant integration to
wider concerns about the welfare state. Thus, it brought an end to the logic
of minorities in problem framing that had sustained the multicultural mod-
el. Rather than focusing on the (cultural, ethnic) specificities of minorities,
it contributed to a reframing of immigrants as equals – citizens – involving
a multidisciplinary perspective that was blind to group-specific factors via
the logic of equity.
The enlightenment configuration was designed by political actors and
WRR to punctuate the structure-induced equilibrium in minorities policy
and research. It also had the unintended effect of contributing to frame re-
flection, leading to an open scientific and political debate about immigrant
integration (punctuating the structure-induced equilibrium of the 1980s),
and providing a legitimate, acceptable venue for an alternative frame (uni-
versalism). Furthermore, it forced critical reflection on alternative frames
through freely confronting frames in public, political and scientific debates.
However, the enlightenment configuration also constrained frame reflection
because it aimed to confront established minorities policy and research
rather than promote reflection about multiculturalist or universalist frames
in a sphere of pragmatism and trust.
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6 The engineering of the assimilationist turn
(2000-2004)
Around the turn of the millennium, many Western European countries ex-
perienced what has been described as ‘an assimilationist turn’ in their im-
migrant integration policies (Joppke & Morawska 2003). The Netherlands
is, arguably, the country where such an assimilationist turn manifested it-
self in a significant manner, at least in national policy discourse. In ‘the
long year of 2002’, as it was called (see section 6.1.1), immigrant integra-
tion was to become the central issue in one of the most dramatic episodes
in Dutch post-war political history, involving the rise and subsequent mur-
der of the populist politician Fortuyn. At the same time, the multicultural
model, for which the Netherlands had once been so well known, was now
broadly discarded as ‘a failure’ and turned into a prominent counter-
discourse against which new policy developments were juxtaposed.
The research-policy nexus would, more than ever before, itself become
the object of intense controversy in the sharp politicisation of immigrant
integration in this period. A technocratic model of government was now
denounced together with the multiculturalist model with which it was often
associated. Because of their intense involvement with policy developments
in previous periods, the credibility of immigrant integration researchers
was publicly put on the line. This episode will show how difficult it is to
organise reflective research-policy dialogues on intractable controversies
such as immigrant integration, and how much the construction of these dia-
logues is entwined with the construction of social problems like immigrant
integration.
Controversies about the research-policy nexus make this episode even
more interesting in terms of studying the co-evolution of immigrant inte-
gration research and policy in the Netherlands. For instance, why did a
third report go ignored from the, by now, highly authoritative WRR, ‘The
Netherlands as immigration society’ (2001)? This does not mean that re-
search played no role in ongoing developments in this period. In fact, the
SCP would venture beyond its capacity as a data provider to become an
open advocate for an assimilationist approach. In addition, a parliamentary
investigative committee would commission an extensive survey of avail-
able migration and integration literature in order to establish why policy
had, thus far, only been ‘partly successful’. However, internationalisation
of the research field and the growing involvement of European institutes in
the co-optation of immigrant integration researchers inspired trends to
frame migration and integration as transnational issues. This development
ran, of course, directly against emergent national framing in the field of
policymaking.
6.1 The turn towards assimilationism and transnationalism
In chapter 4 we saw that, at least in formal policy discourse, a frameshift
occurred from universalism towards assimilationism. In this respect, the
Dutch case seems to resemble other countries that experienced an assimila-
tionist turn in this period. Also in the field of research, assimilationist
knowledge claims surfaced. However, as previously observed, the trend in
this field is better seen in terms of the growing fragmentation of knowl-
edge claims. In fact, besides multiculturalism, universalism and the new as-
similationism, there was a clear rise of transnationalism in the field of im-
migrant integration research. In particular, there was a widening divide be-
tween research and policy in terms of their transnationalist and
assimilationist framing of immigrant integration. In what situational setting
did this split emerge, and which main research and policy actors were in-
volved in research-policy dialogues in this period?
6.1.1 Context: Internationalisation and national identity
Several contextual developments during the 1990s and around 2000 put
stress on the structural equilibrium that had evolved around the universalist
policy approach earlier in the decade. One development that induced actors
to reframe immigrant integration was the ongoing process of internationali-
sation or, as others called it, globalisation, which had a mounting effect on
various institutions, including government and science. The establishment
of the European Union during the 1990s and its increasing influence on
various facets of national policies were important indications. In addition,
the national welfare state, which was a central point of reference for Dutch
integration policy in this period, was progressively affected by develop-
ments at a European level. Scientific research also became more internatio-
nalised. Sometimes aided by the development of European institutions
(such as EU research funding), more and more international research net-
works evolved.
Internationalisation also affected immigrant integration. Free movement
of people within the EU and better means of global transportation and
communication surged migration flows to EU countries. In response, EU
governments constantly undertook joint activities to limit migration across
EU borders, contributing to the rise of a so-called ‘Fortress Europe’
(Geddes 2003). Besides the development of a joint European immigration
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policy, EU institutes became more active in the domain of immigrant inte-
gration (ibid.), especially concerning anti-discrimination regulations
(Guiraudon 2006). This also influenced the development of EU research
networks in the field. Whereas immigrant integration research had, thus
far, been confined mainly to the context of nation-states (Favell 2005;
Lavenex 2005), now migration scholars became increasingly involved in
networks beyond their nation-states and, according to some, even coopera-
ted in EU government networks (Geddes 2005).
Ongoing immigration, especially family and asylum migration, had ever
more visible effects in society. ‘Old’ migrant groups grew due to demo-
graphic effects such as high fertility rates and ongoing family migration. In
the Netherlands in 2000, 2.8 million immigrants (comprising 17.5 per cent
of the Dutch population) had either been born outside the Netherlands, or
had at least one parent born outside the Netherlands.1 In the major cities of
Amsterdam and Rotterdam, immigrants comprised, respectively, 31.1 per
cent and 30.5 per cent of the total population.2 Furthermore, asylum migra-
tion contributed to the rise of new migrant groups, such as those from the
former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia. The communica-
tion and transportation means that facilitated migration flows on a global
level also facilitated the orientation of migrants towards their home coun-
tries, for instance, through satellite television and the internet. Cultural di-
versity became further institutionalised in Dutch society, as illustrated by
the establishment of numerous mosques, Islamic schools and even Islamic
universities.
WRR was one of the first actors to reconsider the prevailing perspective
on immigrant integration in the context of these developments. In its third
report on immigrant integration (WRR 2001b), WRR claimed that the
Netherlands had become an immigration society and that immigration and
integration policies, as well as the Dutch social state itself, had to adapt to
this development.
There was reluctance in Dutch society to adapt to this prospect of an im-
migration society. In fact, there were indications during this era that the in-
tegration process was advancing rapidly in the social-economic areas of la-
bour, education and housing, all key components of the integration policy.
Unemployment levels among immigrants had declined significantly since
the early 1990s, from over 30 per cent among Turks and Moroccans and
over 20 per cent for Surinamese and Antilleans in 1994, to under 10 per
cent for all these groups in 2000 and 2002. The government’s aim to re-
duce unemployment among immigrants by 50 per cent had been achieved
by 2001 (SCP 2001: 14). Nonetheless, the level of immigrant unemploy-
ment remained more than double that of the average native population.
Labour market participation among minorities also grew significantly,
although, again, it was still less than among natives. The position of immi-
grants in education was ameliorated as well, despite persistent differences
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between the groups (notably, the weaker position of Turks and Moroccans)
and their sustained gap in education compared with natives.
A series of political and societal developments after the turn of the mil-
lennium changed the direction of policy developments. A second national
minorities debate emerged in 2000, the so-called Scheffer debate, which
focused attention on an alleged ‘multicultural tragedy’. Secondly, a series
of events widely discussed in Dutch media and politics drew further atten-
tion to an alleged ‘clash of civilisations’ (Snel & Scholten 2005). This
included incidents with acts of violence that involved immigrants, as well
as morally questionable events that focused attention on the dilemmas of
cultural and religious diversity, including imams making radical statements
about homosexuals and refusing to shake hands with the female Minister
for Integration (ibid.). The international developments surrounding the ter-
rorist attacks of 9/11 also led to fierce anti-Muslim responses in the
Netherlands, as was the case in other European countries (Fennema 2002).
Especially groundbreaking was ‘the long year of 2002’ when the popu-
list politician Fortuyn brought immigrant integration to the centre of public
and political attention. Fortuyn was the political leader of the newly
founded party Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) in 2001 and led
the local branch Liveable Rotterdam in the local elections of 2002. He ra-
pidly became the subject of controversy because of his tough media state-
ments, calling for ‘zero-immigration’ because the Netherlands was ‘full’,
calling for a ‘cold war against Islam’ and dismissing Islam as ‘an idiotic
culture’.3 Following these statements, Fortuyn was fired by his own party
as their political leader and founded his own: the Pim Fortuyn Party (LPF).
During campaigning for the 2002 parliamentary elections, an animal-rights
activist assassinated Fortuyn on the very day the polls showed his party
would come first. Following these elections, the LPF eventually became
the second-largest party and was included in a centre-right government
coalition with the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. The LPF was to
be included in a centre-right government coalition with the Liberals and
the Christian Democrats.
The ‘long year of 2002’ had two direct political effects. Firstly, it led to
the initiation, in the year following the elections, of a parliamentary inves-
tigative committee on the integration policy. The aim of this committee
was to examine why the integration policy had been so limited in its suc-
cess and also to provide building blocks for new policy initiatives.4 Partly
based on an extensive study of scientific sources by the VWJ, this commit-
tee eventually concluded that the integration policy had actually been rela-
tively successful. This declaration provoked fierce controversy in public
and political debates.
A stronger political leadership emerged in migration and integration pol-
icy during 2002. The responsibility for immigrant integration and immigra-
tion policy shifted towards the Department of Justice. LPF member
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Hilbrand Nawijn was Minister of Immigration and Integration for a rela-
tively short time. When this brief coalition fell in 2002 and a new centre-
right coalition was formed in 2003 without the LPF, immigration and inte-
gration once again found strong political leadership under Minister
Verdonk from the Liberal Party. Verdonk was central to the development
of several memoranda in which the contours of an integration policy ‘new
style’ were elaborated. Although the effects of this new policy discourse
on policy practices seems to have been limited (Poppelaars & Scholten
2008), the policy documents from this period reveal a change in how im-
migrant integration was framed in government policies, from universalism
towards a more assimilationist policy frame.
In both politics and research, more attention was being devoted to the
social-cultural dimension of immigrant integration. In contrast to the trans-
nationalist discourse of WRR, SCP attributed attention to the social-cultur-
al integration of migrants in Dutch society. SCP was also more explicitly
involved in advocating a more assimilationist approach in this period.
This context analysis shows how several actors were involved in re-
search-policy relations. In the field of research, this once again involved
WRR, reflecting the internationalisation of research in this domain. This
time around, however, it seems to have been less influential in terms of
policy framing. SCP also continued to be involved at this time.
Furthermore, the parliamentary investigative committee and the scientific
study it commissioned from the VWJ seem to have been the result of a
combined effort by research and policy actors. Finally, in the field of pol-
icymaking, the political leadership of the Department of Justice, the new
coordinating department for the integration policy ‘new style’, clearly
played a prominent role in policy changes in this period.
6.1.2 WRR: ‘The Netherlands as an immigration society’
In 2001, WRR published a third report on immigrant integration entitled
‘The Netherlands as an immigration society’. It contrasted with earlier ones
by placing immigrant integration more in the context of immigration policy
and the Dutch rule of law, whereas previous reports had focused more nar-
rowly on immigrant integration (De Jong 2002). WRR argued that inade-
quate integration of migrants into citizens could create tensions in Dutch
society. It also stated that ongoing immigration could negatively affect the
absorption capacity of society (WRR 2001b: 25).
While the first WRR report (1979) suggested immigrants would not re-
turn to their home countries and had become permanent minorities and the
second WRR report (1989) claimed immigration as such had become a
permanent phenomenon and that the Netherlands had become a de facto
country of immigration, this third one argued that ‘the permanency, diver-
sity and unpredictability of migration’ and the ‘sharp increase of diversity
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since the 1980s [...] also have consequences for the (organisation of) Dutch
society […] and the capacity of Dutch society and its institutions to cope
with (cultural) differences and take benefit of the positive contribution of
immigrants’ (ibid.: 19). It adds that, although the second WRR report’s
statement that the Netherlands had become a country of immigration was
now widely recognised, ‘the translation of this fact into conduct and policy
takes effort’ and that ‘basically, Dutch government policy is insufficiently
directed at the immigration society’ (ibid.; author’s emphasis). Such an im-
migration society would demand ‘a capacity from Dutch society and its in-
stitutions to cope with [cultural] differences and take profit from the contri-
bution of migrants’ (ibid.).
WRR did not adopt a new way of classifying immigrants, as it had done
in the two earlier versions. It used the term ‘migrant’ or ‘immigrant’, but
also ‘allochthonous’ and ‘newcomers’. An important argument for using
the comparatively neutral depiction of ‘migrants’ was that referring to sec-
ond- or third-generation migrants as ‘allochthonous’ could have a labelling
effect that supported the intergenerational character of being an immigrant
(ibid.: 32). The report also speaks more of ‘participation’ than of ‘integra-
tion’. The former term was used referring to the position of migrants,
whereas the latter connoted mutual interdependence within society. The
general use of the term ‘integration’ referring to the incorporation of mi-
grants into society was not adopted in this report.
In contrast to the two earlier reports and despite reference to the
Netherlands’ fundamental transformation into a so-called immigration so-
ciety, WRR does not explicitly call for a fundamental policy shift. In fact,
it takes sides in the controversy over policy success or failure by claiming
that government should resist ‘the pressure to [...] formulate new policies,
instead of striving to ameliorate the implementation of current policies’
(ibid.: 180). Despite the often ‘strongly ideological character of policies
concerning immigration and integration’, WRR calls for a more instrumen-
tal and procedural policy approach, one which focuses primarily on those
areas that best lend themselves to government intervention, such as lan-
guage proficiency, labour and education.
WRR dissociated itself from the emerging assimilationist policy dis-
course. In important respects, it built on the universalist frame of the
1990s, for instance, in its emphasis on the principles that migrants have a
personal responsibility to participate (citizenship) and that immigrant parti-
cipation requires accessibility to institutions. The report formulates princi-
ples of ‘encounter’ and ‘confrontation’. This concerns the promotion of in-
teraction within society, avoiding the formation of segmented societies that
threaten the integration of society at large, without necessarily involving
assimilation. The task of government in this respect would not be substan-
tial but rather instrumental, creating the conditions for interaction.
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These principles underline that the aim of assimilation, in the sense
of the absorption into Dutch culture, is neither desirable nor neces-
sary in a highly diversified immigration society. However, for the
ongoing existence of the social-democratic system in the
Netherlands, it is necessary to lay down certain requirements for im-
migrants and the host society. The requirements imposed on immi-
grants are aimed at their participation in Dutch society and those for
the host society at the accessibility of the institutions of the social
state and adjustment to the cultural diversity of the population.
(ibid.: 25)
However, the report also adds a cultural dimension to this frame that re-
flected more of a transnationalist than an assimilationist frame. Whereas
both universalism and multiculturalism contain a clear national perspective
on immigrant integration (the Dutch multicultural society, the Dutch func-
tionalist state), WRR now viewed immigrant integration through the lens
of internationalisation. There are numerous references to the fact that ‘the
world has become smaller’, that cultures have become more dynamic, that
individuals develop more and more hybrid or multiple identities and that
migration has led to the formation of transnational communities that keep
their one foot in the country of origin and one in the destination. Without
explicitly taking this transnationalist perspective as normative, internationa-
lisation became accepted as a way in which policy should be adapted. To
do this, the report set a more positive tone on migration as an element of
internationalisation. In fact, it put forward ‘an approach that would maxi-
mise the benefits of immigration, both for Dutch society and for the new-
comers’ (ibid.: 9). It explicitly denounced the ‘programmatic and norma-
tive tone’ of the debate on the multicultural society (ibid.: 22).
6.1.3 Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP)
In the early 1990s, SCP gained prominence for providing social-economic
data on immigrants. It had acquired an important role in the structure-
induced equilibrium of the universalist approach with the provision of in-
strumental data in its regular minorities reports. During the 1990s, SCP’s
minorities reports remained an important tool in the interdepartmental coor-
dination of the integration policy. They occasionally contributed to impor-
tant policy corrections, for instance, in 1996’s housing policies (VWJ
2004: 138). More generally, because of its involvement in other domains
and high media profile, SCP became more established in this period, with
authority in the political field and the field of scientific research.
At the end of the 1990s, SCP adopted a more assimilationist problem
framing in response to, among other things, indications of decline in the
acceptance of minorities and cultural diversity in Dutch society. Firstly, in
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its ‘Social and cultural report’ from 1998, SCP explicitly dissociated itself
from the idea that the Netherlands would have, or should become, a multi-
cultural society.5 SCP (1998: 8) claimed that ‘although Dutch society does
increasingly contain people of different cultural origins, the secular, uni-
versalist, individualist, in short Western culture experiences barely any
competition from other streams’. Moreover, cultural goods, such as norms
and values, would have to be clearly distinguished from social goods such
as labour and income, which can be discussed in terms of individual rights
and duties. According to SCP, cultural goods cannot be differentiated for
various individuals and groups. Instead, they represent an ‘intrinsic hierar-
chy’, ruling out the possibility of ‘essentialistic pluralism’ as this would
lead to ‘as many public spheres as cultural groups’ (ibid.: 267). In this con-
text, the importance of ‘cultural assimilation [would have been] underesti-
mated and ignored by government, agents and social scientists’ (ibid.:
271). SCP had already made similar statements in its ‘Social and cultural
report’ from 1986, but refrained from repeating these observations ever
since becoming more structurally involved in the domain in the early
1990s.
In 1998, the newly appointed director of SCP, Schnabel, explicitly ar-
gued for ‘adaptation and assimilation’, claiming that the multicultural so-
ciety was ‘an illusion’. He did so in a lecture for the Institute for
Multicultural Expertise (FORUM), and in an essay (Schnabel 1998) and a
newspaper article in 2000.6 He based his argument on 1998’s ‘Social and
cultural report’.7 According to Schnabel (ibid.: 8), becoming a multicultur-
al society was ‘neither a realistic nor a desirable option’. He saw social-
cultural adaptation as an important means for achieving integration or, as
he called it, ‘assimilation’ (ibid.: 25). Concerning central cultural areas
such as the Constitution and civil rights, Schnabel argued that there was no
other option but complete assimilation. In other public areas, such as
school and work, some degree of integration or assimilation could be ex-
pected, whereas in the more private cultural spheres, such as home, family
and church, there would be more space for diversity or even segregation.8
SCP’s minorities report also paid more systematic attention to ‘social-
cultural integration’. For the first time it included an empirical analysis of
data on social-cultural integration in a preparatory study it made for the
2001 WRR report on immigrant integration (Dagevos 2001). In the context
of rising concerns about social-cultural diversity and ethnic cleavages in
society after the turn of the millennium, SCP decided, together with the co-
ordinating Department of Justice, to include social-cultural integration in
its minorities report for the first time in 2003 (SCP 2002: 134, 2003: 9). It
defined social-cultural integration in terms of the modernisation of specific
norms and values, referring to ‘a centuries-long modernisation process of
western culture [...] which has advanced less in many other parts of the
world’ (SCP 2003: 9). According to SCP:
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Social-cultural integration stands […] for the extent to which ethnic
minorities share a number of the basic values and norms of Dutch
society and the extent to which they have contacts with natives. A
modern western world view was taken as a point of reference for
the choice of these norms and values, which is characterised by the
idea of individual human development, social equality (also be-
tween men and women), secularism and a democratic regulation of
power (ibid.: 9).
In the 2003 minorities report, SCP provides a differentiated image of the
process of social-cultural integration. In terms of modern cultural attitudes,
there were signs of cultural assimilation, especially in second- and third-
generation migrants of specific groups (SCP 2003: 427). However, in terms
of religious attitudes and social contacts, it appears that there was a grow-
ing divergence between natives and immigrant groups (ibid.). Turks and
Moroccans had an especially pronounced orientation towards their own
cultural group, whereas Antilleans and Surinamese were more assimilated
into Dutch society (ibid.: 430). As for social-economic participation, SCP
signalled that, despite the significant progress made in the previous decade,
persistent problems remained. They involved, among other indicators, a
persistent relative deprivation in education and labour, the latter of which
was deteriorating due to overall economic decline.
SCP would continue to draw attention to the social-cultural dimension
of integration. Following the ‘long year of 2002’ when the populist LPF
was eventually incorporated into government, the Minister of Immigration
and Integration asked SCP to coordinate a research project on Islam in
Dutch society. This eventually led to 2004’s ‘Muslims in the Nether-
lands’.9 This report concluded that although secularisation did occur
among Muslims in terms of religious practices, the group’s religious iden-
tity underwent a religious revitalisation. SCP focused on social-cultural
integration in other reports as well as – and often in relation to – social-
structural integration.10 Although the regular minorities reports were dis-
continued after 2003, SCP continued to issue documents on this matter, in-
cluding the ‘Annual integration report’ (2005) that was published together
with the Statistics Office (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS) and the
Scientific Research and Documentation Centre of the Department of
Justice (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-en Documentatiecentrum, WODC).
6.1.4 The Blok Committee and the Verwey-Jonker Institute
Following the controversial parliamentary elections of 2002, Parliament
took the initiative in establishing an investigative committee to examine
the integration policy. Dutch Parliament has a constitutional right to estab-
lish investigative parliamentary committees or parliamentary inquiries not
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only to look into social problems but also to evaluate policies. They form
an important means through which Parliament can alleviate its relatively
asymmetrical access to information compared to government, which has a
great number of advisory bodies at its disposal, including WRR and SCP
(Halffman & Hoppe 2006).11 Although this right had existed for a long
time, it only recently came to be used more frequently by Parliament, parti-
cularly for the investigation of policy fiascos (Andeweg & Irwin 2005:
144). This development was also institutionalised with the establishment of
a Research and Verification Office (Onderzoek en Verificatie Bureau,
OVB) in 2002, which provided administrative support to parliamentary in-
quiries and investigative committees. In this case, Parliament established
an investigative committee, which has fewer formal powers than a parlia-
mentary inquiry, but can have a similar policy impact.
The parliamentary motion that demanded the establishment of an investi-
gative committee was submitted by the Socialist Party, who advocated a
more assimilationist policies (Fermin 1997: 112). Previous attempts by this
party to call for a parliamentary investigative committee had been fruit-
less.12 Now, though, Parliament accepted a motion concluding that integra-
tion was ‘insufficiently successful’ and called for an evaluation of the
causes for failure.
Concluding that the integration policy has thus far been insuffi-
ciently successful, observing that it would be desirable to evaluate
what may have been the cause of this, observing that such research
could provide the building blocks for the formulation of a new inte-
gration policy, Parliament decides to establish a parliamentary re-
search committee on the integration policy.13
In fact, there was already an evaluation of policy failure present in this
stage of the research problem formulation. However, members of the LPF
voted against this motion; as for them, the conclusion that the integration
policy had failed was already so clear that they believed a special research
committee was unnecessary. Perhaps more importantly, the LPF did not
want to gain any new ‘building blocks’ for an integration policy; rather, it
wanted to abolish the integration policy altogether and incorporate policies
towards immigrants into general government policy.14
Whereas the initial idea for establishing the investigative committee was
based on an assimilationist evaluation of the integration policy – as insuffi-
ciently successful or ‘failed’ in the social-cultural terrain – eventually its
official aim was reformulated in a more open way, by a parliamentary
working group that made preparations for establishing the committee. The
final assignment given to the committee also contained no specific focus
on social-cultural issues, something that would have been expected in an
assimilationist framing of the investigative committee’s aim. Instead, the
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goal of the committee was ‘to enable the Second Chamber of Parliament to
evaluate the integration policy of the Dutch government over the past 30
years, to evaluate the aimed effects and factual results of this policy and to
evaluate the coherence of policy in various policy sectors’.15 Also, ‘the re-
search should provide building-blocks for the integration policy to come’.
The various policy domains considered relevant included income and la-
bour, education, housing and recreation and sports.
The report by the investigative committee, named the ‘Blok Committee’
after its chairman, Stef Blok, was for a large part based on a study by the
VWJ, although the reports of this committee and the institute also differed
in important respects. The VWJ was asked to undertake an evaluative
study of the goals and results of the integration policy over the past dec-
ades in specific areas and to determine to what extent policy had been con-
sistent and coherent.16 Moreover, it was asked to determine the extent to
which the integration policy ‘could be qualified as successful’.
This last question, in particular, related to the framing of immigrant inte-
gration. The approach adopted by the VWJ was manifest in its assumption
that ‘success in one domain can be of higher importance than that in
others’ (VWJ 2004: 196). The ‘success in the domain of education appears
[to be] the key for the further success of the integration process’, meaning
that the results in this area are of extra importance. It was this assumption
that eventually led the institute to the conclusion that the integration policy
had been ‘relatively successful’ (ibid.). Furthermore, it concluded that ‘part
of the intended goals have been realised [...] especially in the domain of
education’, as well as in the domain of housing, whereas the goals in the
domain of income and labour ‘have been less achieved’ (ibid.).
This emphasis on education and labour as corner stones of integration
reveals the VWJ’s universalist framing. Thus, it founded its conclusion
about the relative success of the integration policy on achievements in the
social-economic, rather than the social-cultural, domain. The institute also
put its conclusions in greater context, providing an incentive for critical re-
flection about this problem frame. The lack of complete success was due
to inconsistencies between policies, it argued. Another conclusion was that
‘especially in the social-cultural domain there is a gap between formulated
objectives and results that have been attained thus far’ (VWJ 2004: 197).
There was warning against an ‘anachronistic evaluation’ of policy results
accumulated from the past but based on policy objectives set out only re-
cently: ‘results are lagging mainly in areas where only recently new and
sharper goals have been formulated’ (ibid.). Here, the VWJ appears to be
using the fact that this had been the dominant frame in the previous decade
as a way of legitimising its choice for a universalist approach, thereby dis-
sociating itself from the new assimilationist frame to emerge in the political
discourse during that time. It did, however, raise the question of whether,
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given the ‘recent political turbulence, the goals have always been formu-
lated sufficiently broad in the past’ (ibid.: 198).
The Blok Committee formulated a definition of ‘integration’ to use for
determining whether the integration was successful or not. This definition
was universalist in character, emphasising social-economic participation,
equality in legal terms and the ‘two-sidedness’ of integration. The defini-
tion also contained some elements that could lead either to a more assimi-
lationist framing (respect for common values, norms and patterns of beha-
viour) or even a multiculturalist framing (integration as a person or a
group). However, the committee failed to elaborate the definition to such
an extent that the relative importance of these various indicators of integra-
tion could be established. The committee adopted the following definition
of successful integration:
A person or a group is integrated in Dutch society when they have
an equal legal position, equal social-economic participation, knowl-
edge of the Dutch language and when common values, norms and
patterns of behaviour are being respected. Integration is a two-sided
process. On the one hand, newcomers are expected to be willing to
integrate; on the other hand, Dutch society must make this integra-
tion possible. (Blok 2004a: 105)
Based on this definition, the Blok Committee concluded that ‘the integra-
tion of many immigrants has been a total or partial success and [...] this is
quite an achievement for the involved immigrant citizens as well as for the
host society’ (Blok 2004a: 105). The way in which the committee substan-
tiated this conclusion revealed a more universalist framing than its defini-
tion of integration would suggest. Its belief in the success of the integration
process was founded especially on the progress made in education, labour,
housing and women’s emancipation (ibid.: 522). These domains mainly
concern the individual participation of migrants, regardless of gender,
rather than group emancipation (as in multiculturalism) or social-cultural
integration (as in assimilationism).
An important difference from the VWJ was that the Blok Committee
did not conclude that the integration policy had been successful but rather,
that the integration process had been successful. The committee observed
that ‘causal relations with the general integration policy are difficult to
prove [...]’ (ibid.: 522). The success of the integration process would have
been especially affected by general developments in society and by the ef-
forts of those migrants involved. In this respect, too, the Blok Committee
seems to have followed a universalist frame in which the government had
only a supporting role in the integration process.
The Blok Committee and the VWJ produced what could be expected
from an evaluative study of the integration policy – evaluating policy
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effects based on given policy goals. Adopted was the universalist problem
frame of 1990s integration policy and, based on this frame, both actors
came to the conclusion that integration had been rather successful.
However, within the context of ongoing policy debates after 2000, they
also continued to propagate a universalist frame. They pinpointed educa-
tion and labour as the key sectors of integration. The Blok Committee even
concluded that, given the progress achieved in those sectors that were con-
sidered vital from a universalist frame of immigrant integration, the inte-
gration process – though not so much the integration policy – had been re-
latively successful.
6.1.5 Politics and public intellectuals
Finally, political actors and so-called public intellectuals who were main
players in public, political and sometimes scientific debates became more
involved in policymaking. They ensured that immigrant integration topped
the political agenda during this period (Essed & Nimako 2006). This
would have a direct effect on the policy changes that were made by the
two centre-right governments formed in 2002 and 2003.
Two actors particularly had a significant impact on policymaking. First,
the public intellectual Paul Scheffer triggered a second national minorities
debate in 2000, with a piece published in NRC Handelsblad (29 January
2000) on what he described as the ‘multicultural tragedy’ taking place in
the Netherlands. In this newspaper article, Scheffer adopted a more assimi-
lationist frame, focusing attention on the relation between social-cultural
differences and social-economic deprivation.17 He defined immigrant inte-
gration as ‘the social question of this age’ and warned of the development
of an ‘ethnic underclass’ in Dutch society, characterised by ‘unemploy-
ment, poverty, school drop-outs and criminality’.18 He claimed that the ‘be-
nign multiculturalism’ found in a cultural differences approach was one of
the causes of the formation of the ethnic underclass. To achieve better inte-
gration, Scheffer called for a ‘civilisation offensive [in which] Dutch lan-
guage, culture and history should be taken more seriously’. Scheffer
believed that, ‘We say too little about our boundaries, cherish no relation
with our past and treat language in an ignorant way [...] a society that re-
pudiates itself has nothing to offer to newcomers’.19 He also warned
against the growth of ethno-cultural cleavages in society. Scheffer’s analy-
sis of the alleged clash of civilisations was an important element in ‘The
multicultural tragedy’ (Prins 2002a; Snel 2003a: 13). The unfolding debate
put immigrant integration back on the public and political map in 2000,
sparking a lively polemic in the national media (Scholten & Timmermans
2004). Subsequently, a special parliamentary debate was held among var-
ious political party leaders to discuss integration policy ‘in general’.20
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The second actor to have an effect on policy was another public intellec-
tual heavily involved in politics. Fortuyn was already known for his con-
servative columns in the popular Dutch magazine Elsevier and his 1997
book Against the Islamisation of society (Fortuyn 1997). Fortuyn’s 2001
entrance into politics marked the beginning of ‘the long year of 2002’ and
one of the most controversial periods in Dutch post-war political history
(Andeweg & Irwin 2005). Fortuyn, even more so than Scheffer, framed
immigrant integration in an assimilationist way. He defined migrants in
terms of their social-cultural differences in relation to Dutch society.
Generally, this involved highlighting the religious status of migrants. He
also framed immigrant integration in terms of compensating the ‘social-
cultural deprivation’ of migrants whose upbringing had not been part of
Western Judeo-Christian culture.21 In order to preserve Dutch culture and
identity and to compensate for the social-cultural deprivation of migrants,
Fortuyn argued for a more obligatory approach to integration that also in-
volved adaptation to Dutch norms and values.
Although the minorities debate inspired by Scheffer did not immediately
lead to policy change, several years later, it would be seen as an important
turning point in the development of this domain (Entzinger 2005: 8). The
coordinating Minister of Integration and Urban Affairs refuted claims that
there would be a ‘multicultural tragedy’, pointing instead to signals of
social-economic progress. Based on the prevailing universalist problem
framing, this was evidence that the integration policy was rather
successful.
We do not share the feelings of dejection. [...] A warning against an
unbalanced idea about the position of minorities in Dutch society is
surely in place. There are not only problems, there is also progress.
[...] There is no question of a multicultural tragedy. There is no
progressive marginalisation of various ethnic groups in the
Netherlands. They are (on average) better integrated than in the
past. (Van Boxtel 2000: 12-13)
The rise of Fortuyn had a more immediate effect on policy changes. The
2002 elections brought a new government to power with very different
ideas on immigrant integration. The populist LPF was a part of the new
government coalition and named immigrant integration a top policy prior-
ity. The coalition agreement signed by the Liberal Party, the Christian
Democratic Party and the LPF emphasised, in particular, the social-cultural
dimension of immigrant integration. It highlighted how ethnic differences
in combination with discrepancies in education, labour participation and
crime rates contribute to ‘divergent powers within society and to physical,
social and mental cleavages between communities’.22 Although it claimed
to renounce a politics of assimilation, perhaps in part due to the sensitivity
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of this concept, it argued for ‘approaching religious, cultural and ethnic dif-
ference on the basis of respect for fundamental values and norms that are
characteristic for Dutch society’. 23
In this centre-right government, LPF member Nawijn became Minister
for Immigration and Integration. What is more, responsibility for integra-
tion policy was taken away from the Department of Home Affairs, which
had been the coordinating department since the late 1970s. The
Department of Justice now became coordinator, signalling a more pro-
nounced law-and-order approach to immigrant integration (Entzinger
2003). In 2003, when a new centre-right government was formed, the
Department of Justice remained in control for policy coordination in this
area, this time with a minister from the Liberal Party.
Rita Verdonk, the new minister responsible for the coordination of the
integration policy, produced several policy documents that elaborated a
more assimilationist approach to immigrant integration, or the so-called in-
tegration policy ‘new style’. Details of this policy were also set out in a let-
ter from the minister that accompanied the 2003 minorities report by SCP,
which were simultaneously sent to Parliament. Building on observations
by SCP on social-cultural integration, the minister observed in this letter
that ‘in spite of moderate successes in the sphere of education and the la-
bour market, too great a part of the minority population stands at too great
[a] distance from Dutch society’ affecting ‘social and cultural distance as
well as economic distance’.24 Moreover, the letter explicitly speaks of a
turning point in the integration policy, which would involve, in particular,
a change from cultivating cultural differences towards ‘searching [for] the
unity of society in what participants have in common’.25
This frameshift towards assimilationism was further codified in the gov-
ernment reply memorandum to the Blok Committee’s 2003 report. In this
response, the government confirmed the new policy contours that had been
elaborated in the ministerial letter. It reiterated its emphasis on social-cul-
tural differences as the incentive for the integration policy ‘new style’.
Responding to the conclusion of the Blok Committee that integration had
been relatively successful, the government stated that it:
endorses the conclusion that especially in the 1990s progress has
been made in various domains [...], but that [government] in its
own analysis of the actual position [of immigrants] puts emphasis
on the social, cultural and economic cleavages that persist.26
In this context, the government expressed its disappointment that the Blok
Committee had ignored some important facets of immigrant integration, ‘in
particular the social-cultural aspects of integration and the disproportionate
crime rates among some minority groups’.27 Moreover, it raised doubts
about the ‘factual meaning’ of the conclusion that integration would have
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been ‘a total or partial success’. In fact, the government reframed this con-
clusion as evidence that integration had been at least partially unsuccessful,
or possibly even a complete failure, and that these observations would
guide government policy.28
This actor analysis clearly shows the multiplicity of frames involved in
this period. Recognising this multiplicity creates a very different perspec-
tive on the somewhat simplistically described assimilationist turn in Dutch
policies. Whereas WRR adopted a transnationalist framing, the parliamen-
tary investigative committee and the VWJ adopted a more universalist
frame (in contrast to the parliamentary motion that had led to the establish-
ment of the committee). Moreover, in line with a number of influential po-
litical actors and public intellectuals in this period, SCP adopted a progres-
sively explicit assimilationist problem frame.
These actors also selected and interpreted different contextual evidence
to support their frames. Whereas universalists selected evidence about the
improvement of the position of migrants in crucial social-economic do-
mains, assimilationists chose to select evidence about persistent differences
in terms of social-cultural integration or even ‘social-cultural deprivation’.
While WRR interpreted evidence about ongoing immigration and burgeon-
ing cultural diversity as signs that the Netherlands was becoming an immi-
gration society, actors with assimilationist frames interpreted them instead
as indications of a clash of civilisations that demanded more focus on so-
cial-cultural adaptation. Furthermore, the attribution of meaning to the fo-
cus events that occurred after the turn of the millennium was very impor-
tant at the time. Actors with assimilationist frames, especially political ac-
tors and public intellectuals, played an important role in giving weight to
incidents such as the murder of Fortuyn, viewing them as focus events for
an alleged ‘clash of civilisations’. For instance, even though Fortuyn was
murdered by a leftist animal-rights activist, his death acquired the meaning
of someone killed for his opinion on multiculturalism and his criticism of
Islam, in particular (Essed & Nimako 2006: 304). The same was true for
the murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004, which also rein-
forced the idea that discourse on multiculturalism had reached a ‘dead
end’, and that Islam posed a threat to national social cohesion and identity
(Hajer & Uitermark 2007: 7).
6.2 The research-policy nexus on the line
As we have seen, controversy over the ‘culture’ or framing of problems
tends to coincide with disaccord concerning the ‘structure’ of how pro-
blems are dealt with by various actors. This is certainly the case in this era,
as the division of labour between research and policy became openly
contested. Whereas in previous episodes, research made significant
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contributions to policy developments in a technocratic or enlightenment
manner, this time the construction of effective research-policy dialogues
would prove much more difficult. However, the fact that research-policy
boundaries were at stake, as never before in these controversies, makes this
an even more compelling episode in which to examine just why the status
of research became so contested.
6.2.1 The field of scientific research
Fragmentation appearing in the field of immigrant integration research as
early as the end of the 1980s would only continue during this period.
Within immigrant integration research, a multiplicity of problem frames
was manifesting, involving universalist, assimilationist and transnationalist
frames. This would also affect relations between different research actors
within the field of policymaking, which went through a dramatic assimila-
tionist turn at this time.
WRR: Boundary work beyond the national polity
In 1997, WRR decided to continue its tradition in the domain of immigrant
integration. This led to the report ‘The Netherlands as immigration so-
ciety’, published in 2001. Unlike the 1989 report, this document did not re-
spond to a formal advisory request from government. Rather, the initiative
for the report was taken as a result of a brainstorming session of the sixth
council, which was inaugurated in 1997. The success of earlier reports pro-
vided an important motivation for WRR to once more publish a report in
this area. The two previous reports had been powerful illustrations of the
institutional legitimacy of WRR, and it was considered useful for the coun-
cil to continue its involvement by producing one report approximately
every decade.29 A more personal factor involved in this initiative was that
council member Pauline Meurs was very interested in this issue. Although
immigrant integration was not WRR’s academic specialisation, her perso-
nal interest was an important motivation for starting this new study.30
This time, WRR did not demarcate its role as developer of an alternative
design for the immigrant integration policy. Rather, it proclaimed its task
to be that of reviewing current policies in this domain, including immigrant
integration as well immigration and welfare state policies in the context of
ongoing internationalisation. Internationalisation was a focus of this new
council, which also produced several other reports during this period on,
for instance, the EU (WRR 2001a). This thematic programme was, how-
ever, different from WRR’s more substantial policy agenda at the time of
its 1989 report.
A thematic focus on internationalisation influenced the clear stance of
WRR’s report vis-à-vis the field of immigrant integration research. WRR
adopted a transnationalist framing that linked immigrant integration to the
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ongoing process of internationalisation and set it apart from other frames
with a more national perspective. Contrary to previous reports, WRR could
not once again lean on issue-specific experts within its own organisation.
As a result, the authors expended significant effort in examining scientific
literature on the subject.31 In the initial stages of the report, the authors
met with various researchers on immigrant integration. They were also sup-
ported throughout the project by researchers such as Kloosterman, who
had held a part-time position in WRR for some time, and Entzinger. In this
way, WRR became acquainted with the transnationalist frame that had de-
veloped in the context of a larger ongoing process of internationalisation.32
In fact, as prior observed, transnationalism emerged in this field as a conse-
quence of a structural process of internationalisation and, in particular,
growing involvement by European institutes, which induced researchers to
look beyond their national models of immigrant integration and to engage
in more international comparative research (Favell 1998, 2001; Lavenex
2005).
This demarcation of WRR’s mandate involved a deliberate strategy of
‘keeping politics out’. Its independent, authoritative position enabled WRR
to fulfil a debunking role. In fact, WRR’s advisory council, whose mem-
bers included directors of several other institutes, including from SCP, en-
couraged WRR to use its independence as a means to discuss sensitive is-
sues such as immigration and integration. The SCP director, who was later
to become an important entrepreneur in this field, argued that WRR should
take advantage of its independence to address this sensitive topic, some-
thing that SCP would be less capable of doing due to its relationship with
the Department of Home Affairs.33
In 2000, in the midst of the development of the WRR report and follow-
ing the second national minorities debate, immigrant integration emerged
at the centre of public and political attention. For WRR, this was a moment
to reinforce its strategy of ‘keeping politics out’. It decided not to engage
in the ongoing debates because the report would be published much later.
Furthermore, it rejected the negative tone towards immigration and diver-
sity that was evident in this debate. Ultimately, the WRR report would con-
tain no reference to the article by Scheffer that had triggered the second na-
tional debate. In a memorandum to the council, the WRR project group ar-
gued, in reference to the assimilationist Scheffer debate, for a more
international perspective.
The article [...] has led to a vivid debate about the success or failure
of the integration of ‘allochthones’ in the Netherlands. It is striking
that the positions were hardly nuanced, that all allochthones were
treated as one and that policy responses have an ad hoc character;
several elements were suddenly overemphasised in comparison to
others. [...] With our report, we wanted to nuance this debate and
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present a more integral approach and, wherever possible and rele-
vant, also involve the international debate about immigration and
integration.34
It is significant that WRR renounced ideas of an advisory request for a re-
port on immigration policy in this period. Although the Minister of
General Affairs formally issues advisory requests, there was debate at this
time about a potential advisory request from the Department of Justice.
Considering a new immigration law that was to be implemented in 2000,
the State Secretary for Immigration at the Department of Justice showed
particular interest in a WRR study on this issue and contemplated issuing
an advisory request.35 The study was to address questions such as how to
distinguish real (political) refugees from bogus (economic) refugees and
look for explanations for why immigration to the Netherlands was so
high.36 WRR responded negatively to discussions about this advisory re-
quest. It considered it too difficult to create an ‘objective’ explanation of
reasons for migration and, more precisely, the choice to immigrate to the
Netherlands. It also believed that such a report would deviate too greatly
from the project, already underway, that focused mainly on cultural diver-
sity.37 Moreover, it was feared that this topic would not be ‘scientifically
investigable’, in part because of the political nature of distinguishing be-
tween economic migrants and political asylum applicants.38 Council mem-
bers were fearful of an advisory request that would effectively put a politi-
cal problem on WRR’s plate.39 It was never issued.
This strategy of making of the report in a concertedly apolitical way, de-
spite the rapid ongoing developments during its production, also reflected
internal difficulties in achieving the goals set within WRR. Initially, WRR
had planned to formulate a ‘minimum of commonality’40 required for the
functioning of an immigration society. At the beginning of the project, it
was observed how ‘the increase in ethnic diversity in Dutch society raises
a lot of questions [...] [W]e have the impression that an important part of
the answer can be found in cultivating specific general conditions’.41 With
this focus, the project group developed working titles such as ‘cultural het-
erogeneity’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘coping with differences’. Later, it nar-
rowed down this problem formulation to a more modest state.42 Instead of
formulating its own normative framework for a minimum of commonality,
the morality of the core institutions in society was taken as a normative
starting point. In other words, a more sociological institutionalist mode of
reasoning was adopted, somewhat similar to the 1989 WRR report, with a
focus on the ‘social state’. This was seen as a way of abandoning the idea
of developing a substantive organising principle (i.e. a minimum of com-
monality) for a more procedural principle.43
One reason behind this more modest formulation was an internal dis-
agreement about the broader normative framework. As a sensitive issue,
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immigrant integration led to considerable disputing within WRR, espe-
cially surrounding the Scheffer debate but also surrounding specific issues
such as dual nationality and the economic evaluation of the costs and bene-
fits of immigration.44 This made it difficult to agree on a common norma-
tive framework or to formulate clear policy recommendations on which all
members could agree. These internal difficulties were an important factor
as to why the report did not adopt policy recommendations as strong as
those in previous ones.
Looking back, we could have perhaps gone a bit further in terms of
recommendations. That our recommendations were eventually a bit
‘softer’ was also because this is a politically controversial issue, on
which it is difficult to reach agreement within the project group and
within the council. […] You must have a very good argumentation
and a good idea about the perverse effects of such an approach.45
By trying to keep politics out, WRR aimed to debunk or demythologise
some prevailing national myths about immigrant integration in the context
of internationalisation.46 Rather than being a ‘report to government’, this
was more ‘a report to society’. It contained a new perspective on immigra-
tion and integration rather than a new policy plan.47 It did not contain
many concrete policy recommendations, ‘but was rather aimed at introdu-
cing a change of perspective’.48
Debunking involved, firstly, revealing the pervasive effect of migration
and diversity as facets of the ongoing process of internationalisation on the
structure of national institutions. It also involved a ‘conceptual debate
about concepts [such] as multiculturalism and integration’ and a discussion
about ‘taboo topics such as differences between groups’, including the is-
sue of dual nationality and the relation between immigration and integra-
tion.49 WRR believed that the notion of multiculturalism had been troubled
by normative debates on whether the Netherlands should be a multicultural
society, rather than a factual debate about what cultural diversity meant for
society. Furthermore, debunking meant that WRR diverged from the pre-
vailing policy discourse. It avoided the concept of ‘integration’ because the
notion reflected the dominant national discourse and stressed deficiencies
on the part of immigrants, rather than the larger implications of diversity
and migration. Instead, more analytical concepts such as ‘incorporation’
and ‘participation’ were used.50 Another myth that was addressed con-
cerned the relation between immigration and integration, which had, thus
far, been treated as largely separate policy areas, embedded in different in-
stitutional contexts. Whereas it had previously been accepted that integra-
tion policy was conditional upon immigration policy, WRR now argued
that immigration policy should also be conditional upon integration policy.
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In an immigration society, immigration and integration policies were inti-
mately entwined.
Thus, WRR dissociated itself from national policies, politics and the
ongoing national debate on immigrant integration in an effort to debunk
national myths about immigrant integration in the context of ongoing inter-
nationalisation. However, the timing of its report proved highly inoppor-
tune. Between the day the report was sent to the publisher (20 August
2001) and the day it was made public (24 September 2001), the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 occurred. Immediately following 9/11, the council met to
discuss whether changes should be made to the report; they decided no
modifications were necessary.51 Although WRR had already chosen to dis-
sociate itself from ongoing developments in public debate by not engaging
in the 2000 minorities debate, this unfortunate timing meant that the report
appeared in a very different problem setting than when the project began.
In the words of one of the staff members, it had already been ‘overtaken
by problem developments such as the Scheffer debate and 9/11 by the time
it was published’.52
SCP: Boundary work within the nation-state
SCP was another research actor to get more deeply involved in immigrant
integration during the 1990s that now began advocating a more assimila-
tionist policy approach. The institute had gained a structural position in the
field of immigrant integration research as a data provider on the position of
minorities. During the 1990s, it demarcated and coordinated its role in in-
strumental terms in the context of involvement in the new structure-induced
equilibrium of the universalist approach of the integration policy. This,
however, changed as SCP’s position became steadily institutionalised in the
1990s.
Although SCP continued to be a provider of quantitative data, it came to
define its task as being more than just instrumental. Its mounting authority
in the domain enabled it to become less reserved, making more normative
statements about immigrant integration.53 This was manifest in its more
open advocacy of an assimilationist policy approach in 1998’s ‘Social and
cultural report’. It was also illustrated by SCP director Schnabel’s engage-
ment in the public debate on immigrant integration. This more normative
engagement attracted significant criticism, some of a moral nature.
According to Schnabel (see Blok 2004b: 294):
My argument received a somewhat mixed response, because it was
a very critical story: there is no multicultural society, nor would it
be a good option. Somewhat on purpose, but perhaps also a bit na-
ively, I used a rather sensitive word: I said that there is no choice
but to choose for assimilation. [...] Because I had not been involved
in this branch for so long, I did not realise that this was rather hard
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and unpleasant for some people. [...] I was rather shocked by the
fierceness of the responses. [...] You find yourself quickly in situa-
tions about moral issues or moral decency.
This new role for SCP was, in sharp contrast to that of WRR, coordinated
with ongoing developments in public and political debate. In fact, SCP be-
lieved it was meant to respond to shifts in public and political mood (SCP
2005: 7). Furthermore, its sharpening focus on social-cultural integration
was linked with actors in the field of policymaking. This coordination
occurred primarily via the involvement of SCP’s director in the ministerial
sub-council (‘onderraad’ in Dutch) that dealt with the topic of immigrant
integration.54 In this way, SCP had direct access to the Prime Minister and
other involved ministers, unlike WRR, which launches reports to the
government but has no formal role in their policy follow-up. Furthermore,
personal relations between SCP and the government appear to have grown
in this period. SCP’s director had a good working relationship with the
minister responsible for integration policy until 2002. Moreover, one of the
main authors of the minorities reports moved from a position at SCP to
that of a research coordinator within the government directorate responsi-
ble for coordinating the minorities policy.55
Although SCP ventured beyond its traditional instrumental boundaries
during this period, it served primarily in a functional relation to national
policy institutes and national politics.56 Rather than debunking myths about
immigrant integration on a national level, its role was to facilitate the de-
velopment of integration policies on the national level.
The Verwey-Jonker Institute: Boundary work of a private research institute
Another research actor that was involved in this period was the VWJ. This
institute was asked to carry out a policy evaluation study based on avail-
able scientific sources for the parliamentary investigative committee on in-
tegration policy. Later, it was also asked undertake additional research on
more specific issues together with another private research institute (QA+).
Given the VWJ’s more substantial participation in the investigative com-
mittee and its focus on questions that concerned problem framing (to what
extent policy was or was not successful), I will focus, in particular, on the
institute’s policy evaluation study.
The VWJ was selected through a public tender organised by
Parliament’s Research and Verification Office. The scientific sources study
requested by the Blok Committee was to evaluate government policies
based on an extensive evaluation of available literature on the integration
policy and progress of the integration process. Moreover, the study had to
be completed within two and a half months. The VWJ was selected for fi-
nancial reasons, because of its expertise in this area57 and as it was also
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argued that the institute had had no past involvement with government pol-
icy (Blok 2004a: 15-16).
This selection criteria provides a clear indication of how the VWJ’s tasks
were defined. Within a short time and based on available scientific sources,
it would have to evaluate the extent to which policy had been successful in
specific areas. Other experts and institutes rejected the Blok Committee re-
quest because they felt they had been too deeply involved in policy them-
selves or the timeframe for carrying out research was too limited to allow
for a meaningful scientific examination. One of those who rejected the re-
quest was Entzinger, having been deeply involved in policy developments
in his work at ACOM, as well as serving as an author of the 1989 WRR
report and an actor in 1994’s policy succession minorities debate.58
An important factor behind the VWJ’s decision to participate in the pub-
lic tender was the fact that the research assignment was open – that there
were no foregone conclusions about policy failure or success.59 The VWJ
wanted to safeguard its integrity as a scientific research institute by allow-
ing the research outcomes to vary and avoid providing scientific legitimacy
to already formulated political conclusions. Although a parliamentary mo-
tion had originally asked for an evaluation of why policy had been so
minimally successful – thereby defining policy as a failure – the ultimate
question founding the VWJ study was more open-ended. A parliamentary
working group established in response to this motion to make preparations
for a research committee had reformulated the research question into a
broader one: to what extent had policy failed or not (VWJ director in De
Hart & Prins 2005: 182).
In terms of coordination, the private status of the VWJ influenced its re-
lationship with Parliament. As a relatively young institute, in need of as-
signments to establish its status and reputation, the VWJ had an important
market incentive to accept the research questions formulated by the parlia-
mentary working group. The opportunity to be involved at a time when the
issue was so high on the agenda furnished an opportunity for the VWJ to
strengthen its reputation, ‘as researcher[s] must always have a particular re-
lation to the dominant discourse. [...] Only if you discuss really cutting
problems will people be willing to read the rest of the report’ (ibid.: 185).
This also meant that it had to accept the more substantive focus implicated
in these research questions. The fact that all the research questions only
concerned the social-economic domains of immigrant integration, omitting
social-cultural issues, meant that there was already a specific ‘framing’ of
the issue of immigrant integration going on. The principle-agent type of re-
lationship between Parliament and the VWJ obstructed opportunities for
this institute to discuss these questions in a normative way. The institute
was also aware that its involvement in this controversial issue could prove
problematic; however, it could not have anticipated the severity of the con-
troversies to follow.60
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Thus, the multiplicity of frames in the field of immigrant integration re-
search was clearly reflected in the multiplicity of boundary work practices
by research actors in the ongoing policy developments. WRR clearly de-
marcated its role from ongoing developments in public and political debate
(‘keeping politics out’), and coordinated its relation to policymaking in
terms of debunking prevailing myths about national immigrant integration
in the light of internationalisation. In contrast, SCP defined itself more and
more through active engagement in ongoing debates about immigrant inte-
gration and coordinated its relations with national politics and policymak-
ing in functional terms. Whereas the boundary work of WRR was aimed at
reaching beyond national policymaking, SCP clearly remained within these
parameters. Furthermore, the VWJ defined its dealings with Parliament in
terms of a principle-agent relationship, in which it had only limited scope
to negotiate the research assignment and whereby market incentives en-
couraged an acceptance of the commission.
6.2.2 The field of policymaking
The assimilationist policy pattern to emerge just after the turn of the mil-
lennium coincided with the sharp politicisation of immigrant integration.
How did this politicisation affect the boundary practices of key policy ac-
tors in this period? In this context, I will examine the boundary work of
the parliamentary investigative committee that was established following
the ‘long year of 2002’, as well as that of the political actors and political
entrepreneurs who were playing a key role in keeping immigrant integra-
tion on the political agenda.
The Blok Committee: Boundary work of a committee under pressure
The Blok Committee was established by Parliament after the controversial
elections of 2002. A parliamentary motion was accepted that asked for a
parliamentary investigation to examine why the integration policy had been
so minimally successful.61 This motion revealed that Parliament regarded
the integration policy thus far as a failure. As discussed above, the negative
evaluation was based on an assimilationist perspective that stressed, in par-
ticular, the lack of policy results in the domain of social-cultural integra-
tion. Furthermore, it showed how Parliament sought a new impetus to the
integration policy – it wanted to create a broad political basis for changes
in the integration policy.
This committee’s tasks gradually became narrower and more specific.
An important element here was the broadening of the research questions it
was to deal with. A parliamentary working group62 had reformulated the
research problem in a freer way, allowing for broader conclusions; it made
evaluating policy success or failure a part of the research problem. The
purpose was to enable Parliament to assess the integration policy adapted
206 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
over the past decades, including its intended policy goals and obtained pol-
icy results, as well as the consistency and coherence of policy in various
areas including housing and recreation, income and labour and education.
The committee would also have to provide ‘building blocks’ for a future
integration policy. The assignment eventually formulated by Parliament
was as follows:63
To enable the Second Chamber of Parliament to evaluate the integra-
tion policy of Dutch government over the past 30 years, to evaluate
the aimed effects and factual results of this policy and to evaluate
the coherence of policy on various policy terrains. Moreover, the re-
search should provide building blocks for the integration policy to
come. The questions that need to be answered by the temporary
committee are:
– What integration policy has been conducted in the Netherlands
over the past 30 years?
– What were goals and results of this policy in important areas such
as housing and recreation, income and labour and education?
– Has there been a consistent and coherent integration policy in the
various domains?
– To what extent can this policy, given its goals, be qualified as
successful?
– Are there experiences in foreign cities with the integration policy
from which our country can learn?
Once the investigative committee had been established, Parliament further
specified the task.64 The committee’s first task would be to commission a
study of available references or ‘sources’ – only after completion of which
it could then pursue its further activities. Initially, the literature study was
to be completed in about seven weeks.65 However, the committee decided
that this period was unrealistic, thus extending it by seven weeks.66 In the
midst of this, the new centre-right government that was established in 2002
fell. However, following new parliamentary elections, the committee was
re-established in February 2003, with more or less the same composition.67
Relations between the committee and the evaluation VWJ study were
coordinated in such a way that the latter would be the starting point for the
former. In fact, the VWJ Institute was asked to answer the same questions
as those posed to the committee. This was crucial in that it not only pro-
vided the required information for the fulfilment of the committee’s task,
but also provided a means for coping with the tremendous political stress
being put on this committee – because of the political sensitivity of the is-
sue at hand, the committee was ‘constantly under pressure’.68 The pressure
manifested itself in political differences among the various parties repre-
sented in the committee as well as in political incentives to leak
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information to the media.69 This posed political threats to the research
committee and political opportunities for parties wishing to distinguish
themselves from the others.70 Surveying available sources provided a way
of coping, by first examining ‘the facts’ that could tame the centripetal
forces.71
Based on the VWJ report, the committee would formulate its own con-
clusions during the second phase of the committee proceedings.72 First, a
series of interviews was held with those people who had been involved in
the national and local integration policies over the past decades. Two series
were held – one closed and one open. The former aimed to ‘test the find-
ings from the sources study’, to ‘enhance knowledge and insight in the
matter concerned’ and to ‘select the people that would be invited for the
open meetings’.73 In total, 103 meetings were held with 145 people. The
‘primary function’ of the open meetings, again with a very large cast of
actors – 86 meetings with 142 people – was to ‘test the findings of the lit-
erature study in public’.74 The interviewees included former ministers, civil
servants from the local and national level, scientists, representatives from
minorities organisations and also ‘successful immigrant women’. Further-
more, these public hearings welcomed participation from all interested par-
ties. Two large and two medium-sized cities were selected from across the
country, with participation open to all. The goal of these public hearings
was to heed the ‘voice of the street’ and, once again, to ‘test the findings
from the literature study’.75 The organisation of these public hearing was
referred to as the ‘public conclusion’76 and it furnished more fundamental
input to the committee. Finally, based on the findings from the VWJ study,
the committee decided to commission six more on several topics, including
the labour market position of immigrants; the role of self-organisations,
welfare organisations and interest groups; the emancipation of girls and
women; the policy objectives in education; experiences in foreign cities
with immigrant integration; and finally, the role of governments in immi-
grants’ countries of origin. These studies were also commissioned from pri-
vate research institutes, including QA+ and, once more, the VWJ.
Establishment of this parliamentary investigative committee was a politi-
cal initiative to strengthen Parliament’s control over the government’s inte-
gration policy. An evaluation of the policy fiasco would provide a way for
Parliament to free itself in this domain following the turbulence of 2002,
and provide a new political impetus to the integration policy. However, po-
litical pressure, time constraints and committee’s research design seem to
have narrowed the committee’s work. These factors contributed to the most
central aspect of the study – an evaluation of scientific sources by the
VWJ. The interviews, public hearings and additional studies that were con-
ducted in the second stage mainly served the purpose of testing and refin-
ing the VWJ’s conclusions. Parliamentary effort to set a new political
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course in this domain was therefore based on a study of scientific sources
that had been conducted under serious constraints.
Politics: Putting scientific credibility on the line
The parliamentary initiative to provide new impetus to integration coin-
cided with efforts by the new centre-right government coalitions of 2002
and 2003 to develop another approach to immigrant integration. Immigrant
integration had shot to the top of the political agenda following the rise of
Fortuyn, a series of focus events (such as 9/11 and morality-questioning in-
cidents in the Netherlands spurred on by radical statements from a Dutch
imam) and the continuous involvement of public intellectuals. Notable
individuals were Scheffer and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a female Dutch
Parliamentarian of Somali birth whose critique of Islam attracted much at-
tention in politics and the media. It was in this politicised context that the
centre-right government took charge of the development of an integration
policy ‘new style’.
Political actors in this period defined their task as respondents to heigh-
tened feelings of anxiety about multiculturalism and, in general, the Dutch
democratic establishment, which had manifested themselves in 2002
(Pellikaan & Trappenburg 2003). For Fortuyn, public discontent about
multiculturalism and politics were interconnected (Wansink 2004). An im-
portant aspect of Fortuyn’s populist agenda, aimed against elitism in Dutch
politics, was drawing attention to politics being deaf to the ‘voice of the
street’. According to Fortuyn, but also Hirsi Ali and Scheffer, politics ig-
nored the alleged ‘clash of civilisations’ taking place within society be-
cause of its adherence to a supposedly benevolent multiculturalism. By
avoiding political debates and maintaining taboos, politics was ‘undemo-
cratic’ and elitist. Now, however, the centre-right government was clearly
gaining a prominent position in public and political debates on immigrant
integration.
In contrast to a politics of avoidance (De Beus 1998), an articulation
function now emerged (VWJ 2004: 201), meaning that politics played a
role in naming society’s problems and feelings, articulating them in their
actions to ensure the ‘voice of the street’ be taken seriously. Prins (2002b:
252) describes this in terms of ‘hyperrealism’, which, unlike new realism,
involves not only politics eradicating taboos and speaking freely about the
problems of integration, but an approach ‘in which the courage of speaking
freely about specific problems and solutions became simply the courage to
speak freely in itself’.
Furthermore, these political actors and public intellectuals linked immi-
grant integration to broader concerns about national social cohesion and
national identity. The debate about immigrant integration had become per-
ceptively philosophical, in part due to the involvement of public intellec-
tuals. It focused attention on matters of principle, such as freedom of
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expression and a clash of civilisations. Another emergent theme in this per-
iod concerned the freedom of religion in relation to principles such as free-
dom of expression, gender equality and separation of church and state.
These matters were often showcased in the debate as symbolic incidents,
such as wearing the Islamic headscarf while in public office, statements
about Islam (by Fortuyn, among others) or some newsworthy event, such
as in Tilburg in 2004 when an imam refused to shake hands with the
Netherlands’ female Minister of Integration and Immigration.
Defining politics’ task of ‘articulation’ within policymaking evoked clear
expressions of national orientation in political discussions on integration.
In fact, immigrant integration became one of the central issues in a national
debate about societal values and norms, which was formally called for the
Prime Minister. Whereas the universalist approach of the 1990s had con-
tributed to decentralisation, privatisation and the Europeanisation of ele-
ments of the integration policy, now a reverse trend was set in motion to
put immigrant integration clearly at the locus of central government, espe-
cially in terms of policy formulation (Penninx et al. 2005). For instance,
measures were taken to fortify the national government’s role in civic inte-
gration courses. This included introducing standardised national exams and
strengthening the symbolic meaning of Dutch nationality acquisition by or-
ganising ceremonial festivities and introducing stricter regulations against
dual citizenship (De Hart 2004). In addition, a stronger link was estab-
lished between integration and immigration policies and the stricter ap-
proach to immigrant integration was used as a means to restrict further
immigration (Penninx et al. 2005).
These changes in how the task of politics was demarcated had conse-
quences for the way relations with the field of research were coordinated.
Politics became more selective in its use of research, adopting pick-and-
choose strategies towards science (Penninx 2005). Whereas reports by
WRR had marked fundamental policy turning points in the decades before,
now the council remained largely ignored. The main conclusions of the
Blok Committee, which had been established by Parliament itself, were
especially ignored. Although Parliament accepted no fewer than 25 of the
committee’s 27 recommendations, it rejected the most fundamental conclu-
sions regarding the success of the integration process. In contrast, govern-
ment granted a more prominent voice to SCP. This was illustrated by the
fact that, whereas prior policy documents were often directly related to ear-
lier WRR reports, this time the first document in which the integration pol-
icy ‘new style’ was announced was related to the 2003 minorities report by
SCP.
The credibility of researchers was discussed ever more openly. The Blok
Committee and, in particular, the evaluation study it commissioned from
the VWJ, became objects of fierce public and political controversy, even
before the committee had published its findings. Internal wrangling in the
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committee drew public attention when member Ali Lazrak decided to leave
the committee, under sway by his own Socialist Party (which, significantly,
had taken the initiative for the parliamentary motion in 2002). In a flurry
of media statements and revelations on the progress of the Blok
Committee, the resignation of this member spurred controversy on the
committee’s research approach and, in particular, the VWJ report and its
conclusion that policy had been relatively successful. Lazrak claimed that
the committee should not have commissioned a study from this institute,
as experts involved in this institute had been too closely involved with pol-
icy developments in the past.77 The authority of this institute was further
called into question by the alleged political connections held by Jan
Willem Duyvendak, one of VWJ’s directors and a main author of the Blok
Committee study. This expert had been involved with the leftist Green
Party, which was now severely censured for its multiculturalist bias and ac-
cused of support for political correctness and taboos. In addition, the criti-
cism concerned the committee’s conclusion that the integration policy had
been relatively successful. This conclusion immediately garnered responses
from participants in the public debate, from involved public intellectuals as
well as politicians who discarded such a conclusion as ‘naive’.78
Surprisingly little attention was paid to the more critical conclusions about
the social-cultural integration of immigrants (VWJ director in De Hart &
Prins 2005: 185).
In the study for the Blok Committee we have observed spectacular
progress of immigrants in the domains of housing, labour and edu-
cation. [...] But we also concluded that the integration as a whole
cannot be defined as successful. There are, after all, many other pro-
blems. Without the Blok Committee asking us for it, we have put
these problems on the agenda, also to make that bridge to the
broader debate. Nonetheless, we were attacked most on the positive
part of our conclusion. Apparently, one is too quickly optimistic in
these gloomy times.
Following criticism concerning the VWJ’s study, in particular, controversy
emerged about the entanglement of science and policy. Politicians would
have overly ‘delegated’ the development of a political vision to scientists.
A debate that had taken place earlier on a small scale, was now revived on
a larger scale, criticising the immigrant integration research field for being
too policy-oriented.79 Researchers were also criticised for having a multi-
culturalist bias and for operating primarily in the interest of minorities.
The committee report remained an object of public scrutiny after its pub-
lication. In parliamentary hearings, debate arose about whether the Blok
Committee had ‘measured’ what it was supposed to measure. Questions
emerged about the usefulness of an evaluation study when there was no
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consensus on the definition of integration. Hirsi Ali, who had since become
a member of Parliament, claimed that ‘there has never been a consensus on
a definition of the word “integration” [and therefore] Parliament has given
the research committee an assignment that was too vague’.80 Other parties
argued, based on their frame of integration, that the committee report pro-
vided a thorough analysis of all the problems, ‘but is too reserved when it
comes to drawing the proper conclusions from all this’.81 Based on their
own approaches to integration, various parties pointed to the report’s ‘blind
spots’, such as the place for religion – Islam, in particular – as well as
criminality and a lack of attention to cultural issues. In addition, a repre-
sentative from the Socialist Party that had initiated this committee asked
how it could have come to its relatively positive conclusions about policy
when it had been given an assignment to investigate why policy had
failed.82 Finally, in the parliamentary hearings following the committee re-
port, criticism continued over the choice for the VWJ to carry out the
study. Soon criticism spilled over into the composition of the committee it-
self – for instance, one committee member, a former State Secretary for
Education, had helped to investigate the extent to which her own policy
had been successful.
In terms of boundary work during this era, the development of politics
as an articulator of democratic beliefs on immigrant integration went hand
in hand with mounting cynicism towards scientific research. Indeed, the
use of scientific research became steadily selective and scientific credibility
was more candidly discussed.
In sum, within the field of policymaking, there was a clear shift in how
politics in policymaking was demarcated. Both Parliament, by establishing
the Blok Committee, and the centre-right governments from 2002 and
2003 attempted to provide a new political élan to the integration policy. In
terms of coordinating relations with research, there were some differences
between the boundary work practices of the two actors. The Blok
Committee privileged the literature study conducted by the VWJ. In con-
trast, the centre-right government adopted a more cynical attitude towards
scientific research. Furthermore, in response to growing public controversy
about the credibility of researchers, the government became very selective
in its use of research.
6.2.3 The construction of an engineering boundary configuration
The field analyses of immigrant integration research and policymaking in
this period reveal very different patterns of boundary work in both fields.
How, then, did these patterns combine in terms of a specific research-pol-
icy dialogue? What type of research-policy nexus was constructed in this
setting characterised by so much controversy?
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Selective convergence between research and policy
The interaction between research and policy seems to have been charac-
terised by selective convergence as well as selective divergence in the rela-
tions between specific actors. On one hand, the boundary work of political
actors and the SCP combined to produce a direct form of interaction. SCP
defined its role as responding to shifts in public and political mood, and
closely coordinated its activities with actors in the field of policymaking
through its personal networks with policymakers and politicians, as well as
its direct formal involvement in political decision-making. In this respect,
it no longer demarcated itself in relation to policymaking in instrumental
terms, but became more directly involved in policy framing. Government
and political actors, such as the Minister of Home Affairs and later the
Minister of Justice, also had a more direct relationship with SCP (than, for
instance, with WRR). As an example, when social-cultural integration be-
came an important issue on the public and political agenda, the govern-
ment and SCP agreed to pay attention to the issue of social-cultural inte-
gration in the SCP minorities reports. As a result, SCP was more directly
involved in policymaking. This close relationship between SCP and policy
actors was indicated when the Minister of Justice, for the first time, elabo-
rated the contours of an integration policy ‘new style’ in a letter to
Parliament. It was issued together with the 2003 SCP minorities report.
The interaction between research and policy was also rather direct in the
case of the Blok Committee and the VWJ. The former attributed a promi-
nent position to the latter in drawing up its own report. By delegating the
same questions to this institute as those posed to the committee – including
the inherently normative question of whether the policy had been success-
ful or not – it made no attempt to establish a strict distinction between the
role of the VWJ and its own role as a parliamentary investigative commit-
tee. On its part, the VWJ also had no difficulties engaging itself so directly
in the evaluation of the committee, in part because of its private status.
On the other hand, this convergence seems to have been selective, as
signalled by amassing political cynicism towards scientific expertise and
reluctance to use scientific research. For instance, the credibility of the
VWJ report and, more generally, the Blok Committee became the subject
of heated public debates. Furthermore, the 2001 WRR report went largely
ignored. In fact, WRR also tried to dissociate itself from ongoing public
and political developments. From an enlightenment model of research-
policy relations, it attempted to debunk the public and political debates that
had emerged since 2000, brining in a normative perspective of internatio-
nalisation that conflicted with the more national mode of policymaking
prevalent in this period.
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Political primacy
This period provides indications of political primacy in the mutual relations
between research and policy. For instance, developments in the field of
policymaking after 2000 had an important effect on the research carried
out by SCP. More than ever, policy actors were able to ignore research if it
developed a frame other than the assimilationist one that became dominant
in policymaking in this period. This is certainly what happened with the
2001 WRR report, but also in the case of the VWJ report where only the
instrumental conclusions were adopted.
This political primacy was related to the politics of articulation that had
emerged specifically after ‘the long year of 2002’. Whereas the culture of
depoliticisation in previous episodes had helped legitimise policies with
the support of scientific expertise, an emphasis on politics’ democratic re-
sponsiveness and a growing cynicism towards research signalled that poli-
tical risks could be at stake. This became particularly clear when the Blok
Committee, presumably endeavouring to use research to coordinate politi-
cal consensus among its members. However, rather than offering a way to
resolve political controversy over immigrant integration, the involvement
of these scientific researchers instead became contentious.
The selective convergence between specific research and policy actors,
along with the aforementioned signs of political primacy, points to an engi-
neering model of boundary configuration. This involved the engineering of
a new assimilationist approach to immigrant integration driven primarily
by political developments in this period, making selective use of scientific
research that could contribute directly to the framing of such an approach.
This engineering model involved political actors with a primary role in de-
veloping the assimilationist approach following ‘the long year of 2002’, in-
cluding the political leadership of the Department of Justice that had now
become the coordinating department and also including SCP, which was
clearly stretched beyond its instrumental task to one more clearly advocat-
ing assimilationism. It left out other actors that advocated alternative
frames, such as WRR, which favoured a more transnationalist approach.
6.3 Engineering and the selective co-production of research
and policy
Within a setting characterised by open controversy regarding both the
framing of immigrant integration and a ‘proper’ division of labour between
research and policy, a very selective engineering type of research-policy
nexus emerged. Yet, how did this nexus contribute to the assimilationist
turn in Dutch policies to occur in the new millennium?
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6.3.1 The structural effects of engineering
The first step in analysing the impact of this nexus on research and policy
developments is to examine its effect on the structural equilibrium of the
1990s. Although there had been no heavily institutionalised research-policy
nexus, as was the case in the 1980s, the next decade’s universalist ap-
proach was supported by specific actors. So did the engineering nexus then
constructed mobilise negative or positive feedback towards this
equilibrium?
Engineering and negative policy feedback
The research-policy nexus seems to have played only a marginal role in
the positive feedback process that led to the integration policy ‘new style’.
The process was driven primarily by macro-political developments – speci-
fically in 2002 – and, in this issue domain, by developments on the policy-
making side of the nexus, i.e. the context of the national minorities debate
of 2000. The structure-induced equilibrium of the universalist approach in
integration policy persisted at least until 2000, when the second national
minorities debate emerged. Until then, immigrant integration did not rank
highly on the public and political agenda. This was illustrated when WRR
announced in 1997 that it would develop a new report on immigrant inte-
gration. The initiative was received with sharp cynicism on the part of
DCIM, which saw no need to adapt the current universalist approach.83
The government maintained its approach, especially in view of evidence
(provided by, among others, SCP) that the social-economic position of mi-
grants was improving considerably.
SCP, which was involved in the structure-induced equilibrium of the in-
tegration policy as a provider of instrumental data, contributed to the soft-
ening-up process that eventually led to the developments after 2000.
Before and during the national minorities debate, SCP was one of the ad-
vocates of a more assimilationist approach. This was a consequence of the
institutionalisation of SCP’s position, which allowed it to go beyond being
purely instrumental. In particular, SCP seems to have reinforced the trend
towards assimilationism. This can be explained by SCP’s functional posi-
tion within the national government apparatus, which included responding
to shifts in public and political mood.
The 2001 WRR report failed to generate positive feedback, in contrast
to its previous reports, which had marked turning points in the develop-
ment of immigrant integration policy. In the run-up to publication, WRR
was met with cynicism on the part of a government seeing no need for pol-
icy change. This was superseded by a heightened sense of urgency by the
time the WRR report was made public. However, the strongly altered pro-
blem context had made the report irrelevant. According to the chairman of
the WRR project group:
THE ENGINEERING OF THE ASSIMILATIONIST TURN 215
this report could have been considered quite critical of policy issues,
until 9/11. Afterwards, it has mostly been regarded as ‘too soft’ a
report, because then the discourse had become much harder in a re-
latively short period. Therefore, the nuance that we had developed
in our report was now seen as too nuanced.84
The national minorities debate in 2000 and ‘the long year of 2002’ in
Dutch politics were the most direct causes of the shift in attention from so-
cial-economic to social-cultural facets of immigrant integration. It was in
this period that the bureaucratic research-policy nexus, which had sustained
the structure-induced equilibrium of the integration policy in the 1990s,
was replaced by the engineering research-policy nexus, with political pri-
macy and more convergent roles of research and policy. The Minister of
Home Affairs, together with SCP, organised more systematic attention to
be given to social-cultural integration in response to the national minorities
debate. Subsequently, the centre-right coalition continued to coordinate re-
search on social-cultural integration, doing so with SCP and several other
research institutes.
Engineering was thus functional to scientific research in the develop-
ment of a more assimilationist policy approach in response to political de-
velopments after 2000. As such, it was a source of negative, rather than
positive, feedback. Although engineering itself did not cause the changes
in the structure-induced equilibrium of the 1990s, it did contribute to the
development of a new structure-induced equilibrium.
The engineering of research on social-cultural integration
Engineering involved selective use of expertise functional to the develop-
ment of a new structure-induced equilibrium in the policy field. In the field
of research, it called attention to social-cultural topics, such as social-
cultural integration, criminality and social cohesion. The Department of
Justice played a central role in engineering research in this direction. While
this strengthened the position of SCP, it also involved more research in-
stitutes with a functional relationship to the state apparatus. Various in-
stitutes now published reports on immigrant integration, including SCP with
its (then biannual) minorities reports, the annual report by the CBS,
‘Allochthonous in the Netherlands’ and the ISEO with its regular integration
monitors. The Department of Justice wanted to achieve better integration of
these various studies. This led to the ‘Annual report of integration’ in 2005,
a combined effort by SCP, CBS and the Scientific Research and
Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Department of Justice.85 The project,
however, turned out to be a one-off, as it proved too difficult to combine the
various institutes’ perspectives into a single report. In 2006, WODC and
CBS presented an integration map showing key indicators of the position of
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immigrants in various areas. In the following year, SCP and CBS issued a
more ‘policy-oriented scientific [annual] report’ (SCP 2006b: 13).
These studies covered social-cultural facets of immigrant integration as
well as more traditional social-economic ones. For its 2003 minorities re-
port, SCP had already decided, together with the Department of Justice, to
include the topic of social-cultural integration. The integration map devel-
oped by WODC and CBS also included themes such as criminality and
points of contact between immigrants and natives. The combined 2005 an-
nual integration report included the themes social-cultural integration, live-
ability in concentration areas, youth and criminality, the position of women
and public perception of the multi-ethnic society. In addition, ‘traditional’
themes such as labour and income, education, language apprehension, civic
integration and demography were also covered in this report.
Another aspect of the engineering boundary configuration was that it al-
lowed government to selectively interpret or ignore scientific research.
This was the case with the 2001 WRR report, because of its transnational-
ist framing, but also with the VWJ’s study, because it only focused on the
‘traditional’ social-economic facets of immigrant integration. Aided by the
mounting cynicism towards scientific research overall and notably by pub-
lic controversies on immigrant integration research, this engineering con-
figuration facilitated government efforts to develop a new policy approach
based on political factors. It also furnished the government with an oppor-
tunity to ignore scientific claims contending for the new ‘assimilationist’
approach.
As illustrated, the engineering boundary configuration was pivotal in
policy and research frameshifts during this period, though as a source of
negative rather than positive feedback. The policy frameshift that occurred
after the turn of the millennium was a direct consequence of political
developments such as ‘the long year of 2002’ and the national minorities
debate of 2000. The engineering configuration had a functional role in es-
tablishing a structure-induced equilibrium around the new assimilationist
approach. Engineering stimulated research on social-cultural facets of im-
migrant integration. In particular, it reinforced the position of research ac-
tors with a direct and functional relationship to government, such as SCP,
but also gave weight to new actors such as WODC and CBS.
6.3.2 Engineering, assimilationism and transnationalism
In the policy field, the engineering configuration was mainly a source of
negative feedback in establishing the new policy approach that was set by
political actors. But did engineering also contribute to the rise of assimila-
tionism? We have seen how it encouraged the rise of research into social-
cultural facets of immigrant integration. However, as observed in chapter
4, this period also marked the rise of transnationalist research. What was
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the relation between this engineering configuration and the rise of transna-
tionalist thinking in this period?
The engineering of a national perspective on immigrant integration
The political events following the turn of the millennium connected the is-
sue of immigrant integration to broader concerns about national identity,
norms and values. For instance, Fortuyn turned immigrant integration into
a symbolic issue for a broader populist agenda that was anti-elitist, anti-
multiculturalist and anti-Europeanist. This issue linkage on the national
level meant that the call for an assimilationist policy approach stood, at
least to some extent, apart from developments in the issue domain itself.
Rather, it became a symbol of the populist struggle against the alleged
political correctness of the Dutch political elites and against the political
denial of popular dissent about the effects of immigration and
Europeanisation on social cohesion.
In the political arena and public debate, public intellectuals who fol-
lowed Fortuyn often made the claim that one has to be able ‘to say the
things we have all been thinking’ (Holsteyn & Irwin 2003: 62). From this
populist perspective, a properly functioning democratic state apparatus
should give credence to popular dissent and not ignore the ‘voice of the
street’. This has been referred to as the ‘articulation function’ of politics
(VWJ 2004: 201). Indeed, in political debates following the contention sur-
rounding the Blok Committee, politicians pressed the point that these con-
troversies had, in fact, helped politics ‘beyond the phase of denial’ and had
established a general feeling that ‘disinterest and lack of commitment
should now belong to the past’.86 Following the committee report, most
political parties presented papers in which they developed their position on
a reformulation of the integration policy. According to critics, this articula-
tion function involved a sort of hyperrealism, ‘in which the courage of
speaking freely about specific problems and solutions became simply the
courage to speak freely itself’ (Prins 2002b: 252). Hyperrealism replaced
the old political correctness with a new political correctness concerning
‘saying something positive about the integration of immigrants, which
would be naive and would mean ignoring the problems’.87
This linkage to national political issues invited an assimilationist framing
of immigrant integration by drawing attention to social-cultural integration
rather than social-economic participation. The engineering boundary con-
figuration allowed government to develop this assimilationist approach de-
spite resistance from other involved actors. Generally, this resistance in-
volved researchers who believed in differing frames but, for instance, the
Association of Dutch Municipalities also offered stark opposition to the as-
similationist approach (Municipalities 2003: 7-8). Adopting a clear political
primacy and ‘picking-and-choosing’ those strands of expertise to support
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the new approach allowed government to engineer the assimilationist inte-
gration policy ‘new style’.
Engineering and frame conflicts in the scientific field
Engineering of an assimilationist approach to immigrant integration in con-
nection with national political developments further reinforced the frag-
mentation of the research field in terms of problem framing. It contributed
to the rise of immigrant integration research with assimilationist frames,
such as that forwarded by SCP and other institutes with a functional rela-
tionship to government, including WODC and CBS.
Whereas the engineering configuration on the national research-policy
nexus was particularly susceptible to research of the assimilationist type,
the research-policy nexus on local and European levels seems to have pro-
vided opportunities to develop other research frames. For instance,
Penninx, an established researcher in this domain since the 1970s, ob-
served that he (and his Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, or IMES
for short) increasingly relied on local and European research funding
(Penninx in De Hart & Prins 2005: 183). Local governments gained more
prominence in integration policy design during the 1990s due to territorial
decentralisation. This led to local governments’ rising demands for re-
search, often aimed at coping with concrete problems of immigrant integra-
tion, rather than larger national symbolic issues. An illustration of research
responding to local demands was a study of integration at the neighbour-
hood level funded by the City of Rotterdam (Duyvendak & Veldboer
2004).
European institutes’ involvement in research funding and the ongoing
internationalisation of academic research created a different demand for ex-
pertise. Europe’s growing participation created new opportunities and new
‘structures and incentives for researchers seeking to probe these “problems
of Europe”’ (Geddes 2005: 266). As yet, the EU had little means for inter-
national policy coordination, especially in the domain of integration, as the
subject remained a resilient national issue. As such, the assignment of re-
search was a so-called ‘soft means for coordination’. The cooperation of
researchers, then, could help construct migration and integration as ‘pro-
blems of Europe’. ‘[T]he identification of problems of European integra-
tion can enhance the perceived relevance of the European dimension and
contribute to arguments for closer integration and more power for suprana-
tional institutions’ (ibid.: 267). This often involved international compara-
tive research, which helped extend the debate on immigrant integration be-
yond the scope of the nation-state (Favell 2005). The recent expansion of
European research funding for issues of migration and cultural diversity in
the Seventh Framework Programme suggested that Europe was co-opting
research as a soft measure of policy coordination.
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Frame conflicts resulted from this fragmentation of the immigrant inte-
gration research field. A heated controversy unfolded when one of the
leading Dutch journals in this field, Migrantenstudies, invited a number of
researchers to respond to the 2001 WRR report.88 The document was posi-
tively received by various researchers, including in a publication on the
structural relation between immigration and the social welfare state
(Entzinger & Van der Meer 2004) and in a special booklet by the
Scientific Bureau of the Social Democratic Party entitled ‘The transnational
Netherlands’ (Becker, Van Hennekeler, Sie Dhian Ho & Tromp 2002).
However, Koopmans, then a senior researcher at the Social Science
Research Centre in Germany, also wrote an article in the special issue of
Migrantenstudies. In it, he compared the position of migrants in Germany
with those in the Netherlands, thereby illustrating how WRR provided too
positive an image of Dutch integration policies. According to Koopmans,
Dutch integration policy had clearly failed, primarily because of its persis-
tent tendency to reify cultural differences (as a legacy of pillarism). In a
subsequent issue of Migrantenstudies (Böcker & Thränhardt 2003) and in
other journals (Snel 2003b), this claim was rejected and denounced as
unscientific due to a number of methodological problems concerning com-
parative design. In a response, Koopmans (2003), clearly lifted this criti-
cism to the level of problem framing, attributing the intense reactions his
article promoted to a self-sufficiency among researchers concerning the
Dutch multiculturalist and universalist approach.
Thus, the controversy over policy failure or success also entered the
field of immigrant integration research. It piqued the interest of the
Minister of Integration and Immigration of the first centre-right govern-
ment in 2002 (Böcker & Thränhardt 2003: 33). Influenced by the contro-
versy surrounding the Koopmans article, SCP carried out a comparative
study on the position of Turks on the labour market in the Netherlands and
Germany, published in 2006 (SCP 2006a). In this study, SCP concluded
that the labour situation of Turks was indeed weaker in the Netherlands
than Germany. However, it claimed that this was due to differences be-
tween the two countries’ Turkish migrant populations rather than to differ-
ent policy approaches.
We have seen, then, how the engineering research-policy nexus at the
national level contributed specifically to the development of an assimila-
tionist framing in both policy and research. In this way, the engineering
configuration also contributed to a national framing of immigrant integra-
tion. At the same time, the research-policy nexus at the local and European
levels created opportunities for other frames of immigrant integration, fo-
cusing either on more local concerns or encouraging a greater European
perspective beyond the nation-state. Therefore, the engineering configura-
tion at the national level and the emerging research infrastructures at the
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local and European levels contributed to further fragmentation of the re-
search field in terms of problem framing.
6.3.3 Engineering and frame reflection?
Beyond the engineering nexus’ impact on both the fields of research and
policy, it is important to look as well at whether it did in fact promote criti-
cal dialogues. And if so, did it make for exchanges that were open, em-
pathic, reflective, pragmatic and trustful?
Opportunities and constraints for frame reflection
One factor that could have contributed to frame reflection in this period
was the expansive scale of debate. More than ever, an open debate on im-
migrant integration emerged in the media and in politics. This drew in
many new actors, into the political arena as well as the public debate. On
one hand, the engineering boundary configuration seems to have contribu-
ted to this openness by enabling a political primacy that carried the discus-
sion beyond researchers and policymakers who were involved in the pre-
vailing policy monopoly. On the other hand, it also constrained the scale
of debate by ruling out specific actors from the scientific field. The fact-
value dichotomy delegitimised the involvement of researchers in the debate
on problem framing because researchers would have to stick to the provi-
sion of data.
Another condition that could have contributed to frame reflection con-
cerned the multitude of frames present during this period. Whereas in the
1980s there had been one dominant paradigm, which was rivalled by at
least one alternative paradigm in the 1990s, now there were actors propa-
gating universalist, multiculturalist, transnationalist and assimilationist
frames. The engineering configuration contributed to the rise of the assimi-
lationist frame in both policy and research. The other frames were sus-
tained by research-policy relations, notably at the local and European
levels.
Despite the presence of various frames, there were few instances of ‘em-
pathy’, where actors tried to put themselves in the shoes of others who be-
lieved in different frames. This is illustrated by the controversy over policy
failure or success, which had raged in the policy field as well as in the re-
search field. This controversy digressed into a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ rather
than promoting empathy in terms of understanding how and why other ac-
tors evaluated policy differently and adopted different frames. A dialogue
of the deaf was clearly present in the public and political debate surround-
ing the Blok Committee and its conclusions regarding the success of the
integration process. Actors involved in these discussions selected different
data and it interpreted it uniquely according to their perspectives; actors
with a universalist frame concluded that policy had been successful,
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whereas those with an assimilationist frame found that it had failed. This
debate never achieved the level of problem framing that could have offered
a way out of the dialogue of the deaf. Similar dialogues of the deaf
emerged surrounding the 2001 WRR report and the Dutch-German com-
parison drawn by Koopmans.
Besides the limited accessibility and lack of empathy, there seems to
have been only minimal critical reflection. Despite many instances during
this era when frames collided, rarely did this lead to a critical examination
of the consistency or coherence of the frames themselves. Often, frame
conflicts produced controversy about the involved actors, questioning their
credibility or even their morality. For instance, the frame conflicts sur-
rounding the report by the VWJ and WRR led to a public enquiry into the
scientific credibility and authority of these institutes and the people in-
volved therein. Intense boundary struggles that increasingly took place in
the open during this period contributed to this lack of critical reflection.
The controversies over science-policy boundaries concealed the underlying
issues about problem framing. The engineering boundary configuration
also formed an impediment to critical reflection, selecting evidence that
could support the assimilationist frame and ignoring possible counterevi-
dence. The emphasis on a fact-value dichotomy in boundary discourse
further inhibited critical frame reflection by constraining the task of scien-
tists to the provision of data and inhibiting their influence as far as problem
framing went.
Furthermore, reflection was inhibited by a lack of pragmatism or, put in
another way, actors’ lack of will to adapt their frames in response to con-
frontation with other frames. The politics of articulation – or, according to
others, hyperrealism – legitimised the dominance of the assimilationist
frame. This lack of pragmatism was also caused by the highly symbolic is-
sue linkage between immigrant integration and populist concerns about
elitism and Europeanisation. As such, the debate about immigrant integra-
tion was, at least to some extent, separated from developments in the pro-
blem situation itself and connected instead to larger symbolic issues. This
was also illustrated by an absence of concern for policy practice and policy
implementation, thus creating a widening gap, especially between national
and local policies.
Finally, trust between actors in the scientific research and policy fields
in this period was limited to a small number of actors sharing the same or
similar problem frame. Moreover, it was confined to actors that had a func-
tional relation to the state apparatus, such as SCP, CBS and WODC.
Convergence in science-policy relations only occurred in the context of re-
lations between state-associated actors who shared similar approaches.
Other actors, sometimes associated with other levels of government, were
left out of the small network of trust that sustained the engineering ap-
proach. In fact, the discursive fact-value dichotomy seems to have served
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mainly to rule out actors in the scientific field with values other than the
dominant policy’s, regardless of the fact that the ‘data providers’ involved
in the engineering of assimilationism clearly also adhered to specific va-
lues. As such, the fact-value dichotomy marked a division between net-
works of trust and distrust.
The Blok Committee and the Verwey-Jonker Institute: Missed opportunities
for frame reflection?
The proceedings surrounding the Blok Committee and the study by VWJ
offer a clear illustration of how and why frame reflection failed in this peri-
od. In both the research design and the way the proceedings of the parlia-
mentary investigative committee actually unfolded, there were several
missed opportunities for frame reflection.
Parliament’s motivation for establishing this investigative committee –
providing a new political impetus to the integration policy – may in itself
have indicated willingness to reflect upon policy framing. However, an im-
portant opportunity for reflection seems to have been missed at the early
stage of formulating the research problem. The parliamentary motion sub-
dued notions of empathy and critical reflection towards alternative frames
by concluding that policy had been ‘insufficiently successful’. This sub-
stantive conclusion suggests that the parliamentary initiative to establish
the committee had already adopted a particular problem framing, one based
on the premise that the committee would have to examine why policy had
failed to become such a fiasco and how ‘building blocks’ for a new policy
could be developed.
In this respect, there was an inherent tension between this parliamentary
initiative and the new centre-right government coming to power some time
after the motion was accepted. In an attempt to improve its relative infor-
mation position in relation to government, Parliament took a more substan-
tial initiative in terms of policy development. On one hand, this showed
the broad parliamentary commitment to policy change in this domain. On
the other hand, it created a tension with the new centre-right government,
which included parties that had spoken out on immigrant integration during
the elections, and also presented new substantial plans for policy
development.
Furthermore, the parliamentary working group that reformulated this
motion into formal research questions for the Blok Committee further con-
strained opportunities for critical frame reflection. Although it broadened
the research questions by allowing for an evaluation of policy success or
failure, it also adopted an implicit problem frame by selecting mainly so-
cial-economic domains as targets for the parliamentary investigation. As
previously observed, this selection revealed a universalist frame by omit-
ting the social-cultural issues that had then become prominent in public
and political debate. This selective formulation of the research questions
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showed that the committee was not established to reflect on alternative
frames but instead, to evaluate policy and contribute to policy development
based on a specific (universalist) approach.
Another element of the research design that constrained frame reflection
concerned the study of scientific sources commissioned from the VWJ. As
observed above, the Blok Committee delegated all the research questions
to the VWJ, including the normative question concerning policy success or
failure. Based on its frame (also universalist), the VWJ examined scientific
sources and concluded that policy had been relatively successful. The
VWJ’s exclusive role meant, however, that only one frame was included in
the analysis of sources and the evaluation of policy success or failure. Had
the Blok Committee asked advice from several institutes, or from one insti-
tute with the explicit instruction to use various alternative problem frames,
it would have been able to reflect on these alternative frames within the
committee. Furthermore, the task of scientific research would have been to
facilitate frame reflection within the politically constituted Blok
Committee; the broad political position of the committee would then have
been to undertake frame reflection by employing a type of scientific invol-
vement that articulated diverse, alternative models.
The political pressure on the Blok Committee formed a further impedi-
ment for frame reflection. This tension manifested in the form of sharp po-
litical differences on immigrant integration, as well as political incentives
for the party representatives to seek publicity for themselves. At first, ask-
ing for expert advice seemed to offer a way to cope. Eventually, however,
it appeared to be at odds with the frequent questioning of scientific author-
ity and expert involvement in problem framing. Furthermore, the stress ex-
acerbated already existing time constraints on the committee as a whole
and frustrated, specifically, the study of scientific sources. A lack of time
clearly limited opportunities for including more frames in this study.
Thus, as the case of the Blok Committee illustrates, the frameshifts in
this period were not purely products of frame reflection. Despite the multi-
plicity of frames (especially in research) and the expanding scale of the de-
bate, most other conditions for frame reflection were not met. The engi-
neering boundary configuration contributed to keeping the scale of debate,
and also trust, confined to a limited network of actors, who generally
shared a comparable frame and were closely associated to the state appara-
tus. It also failed in terms of empathy. Frame conflicts (such as the contro-
versy over policy success or failure surrounding the Blok Committee) often
digressed into a dialogue of the deaf, whereby actors with different frames
selected different data or interpreted data differently, rather than leading to
a critical debate on the level of problem framing. Furthermore, critical re-
flection was inhibited by the tendency to a pick and choose evidence (from
SCP) in an effort to reinforce the assimilationist policy framing and ignore
counterevidence (from WRR). The boundary struggles associated with the
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engineering configuration also shifted attention from the involved frames
to the credibility of involved actors. Finally, the politics of articulation and
the increasingly symbolic nature of the debate on immigrant integration di-
minished the willingness of actors to adapt their frames. In fact, as the case
of the Blok Committee showed, actors often relentlessly held on to their
frames. This is demonstrated not only by reluctant responses to the Blok
Committee, but also the committee itself and the VWJ’s persistence in
holding on to a specific problem frame.
6.4 Conclusion
This third episode in the development of immigrant integration research
and policy in the Netherlands clearly reveals the difficulties in organising
research-policy dialogues in social settings characterised by ardent contro-
versy. Just after the turn of the millennium, immigrant integration became
highly politicised in one of the most dramatic periods in Dutch post-war
political history. Murdered politician Fortuyn transformed immigrant inte-
gration into a symbol for the democratically unresponsive and politically
correct political elite in the Netherlands. A series of national and interna-
tional incidents contributed further to popular and political concern about
the state of immigrant integration. It was this politicisation that drove the
assimilationist turn in Dutch immigrant integration policy, not unlike many
other Western European countries during this period.
In this conflicted setting, the role of research in policymaking also be-
came severely contested. This underscores Gusfield’s (1976) claim that the
‘culture’ or the framing of problems are inherently connected to the ‘struc-
ture’ of these problems; thus, when framing is contested, the structure can
be expected to be contested as well. In this period, the credibility of immi-
grant integration researchers, who had been so heavily involved in the con-
struction of policies in the past, was openly put on the line. Researchers
were held responsible for the elitist style of policymaking in this field and
for their contribution to the multicultural model that was now so widely
discarded as a failure (regardless of the fact that the model had already
been abandoned in formal policy discourse a decade earlier). This became
particularly evident in the parliamentary investigative group known as the
Blok Committee that fruitlessly attempted to forge a consensus by commis-
sioning a state of the art of available research findings – a decision which
became the subject of intense public and political scrutiny.
The technocratic and enlightenment models of research-policy relations
were now strongly rejected. Politicians were called upon to develop a shar-
per political vision and maintain political primacy. In this respect, a so-
called ‘articulation function’ emerged in politics, meaning that politicians
considered it their task to respond to popular concerns about immigrant
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integration when developing policies that are democratically accountable,
rather than having their policies grounded primarily on the advice of aca-
demic or ethnic experts. In this setting, the use of scientific knowledge and
expertise was very selective and primarily instrumental: a pick-and-choose
strategy emerged in which government selected those strands of expertise
that were functional to the legitimation of the new assimilationist policy.
This type of nexus can best be described in terms of the engineering model,
with political primacy and a selective and functional utilisation of research
in the engineering of specific policy programmes. This explains why the
third WRR report on immigrant integration remained largely ignored: it
adopted a very different problem frame and also contained much more con-
ceptual, rather than instrumental, policy advice. At the same time, SCP’s
position became more prominent thanks to its open advocacy of a more as-
similationist approach and its focus on issues of social-cultural integration.
This episode illustrates perhaps most clearly how research-policy dialo-
gues on intractable controversies like immigrant integration can digress
into dialogues of the deaf. Both the fields of research and policy had a pro-
nounced multiplicity of problem frames. This makes it difficult to organise
dialogues across frames. For instance, evaluation of the integration policy
as a failure, which provided the basis for the establishment of the parlia-
mentary investigative committee, was driven primarily by a social-cultural
(assimilationist) frame of immigrant integration. However, the VWJ study
that provided the basis for the committee’s conclusions evaluated the inte-
gration process that was driven by a more social-economic (universalist)
frame. At the same time, WRR framed immigrant integration in a more
transnationalist way. This means that these actors had very different eva-
luations of policy as either a success or a failure, involving very different
ways of selecting and interpreting available evidence.
Critical frame reflection would, according to Rein and Schön (1994), be
an important way to transcend dialogues of the deaf. However, the engi-
neering boundary configuration seems to have inhibited frame reflection,
as it was strategically designed for establishing an assimilationist policy
frame by coordinating research functional to this aim and ignoring research
with alternative frames. It enabled government to promote and exploit se-
lective research on social-cultural integration within a national context and
ignore research that challenged such a national perspective on immigrant
integration. In the field of research, the national research-policy nexus con-
tributed to further fragmentation in terms of problem framing. This was
also encouraged by the emergence of an alternative research-policy nexus
on local and European levels. Ultimately, the engineering approach ob-
structed a critical frame reflection by constraining the debate across the
research-policy nexus to a small group of actors who shared a similar pro-
blem frame (assimilationism) and ignored alternative frames (selective use
of research, cynicism towards science). Moreover, these actors were not
226 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
pragmatic; instead, they followed a logic of articulation, responding to po-
litical developments during this period, and their trust was confined to a
limited number.
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7 Dutch exceptionalism? Immigrant integration
research and policies in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom
The Dutch case has revealed very specific patterns of research-policy dialo-
gues over the past decades. First, it has shown unique relations between
the structure of the research-policy nexus and the framing of immigrant in-
tegration. In this sense, it reflects Gusfield’s (1976) premise that the struc-
ture and the culture of public problems must be considered inherently con-
nected. The technocratic symbiosis of the 1980s helped keep policymaking
behind closed doors, enabling a ‘logic of minorities’ in problem framing
that was relatively insulated from broader societal developments. The en-
lightenment configuration of the early 1990s helped punctuate this symbio-
sis and link immigrant integration to these broader societal developments.
This enabled a ‘logic of equity’ in problem framing that stressed the com-
monalities of migrants as citizens rather than group-specific cultural parti-
cularities. Finally, the engineering configuration from 2000 onwards per-
mitted a cherry-picking of knowledge and expertise in the highly politi-
cised setting that drove the assimilationist turn in Dutch policy during this
period.
Secondly, the Dutch case has displayed a trend of growing political pri-
macy and declining belief in rational societal steering based on scientific
policy advice. Technocratic and enlightenment models of research-policy
relations were rejected after the turn of the millennium, making way for
models in which research was more serviceable to the prevailing political
agenda. In some respects, a widening gap between immigrant integration
research and policy has also been observed, especially in terms of differing
views at the level of problem framing. The highly institutionalised re-
search-policy nexus playing a central role in constructing the famous
Dutch multicultural model in the early 1980s had already been deinstitutio-
nalised by the early 1990s. At the same time, however, a new sort of nexus
– of an engineering, if not bureaucratic, nature – was erected at a more in-
strumental level. It involved, in particular, data provision on key policy
facets and the provision of knowledge claims helping to legitimise the new
policy discourse that emerged after the turn of the millennium. Thus, there
was a distinct trend away from science-led models such as technocracy
and engineering, to more politics-led ones such as engineering and bureau-
cratic models.
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether these patterns can
also be identified beyond the Dutch case. Is there a ‘Dutch exceptional-
ism’? Or can the relations found between the structures of research-policy
dialogues and the frames of immigrant integration, as well as the trend
away from models of societal engineering to models with a stronger politi-
cal primacy, be generalised beyond the Netherlands? To endeavour to an-
swer these questions, analysis will be drawn of research-policy relations
and their role in the framing of immigrant integration in France, Germany
and the UK.
The aim here is to reach beyond ‘models thinking’, which would only
emphasise national differences rather than similarities and would inevitably
contribute to the further reification of national models of integration.
Instead, the focus will be on the construction of these models and, in parti-
cular, the role of research-policy dialogues in this process. Comparing
countries’ different models of integration involves selection on the depen-
dent variable. Instead, the selection of these countries was based on known
differences in their national styles of research-policy relations (see Boswell
2009; Halffman 2005). In Germany there are traditionally sharp boundaries
between research and policy, with the division of labour between both
fields often highly formalised. This applies less to France and the United
Kingdom. In France, there are often close personal connections between re-
searchers and politicians/policymakers, and there is a set practice of politi-
cal involvement by public intellectuals. In the UK, too, the division of la-
bour between both fields is much less codified, often involving personal
cross-boundary networks and a form of authority and credibility that is
highly vested in individual people.
For each country, we therefore first examine how immigrant integration
has been framed in the research and policy fields in these countries.
Secondly, we analyse the frames’ construction – notably, the role of re-
search in the construction. Finally, as in the Dutch case, we assess the ex-
tent to which research-policy dialogues in these countries have contributed
to critical frame reflection. What can be learnt from these country studies
in terms of how to organise frame-critical research-policy dialogues?
7.1 France
7.1.1 The French model(s) of integration
France – more so than the Netherlands – is an experienced country of im-
migration. Throughout the twentieth century, France witnessed significant
immigration and was much less a country of emigration than, for instance,
the Netherlands (Weil 1991; Schain 1999). Even though France developed
into an immigration country earlier than most other European nations, im-
migration has not become part of its founding myth (Tilly, Noiriel & De
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Laforcade 1996). In other words, France is an immigration country, but not
an immigrant society or a so-called nation of immigrants as, for example,
the United States.
France has become internationally renowned for its republican model of
immigrant integration, characterised by assimilationism and individualism
and its reluctance to define immigrants in racial, ethnic, religious or cultur-
al terms (Weil 1991; Castles & Miller 1993). This model stands for the
strong French Republicanist tradition that dates back to the age of the
French Revolution and Napoleon (Brubaker 1992). It also has distinct roots
in the political field and in the scientific or intellectual field, both of which
played an important role in reproducing the republican model (Favell
1998b; Schain 1999). However, France has also witnessed the succession
of various problem frames, in research as well as in policy. In the early
1980s, there was rather a multiculturalist framing of immigrant integration,
characterised by cultural differentialism and a pragmatic politics of ‘inser-
tion’. Only in the late 1980s was the French Republican model revived in
both politics and research.
Politique d’insertion
How have the French framed and reframed their approach to immigrant in-
tegration over the past decades? Until well in the 1970s, there was a belief
in France that many immigrants would, in fact, return to their home coun-
tries (Weil 1991). Although this resembled the Dutch situation in that peri-
od, the difference was that in France immigration was already perceived as
permanent. Following the immigration stop in 1974, after the oil crisis and
the continuation of new immigration from former French colonies such as
Algeria, the need for an integration policy appeared on the agenda in the
early 1980s, several years after this had occurred in the Netherlands.
In the early 1980s, a model of incorporation was developed that had dis-
tinct multiculturalist traits. It proclaimed that immigrant ethnic minorities,
or collectivities, had a right to be different – droit à la différence. This
right involved a ‘separatist demand for egalitarian treatment’ (Feldblum
1999: 33), invoking politics to create equality for immigrant collectivities
in various domains such as culture, religion, politics, labour, and welfare.
It also led to differentialist policies, such as venues for immigrant collectiv-
ities to set up classes in their own language and culture so as to facilitate
return migration rather than integration (Weil 1991; Brubaker 2003). These
were mostly framed as specific elements of general state social policies
(Favell 1998b). A sharp contrast to the republican model, this politique
d’insertion (ibid.: 46-47) proclaimed the right to association, involving im-
migrant organisations in policy initiatives in diverse ways, such as in the
establishment of a National Council of Immigrant Populations in 1984.
The other side of the coin of insertion politics was a pluralist image of
French society. President Giscard d’Estaing, and later also President
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Mitterrand, both declared that France had become a pluralist society
(Feldblum 1999: 33).
Thus, when France first elaborated a model of immigrant incorporation
based on the assumption that immigrants were permanent settlers, it de-
viated from the traditional French Republican model. It chose for a more
pragmatic approach that often involved ethno-cultural accommodation and
social-economic emancipation of these groups, rather than the typical re-
publican assimilationism and individualism. In this sense, France was
remarkably similar to the US and many other Western European countries
mainly choosing for multiculturalist approaches at this time.
Politique d’assimilation
It was not until the second half of the 1980s that the traditional French
Republican model was revived in relation to immigrant integration.
According to Brubaker (1992: 49), the model was closely related to the
founding myth of the French Republic; it was a cultural idiom that had
powerful roots in French history. Reflected were various dimensions of the
French Revolution: a bourgeois revolution that established a bourgeois
society, a democratic revolution calling for active political citizenship, a
national revolution based on civil equality for all French citizens and a bu-
reaucratic revolution that established direct links between the citizen and
the state.
The French Republican model valued individual citizenship. First, it was
relatively inclusive, as citizenship was open to all those born on French ter-
ritory – ius soli. This French conception of Staatsvolk majorly deviated
from other nations, such as Germany, which defined its nation rather as a
Volksstaat based on ethnicity, culture and descent – ius sanguinis
(Brubaker 1992). Citoyenneté (‘citizenship’) thus unmistakable arose from
the traditional French conception of a strong central state rather than of a
French people, unlike Germany with its notion of the Volk.
Second, ethnicity, but also religion, culture and race, were considered ir-
relevant to the citizenship frame. The French model was ‘colour-blind’
(Weil 1991; Schain 1999). Instead of a right to be different, it contained a
right to be indifferent – droit à l’indifférence – or the right to be treated as
equals. Regardless of background, all people who are assimilated through
French institutions such as education and the army (Schnapper 1991) be-
come French citizens. This was closely related to the principle of laïcité,
the secular nature of the French public space. Culture, religion and ethni-
city belonged to the private sphere, whereas public areas were expected to
be neutral and colour-blind. Officially recognising immigrant collectivities
was therefore considered at odds with laïcité. In various creative ways, the
government attempted to design policies so that they would affect the posi-
tion of immigrants without implicitly recognising immigrant groups. For
instance, the Fond d’Action Sociale pour les Travailleurs Immigrés et Leur
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Familles (FAS) was decentralised and connected to urban policy, so as to
avoid state recognition of immigrant groups. This was a classic example of
replacement strategies manifested in the French case. Recognising ethnic
or cultural groups could effectively be avoided by targeting the neighbour-
hoods where ethnic and cultural groups were concentrated rather than di-
rectly targeting the groups themselves (De Zwart 2005). This approach
contrasted dramatically with the general recognition of racial categories or
ethnic and cultural groups as occurred in the Netherlands and in the US.
The French political tradition has always refused to recognise the
American concept of ‘ethnicity’. In the school, the factory, in the
union [...] the ethnic dimension has never been taken into account,
even if social practices don’t always scrupulously follow this princi-
ple. It is not an accident that in France there have never been real
ghettos of immigrant populations from the same country, on the
model of Black, Italian or Hispanic neighbourhoods in the United
States; that in poor areas immigrant populations from different
countries mix with French people, apparently in the same social
milieus. The promotion of Frenchmen of foreign origin comes about
individually and not collectively through groups organised collec-
tively. (Schnapper in Schain 1999: 200)
Finally, Brubaker (1992: 112) observes that there has always been some
ambiguity to the nationalist traits of the French Republican model. The ab-
sence of an ethno-cultural conception of the French nation did not mean
that there was no nationalism. In fact, nationalism manifested itself in the
major emphasis being put on a need for assimilation. Immigrant commu-
nities were to be dissolved and integrated into the French Staatsvolk.
However, this type of nationalism also occasionally led to more exclusio-
nist policies. For instance, some politicians, particularly surrounding Le
Pen, believed that specific non-Western migrants, such as Algerian
Muslims, were ‘unassimilable’. This exclusionist variant of nationalism be-
came more prominent in the 1990s, when measures were implemented
(such as the Pasqua Laws in 1993) that restricted access to French citizen-
ship. Whereas citizenship was first considered an instrument for assimila-
tion, in the 1990s the emergent approach stressed that migrants had to be
willing to acquire French citizenship (volonté). This was a response to criti-
cism from exclusionists that French citizenship had become desacralised –
‘être français, cela se mérite’.
Beyond the republican model?
Throughout the 1990s and after the turn of the millennium, the French
Republican model became increasingly contested. Closely resembling the
situation in the Netherlands during the same period, there were growing
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signs of disaccord between at least three frames of integration: assimila-
tionism (the republican model), universalism (anti-discrimination policies)
and multiculturalism (de facto multicultural practices on the local level).
First, the piecemeal development of a French anti-discrimination policy
in the late 1990s involved the gradual emergence of a more universalist
type of policy frame. A shift in focus from assimilation to anti-discrimina-
tion implied a shift in orientation, away from the rights and obligations of
migrants to integrate towards the host society’s responsibility to integrate
migrants and combat discrimination (Fassin 1999; Geddes & Guiraudon
1996). An anti-discrimination policy was proposed for the first time after
the 1997 elections. This policy would generate a bipartisan support con-
trary to more affirmative action measures or multicultural approaches
(Geddes & Guiraudon 1996). Most notably, this anti-discrimination policy
involved the collection of research on discrimination, the creation of a hot-
line to record discrimination complaints and the establishment of the advi-
sory body Group d’Études et de Lutte contre les Discriminations (GELD).
However, no independent body was created to handle discrimination com-
plaints, as had been the case in the UK (Commission for Racial Equality)
and the Netherlands (Commission for Equal Treatment). The development
of this anti-discrimination policy was spurred on in important ways by the
EU Race Directive that was passed in 2000 and had itself been inspired by
the Dutch and UK approaches to anti-discrimination. The European
Commission played a key role as a venue for promoting frameshifts be-
yond the realm of national politics and public debate, in this case obliging
the French to adopt changes that would have been difficult to achieve via
the national political arena.
The riots that occurred in the suburbs of major cities across France in
2004 proved to be a catalyst for the appearance of policies that involved a
piecemeal de facto recognition of the ethnic, cultural and religious charac-
ter of problems in these suburbs. The riots revealed the problems of French
colour-blindness, which downright failed to address concrete social pro-
blems such as poverty, relative deprivation, spatial concentration, long-term
unemployment and discrimination. A decoupling of the national discourse
of the French model and the social reality and policy practices in French
suburbs was becoming apparent. Favell (1998b: 184) described this as an
‘increasingly sharp décalage between the highbrow republican rhetoric of
the centre – the general symbolic issues involved in the definition of
citoyenneté or laïcité – and the void of appropriate and consistent discourse
and methods at the local level’.
This décalage was evident in, for instance, the rise of political mobilisa-
tion on an ethnic basis, which was distinctly at odds with the colour-blind
republican model (Schain 1999: 210). Thus far, mobilisation of migrants
had taken place mainly through institutions such as political parties, unions
and organisations that were not ethnically exclusive, including France Plus
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and SOS Racisme. The ethnic mobilisation was partly a consequence of
structural changes in the French political system, such as the changing
positions of the French Communist Party (PCF) and the erosion of class
solidarity in favour of ethnic solidarity (Schain 1995). Furthermore, ethnic
mobilisation and heightened ethnic consciousness were also a consequence
of state interference. As the government became more and more mired in
migration-related urban problems, the pragmatic need for recognising orga-
nisations on an ethnic basis – that is, for ethnic categorisation – became
obvious. To illustrate, one of the determining indicators for selecting
Priority Urban Zones and Priority Educational Zones was that at least 30
per cent of the population in such an area be foreign. Another example of
growing ethnic mobilisation and state interference was government’s invol-
vement in establishing a representative body of French Muslims, the
Conseil de Réfléxion sur l’Islam en France (CORIF). Though largely unac-
knowledged in formal policy discourse, these measures do imply a real
shift towards a more pragmatic approach at the level of policy practices.
At the same time, the French Republican model seems to be far removed
from French political and academic discourse. In fact, after the turn of the
millennium, there appears to have been a gradual ‘return of assimilation-
ism’ in a way that resembles developments in many other European coun-
tries during this period (Joppke & Morawska 2003). For instance, the
French government announced an ‘integration contract’ for newcomers in
France, which closely resembles the Dutch approach to the integration of
newcomers. Moreover, in 2004, the High Council of Integration argued
that government should break with ‘the logic of guilt and discrimination’
and return to the original idea of ‘integration’. Clearly, far from being char-
acterised by one dominant republican model, the French case at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century is one characterised by conflict between
various frames, involving the traditional republican model as well as more
multiculturalist and universalist frames.
7.1.2 The construction of the French Republican model
The technocracy of insertion politics
The preceding analysis of the French framing of immigrant integration
shows that the republican model, for which France’s integration policies
has become internationally renowned, has not always dominated French
policy. How can we explain these different frames, and to what extent have
different structures of research-policy relations contributed to their rise?
The ‘rediscovery’ of the French Republican model seems to have taken
place only at the point when migration and integration emerged, for the
first time, at the centre of the political agenda in the mid-1980s (Favell
1998b; Feldblum 1999; Geddes & Guiraudon 1996). Until then, techno-
cratic efforts to avoid politicisation had kept both migration and integration
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policy firmly off the agenda. The administrative field dominated early pol-
icy developments in both domains (Geddes 2003). Administration enjoyed
almost arbitrary power to regulate migration, through ‘a maze of decrees,
circulars, departmental memos or even telexes’ (Wihtol de Wenden in
Guiraudon 1998: 298). It was the legal field that intervened in this policy
domain in the 1980s, through the venues of the Council of State and the
French Constitutional Court. Under jurisprudential pressure from these le-
gal bodies, the government was increasingly forced to formulate an official
immigrant integration policy that accorded with the French law and
Constitution, as well as with international law (Geddes & Guiraudon
1996).
However, the politics of insertion in the domain of immigrant integration
was mainly formulated in the administrative field; it was a product of
‘technocratic elite management’ (Favell 1998b: 47). According to Favell
(ibid.), it was:
not really a grand idea at all, but a loose collection of narrowly tar-
geted practices, which avoided treating the big symbolic questions
that were to blow up centre-state in the 1980s [...] by tracking and
responding to the presence of new immigrants though a concern for
their basic welfare and social needs and [...] by playing down the is-
sue, away from the centre of party policies cleavages.
The politics of insertion was pragmatic and also systemically depoliticised.
For instance, Feldblum (1998: 39) observes how Mitterrand and Giscard
d’Estaing made an agreement in 1981 not to discuss immigration issues in
electoral debates. Before the mid-1980s, when discussions about, for exam-
ple, instant access to national citizenship emerged, they were often re-
stricted to ‘internal state discussions and revisions [...] defined as ‘technical
issues’ and not political stakes’ (ibid.: 59).
At this time, there was still hardly any involvement from the field of
scientific research in immigrant integration. Moreover, little research ap-
peared on this topic at all until the mid-1980s (Mayeur 2006). At that time,
demographers, in particular, but also historians and sociologists, pioneered
immigrant integration research in France (ibid.). One of the few celebrated
studies from this period included a report commissioned by the
Department of Culture by Giordan (1982), ‘Cultural democracy and right
to difference’, which legitimised the multiculturalist policy discourse of the
politics of insertion (Feldblum 1999).
Issue linkage and politicisation
A reconfiguration of the political as well as the scientific fields would be
at the source of the reinvention of the French Republican model. The his-
torical legacy of republicanism had remained a powerful cultural idiom in
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France even during the period of the politics of insertion. A politicisation
of the political field and a dramatic alteration of the institutional logic of
the scientific field and its boundaries with the political field led to the crea-
tion of a powerful cross-boundary discourse coalition in support of the re-
publican model.
What is the explanation for the frameshift towards republicanism in the
mid-1980s? In terms of structural developments in society, the French na-
tion-state was pressured by several factors that seem to have been common
to most European nation-states in recent decades (Favell 1998b). First, there
was a revival of regionalism, which threatened to undermine the traditional,
centralised Paris-centric conception of the French nation-state. Second,
there was a decline of national solidarity or a sense of national belonging;
social cohesion was also under pressure. Third, there were rising concerns
about the scope of governance by central government and the feasibility of
society, which coincided with particular concerns about the welfare state
and the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation. These structural devel-
opments raised the government’s sensitivity and sense of urgency concern-
ing national identity and the functioning of the nation-state, thus paving the
way for the revalorisation of national issues.
Immigration and integration fed precisely into this sort of sensibility.
Within the political structure of competitive elites (Guiraudon 1998), they
were prime issues for politicisation. This politicisation came from the poli-
tical right. In the early 1980s, the political right – in the form of the
Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and the Union pour la
Démocratie Française (UDF) – was in disarray, a consequence of the domi-
nance of socialist governance, and sought opportunities to revitalise its
competition with the political left. In 1985, the UDF called for a reframing
of the immigrant integration issue. This polarised the right and the left,
with responses to the rightist discourse sometimes taking the form of accu-
sations of racism (Feldblum 1999: 57). It was against the background of
changing party strategies (left versus right) and state practices (the early
1980s’ politics of insertion), that Le Pen and his National Front Party ap-
peared on the French political stage (Schain 1988). Le Pen, however, radi-
calised the prevailing discourse, mixing its differentialist frame of immi-
grant integration – he saw Muslim migrants as essentially ‘unassimilable’
(see Wieviorka 1995) – with populist and regionalist opposition against the
Paris centre held accountable for the malignant politique d’insertion.
With structural factors providing an opportune context for politicisation,
the rise of Le Pen appears to have been an important situational factor
(Brubaker 1992). Le Pen and the political right reframed immigrant inte-
gration as an issue of national identity, related to the meaning and value of
what being French is – or what it should be. As such, the issue became
linked to concerns about the nation-state. Honing in on citizenship, the
right called for a more voluntarist conception of national membership,
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breaking with the republican model’s automatic granting of citizenship to
all those born on French soil (ius soli). This voluntarist reframing of
French citizenship as something that had to be merited – ‘être français,
cela se mérite’ – also involved communitarian arguments – ‘France for the
French’ – and nativist arguments that questioned the loyalty of Muslim mi-
grants, in particular (Feldblum 1999).
However, Le Pen’s sudden advent and the radicalised discourse on mi-
gration and integration had adverse effects (Favell 1998b). First, the fierce
accusations of racism made against Le Pen resulted in other parties, includ-
ing those on the political right, becoming more reluctant to join forces with
the National Front. Second, it created conditions for a left-right consensus
on the revival of the traditional French Republican model of immigrant in-
tegration and national citizenship. This consensus was not only less differ-
entialist than the politics of insertion but also less voluntarist, communitar-
ianist and nativist than the ideas of Le Pen (Feldblum 1999). It led to a fra-
meshift on the left, reframing integration as an issue of national identity, as
well as on the right, abandoning its original call for more voluntarist, com-
munitarianist and nativist citizenship.
Structural developments in French society appear to have contributed to
the restructuring of the political field on migration and integration. This re-
structuring involved politicisation, left-right polarisation and the rise of Le
Pen, and connected migration and integration to issues of national identity.
Moreover, restructuring the political fields seems to explain the formation
of a left-right consensus on the revival of the republican model of integra-
tion. The reframing of the republican model was not only highly contin-
gent on politics, but also highly symbolic. However, a series of focus
events in the late 1980s and early 1990s further reinforced the structural
developments in this field,. The so-called Foulard Affair in 1989 that fol-
lowed the headscarf controversy underscored the high principles of the
French Republican model, such as citoyenneté and laïcité.
Public intellectuals and the republican model
Restructuring the political field and a revival of the French Republican
model were also related to a restructuring the scientific field (Amiraux &
Simon 2006). France already had a tradition of major involvement by –
usually Parisian – intellectuals in public and political life (Bourdieu 1988).
From the mid-1980s onwards, scientific and intellectual involvement in mi-
gration and integration would be dominated by specific intellectuals, often
of a philosophical background. They contributed to ‘public reflection of a
highly philosophical nature, extraordinary in its abstract and theoretical
content, and peculiar to the French political scene’ (Favell 1998b: 40).
Highly politically oriented think tanks, such as the Club d’Horloge,
which had links to the UDF and the National Front, and the Club 89, with
links to the UDF and RPR, played an important role in legitimising rightist
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discourse on a revalorisation of French citizenship in the mid-1980s.
Reports from these think tanks supported expansion of the discussion to
eventually create conditions for reviving the republican model (Feldblum
1999: 38). Moreover, when the political field was successfully reframed in
terms of national identity, leftist thinkers, including Alain Touraine, who
was to become an influential intellectual in this field, also reframed their
discourse in national terms. They shifted from a pluralist discourse to na-
tional, citizenship discourse (ibid.: 44).
In the 1980s, a broader group of intellectuals supported the renewed
republican discourse, including, Dominique Schnapper, Pierre-André
Taguieff, Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard Henri-Lévi and, somewhat later,
Patrick Weil who was to become one of the most prominent republicanists
to work on both sides of the research-policy nexus in the 1990s. They were
public intellectuals in the sense that they derived their authority not only
from their scientific field or their philosophical background, but also from
their connections to politics and their reputation in the media. These public
intellectuals further reinforced the focus of policy discourse on high repub-
lican principles instead of concrete urban problems in the ‘banlieues’.
Favell (1998b: 58) described them as:
a new generation of media-wise, self-promoting public intellectuals
seeking to distinguish themselves from the dominant intellectual
currents of the 1960s and 1970s, and keen to tender for direct politi-
cal influence via all kinds of government-funded research projects,
advisorships and commissions now available to the Socialists in
power [...] as well as their fervent national republicanism, what
characterised the more successful and mediatised figures – for ex-
ample Luc Ferry, Alain Finkielkraut, Pierre-André Taguieff – was
that they were almost always philosophers in tendency, not empiri-
cal social scientists; they frequently came from Jewish backgrounds;
and they had apparently easy access to the most influential organs
of the intellectual liberal press, Le Monde, Libération, Le Nouvel
Observateur, L’Express and the widely-read academic journal
Esprit.
Together with the left-right republican coalition in the political field, these
individuals formed a discourse coalition that transgressed both science-
policy and disciplinary boundaries. It was impossible to distinguish their
normative and factual claims, which fitted into the typical French tradition
of normative social science. According to Favell (ibid.: 41):
This interdisciplinary, cross-party and cross-institutional consensus
among ruling elites on the terms and language of the debate came
together to marginalise thoroughly the claims of other possible ideas
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about the nature and future of French political unity: principally, the
nationalist and culturally exclusive rhetoric of the far right, and the
multicultural and internationalist ideas of the radical left.
This republicanist discourse coalition developed itself in opposition to an-
other group of public intellectuals, with more poststructuralist and cultural
relativist ideas, the so-called soixante-huitards, who counted Claude Lévi-
Strauss among their number (ibid.: 58).
The public debate triggered by these intellectuals culminated in at least
two government-established committees, whose reports would provide the
basis for revival of the French Republican model. First established was the
Nationality Committee, also known as the Wise Men Committee
(Commission des Sages). This was set up in 1987 to reconsider French
nationality law as a consequence of the politicised debates on migration,
integration and national identity from preceding years. It was a product of
the cross-party consensus developed at this time. The committee included
mostly academics ‘from elite Parisian backgrounds, in history, law, sociol-
ogy and political science, including Alain Touraine and Dominique
Schnapper’ (ibid.: 42). While the committee only operated behind closed
doors, it also held a range of public interviews with diverse actors involved
in issues of integration and citizenship. The Nationality Committee was
one of the first to formulate a republicanist approach to ‘integration’, a
concept that initially surfaced in the period, being largely inspired by legal
arguments, such as access to full citizenship, rather than by cultural argu-
ments (Commission de la Nationalité 1988; Geddes & Guiraudon 1996).
The Nationality Committee’s work was succeeded by the establishment
of the High Council for Integration (Haut Conseil a l’Intégration, HCI).
HCI comprised civil servants and legal experts rather than academics
(Favell 1998b: 42), and in 1993, provided an official definition of the re-
publicanist approach to immigrant integration. It stressed the ‘resemblances
and convergences in the rights and obligations’ of ‘all those who are des-
tined to live durably in our land’ and emphasised the ‘active participation’
of all those in French society (see Geddes & Guiraudon 1996). The HCI
did not only advise government on reforms of the nationality law and inte-
gration policies, but also on the establishment of research programmes. It
was to offer both scientific legitimacy and instrumental data for sustaining
the republican model. According to Favell (2001):
the government appointed HCI [...] not only sought to formulate the
normative, historical and political grounding for the new republican
philosophy it espoused, they also set in motion a machine of empiri-
cal evidence gathering, explicitly constructed to find the data that
the public theory had set out to prove.
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The formation of this discourse coalition in response to politicisation of the
political field did not, however, produce greater responsiveness to the pub-
lic. The French state’s strongly centralised, unitary policy structure and the
co-optation of French public intellectuals helped constrict debate to the
national level (Guiraudon 2000b). Despite the debate’s highly mediatised
nature, the coalition and the republican discourse it sustained formed a
new type of elite discourse (Schain 1995). The public intellectuals per-
ceived their role as one of enlightenment, in which they had to defend and
advocate the republican model at all costs. For instance, in the context of
the Foulard Affair, they vigorously participated in public debate, defending
French republicanism and warning that the affair should not become ‘the
Munich of republicanism’ (Le Nouvel Observateur 2-8 November 1988 in
Favell 1998b: 154).
The Stasi Commission and the blind spot for empirical social science
research
A more recent episode illustrates the difficulties of achieving research-pol-
icy dialogues that reach beyond this French Republican model and the dis-
course coalition that supports it. In 2002 and 2003, a new series of Foulard
Affairs occurred in France; the Islamic headscarf came to serve as a sym-
bol of French integration problems, challenging the republican principle of
laïcité. Consequently, President Chirac decided to establish a new commis-
sion to tame the episode of fresh controversies. The Independent
Commission of Reflection on the Application of the Principle of Laïcité in
the Republic, also known as the Stasi Commission after its chairman,
Bernard Stasi, was given the broad task of reporting on issues concerning
laïcité. Ultimately, this commission would recommend a ban on all ‘osten-
sible religious signs’, such as Islamic headscarves, in French public space.
The commission comprised nineteen members, including intellectuals, ad-
ministrators and politicians (Bowen 2007: 114).
What becomes clear from the commission’s proceedings is that the focus
gradually became the veil as a challenge to laïcité, rather than addressing
the greater social aspects of integration and the place of religion in French
society. According to Bowen (ibid.: 116):
the organization of the commission’s work, the choice of people to
hear and places to visit [...] all focused everyone’s attention on this
topic and on this hypothesis, rather than on the topic of laïcité, or
on the topic of why it is that things are in such bad shape in these
neighbourhoods.
Furthermore, while the commission included at least one empirical social
scientist who was critical of the French Republicanist perspectives on inte-
gration and headscarf wearing, this member who was surrounded by a
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predominant republicanist mode of thinking eventually also voted for the
joint recommendation of a legal ban, in order to preserve the unanimity of
the committee (ibid.: 124). Moreover, among the many experts invited for
interviews, no sociologists were asked to share empirical findings from
their research concerning, for example, why Muslim women wear head-
scarves or social problems such as discrimination and poverty (ibid.: 19).
Like the Blok Committee in the Netherlands, which was established in
roughly the same period, the Stasi Commission chose to remain within the
frame of government policy, rather than critically reflect upon it and possi-
ble alternatives. This shows how the French Republican model continued
to be reproduced by a discourse coalition of administrators, politicians and
intellectuals.
Despite this blind spot for empirical social science, the 1990s in France
saw a rise in more ‘empirical’ social research. This came in response to,
among other things, mounting unease with the highly philosophical nature
of intellectual and political discourses on immigrant integration. Bourdieu,
for example, focused more on concrete issues in the banlieues, such as
poverty, relative deprivation, criminality and anomie (Amiraux & Simon
2006). Moreover, after the turn of the millennium, researchers would return
to the dispute on statistiques ethniques (Sabbagh & Peer 2008). It was
claimed that the government would be unable to effectively implement EU
directives on anti-discrimination if it was unable to keep track of direct and
indirect discrimination of specific groups (Simon 2005). This shows how
around 2000, the French field of immigrant integration research was be-
coming more and more fragmented. One of the vectors in this fragmenta-
tion appears to be the Europeanisation of immigrant integration research, a
phenomenon also observed in the Dutch case. Interaction between scholars
across Europe (and the US) generated more interest among French scholars
in issues such as ethnic statistics, which is a cornerstone of immigrant poli-
cies in the UK, the US and the Netherlands. This Europeanisation – or in-
ternationalisation – also changed the French-American antagonism that had
been a significant factor behind the development of the French Republican
model.
The ongoing boundary struggles on ethnic statistics
Whereas immigrant integration research in many countries, including the
UK and the Netherlands, was strongly influenced by the American sociol-
ogy of race and urban sociology (promoted by the Chicago School and
Robert Park), French discourse and research appears to have developed in
a more antagonist relation to American research and discourse (Fassin
1999). Whereas American sociology framed immigrant integration as an
issue of minorities and multiculturalism, French discourse stressed citizen-
ship and colour-blindness. In French social research, America is often de-
picted as a counter model, in which the recognition of minorities has
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adverse effects such as ghettoisation – something avoided in the French
Republican model (Bleich 2003). The American reference in French dis-
course often has the purpose of delineating the French model and warning
against multiculturalism. As Fassin (ibid.: 226) put it: ‘first, when discuss-
ing the politics of multiculturalism, “America” is the Other – a radically
different culture of cultural difference [...] at the same time, the Other is a
threat; we may not be so different any longer, we are indeed already
engaged in a process of Americanization’.
This function of the American reference on how immigrant integration
was framed in France relates specifically to a French taboo on social cate-
gorisation on the basis of ethnicity, culture or religion. Such classification
is at odds with the colour-blindness of republicanism (Amiraux & Simon
2006). For instance, data gathered by the official French Statistics Office
(Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, INSEE) re-
fer only to foreigners without French citizenship, as the categorisation of
French citizens on their particular ethnic or religious origin is prohibited
(Favell 2001). This means that second-generation migrants who would be
categorised as members of minorities in, for instance, America and the
Netherlands, remain invisible in French statistics. It also means that state-
ments about policy success or failure are difficult to support with scientific
data (ibid.).
The republican prohibition of ethnic categorisation significantly con-
strains empirical sociological research. This was illustrated by a controver-
sial survey by social scientist Michèle Tribalat in 1995, who attempted to
organise her data with questions referring to ethnic proximity and to
French norms and values (Tribalat 1996). Conducted at the National
Institute for Demographic Studies (Institut National des Études
Démographiques, INED), this study broke the taboo on ethnic categorisa-
tion that was manifest in the official data from INSEE (Favell 2001).
According to Favell (ibid.), the symbolic struggle over ethnic categorisa-
tion clearly illustrates how ‘the criteria for competition in the intellectual
field are not about empirical proof but about controlling the ideological
high ground’.
In close correlation with the development of a (universalist) anti-discri-
mination policy around the turn of the millennium, the dispute on ethnic
statistics was again revisited. In 1998, the High Council of Integration pub-
lished a report for the first time on discrimination, and recommended the
establishment of anti-discrimination group GELD. Various scholars, includ-
ing demographer Patrick Simon, advocated the development of ethnic sta-
tistics vis-à-vis the 2000 EU Race Directive. This was not without effect,
seeing as the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour
l’Egalité (HALDE) was established in 2005. Clearly, the development of
the new anti-discrimination frame placed ‘a normative issue requiring poli-
tical and legal decisions and discussed either in juridical terms by
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conseillers d’État or philosophical ones by public intellectuals’, as
Guiraudon and Geddes (1996) into the hands of ‘social scientists and ‘so-
cial partners’. More than ever before, this put empirically oriented social
scientists at the heart of the French debate. However, regarding a series of
meetings on ethnic statistics in France and the US in 2006, Sabbagh and
Peer (2008: 2) had to conclude that:
While there was general agreement among the American partici-
pants about the necessity and value of using statistical data to mea-
sure discrimination based on race and ethnicity, as well as to assess
the impact of antidiscrimination policies, only a minority of the
French participants shared this opinion.
This was confirmed by a 2007 petition in the French media signed by lead-
ing national academics, including republicanist Patrick Weil. The petition
argued against any research that involved a categorisation on the basis of
origin (see Guiraudon & Geddes 1996). This makes it obvious how in both
policy and academic discourse, the republican model was far from dead,
and the dilemma of ethnic statistics is as much a controversy in France’s
academia as its politics.
7.1.3 French Republicanism across research-policy boundaries
The French case contains vivid examples of how a changing division of la-
bour between science and politics contributed to reframing the immigrant
integration issue. Once France came to terms with not only having become
a country of temporary migration, but also admitting that immigrants were
now permanent settlers, the issue was reframed in a distinctly technocratic
way. The administrative field had a heavy hand in framing the policy as a
kind of ‘technocratic elite management’, in which central and local govern-
ments were majorly implicated. At the same time, politicisation was sys-
tematically avoided. Framing responded to pragmatic needs from central
and local administration, rather than deliberations on symbolic issues or
matters of principle. The legal field was crucial in forcing government to
stop ruling by discretion and to adopt formal policies. This stood in con-
trast to the marginal role given social scientists. On the few occasions so-
cial scientists were involved, notably as demographers and sociologists,
they legitimised the multiculturalist, pluralist policy discourse that had
been generated in the administrative and legal fields. The legal field advo-
cated recognition of difference – unlike the traditional republican model –
because of national and international principles of law such as equality; the
administrative field preferred a degree of cultural pluralism, based on a be-
lief that it would be most efficient in terms of the pragmatic resolution of
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concrete, local issues of immigrant integration. It was this technocratic di-
vision of labour that sustained the politique d’insertion of the early 1980s.
Changes in the structure of the political and scientific fields in the mid-
to late 1980s contributed to a frameshift that revived the traditional French
Republican model of integration and citizenship. This interaction appears
to have been generated, in particular, by an elite discourse coalition advo-
cating French Republicanism across the boundaries of both science and
politics. In the political field, a number of think tanks associated to politi-
cal parties on the right punctuated the norm of depoliticisation that had
sustained the politique d’insertion, and called for a more assimilationist
policy approach. This compelled a political reconfiguration – across the left
and the right – of immigrant integration in terms of national citizenship. In
other words, politicisation and Le Pen caused a revival of the French
Republican model in the political establishment. Meanwhile, in the scienti-
fic field, policy-oriented social scientists were gaining influence. A number
of public intellectuals, often with a philosophical background, would play
an important role in advocating and defending the French Republican
model.
The politique d’insertion frame was largely pragmatic and technical.
Now, the discourse coalition of scientific public intellectuals and the repub-
lican coalition between the political left and right reframed immigrant inte-
gration as a symbol of larger societal issues such as national identity, the
emergence of Europe and the viability of the national welfare state. The
new division of labour between science and politics, triggered by politici-
sation and issue linkage, contributed to the revival of the French
Republican Model. The administrative (local governments) and legal fields
(Council of State, Constitutional Court) could only defend certain aspects
of cultural pluralism and achieve some depoliticisation, albeit in an incon-
sistent, touch-and-go manner. However, they could never really undermine
the revival of the French Republican model. The scientific-political dis-
course coalition for republicanism defined its role in terms of enlighten-
ment – defending the high principles of the universal French model – as il-
lustrated by its response to the Foulard Affairs. As such, the politique d’as-
similation was a project of the French elite.
However, this discourse of republican enlightenment appears to have
generated specific pathologies that would gradually trigger another change
to the division of labour and problem framing. There was a spreading
décalage between the national republican rhetoric and the de facto multi-
culturalism found at the local level. In response to concrete, problem-
exerted pressure at the local level, governments adopted a more pragmatic
approach to coping with these difficulties. On many occasions (such as the
establishment of FAS and CORIF), this led to measures at odds with the
national republican model. In the political field, growing problem-exerted
pressure from the banlieues also sparked greater support for an approach
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to integration that would target more specific problems, rather than philo-
sophical matters or symbolic issues such as national identity. In the scienti-
fic field, more empirical social research seems to have emerged on issues
related to migration and diversity in French society
7.2 Germany
7.2.1 A reluctant country of immigration
Germany was one of the last Western European countries to formulate im-
migration and immigrant integration policies. This was due to a belief – or
a norm – that Germany was not and should not be a country of immigra-
tion: Kein Einwanderungsland (Faist 1994). Although there are notable
differences across the various German Länder, in terms of their regional,
more pragmatic and ad hoc policy responses to immigration, this norm has
proved much more resilient in Germany than in many other European
countries, including the Netherlands. Somewhat paradoxically, despite the
absence of integration policies, Germany has become internationally
renowned for the extent to which it has granted legal and social rights to
immigrants, although largely excluding them from political rights
(Guiraudon 1998; Soysal 1994). It has been considered an example of
post-national immigrant membership, which means that citizenship in-
volves universal personhood, rather than membership of a specific nation.
The following section will explore the development of this model and the
more recent turn towards assimilationism that seems to be occurring in
Germany as well as a series of other European countries (Brubaker 2003;
Joppke 2003).
A differentialist frame: Kein Einwanderungsland
Germany held on to the belief that it was not a country of immigration
much longer than most of its surrounding countries. More than just a be-
lief, not being an Einwanderungsland had a distinct normative character,
tied up with German’s history, culture and nation-building experience
(Joppke 1999b: 62). Whereas in France the nation and the state were clo-
sely bound in the French notion of Staatsvolk and ius soli (citizenship as
birthright), the German nation-building legacy retained a distinct discre-
pancy between nation and state (Brubaker 1992: 137). The German nation
was defined on ethno-cultural ties, as a Volksgemeinschaft or a community
of common descent, characterised by ius sanguinis (citizenship as a right
of blood) instead of ius soli. This way of constructing the imagined
German Volksgemeinschaft dated from the Wilhelmine period, in which
German (Prussian) territory did not fully overlap with what was conceived
to be the German nation; there was a large German diaspora throughout
Eastern Europe and there was also a significant Eastern European
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immigrant population (e.g. the Polish) within Germany (ibid.). This made
Germany a ‘nation without a state’ or an ‘organic Volksgemeinschaft’ em-
phasising the exclusion of Fremdvölkisch (‘foreign people’) and, in the
Nazi period, the exclusion of Jews, in particular (ibid.: 166).
This ethno-cultural nation-building legacy was revived after World War
II, in the context of the separation of East and West Germany. The belief
in an organic German Volksgemeinschaft provided the basis for defining
Germany as an incomplete nation so long as East and West were separated
(Geddes 2003). This was one of the reasons for Germany’s reluctance to
concede to being an immigration country: being an immigration country
was at odds with the organic conception of the Volkskgemeinschaft that fed
the national longing for reunification. As a consequence, naturalisation was
tremendously difficult for immigrants, as it would require ‘a social transub-
stantiation that immigrants have difficulty imagining, let alone desiring’
(Brubaker 1992: 78). In the 1980s, the annual nationalisation rate among
immigrants was as low as 0.5 per cent and dual nationality was ruled out
as a consequence of German constitutional thought, which had evolved
since the Wilhelmine period (Geddes 2003: 94). Although the naturalisa-
tion procedure was relaxed in the 1990s, the annual naturalisation rate rose
only to about 1 per cent in 1995 and dual nationality remained a controver-
sial topic in Germany.
The denial of being an immigration country was distinctly at odds with
the post-war reality in which Germany witnessed very significant and di-
verse immigration (Joppke 1999a). First, Germany experienced the arrival
of large numbers of foreign workers, Gastarbeiter, mainly from Turkey
and the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, in line with its self-definition as a
Volksgemeinschaft, Germany orchestrated one of the largest state-led immi-
gration projects ever, to repatriate Germans, the so-called Aussiedler, from
its diaspora, particularly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(Thränhardt 2000). The Aussiedler enjoyed a constitutional right to return
to Germany. Finally, Germany has been a main receiving country for large
numbers of asylum seekers; its Constitution protects a basic right for appli-
cants to file an asylum application in Germany, without allowing the
German state to limit migration to its territory. This came in contrast to
ideas that international human rights regimes and discourse would con-
strain national sovereignty; rather, it was a case of self-constrained sover-
eignty, connected to German history (Joppke 1999b).
In this context, Germany has been reluctant to develop an immigrant in-
tegration policy, as this would be self-acknowledgement of being a country
of immigration. Instead, it promoted programmes that would facilitate re-
turn migration, orientating migrants towards their countries of origin rather
than the host society. Those measures taken in the domains of labour and
education were considered for ‘temporary integration’ (Joppke in Broeders
2001: 71). Furthermore, they often involved more pragmatic, ad hoc policy
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responses at the local or regional levels. This led to an ambivalent ap-
proach, not unlike the two-tracks policies adopted in the Netherlands in the
1970s. Until as late as 1997, return migration would remain an important
policy aim, as demonstrated by the policy memorandum ‘Integration, re-
stricting immigration, help with voluntary return migration’1 (ibid.: 76).
Institutionalised separateness and the welfare state frame of integration
Parallel to this persistent denial of being a country of immigration, immi-
grants were nevertheless granted significant legal and social rights. In this
way, Germany gradually established a very particular type of multicultural-
ism (Joppke 1999b: 191). First, immigrants became post-national members
of state. These ‘denizens’ (Hammar 1985) enjoyed equality in the legal
and social-economic sphere, with equal rights as national citizens, while
being excluded from political rights or membership of the German nation.
Post-national membership fitted with the divergence of state and nation in
German history and culture. It made Germany an interesting case study for
post-nationalist thinkers (Soysal 1994), although this ‘post-nationalism’
had national, rather than international or global, roots (Joppke 1999b). In
this respect, German policies towards immigrants were not geared towards
a socially constructed category of ethnic or cultural minorities but rather,
what were considered national minorities – or minorities belonging to a
particular nation who remained oriented towards that nation. This explains
why Germany did not experience a rise in ethnic politics as the
Netherlands and the UK did; immigrants, such as Turks, remained loyally
oriented towards their homeland politics (ibid.) – a form of ‘transplanted
home politics’ (Koopmans & Statham 2003).
This post-national framing of immigrant ‘denizenship’ by the German
state coincided with a sharp focus on the role of the welfare state in rela-
tion to immigrant integration (Bommes & Geddes 2000). Bommes (2000)
describes this as a ‘community of GNP contributors’ comparable to the
German ‘community of descent’. Neither nationality nor ethno-cultural ori-
gin mattered in the German model of integration but rather, territory and
an individual’s participation in the social-economic sphere of the welfare
state (Thränhardt 2000). This frame of integration was therefore colour-
blind, albeit grounded within a very different frame than in France.
Second, in social-cultural terms, this approach also involved a sort of in-
stitutionalised separateness, or ethnic separatism (Brubaker 2003; Castles
& Miller 1993; Green 2004). In various domains, while in some regions
more than others, facilities such as immigrant minority language classes
were established as a means to accommodate cultural pluralism, such as in
the sphere of welfare policies. However, in contrast to France and the
Netherlands where ethnic accommodation was part of a multiculturalist
policy of emancipation, in Germany it was considered part of ‘foreigners
policy’.
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policies in these three domains – schools, social services and citi-
zenship – and the idioms in which they were rationalized and justi-
fied were indicative of a kind of benevolent, paternalistic, and egali-
tarian (or pseudo-egalitarian) apartheid, an institutionalized separate-
ness, suggested in the oxymoronic phrase ‘unsere ausländischen
Mitbürger’ – our foreign fellow citizens – that has been a leitmotif
of well-meaning public discussion of what continues to be called
Ausländerpolitik – politics or policies regarding foreigners – in
Germany. (Brubaker 2003: 46)
An assimilationist turn?
A frameshift has been taking place in Germany over the past decade or so,
putting increasing pressure on the post-national problem frame and gradu-
ally shifting towards a more assimilationist frame. First, when East
Germany and West Germany were united in 1990, the incomplete nation
argument dissipated and, as it did, the powerful political-cultural norm of
not being a country of immigration also came under fire. Second, Germany
witnessed massive asylum migration in the early 1990s, which forced the
government to adopt a so-called ‘asylum compromise’ that allowed more
discretion in restricting immigration while, at the same time, promising to
make its citizenship regime more accessible to foreigners. This led to a
normalisation of immigration during the 1990s, adopting restrictive migra-
tion policies towards foreign workers and asylum seekers, as well as
Aussiedler (Geddes 2003). Third, the effects of the German post-national
approach on the position of migrants appears to have been detrimental; in-
creasingly, the post-national model was considered a failure (Hansen
2003). For instance, in terms of naturalisation, employment and language
acquisition the position of migrants remained marginal (ibid.). Finally,
there were rising concerns about racism and discrimination in the early
1990s. This was a consequence of several highly mediatised focus events,
such as 1993’s incident in Solingen where extreme-right youth burned the
home of a Turkish family, resulting in five deaths.
These events gradually pushed the German approach towards a civic na-
tion à la française, with a more assimilationist approach (Joppke 2003;
Joppke & Morawska 2004). As the citizenship regime was relaxed, some
ius soli (birthright) elements were introduced in order to make naturalisa-
tion easier and citizenship more accessible. Until this point, cultural assimi-
lation had been a condition for naturalisation and the German state enjoyed
great discretion in granting it to newcomers. Now, national citizenship be-
came attainable, although still subject to strict conditions. This meant that
naturalisation was gradually reframed as a means for integration, rather
than as an outcome of integration or assimilation (Hansen 2003: 95).
However, dual nationality remained an obstacle; immigrants still had to
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select either their German or original nationality at the age of maturity. As
a consequence, even in the 1990s, the annual rate of naturalisation hardly
rose (Geddes 2003). As a result, the effects of the assimilationist turn have
not yet been very significant; however, at least in the policy discourse,
there has been a turn towards ‘politically recognizing, legally constituting,
and symbolically emphasizing commonality rather than difference’
(Brubaker 2003: 47). This coincided with emerging discussions about the
German Leitkultur (‘guiding culture’) in national political and public de-
bates (Geddes 2003).
After the turn of the millennium, following a report from the Süssmuth
Committee, the government finally acknowledged that Germany was in
fact an Einwanderungsland (Hansen 2003). This led not only to greater
efforts in immigration policy, but also endeavours to formulate a more sub-
stantial integration policy; to do this, Germany often looked to its neigh-
bours across the border, the Netherlands (Geddes 2003).
7.2.2 Germany’s ‘muddling-through’ integration
Muddling-through policymaking
How can Germany’s particular framing of immigrant integration and the
frameshift that has taken place be explained? Firstly, it is important to ob-
serve that the German policy of social integration was not so much the pro-
duct of a grand central policy design, such as the French Republican model
or the Dutch minorities policy. Rather, it was the consequence of an institu-
tional process of ‘muddling-through’ by Germany’s local, regional and na-
tional administrations, politics, social scientists and legal venues (Joppke
1999b: 187; Schneider 2007). This muddling-through involved, on one
hand, coping with the negative feedback that sustained the denial of being
a country of immigration, for a long time based on the charged argument
of an incomplete German nation. On the other hand, it involved coping
with the permanent settlement of rising numbers of migrants. This put in-
creasing pressure on the policy monopoly of not being an immigration
country, to formulate immigration policies and to adopt measures to ame-
liorate the social, economic, cultural and political position of migrants.
Bommes (2004: 161) speaks, in this regard, of the hypocrisy of German
policies, noting how ‘the political front stage was dominated [...] by the of-
ficial mantra that Germany is no immigration country’, while ‘backstage,
the legal obligation to include migrants [...] in the general welfare provi-
sions was more and more transformed [...] into an everyday routine’.
Lack of a grand central policy design was reflected in the absence of a
unitary, central policy structure. The federal structure of the German state
meant that local (Länder) and regional governments (Bundesstaten) en-
joyed significant autonomy in several key domains of integration, such as
education, welfare and culture (Soysal 1994: 62), also setting up local and
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state offices that specialised in integration policies and creating networks
for consultation with immigrant self-organisations (ibid.: 78). This led to
significant differences between regions. For a long time, some states, such
as Bavaria, maintained immigrant minority language courses in order to fa-
cilitate return migration; in some states these courses were aimed at accom-
modating ethno-cultural diversity, while in others they were abandoned al-
together, being declared an obstacle to German language apprehension
(Hansen 2003). This autonomy of local and regional governments created
a large number of venues where new policy ideas could emerge. For in-
stance, in the late 1980s, several states decided to afford voting rights to
immigrants that had been resident for a specific period (Joppke 1999b).
Although their decision was eventually annulled by the German
Constitutional Court, which interpreted the Constitution in such way that
the right to vote was to be confined to the German people only, it does
show how local and regional venues do furnish opportunities for positive
feedback towards policy change.
These venues in the German federal system had an important part in the
piecemeal attribution of legal and social rights to migrants. On the national
level, there was ‘no unitary structure or co-ordinating unit’ for integration
or immigration policies (Guiraudon 1998: 296). There was a Federal
Commissioner for Foreigners, the Ausländerbeauftragte (within the
Department of Labour and Social Affairs), which has ‘when similar agen-
cies in other countries are considered [...] a much weaker position vis-à-vis
both the state and migrant groups’ and significantly lacked ‘resources and
attention from government’ (Soysal 1994: 78). Moreover, the role of this
commissioner and committee within the department was deliberately kept
small-scale, as part of a political strategy to avoid any suggestion that
Germany had become a country of immigration (Guiraudon 2000b).
At the same time, this created tension between the autonomy that was
granted to local and regional governments – who often used this power to
extend immigrant rights and accommodate pluralism – and central govern-
ment, notably the Department of Home Affairs (Joppke 1999b: 192).
Embedding the integration policy in the Department of Social Affairs and
the Auslanderbeauftragte was therefore an important indication of framing
immigrant integration in terms of social-economic participation and the
welfare state, rather than in terms of home affairs and national citizenship,
as advocated by the Department of Home Affairs.
National government involvement in this policy domain was mainly
through semi-public organisations that were organised at the national level
and associated with government – what Soysal (1994: 77) describes as a
‘statist-corporatist’ pattern of incorporation. This included a series of wel-
fare organisations providing social assistance to migrants, such as Catholic
organisations that targeted mainly Catholic migrants, Protestant organisa-
tions for Protestant migrants and welfare organisations often associated
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with the Social Democratic Party that catered to the large remaining group,
notably including Muslim migrants such as Turks. The organisations were
represented in a Department of Social Affairs committee for the coordina-
tion of the integration policy, which also involved various other govern-
mental and public organisations, federations of trade unions and business
organisations and church organisations (ibid.: 78) In contrast to the UK
and the Netherlands, migrant organisations themselves were not present in
such a central government committee (ibid.).
Correspondence between immigrant integration research and policies
Social scientists played an important role in the ‘muddling-through’ ap-
proach to immigrant integration. They legitimised the welfare state ap-
proach that emerged within the setting of the broader German differentialist
frame of being Kein Einwanderungsland. Social researchers have generally
zeroed in on ‘social economic factors’ and ‘mainly on the welfare state
context of immigrant inclusion’ (Lavenex 2005: 250). According to
Lavenex (ibid.), ‘the successful integration of non-nationals in Germany is
discussed as a function of their participation in the social and economic in-
stitutions of the welfare state, including in particular schools, professional
training and the labour market’.
Bommes (2004: 197) also speaks of the pronounced ‘embeddedness’ of
German research and its approaches within ‘the model of the German wel-
fare state’. Especially since immigration levels surged due to labour migra-
tion, German scholars, particularly sociologists, became highly preoccupied
with the social integration of migrants into the German welfare state. In
this respect, German immigrant integration research developed within the
political frame of reference that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s; ‘the pri-
macy of problems was defined in politically rather than scientifically em-
bedded frames’ (ibid.: 199). Bommes (ibid.: 198) says that this ‘striking
homology between the perspectives of the social sciences and the
Sozialstaat’ is due to a powerful process of co-evolution of immigrant inte-
gration research and policy in Germany, or what he describes as:
a relation of correspondence and mutual support between science
and politics: the orientation of research to the public and political
definitions of migration and integration and the effective message
that migration and integration constitute important issues of the pre-
sent and future, succeeded in creating political resonance and a cor-
responding willingness to provide the means required for research.
According to Lavenex (2005: 251), the paradigm of welfare state integra-
tion had already been present in the pioneering stage of German immigrant
integration research. For instance, Hoffman-Nowotny (1973) adopted a
macro-sociological approach on migrant inclusion and exclusion in terms
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of opportunities to participate in various systems, such as labour, education
and politics, without focusing on the cultural domain. In a similar vein,
Esser (1980) defined migration and integration as a function of compatibil-
ities between the rational interests of migrants and societal systems. The
welfare state frame of immigrant integration also clicked with the German
ethno-cultural frame of national citizenship, that a priori excluded the op-
tion of assimilation, which could only mean being born as a German
(Lavenex 2005: 257). In addition, it was in line with German discourse
about the success of its welfare state, with American laissez-faire liberalism
as its counter image. Finally, the welfare state frame and post-nationalism
did not violate the taboo on critically assessing religious, cultural and eth-
nic differences (ibid.). Instead, it provided a powerful counterargument to
racist discourse.
In contrast to this integration paradigm, ‘the ethnic dimension of integra-
tion is rarely stressed’ in German immigrant integration research (ibid.:
250). Lavenex (ibid.: 252-253) quotes Faist (1994), among others, stating
that disagreements about ethnicity and multiculturalism were deliberately
avoided, as they would lead to ideological struggles. Unlike countries such
as the UK, the US and the Netherlands, minority approaches never really
gained ground in Germany. These approaches were immediately criticised,
by those supporting the dominant German frame of welfare state integra-
tion, as ‘creating the societal construction of immigrants as a social pro-
blem’ and ‘ignoring the main underlying socio-structural conditions for the
emergence of the immigration situation since the 1980s’ (Bommes 2004:
177-178).
Studies that did raise ideas countering German post-nationalism and its
welfare state integration frame risked being ignored. For instance, as early
as 1979, Germany’s first Federal Commissioner for Foreigners
(Ausländerbeauftragte), Kühn, had issued a report that demanded funda-
mental reform of the German citizenship law, including extending voting
rights to migrants (Guiraudon 2000b). Such ideas resembled those put for-
ward in the WRR report ‘Ethnic minorities’ in the Netherlands from that
same year (Thränhardt 2000). However, Kühn’s report remained largely
ignored, especially when it came to more fundamental recommendations
such as voting rights. It was then still too controversial for the government,
given the German policy context and the persistent ethno-cultural self-
understanding, to adopt such a radically new approach.
This type of research-policy nexus seems to approximate the engineering
model; research is highly policy-oriented but operates in a setting charac-
terised by political rather than scientific primacy and usually contributes to
legitimating a specific mode of government discourse. In this case,
German social researchers were undoubtedly pivotal in engineering the
German (universalist) welfare state frame of integration. The Dutch inte-
gration policy of the 1990s closely resembled this German welfare state
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frame of integration. However, an important difference is that, in Germany,
the welfare state had been the dominant frame for the evolution of policy
as well as research in a relatively uncontested way; in the Netherlands, the
rise of universalism in the late 1980s was accompanied by major frame
conflicts and boundary struggles.
However, since the 1990s, German immigrant integration research has
become more differentiated and generalised (Bommes 2004). Its closer
connection to general social science disciplines – particularly, general so-
ciology – has diluted what was once a remarkable emphasis on welfare
state integration (ibid.). At the same time, another vector at work is the
Europeanisation of immigrant integration research. As also observed for
the Dutch and French cases, German migration scholars are interacting
more and more within international research networks. This has added
further to differentiation in terms of research approaches and knowledge
paradigms, notably contributing to the rise of transnationalist frames in
German immigrant integration research (in a way that is very similar to the
Dutch case). Transnationalism seems, however, highly compatible with the
traditional German welfare state approach to integration, as illustrated aptly
in the work of German sociologist Thomas Faist (2000a, 2000b). Whereas
multiculturalism and assimilationism remain within the boundaries of the
nation-state, transnationalism loosens this grip. It highlights not how immi-
grants are incorporated into the nation-state but instead, how migration can
bring about integration in various social spaces. The nation-state is just one
of those social spaces; others include the welfare state or an international
human rights regime.
Politicisation and consensus-seeking: The Independent Commission on
Immigration
Compared with the UK and the Netherlands, immigrant integration was po-
liticised relatively early in Germany (Guiraudon 2000b: 145). Whereas
there had been a broad consensus on immigration until the 1980s, by the
end of the decade, political party competition surrounded the issues of mi-
gration and integration (Thränhardt 2000). With anti-communism senti-
ments waning, the Ausländer issue became a source of party conflict, espe-
cially for the centre-right CSU/CDU union (ibid.: 165). In the early 1990s,
anti-immigrant parties such as the National Democrats (NDP) and the
German People’s Party (DVU) also made the CSU/CDU more eager to
take a tough stance on migration and diversity (Geddes 2003). Moreover,
by the end of the 1990s, fierce competition erupted between the SPD/
Green coalition in government and the CSU/CDU in opposition, concern-
ing plans to introduce more ius soli elements to the law on German citizen-
ship. The opposition arranged a broadly supported petition in which it
called ‘For integration – but against dual nationality’ (ibid.: 96). In 1999,
having suffered a major defeat in elections in one of the Länder, the
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government coalition had to give way on a number of major points. That
immigrants still had to choose between their German or original nationality
at maturity continued to form a significant obstacle to naturalisation.
As Guiraudon argues (2000: 137), this politicisation may be explained
by the absence of a strong central policy structure and the abundance of lo-
cal, regional and federal venues. The same argument is made by Green
(2004: 139), who sees the lack of a clear institutional policy structure as
one of the reasons this area could be prone to such heavy politicisation and
polarisation. Several other factors explain why this politicisation was
milder than observed elsewhere, for instance, in France. First, racism in
Germany has been a huge taboo, a legacy of its Nazi history (Thränhardt
2000). As concerns about racism rose in the early 1990s, with the emer-
gence of anti-immigrant parties and a series of focus events involving ra-
cism, such as Solingen in 1993, the government faced mounting pressure
to create a new elite political consensus on this issue. This contributed to
the development of the 1993 asylum compromise (Joppke 1999b).
Second, Germany has been characterised by a culture of consensus-seek-
ing, Verhandlungsdemokratie, not unlike that in the Netherlands
(Guiraudon 1998: 296). Because of the multiparty system, there is no ‘win-
ner-takes-all logic’ that might contribute to politicisation but rather, politi-
cal parties are forced to rule alongside each other, with the liberal demo-
cratic FDP party in a particularly pivotal role. An important facet of this
German Verhandlungsdemokratie has been, as Schneider (2007) shows, the
establishment of ‘independent commissions’ that helped create inter-party
consensus on complex, contested policy issues. Often, these commissions
were ‘independent’ in that they involved representatives from various par-
ties and incorporated the expertise of academics and interest groups.
In the field of migration, too, an effort was made to tame the ongoing
politicisation through independent expertise. Major party conflict emerged
when, at the end of the 1990s, the Schröder (SPD) government decided to
allow selective labour migration, especially in highly skilled areas such as
IT. Faced with political opposition from the CDU, who maintained that
Germany should not be an Einwanderungsland, then Minister of Interior
Schilly decided in 2000 to establish an Independent Commission on
Migration to Germany (ICM). This commission was to develop a compre-
hensive outlook on the implications of migration, asylum and integration.
Although only a relatively small number of its members were academics,
the credentials of its chair, Rita Süssmuth, gave important legitimisation
for the commission’s work (ibid.: 102). However, the main function of this
commission would not be to ‘enlighten’ politics with a new frame but
rather to create consensus and avoid party political conflict (ibid.: 103).
The fact that Süssmuth was a prominent member of the CDU and former
chair of the German Bundestag added to the authority of this consensus-
building effort. According to Boswell (2009), the relatively weak role of
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academic expertise in this commission can be explained by the govern-
ment’s efforts to avoid being labelled as technocratic and out of touch with
the public.
The Süssmuth Commission tried to impose a more rational tone on the
immigrant integration debate. It recommended a more rational view be de-
veloped concerning the economic benefits of selective labour migration
and, emulating the Dutch example, the necessity of developing civic inte-
gration courses for newcomers (Schneider 2007). It also suggested the need
for a more systematic provision of data and analysis on which German mi-
gration policies should be founded (Boswell 2009: 151). Furthermore, one
of the background papers to the Süssmuth report recommended establish-
ing a new research institute affiliated with the government agencies respon-
sible for such data and analyses.
However, as was the case in the Netherlands with the Blok Committee,
Germany’s effort to tame the ongoing political controversies with indepen-
dent expertise would prove rather ineffective. In the midst of proceedings,
the CDU, angered that Süssmuth had agreed to head Schilly’s commission,
established its own commission on immigration. Both commissions’ re-
ports were published shortly after one another, in June and July 2001.
Their timing would prove unfortunate in view of 9/11, as well as early
2002’s appearance of CSU leader Edmund Stoiber on the German political
stage. Stoiber advocated a much more conservative tone vis-à-vis migra-
tion and integration (Green 2004: 123-124). Furthermore, the Süssmuth
Commission was accused of having an elitist, technocratic style that was
entirely out of touch with public concerns about restricting immigration
and furthering immigrant integration (Boswell 2009: 103). Boswell con-
nects this wariness of technocraticism to the legacy of the guest worker
era, which would also have been driven by technocratic views on migra-
tion rather than by consideration for migration’s impact on society.
Controversies surrounding the Süssmuth Commission were clearly re-
lated to the underlying frame conflicts in Germany. The commission’s
rational social-economic emphasis was simply at odds with the much more
social-cultural frame of the CDU/CSU, who articulated public concerns
about the societal impact of migration and the preservation of the German
Leitkultur (Boswell 2009; Green 2004). Rather than compelling a process
of critical reflection on these different frames, the commission (like the
Blok Committee in the Netherlands and the Stasi Commission in France)
chose a specific frame, thereby dissociating itself from the multiplicity of
frames present in both political and scientific discourses. The new migra-
tion law that had been recommended by the Süssmuth Commission was ra-
tified only years later through difficult negotiations and compromises
reached between the main political parties, though only after it was first re-
jected by the German Constitutional Court in 2003.
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The evolution of a bureaucratic nexus
The Süssmuth Commission did create a new discourse that embraced
Germany’s becoming an Einwanderungsland and its need for a more sys-
tematic policy of immigrant integration (Schneider 2007). In this context,
it had also created awareness that policymaking should be sustained by
more systematic research and data (Boswell 2009). Whereas Germany had
never developed an institutionalised research-policy nexus like the
Netherlands or the UK (Schneider 2007), this new consciousness did create
a very different pattern of boundary work in Germany. Following the
Süssmuth Commission, an Immigration Council was established in 2003,
which was to advise on the (then still to be ratified) new immigration law
(Boswell 2009: 151). This council was again chaired by Süssmuth, and its
members comprised several academics. However, due to difficulties in get-
ting the law ratified, the council was disbanded after a year. As Boswell
shows, though, the council further reinforced the need for a more systemic
approach to data and research (ibid.: 152).
This led to 2004’s establishment of an in-house research group within
the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamtes für
Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF). It took over the main functions of the
Immigration Council. However, as Boswell (2009) shows in her in-depth
analysis of the research group, its main function was to bolster BAMF’s or-
ganisational legitimacy in relation to other organisations who claimed
authority in Germany’s emerging field of migration policies. Boswell
found very little evidence of instrumental or substantive uses of the re-
search by the group. There was ‘a strong respect for knowledge as a source
of organizational legitimacy, but limited interest in drawing on research to
justify policy preferences’ (ibid.: 171). Rather, what the research group
mainly provided was general background information and data.
This way of configuring the first institutional research-policy nexus in
Germany reflects, at least to some extent, the rational bureaucratic mode of
governance that applies more broadly in Germany. On one hand, this in-
volves clear-cut boundaries: the role of research is clearly demarcated from
politics and independent expertise is highly valued in the political arena.
On the other hand, it involves prominent political primacy: the role of re-
search is to help politics rather than to do politics. The institutionalisation
of a migration policy domain, now that Germany had recognised it was an
Einwanderungsland, also brought about a degree of isomorphism in align-
ing research-policy relations in this field with the more general bureau-
cratic pattern in Germany.
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7.2.3 The co-evolution of German immigrant integration research and
policies
The German approach to immigrant integration is often depicted in migra-
tion literature according to the ‘differentialist model’. However, as an ana-
lysis of the development of immigrant integration research and policy in
Germany has shown, this model was heavily contested over the past dec-
ades, thereby needing to be supplemented by several alternative frames.
First, there was a strong welfare state frame of immigrant integration
among researchers and policymakers. Rather than integration into German
national society, which was excluded by the ethno-cultural conception of
‘Germanhood’, researchers and policymakers were mainly concerned with
integration in the German welfare state (Lavenex 2004). This welfare state
approach to integration has also been qualified as post-national, endeavour-
ing to include migrants in specific institutions rather than to assimilate
them into a specific national community. However, it also carries distinct
characteristics of a universalist frame, the kind that had emerged in the
Netherlands during the 1990s. Furthermore, an assimilationist frame fo-
cused on the German Leitkultur in public debate and the political arena,
although it has hardly yet been articulated in the field of German immi-
grant integration research. This shows how the German situation, contrary
to Brubaker’s institutionalist claim, must be qualified as a multiplicity of
frames rather than a dominant national model. As Green (2004) has ar-
gued, there has been an almost continuous conflict between different
frames of immigrant integration in the political arena, which explains the
slow and incremental development of German policies, rather than the resi-
lience of the German differentialist model.
A clear pattern of co-evolution in the development of German immigrant
integration research and migration policies is evident. At least until re-
cently, this co-evolution was not triggered by an institutionalised research-
policy nexus, as was the case in the Netherlands. There was, though, a
clear relation of ‘mutual correspondence’ between the framing of immi-
grant integration in research and policy. This relation of correspondence
evolved around a frame of welfare state integration. However, researchers’
involvement in policymaking was never very direct. Rather, immigrant in-
tegration research operated in a setting in which the framing of immigrant
integration was set primarily in the political arena. This was similar to
France, where immigrant integration was politicised relatively early. As
such, the German nexus between research and policy can best be described
in terms of the engineering model: politics maintained primacy, while re-
search helped to legitimise the dominant policy approach. In other words,
German immigrant integration research helped to engineer the German
welfare state approach to integration.
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An institutionalised nexus between research and policy did not form un-
til the persistent norm that Germany was and should not be an
Einwanderungsland had been punctuated. However, this punctuation itself
was not primarily an achievement of research-policy dialogues. It was lar-
gely an effect of political turnover at the end of the 1990s, when the CDU/
CSU government was replaced by the first ever SPD/Greens. Through the
Süssmuth Commission, independent, academic expertise was able to play a
role in this frameshift. Although the commission had an important effect
on German discourse in terms of realising that the country had become an
Einwanderungsland and that an integration policy was required, its direct
impact on policy was limited. Firstly, the decision to establish this commit-
tee was contested – the political opposition saw it as an indication that
government wanted to develop policy in an elitist, technocratic way, ne-
glecting popular concerns about migration. Secondly, the committee
adopted a highly rational, technocratic line of argumentation applicable to
migration regulation and integration policies, which was, indeed, discon-
nected from multiplying public and political worries about social-cultural
elements of integration and, particularly, preservation of German
Leitkultur. This reflects the situation with the Dutch Blok Committee and
underscores how hard it is to resolve intractable policy controversies
through independent expertise – for the simple reason that this expertise
tends to be contested as well.
The institutionalisation of a policy domain for migration and integration
after the turn of the millennium also gave way to the institutionalisation of
a research-policy nexus. The Süssmuth Commission, and its short-lived
successor, the Immigration Council, raised awareness not only about the
need for an integration policy, but also that policy-development required
more systematic data provision and research. As such, the German Federal
Office for Migration and Refugees established an in-house research group
that would provide a first form of the institutional research-policy nexus in
Germany. However, its main function would be to bolster the organisa-
tional legitimacy of this federal office within the emerging institutional pol-
icy domain. This reconfiguration of the German research-policy nexus is
thus best described in terms of the bureaucratic model, involving a clear
demarcation of the roles of research and policy and a clear political pri-
macy. In this sense, the new nexus seems to reflect the broader German
tradition of rational bureaucracy.
7.3 The UK
7.3.1 The British race relations model
The UK was one of the first European countries to recognise having be-
come a multi-ethnic, multicultural society. This ethos was not so much
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cosmopolitan in nature but rather, closely tied to British legacy as having a
culturally diverse empire in which ‘race relations’ had to be managed.
Moreover, the UK has held on to the idea – and norm – of being a multi-
cultural society much longer than most other European countries; only re-
cently have there been indications that the UK is joining the assimilationist
turn that is spreading across Western Europe (Joppke & Morawska 2004).
Universal British citizenship
How have the British framed immigrant integration over the past decades?
First, it is important to recognise that, like France, the UK has a long tradi-
tion of post-war immigration. In contrast to its history of emigration and
colonisation around the world, the UK itself was confronted with signifi-
cant immigration from its former colonies after World War II – an issue of-
ten phrased in the literature as ‘the empire strikes back’. Like initial colo-
nial migration to the Netherlands, most of these migrants were never seen
as immigrants in the first place, perceived, instead, as subjects of the
British Crown who had the right to settle in the UK. The 1948 British
Nationality Act also provided equal legal, political and social rights to all
citizens in the Kingdom as subjects of the crown (Geddes 2003: 32).
However, the levels of migration in the 1950s, the rise of public hostility
towards ‘coloured’ migration (Freeman 1994) and the occurrence of a ser-
ies of focus events in the late 1950s (Joppke 1999b) compelled the UK to
implement more restrictive immigration policies. Compared to other
European nations, the UK formulated some of the most restrictive policies,
allowing only for a minimum of immigration – which was in sharp contrast
to its earlier expansive immigration policies. Whereas in Germany the ra-
tionale for restrictive immigration policies was being an incomplete nation
conflicted by the idea of becoming an immigration country, in Britain the
rationale was based on a conception of the nation considered too wide to
be accommodated by the state (ibid.: 62). As early as 1958, race riots in
Nottingham and London’s Notting Hill called attention to rising hostility
towards colonial migration. This led to restrictive immigration policies be-
tween 1962 and 1981, eventually differentiating British citizenship as full
citizenship, citizenship of British Dependent Territories and citizenship of
British Overseas Territories, each category with distinct migration
eligibilities.
An essential difference with other countries was that most immigrants in
the UK already enjoyed formal citizenship. This meant that a different type
of citizenship discourse emerged than in France and Germany, where citi-
zenship was closely tied up with the issue of naturalisation. In the UK, the
logic of immigrant integration was rather a form of legal, political and, ul-
timately, social rights, as in Marshall’s (1964) ‘Citizenship and social
class’, which predicated this progressive expansion of rights throughout
various classes of British society. In contrast to the ‘thick’ citizenship
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conception in Germany and, to some extent, France, where citizenship was
connected to issues of national identity, citizenship in the UK was rela-
tively ‘thin’, or empty (Hansen 2003; Joppke 1999b; Small & Solomos
2006). Consequently, framing the UK as a multicultural society went rela-
tively uncontested, having deep roots in the legacy of multi-ethnic nation-
hood and indirect rule of the British Empire, which had left significant
space for cultural pluralism (ibid.: 233).
British ‘multiculturalism-on-one-island’: The race relations frame
Adopting restrictive integration was an important condition for the UK’s
formulation of integration policies in the 1960s. As described by Brubaker
(1992), the British model was externally exclusive and at the same time in-
ternally inclusive. Assimilation was rejected (in contrast to most other
European countries, which at that time still conducted assimilationist poli-
cies), and a choice was made for a multiculturalist approach that was also
distinctly national in nature, referring to the multicultural British society
rather than to a connection between Britain and foreign cultures, such as in
transnationalist or post-nationalist perspectives (Vertovec 2001); it was
‘multiculturalism-on-one-island’ (Favell 1998a). Until as late as 1999,
British multicultural society was perceived as a ‘community of commu-
nities’ (Parekh 1999).
Colour and race were central to how the issue of immigrant integration
was framed. Integration policy was framed primarily as an issue of improv-
ing race relations (Broeders 2001; Favell 1998a; Joppke 1999a). One of
the reasons for this was that at the time of framing its first integration poli-
cies in the 1960s, the UK took a good look across the Atlantic. The con-
temporaneous US case was trying to cope with significant racial unrest
(Bleich 2003). In the absence of citizenship as a defining and dividing
characteristic, race and colour became the criteria for social classification.
To some extent, this resembled the minoritarian logic of framing policy’s
social target groups in a way that would be developed in the Netherlands
later on, with a focus on ethnic or cultural minorities. One important differ-
ence, however, is that minorities in the UK were not framed according to
ethnicity, culture or religion but rather, on colour or race (Modood 2005).
This was a racialisation of the immigrant issue, as opposed to the
Netherlands’ ethnic minorisation and the colour-blindness found in French
Republicanism (Rath 1991).
The goal of British multiculturalism was to promote racial equality and
equal opportunities and improve race relations (Soysal 1994: 54), rather
than to contribute to the emancipation of racial groups, per se. ‘Racial in-
explicitness’ proved to be a powerful norm (Kirp in Joppke 1999b: 226).
This means that race was referred to as a general category and group parti-
cularism was avoided. One of the reasons for this was that British race re-
lations policies were framed in the shadow of American racial unrest and
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that the UK wanted to avoid such racial consciousness in the interest of
public order. This reflected the state’s role in British society, which differed
majorly from other European countries in that it was much more limited
and residual, primarily taking care of issues such as public order. State in-
terference in the private sphere, including, for instance, culture, was much
more limited. A British judge once stated that ‘England [...] is not a coun-
try where everything is forbidden except what is expressly permitted; it is
a country where everything is permitted except where it is expressly for-
bidden’ (Joppke 1999b: 233). One of the rationales for the British state to
engage in immigrant integration in the first place was to preserve public or-
der by managing race relations.
Instead of group emancipation, which was the aim of Dutch multicultur-
alist policies in the 1980s, the British sought ‘welfare state integration’
with much less government intervention (Joppke 1999b). Emphasis was on
ensuring equal opportunities in spheres such as education, labour, housing
and health care for all citizens, without carving out specific social groups
within the British welfare state, an institution that is universalist and needs-
based (Titmuss 1976). According to Soysal (1994: 55), the aim of the pol-
icy was ‘that of providing opportunities for and removing obstacles to indi-
vidual migrants’ integration into existing institutions of society, so that
they can gain those benefits already offered by the system’. In this vein, it
specifically stressed the anti-discrimination issue. Three successive Race
Relations Acts, in 1965, 1968 and 1976, established progressive legislation
to limit discrimination, with the first two acts concentrating mainly on di-
rect discrimination, but the third act also including indirect and statistical
discrimination (Geddes 2003). The 1976 act also formulated positive action
policies and established a Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to moni-
tor compliance to the Race Relation Act (ibid.: 46). Monitoring also in-
voked the question of social classification – so-called ‘ethnic monitoring’ –
as racial discrimination could only be monitored if there was some kind of
registration of ethnic or racial minorities. Though contradicting the norm
of racial inexplicitness, a question about race was included in the 1991 de-
cennial population census in order to register racial belonging.
The limits of British multiculturalism
Developments in the last decade or so have drawn attention to the limits of
British multiculturalism, contributing to a modest assimilationist turn in in-
tegration policies, like many other Western European countries (Joppke &
Morawska 2004). The imagined ‘community of communities’ has been
further challenged by events such as the 1989 Rushdie Affair and a
strengthened religious consciousness and activism on the part of British
Muslims (Favell 1998b). As a religious category or community rather than
a racial category, Muslims defy the British frame of race relations politics
(Modood 2005). More and more, a process is unfolding to redefine the
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British imagined community by finding the minimum requirement of what
‘being British’ means and by searching for commonalities – more than
compatibilities – in order to improve race relations (Joppke 2003; Singh
2004; Small & Solomos 2006).
An advisory report to the government in 2001, entitled ‘Community co-
hesion’ (the so-called Cantle Report), sketched a grim picture of the
British community of communities; it lacked a ‘meta-community’, where
minorities and natives often lived ‘parallel’ lives in local British neighbour-
hoods, contributing to spatial segregation and polarisation between ethnic,
racial and religious groups (see Joppke 2003). It rejected the current
British laissez-faire approach to multiculturalism as a policy that would
contribute to de facto apartheid (see Singh 2004: 56-57). In 2002, the na-
tional government issued a new memorandum on integration policy,
‘Secure borders, safe haven’, which adopted many elements of the Cantle
Report and moved ‘beyond multiculturalism’. It attempted to ‘thicken’ the
British citizenship conception, referring to a national ‘sense of belonging
and identity’ as a condition for British society to be able to receive and ab-
sorb immigration. Thus far, restricting immigration had been perceived as
a condition for positive race relations; now the preservation of national
identity was set as a condition for restricting immigration. In concrete
terms, the government attributed a more central role to English language
apprehension in integration and, in order to stress the ‘thicker’ citizenship
conception, it also introduced more ceremonial naturalisation procedures
(Hansen 2003).
7.3.2 The construction of the British race relations frame
Early debate expansion and contraction
On the international landscape, the British case stands out for the early
point at which the debate about migration and immigrant integration ex-
panded (politicisation), as well as how quickly its scale and scope again
contracted (depoliticisation). Already by the late 1950s and 1960s, immi-
grant integration had become a major concern in the political field. This
was largely in response to rising racial tensions among the British public
(Freeman 1994), notably culminating in race riots in Nottingham and
Notting Hill, orchestrated by anti-immigrant political forces. This led to
polarisation between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party with the
former pleading for tough restrictions on immigration and the latter warn-
ing against a rise in racism and discrimination (Geddes 2003).
A turning point came in 1968 when Enoch Powell, a right-wing
Conservative, gave a speech in which he warned against ‘rivers of blood’.
If the native white population were to become even more marginalised in
their cities and no proper action was taken, there could be bloody out-
comes, as Powell warned (Favell 1998b: 105). According to Favell (ibid.),
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Powell linked migration and integration to the issue of public order.
However, he also invoked more essentialist notions of ‘the English people’,
in contrast to what he defined as inassimilable migrants from some former
British colonies (Geddes 2003).
The stark politicisation invoked by Powell seems to have had a some-
what adverse effect. First, it was precisely concern with public order that
incited British politicians to prevent inflammatory speeches such as those
made by Powell, who was dismissed from his post and forced into an in-
formal agreement to desist further politicisation of the issue (Favell 1998b:
106). Moreover, a fear was incited that ‘playing the race card’ could, in
fact, undermine the current political establishment (Geddes 2003; Saggar
1992). Powell’s politicisation contributed to a political agreement to re-
move this issue from the political agenda and out of the political field.
Powell had ignored the rules of the political game forbidding any conflict
about English nationhood that could potentially undermine the pluralist ba-
sis of the UK (Favell 1998b: 105) or that threatened the political capital of
the current political establishment. In this sense, ‘the Powell effect’ re-
sembled that of Le Pen in France, the Dutch anti-immigrant parties of the
1980s and the events at Solingen in Germany – all of which worked to
strengthen the political anti-racism consensus rather than adopting tougher
approaches to immigration and integration.
The British race relations industry
In response to the debate expansion of the 1960s, the British government
embarked on an elite-crafted project of official multiculturalism (Joppke
1999a). Whereas Freeman (1994), argued that Britain’s restrictionist immi-
gration policies were a consequence of popular concerns about migration,
its multiculturalist race relations politics rather seem to have been a conse-
quence of elite anticipation (Favell 1998b; Statham & Geddes 2006). It
was a product of the consensus of political elites that originated in the
1960s, rejecting both assimilation and a sharp anti-racist discourse. Like
the republican model in France, British multiculturalist race relations were
supported by a broad (left-right) political consensus that effectively ex-
cluded both the extreme left and the extreme right, and managed to sustain
a stable policy monopoly for several decades to come. Indeed, in contrast
to the issue’s salience in the 1950s and 1960s, there would be very little
political disagreement about these matters until after the turn of the millen-
nium; the issue was, effectively, pacified.
As a consequence of the events in the 1950s and 1960s, an emergent
structure in the political field devolved the issue to alternative venues (lo-
cal government, scientific institutes), or to what would become known as
‘the race relations industry’. According to Favell (1998b: 112), the British
way of approaching this issue reflected ‘a familiar utilitarian pattern in
British political thinking, which emphasizes the consequential rather than
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the a priori deontological aspects of ethical and political reasoning’. Unlike
France where such a priori deontological thinking has been common since
the 1980s, partly due to the involvement of public intellectuals with a phi-
losophical background, in the UK there was a preference for ‘calculated,
piecemeal, evolutionary, anti-philosophical pragmatism’ (ibid.: 96). This
meant, for instance, that symbolic deliberations on immigrant integration
vis-à-vis national identity were systematically avoided; integration was in-
stead framed as a Marshallian expansion of legal and political rights to so-
cial rights.
Joppke (1999a: 233-235) adds here the role that the British tradition of
common law has played in this consequential logic. The UK’s pragmatic
legal tradition contrasted sharply with the prominence that constitutional
legal principles have had in this domain in France and Germany. It allowed
for much more flexibility and pragmatism in the legal accommodation of
ethnic pluralism, without offering a venue for linking such issues to funda-
mental legal (and national) principles, such as embedding them in a formal
constitution.
In the 1970s and 1980s, local venues were at the core of this logic of
consequence in problem framing and in the depoliticisation of immigrant
integration. Soysal (1994: 70) describes the way immigrant integration pol-
icy is organised in the UK as decentralised and society-centred, setting it
apart from France and the Netherlands, in particular. There was no unitary
policy structure for the coordination of British integration policy, except
for CRE’s legal, monitoring tasks at the national level. At the local level,
welfare organisations or community relations councils (CRCs, later re-
named RECs for Race Equality Councils) initially had a primary role in
sustaining the welfare state integration of immigrants. This did not so
much imply offering facilities but rather, aiding immigrants to make use of
their rights.
Fear loomed that CRCs would exacerbate racial consciousness, again re-
flecting a similarity with the American case. As they were being replaced
by immigrant self-organisations in the early 1980s (similar to what oc-
curred in the Netherlands during the same period), their responsibility be-
came ever more marginal. This resulted in local governments taking the
primary role in promoting local race relations (Joppke 1999b: 238). Being
reflected here was a British style of emphasis on welfare state integration
in which local governments were key in administering large parts, such as
education and housing (ibid.). Thus, devolving the integration issue to lo-
cal venues supported the welfare state frame of integration and, subse-
quently, the logic of consequence in the political field.
It was also at this local level that ethnic elites were co-opted. This oc-
curred by supporting the development of self-organisations, but also
through the establishment of race relations units in local governments, for
which representatives of immigrant racial minorities were selected (Soysal
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1994: 82). RECs are now also expected to represent minorities at the local
level, though they do not have a formal role as a statutory body (ibid.: 74).
The race relations paradigm in British immigrant integration research
The field of immigrant integration research in the UK was first shaped by
a sociology of race, which had its roots in sociology as well as anthropol-
ogy (Small & Solomos 2006). Like the Dutch anthropologists, the British
sociology of race had its roots in the study of cultures abroad, namely in
former British colonies. Only later would it turn towards the British home
country (Bourne 1980). When the Institute for Race Relations (IRR) was
established in 1952 (then still part of the Royal Institute for International
Affairs), its sights were set on race relations abroad, whereas in subsequent
decades it would become one of the leading institutes studying relations at
home. Research in this early period, around the 1950s, concentrated on the
cultural and racial ‘otherness’ of migrants (ibid.).
IRR would prove to be a cradle for British immigrant research, with pio-
neers such as Michael Banton, Richard Rose and Roy Jenkins. It was,
however, torn apart in the early 1970s by a boundary struggle provoking
scientific as well as political questions. Its first report, ‘Colour and citizen-
ship’ (Rose 1969), would set the tone for future integration research, defin-
ing colour as the guide to its analysis, as a legitimisation of the British race
relations regime (Joppke 1999: 124). Instead of adopting a critical Marxist
approach to issues such as institutional racism, the report sufficed with a
rather factual policy-oriented recommendation, which was also explicitly
stated (in a second version).
Any proposals for the amelioration of relationships between minori-
ties and majority – and this book is intended principally as a con-
structive contribution towards policymaking in this field – must be
justified in purely practical terms. [...] [and] have an application to
the real problems of the adjustment process [...]. (see Bourne 1980:
337)
An impassioned internal struggle ensued between another IRR researcher,
Jenkins and the research group centred around Rose. Gaining media atten-
tion, the conflict was about whether the crux of the study should be race re-
lations, as in Rose’s study, or racism, following Jenkins’ ideas (ibid.: 339).
The so-called pluralist school, which focused on race relations, ethnicity
and the transformation of the UK into a multicultural society rather than
on institutional racism, appears to have won this boundary struggle. It
managed to acquire funding from the Social Science Research Council
(SSRC, then the main body for funding academic research in the social
sciences) to establish a (then fully funded) Research Unit on Ethnic
Relations, which would later become the Centre for Research in Ethnic
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Relations (CRER) (Bourne 1980; Ratcliffe 2001). At the same time, IRR
would remain more on the margins of British integration research.
Consistent with social science on the whole during the 1970s, leading re-
searchers in this field were strongly inclined to take action. For instance,
John Rex, director of CRER since the late 1970s and one of the UK’s lead-
ing public intellectuals and sociologists in this period, fervently believed
that the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ of sociological research could not be separated
and sociology should maintain a societal commitment (Turner 2006). This
may have contributed to the distinct orientation towards policy held by re-
searchers in the field, as well as their being attuned to the political-ideolo-
gical environment. For instance, Rex had dropped many of his critical
Marxist ideas by the time he became CRER director (Favell 2001). CRER
also maintained close ties with state agencies, which sometimes conflicted
with the centre’s academic sensibility, for instance, when disagreements
transpired over use of the term ‘Thatcherism’ in a report from the 1980s
(Ratcliffe 2001: 129). Critics argue that the involvement of researchers in
the ‘race relations industry’ may have inadvertently contributed to racism
and state control over race relations, while being distinctly out of touch
with the black/racial target groups themselves (Bourne 1980). Just as in the
Netherlands, the British government seems to have preferred expert exper-
tise over ethnic expertise.
The dominance of race relations research appears not only to have legiti-
mised the British race relations framing of integration policies, but also its
guiding logic of consequence and pragmatism. Firstly, with a traditional
emphasis on race and multiculturalism, race relations research provided a
frame allowing the government to address immigrant integration without
resorting to extreme-left anti-racism (with such Marxist theories already
tamed in the boundary struggle that split the IRR) or policies of assimila-
tion that would invoke the national identity taboo (which was never present
in this research field). In addition, it supported policy development in an
instrumental manner, with a sociological thesis that equality of opportunity
and elimination of racial discrimination would support public order and
prevent conflict (‘rivers of blood’) in a multicultural society (Favell 1998b:
116). It carried a positive claim that, with a sociologically informed inter-
vention in race relations, public order could be secured (ibid.).
This contribution to the development of the British race relations frame
is manifest in the long series of discrimination studies undertaken by
CRER (also serving as funder), as well as the CRE and the Policy Science
Institute (PSI), which was formerly Political and Economic Planning
(PEP). PSI, in particular, has had an enormous direct and instrumental in-
fluence on policy developments, as two of its reports on discrimination
and race relations (1968, 1977) were immediate precursors for two of the
Race Equality Acts. Some of their later reports, however, appear to have
been largely ignored (Ratcliffe 2001), perhaps due to the fact that PSI is
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known as a rather leftist think tank with little influence in periods of con-
servative rule.
An important issue in the relations between British social scientists and
the British state has been the issue of ethnic monitoring, which is carried
out by institutes such as CRE, in relation to policy purposes. On one hand,
the racial inexplicitness of the British race relations frame means that race
should remain a non-explicit category, not used for carving out specific
groups. On the other hand, the monitoring of discrimination, and hence the
evaluation of policy, would be impossible without some means of register-
ing race as a social category. Social scientists and CRE, as a whole, had
been lobbying government since the 1970s to include questions about race
in the decennial population census (Ratcliffe 2001). It was not until 1991
that such a question was included. Still, it sparked significant conflict
across the science-politics nexus. For instance, there were fervent objec-
tions to using the 1991 census data for a study on racial dynamics of
labour and housing markets and related policy successes and failures, the
latter of which would even have been censured by the Home Office (ibid.:
122-123). The dilemma between the need for ethnic monitoring and the
norm of racial inexplicitness persists until this day. However, in the interest
of anti-discrimination policies, the UK has been one of the first countries
to introduce racial categories in national statistics (Joppke 1999b: 233).
The British case also reveals a persistent tendency towards what can be
described as comitology. After nearly every focus event to occur in this do-
main, the government response has been to establish a committee, often
led by a prominent politician but also calling on the expertise of leading re-
searchers. For instance, following the 1981 riots in Brixton, the Scarman
Committee was established. In 1985, the Gifford Committee was set up
after further unrest. The Bradford Committee followed in 1995 and, in
2001, the Cantle Committee. Although several, especially those chaired by
Scarman and Cantle, were quite influential, they often also seemed to be a
substitute for political action (Ratcliffe 2001). Moreover, they rarely led to
the type of the fundamental reflection seen in, for instance, the Nationality
Commission and the High Council for Integration in France (Favell
1998b). As such, they slotted neatly into the British logic of depoliticisa-
tion and pragmatism.
There was, however, a clear rupture within British race relations research
in the mid-1990s. This time, a new boundary struggle would split CRER.
On one hand, a more critical strand of research emerged, so-called cultural
studies on issues such as hybrid identities and identity politics among im-
migrants. The new school was led by researchers such as Paul Gilroy and
Tariq Modood, and led to the establishment of the Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies (Favell 2001; Small & Solomos 2006). On
the other hand, the cultural pluralists of race relations research (including
Rex) also sought to expand their scope beyond the British territory, trying,
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for instance, to acquire more European research funding. In fact, CRER
split precisely along these lines. To date, cultural studies has nevertheless
acquired little resonance among policymakers, even despite its association
with institutes such as PSI and IRR.
The institutionalisation of a technocratic nexus
In contrast to the other countries examined in this book, the level of politi-
cisation in the UK has, since the 1960s, remained comparatively low.
Direct involvement by social science researchers in policymaking, through
various venues, has remained significant. Although the current assimila-
tionist turn seems tied with progressive politicisation, until shortly after the
turn of the millennium, the debate on immigrant integration (i.e. race rela-
tions) was conducted largely in technocratic terms. This involved attempts
to manage race relations as a way to preserve public order, with several
race relations acts based in important respects on reports from PSI.
Recently, the government has shown renewed concern with ‘evidence-
based policymaking’ in this domain (Boswell 2009). This became manifest
in recent discussions on labour migration, which were highly influenced by
reports from the Institute for Public Policy Research and the Research,
Development and Statistics Directorate from the Home Office (ibid.: 109).
In the British research-policy nexus, boundaries between the two fields
appear never to have been very sharp. First, personal networks and the aca-
demic credentials of specific experts often played a key role in research-
policy dialogues. This reflects the broader British ‘national style’ in creat-
ing science-policy boundaries, whereby the credibility of science relies on
‘the quality and reasonableness of the experts who provide the scientific
evaluations’ (Halffman 2005; Boswell 2009). These personal networks
constituted the core of what Favell (1998b) describes as the elite-crafted
project of British multiculturalism. Within these networks, the boundaries
between research and policy were very diffuse, though academic creden-
tials could also bring about a considerable amount of political capital. This
clearly applies to a variety of leading social scientists in this field who
have contributed significantly to the shaping of British migration policies
(and immigrant integration research), including Rex and Bhikhu Parekh.
Secondly, the direct involvement of social science research in policy-
making is also manifested in the organisation of an extensive in-house
research capacity in the Home Office, particularly the Immigration
Research and Statistics Service (IRSS) in the Research, Development and
Statistics Department (Boswell 2009). In an in-depth analysis of how the
IRSS functions and the knowledge utilisation of its reports, Boswell (ibid.:
124) shows how IRSS findings were often used to substantiate government
positions, such as those in the field of labour migration. This contrasts with
the German research group within the Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees, which used findings mainly to legitimise its own organisational
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position within the emerging migration policy field. Within the largely
technocratic setting of policy debate on labour migration, the IRSS re-
search served as an important means for substantiating the liberal migration
agenda of the New Labour government and convincing fellow organisa-
tions in the field of the need for a more liberal migration regime.
7.3.3 The technocracy of British race relations
The configuration of relations between British immigrant integration re-
search and policymaking can best be described in terms of the technocratic
model. Contrary to the other countries examined in this book, the debate
on immigrant integration remained largely technocratic in the UK, at least
up until recently. Integration was largely depoliticised and devolved to
other venues like local governments and research bodies. In sharp contrast
with the highly philosophical (deontological) logic of framing in France,
the British followed a much more pragmatic (consequential) logic of fram-
ing. This involved a fervent belief that by managing race relations in a ra-
tional manner, public order could be maintained in the multicultural society
and ‘rivers of blood’ could be averted. In this depoliticised setting, the
British multicultural model of integration was the product of an ‘elite pro-
ject’ to manage race relations. The expertise of researchers and specific
research institutes played a key role in the development of these race rela-
tions policies. This included key roles for institutes like PSI, but also the
CRER and, later, the IRSS in the Home Office. On some points in particu-
lar, researchers were able to exert significant influence on policy develop-
ments, such as in the case of the PSI reports on discrimination and the so-
cial-scientific lobbying for ethnic monitoring.
In this depoliticised setting, the boundaries between immigrant integra-
tion research and policy never became as articulated as they were in, for in-
stance, Germany. Researchers were often involved in policymaking in very
direct ways, often through highly personalised settings. This seems to reflect
the broader British style of boundary regimes, where personalised academic
credentials frequently have much more weight than formalised science-pol-
icy boundaries. This is manifested in the many instances where academic
experts participated in government-oriented or government-associated com-
missions, such as the many examples raised by Bleich (2003) on how
British academics and policymakers, alike, were influenced by the US race
relations approach and, more recently, the example of the Commission on
the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain that was chaired by Parekh.
The race relations frame of immigrant integration was clearly an out-
come of co-production between researchers and policymakers in the UK.
After all, this frame was co-produced by what has been described as a
‘race relations industry’, in which researchers, but also local governments
and organisations such as the CRE, played a central role. In the field of
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immigrant integration research, British sociologists of race have been at
the core of co-producing a race relations frame. Having lost its most criti-
cal Marxist roots, the British sociology of race looked primarily to matters
of culture, race and ethnicity in view of developing British multicultural
society. Like Dutch social researchers of the same period, British sociolo-
gists had a strong sense of societal engagement as well as policy orienta-
tion. At an essential moment in the co-evolution of British immigrant inte-
gration politics and research, race relations specialists managed to acquire
a dominant position. This occurred in the 1970s when IRR was struck by
internal boundary struggles and CRER came on the scene, establishing a
base for race relations research in the decades to come.
However, recent developments appear to have strained this technocratic
symbiosis within the British race relations frame. On one hand, a gradual
reframing of the British model occurred after the turn of the millennium,
as renewed politicisation of the issue led to a re-ethnicisation of British po-
licies, in search of commonalities and the minimum requirement of what
‘being British’ means. This politicisation and re-ethnicsation also seems to
involve a punctuation of the technocratic and pragmatic style of policy-
making. On the other hand, a new boundary struggle emerged in the
British field of immigrant integration research: race relations researchers
frequently looking towards Europe for funding versus cultural studies
adopting a more critical perspective on British race relations politics. Just
as in the Netherlands, the division of labour between social scientific re-
search and politics in the UK appears to be characterised by a shift from
symbiosis to a more antithetical relationship.
7.4 Conclusions: Dutch exceptionalism?
This chapter has explored the role of research in the construction – and re-
production – of specific frames of integration in France, Germany and the
UK. The main objective was to find out whether the patterns of research-
policy relations found in the Dutch case could also be identified in coun-
tries with very different national styles of boundary work. Could we identi-
fy more generalisable correspondences between the structure of research-
policy relations and the culture of framing immigrant integration?
A first pattern found in several countries, notably the UK and the
Netherlands, was the relationship between technocracy and multicultural-
ism. In both countries, a relation was found between, on one hand, a highly
institutionalised issue domain with close ties between researchers and pol-
icymakers and, on the other hand, a multiculturalist type of problem fram-
ing that stressed specific characteristics of an ethno-cultural (Netherlands)
or racial (UK) nature. Technocracy resulted in a depoliticised setting in
both countries and a fervent belief in societal steering, be it the
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management of race relations in the UK or the state-led emancipation of
minorities in the Netherlands. In addition, it involved a strong policy orien-
tation and social engagement by researchers, exemplified, for instance, in
PSI’s and CRER’s policy entrepreneurship in the UK and that of ACOM
and WRR in the Netherlands. In both countries, multiculturalism was the
product of ‘elite technocratic management’ (Favell 1998b), which, particu-
larly for the Dutch case, made it vulnerable to criticism of being out of
touch with popular concerns about the broader societal impact of
immigration.
Apparently, there is something about technocracy wont to generate mul-
ticulturalist frames of immigrant integration. Regardless of the alleged na-
tional models of integration that dominate historical-institutionalist think-
ing, this analysis shows that it was the technocratic configuration of dialo-
gues on immigrant integration that contributed to constructing a
multiculturalist frame of integration. In fact, this technocratic configuration
was produced in both countries only after short-lived periods of politicisa-
tion – following key trigger events such as the suburban riots in the UK
and the Moluccan terrorist acts in the Netherlands. It was only then –
mostly ‘behind closed doors’ and by specific national elites – that the mul-
ticulturalist type of frames gained ground in both countries: namely, the
race relations frame in the UK and the ethnic minorities frame in the
Netherlands.
A second pattern found in several countries was that a lack of institu-
tionalisation – deinstitutionalisation – of a migration policy domain tends
to encourage linkages with broader societal issues such as the welfare state.
This is what occurred in Germany until recently and in the Netherlands
in the 1990s. In Germany, until about a decade ago, the Kein
Eindwanderungsland myth prevented a policy domain from becoming in-
stitutionalised; in terms of both research and policy, this meant that issues
of integration were mostly framed within the broader context of the welfare
state. In the Netherlands, the integration policy of the 1990s also involved
a more general (universalist) approach to integration, discontinuing or
weakening the position of domain-specific actors such as the Minorities
Policy Directorate and ACOM and, instead, delegating more responsibil-
ities to generic policy departments and local governments. Lack of an insti-
tutional policy domain also implies that no institutional research-policy
nexus can emerge. Indeed, in the Netherlands, the research-policy nexus of
the 1980s was deconstructed in the early 1990s; in Germany, no nexus was
constructed until shortly after the turn of the millennium. Research-policy
dialogues in this setting mainly involved political primacy and a very se-
lective use of data (e.g. from SCP in the Netherlands) or research that fitted
into the dominant universalist problem frame (e.g. the dominant tradition
of welfare state integration observed in German migration literature).
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Something about a lack of institutionalisation seems to prevent overem-
phasis on what is particular to immigrants and encourages what has been
described in the Dutch case as a logic of equity in problem framing. This
means that issues connected to broader societal themes tend to stress what
migrants have in common with others as new citizens, rather than what dif-
ferentiates them as ethnic or racial minorities. We can also speak of, in this
respect, a co-evolution of immigrant integration research and policies in
developing such univeralist type of frames. Clearly, although less direct
than in technocratic types of research-policy relations, non-institutionalised
research-policy dialogues contributed to the co-production of the welfare
state integration frame in German migration policies and research and the
integration paradigm in Dutch policies and research during the 1990s. It is
doubtful, however, to what extent this co-evolution can be extended to all
European countries. A key variable in the rise of universalism as found in
Germany and the Netherlands of the 1990s is the structure of their welfare
states. Both countries have extensive Bismarckian welfare states, involving
extensive welfare facilities and a view of government as a ‘compensator of
first resort’ (Leibfried 1992). This may explain why this type of universal-
ist frame did not evolve in either the UK or France.
A third pattern was found between politicisation and the assimilationist
turn that seems to be taking place in various Western European countries.
Especially in the Netherlands but also in France, Germany and, to some
extent, the UK, this shift was associated with a more antithetical relation-
ship between research and policy. Politicisation often involved public ques-
tioning of scientific credibility and an aversion to inaccessible technocratic
modes of policy development that would be out of touch with the public.
This became evident in the Netherlands, where the Blok Committee
sparked controversy about social researchers’ reliability, alleging a multi-
culturalist bias and technocratic involvement in prior policy development.
A similar controversy surrounded the Süssmuth Commission in Germany,
spiralling criticism for its technocratic style that disregarded popular con-
cerns about integration. France has, for even longer, been a scene of major
boundary struggles involving open controversy between ‘public intellec-
tuals’ in favour of an assimilationist frame and social scientists advocating
a more pragmatic approach to integration; already for decades, boundary
struggles have been manifest in issues of ethnic statistics in France.
Politicisation somehow created positive conditions for the rise of assimi-
lationist frames in various countries. Especially in France and the
Netherlands, the politicisation of immigrant integration spurred attention to
the social-cultural facets of integration. This has generated a more philoso-
phical or, as Favell (1998b) has described it, deontological logic of pro-
blem framing, concentrating on issues of great symbolic importance for the
preservation of national identity (for instance, headscarves in France and
dual nationality in the Netherlands). However, a deontological logic and
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the national focus of problem framing in political fields seems to be at
odds with the broader development of an increasingly Europeanising field
of integration research. This widening divide is evident in several coun-
tries, for example, in France’s controversies about ethnic statistics and in
the transnationalist and post-nationalist literatures that have evolved in par-
ticular in the Netherlands and Germany.
All cases revealed the institutionalisation of research-policy relations
around specific frames. This applies to the welfare state frame of integra-
tion in German policy and research, the broad science-politics discourse
coalition of the French Republican model, the British race relations indus-
try and the Dutch technocratic symbiosis produced around the multicultural
model of the 1980s. Clearly underscored is the argument made elsewhere
(Favell 1999; Lavenex 2005) that immigrant integration research tends to
be highly nationalised, co-producing the so-called ‘national model of inte-
gration’. However, the ongoing Europeanisation of the domain of immi-
grant integration research does catalyse a denationalisation of research
frames and a greater distance between research and politics in this respect.
This co-production of national frames has complicated critical frame re-
flection in the dialogues between immigrant integration research and poli-
cies. Research-policy dialogues rarely addressed the multiplicity of frames
found in most countries. On one hand, researchers tended to ally them-
selves to one specific frame, often the one predominating their national set-
ting. This was clearly manifest in the dominance of the race relations frame
in British immigrant integration research, the welfare state frame in
German research and the multicultural model in Dutch research of the
1980s. On the other hand, policymakers have had a tendency to pick and
choose those research claims that support their policy discourse, rather than
critically confronting their frames with potential alternatives. This was par-
ticularly evident in France, which had a blind spot for empirical social re-
search that could contest the assumptions of the republican model. In var-
ious cases, though, the Europeanisation of immigrant integration research
and the rise of transnationalist and post-nationalist frames accelerated the
widening divide between research and policy in this respect.
The difficulties of engaging in frame reflective dialogues on immigrant
integration have become obvious from the various committees established
to ‘reflect’ on integration policies. The Blok Committee in the
Netherlands, the Süssmuth Commission in Germany and the Stasi
Commission in France were established to respond to the challenges being
faced by national governments in taming the progressively politicised con-
troversies on integration. Confronted with the multiplicity of frames in-
volved in these controversies, each of these bodies chose to affiliate itself
with a specific frame: universalist for the Süssmuth Commission and the
Blok Committee, and a more assimilationist (republicanist) frame for the
Stasi Commission. Yet, rather than encouraging frame reflection, these
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bodies contributed further to frame controversy. The fact that all fell into
controversy clearly underscores the theoretical premise that intractable con-
troversies cannot be resolved through re-examining ‘the facts’, as these
facts tend to be selected and interpreted very differently by actors with dif-
ferent frames.
Can we conclude, then, that the Dutch case of research-policy dialogues
on immigrant integration is exceptional? In most respects, it is not. The
Netherlands reveals a type of national-level co-evolution between immi-
grant integration research and migration policies that was clearly present in
other countries as well, despite this pattern of co-evolution following dif-
ferent national paths. We have also seen that research-policy dialogues in
the Netherlands were neither more nor less ‘reflective’ than in other coun-
tries. Just as in surrounding countries, the role of research became con-
tested in a situational setting characterised by frame conflicts. In particular,
the tendency for research-policy relations to institutionalise around specific
frames seems to have contributed to this.
What may have to some extent been exceptional is the ferocity of frame-
shifts and frame conflicts in the Netherlands. For in no other county were
so many frameshifts found to occur in such a relatively short time. In fact,
no single Dutch ‘model of integration’ could maintain itself in official pol-
icy discourse for more than a decade or so, whereas models in surrounding
countries – though more dynamic than the historical-institutionalist litera-
ture suggests – were maintained for longer periods. Moreover, in no other
country did frame conflicts become so intense (though France seems to ap-
proximate the Netherlands in this respect). This applies, in particular, to
the fervent denunciation of multiculturalism, which was declared ex post a
failure and blamed for many current Dutch integration problems. Related
to the ferocity of frame conflicts, the role of research has become perhaps
even more contested than in the other countries.
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8 Conclusion: Towards reflective
research-policy dialogues?
This book has ventured into both the political and academic controversies
on immigrant integration in the Netherlands over the past decades. Rather
than honing in on a specific ‘model of integration’ or the famous – or infa-
mous – Dutch multicultural model of integration itself, it has analysed the
multiplicity of frames of immigrant integration. Immigrant integration is an
essentially contested concept in the Netherlands, with policymakers adopt-
ing a new frame of integration almost once every decade or so. This sig-
nificantly challenges the view in national and international literature that
the Dutch case represents a coherent, consistent multicultural model.
Modelling the Dutch case as such seems to be an ex post construction
rather than an accurate depiction of formal policy discourse in the
Netherlands. Indeed, although there was something like a multicultural
model during most of the 1980s, it had already been abandoned by the be-
ginning of the 1990s and was constantly contested by other frames of
integration.
Furthermore, disaccord about how to frame immigrant integration was
closely connected to controversies over mutual relations between research
and policymaking in the field. In the Netherlands, immigrant integration re-
search has been tied up with the framing of this issue as well as the con-
struction of the Dutch multicultural model. Indeed, the development of
both fields can, to some extent, be described as a pattern of co-evolution.
However, Dutch immigrant integration research has become highly frag-
mented, with several frames of integration. This has complicated research-
policy dialogues, particularly in the last decade. Researchers tend to affili-
ate themselves to specific frames, whereas policymakers tend to ignore re-
search containing a frame other than their own. The recent controversies
surrounding the Blok Committee, which defined Dutch policies as a rela-
tive success even though many political parties had denounced it as a fail-
ure, illustrates how easily research-policy dialogues can digress into a dia-
logue of the deaf.
Analysing such dialogues in the construction of specific frames, this
book has tried to transcend the more historical-institutionalist modes of
‘models thinking’ that have acquired wide resonance in European immi-
grant integration research. From a structuralist-constructivist perspective,
this study has taken such models as objects of analysis rather than as
starting points for analysis, and has delved into the process of constructing
the models as frames. This approach has proven highly valuable in under-
standing controversies surrounding immigrant integration and the multipli-
city of frames involved. It has also shown how some cultures of framing
immigrant integration tend to be associated with specific structures of rela-
tions between different types of actors.
8.1 Beyond the Dutch multicultural model
This book punctuates the image of a dominant, consistent and coherent
Dutch multicultural model of integration. Instead, it has developed a view
of the Netherlands’ approach as contested and involving a multiplicity of
frames. Contrary to the path dependency and policy coherency and consis-
tency suggested by models thinking, this view emphasises dynamics, pol-
icy conflict and a high degree of inconsistency in the Dutch approach over
the past decades.
In both policy and research there has been, besides the multiculturalist
framing of integration, a long tradition of a more universalist framing of
integration. More recently, assimilationist and transnationalist frames have
evolved in both fields as well, contributing further to the multiplicity of
frames making immigrant integration such an intractable controversy.
Different frames have prevailed in distinct periods throughout the develop-
ment of Dutch integration policies – multiculturalism in the 1980s, univers-
alism in the 1990s and a more assimilationist frame since the turn of the
millennium. In the field of research, this multiplicity was not so much
manifested in periodic shifts but rather, in a progressive fragmentation of
the research field, involving different research paradigms (minorities para-
digm, integration paradigm, etc.) associated with specific experts, research
institutes and advisory bodies.
The multicultural model, for which the Netherlands has become so inter-
nationally known, can be redefined as a discourse and situated in a particu-
lar historical and structural setting, rather than denounced altogether.
Indeed, during the 1980s, a multiculturalist frame was dominant in both
policy and research (though in both fields combined with important ele-
ments of universalist thinking). It was founded on the consensus of a rela-
tively small network of researchers and policymakers who shared a con-
cern for what was specific to the position of ethnic or cultural minorities –
the logic of minorities. Despite the fact that Dutch society had been depil-
larising rapidly since the late 1950s, this frame seemed to reflect how
Dutch society had responded to social and religious pluralism earlier in the
twentieth century. Vink (2007) explains this as a ‘pillarisation reflex’,
meaning that this pillarisation frame was reinvented in response to immi-
gration, so as to tame a potentially controversial policy problem. The idea
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of a pillarisation reflex in the framing of this issue cannot, of course, con-
ceal that immigrant minorities in the Netherlands never really evolved into
the well-organised and coherent pillars that had once characterised society.
Furthermore, the dominant cultural-anthropological tradition in immigrant
integration research contributed to the emphasis on cultural or ethnic mino-
rities, without any connection to pillarisation.
In formal policy discourse, this multiculturalist model was abandoned in
the early 1990s for a more universalist approach, stressing the ‘good’ or
‘active’ citizenship of individual migrants, especially in social-economic
areas such as labour, education and housing. By 1989, WRR had de-
nounced the decade’s multiculturalist approach as largely ineffective, turn-
ing migrants into ‘welfare dependents’ and being too bogged down in
‘symbolic debates’. This report, together with the national minorities dis-
pute of the early 1990s, contributed significantly to the citizenship-oriented
approach of integration policy seen in the same decade. In immigrant inte-
gration research more generally, there was a major emphasis on the partici-
pation of individual migrants as citizens in the social-economic sphere, as
illustrated in the SCP reports. After the turn of the millennium and espe-
cially after the ‘long year of 2002’ and the Fortuyn revolution in Dutch
politics, the multicultural model was denounced in even stronger terms. A
2003 memorandum stated that ‘with the cultivation of the own cultural
identities it is not possible to bridge differences [...] the unity of our society
must be found in what the members have in common’.1 This statement
clearly illustrates the assimilationist turn that Dutch policies experienced in
the first years of the new millennium.
In Dutch immigrant integration research, the ongoing trend towards
Europeanisation and internationalisation is contributing to a multiplicity of
frames and a widening gap between the worlds of policy and research.
Whereas politicisation is triggering a national framing of immigrant inte-
gration, as illustrated by the tight issue linkage between immigrant integra-
tion and national identity and social cohesion, immigrant integration re-
search has witnessed the evolution of transnationalist and post-nationalist
frames. These frames, at least to some extent, denationalise the process of
immigrant integration, being at odds with the assimilationist turn in many
integration policies in Europe. One of the mechanisms behind this trend is
the co-optation of researchers in European research networks, sometimes
funded by European organisations (e.g. European framework programmes
for research funding that have financed as an example par excellence the
IMISCOE Network of Excellence).
Thus, multiculturalism was only one of several frames to have influ-
enced policy discourse and research in the Netherlands. As a policy dis-
course, the multicultural model has had significant influence on policy
practices, especially in the 1980s. There is some evidence that policies in-
itiated in the 1980s were effectuated in this period and were even
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continued until well after the multicultural policies of the minorities policy
were formally abandoned. This is what Koopmans (2007) refers to as the
strong tendency for ‘path dependency’ practiced in Dutch integration poli-
cies. For instance, immigrant language and culture instruction continued
until after the turn of the millennium, albeit in different forms and with dif-
ferent wordings of its rationale. Whereas the goal was initially formulated
as contributing to identity formation of migrants within the Dutch multicul-
tural society, the rationale of the 1990s was reframed in terms of ‘language
transition’ by first mastering the mother tongue in order to support the sub-
sequent apprehension of Dutch as a second language.
However, the extent to which these practices continue to be inspired by
a coherent multicultural model remains contested. To some extent, the na-
tional and local levels of integration policy seem to have followed different
institutional logics. Whereas national policy discourse was inspired by po-
liticisation, trigger events and a concern with grand themes such as
national identity and culture, local policy discourse seems to have been
much more pragmatic in nature, concerned with practical modes of pro-
blem-coping and a more instrumental policy logic. An important instance
of divergence in this respect concerns the recognition of ethno-cultural
groups and minorities organisations. In the early 1990s, national govern-
ment formally adopted a more colour-blind citizenship approach, approach-
ing migrants as citizens rather than as ethnic or cultural groups. This meant
that various group-specific, tailor-made projects would have to be abol-
ished. Yet, in practice, group-specific projects continued to proliferate (De
Zwart & Poppelaars 2007). Often, there was a pragmatic need for policy
practitioners to concentrate on specific groups and cooperate with migrant
organisations, to be able to ‘reach’ the policy targets and to acquire rele-
vant knowledge and information about them (Poppelaars & Scholten
2008).
Although these local practices often imply a de facto recognition of cul-
tural groups, it would be a mistake to consider them real multicultural poli-
cies. Rather, they form more pragmatic attempts to conduct effective poli-
cies at the local level. They are not inspired by an ideology of multicultur-
alism or a legacy of pillarisation but rather, by the more pragmatic need to
recognise groups and develop tailor-made projects to conduct effective po-
licies and, as former Mayor of Amsterdam Job Cohen often put it very
aptly, to ‘keep things together’. They also show that the 1990s’ citizenship
approach did not institutionalise as a coherent policy model or become a
true ‘national model’. Neither did the multicultural paradigm of the 1980s.
The analysis of Dutch migration policies and research presented in this
study shows the value of looking beyond ‘national models of integration’.
Bowen (2007) has argued that we should distinguish between models of in-
tegration policies and models for integration policymaking. We have now
seen that these national models tend to distort our view as models of
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integration policies, as their emphasis on historical consistency and policy
coherency tends to conceal the more dynamic and contested nature of pol-
icymaking. Instead, ideal-typical frames of immigrant integration, based on
earlier typologies from Castles and Miller (2003) and Koopmans and
Statham (2000), have been used here to empirically analyse how and why
specific frames come and go in policy discourse and research. Thus, rather
then attempting to capture the Dutch case in terms of a specific model, this
book has emphasised the process of problem construction in research and
policymaking. Ideal-typical frames are tools for analysis rather than stand-
ins for empirical analysis. Furthermore, this type of frame analysis also
allows for the empirical study of models for policymaking. Indeed, we
have seen that ‘multiculturalism’ was such a model or discourse for policy-
making for some actors in the 1980s and, in fact, has remained so ever
since. However, this does not legitimise the qualification of Dutch policy
and research in terms of such a multicultural model.
8.2 The Dutch research-policy nexus on the line
The nexus between immigrant integration research and policymaking in
the Netherlands has played a central role in what can be described as a
‘co-evolution’ of both fields. Dutch immigrant integration research has of-
ten been highly policy-oriented, able to ensure its policy relevance through
diverse institutional channels, including expert committees and advisory
bodies such as ACOM, WRR and SCP. At the same time, immigrant inte-
gration policymaking has been majorly influenced by immigrant integra-
tion research, notably in comparison to other policy fields. Much more
than the ethnic expertise of migrant organisations, academic expertise was
pivotal in several policy turning points. The initial urge for depoliticisation,
the belief in societal steering of processes of integration and, of course, the
ready availability of policy-relevant research seem to have been important
causal factors in the role of this nexus.
The nexus between research and policy has, however, been shaped very
differently over specific periods. Supported thus is the premise of scientific
studies that, in empirical research, the role of science rarely accords to that
long-held dogma of ‘science speaking truth to power’. This book finds
clear correlations between what Gusfield (1976) described as the structure
of policymaking, including a specific role for academic expertise, and the
culture of policymaking, or the framing of the immigrant integration issue.
First, the technocratic structure of policymaking in the late 1970s and early
1980s created a structural setting that allowed for a multiculturalist framing
of integration. As already indicated by Guiraudon (1997) and supported
here, this technocratic structure helped keep the policy debate behind
closed doors. It limited not only the discussion’s scale to a small network
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of policymakers and experts, but also its scope, concerned with what was
specific to ethnic and cultural minorities and that which called for a logic
of minorities. This structure helped sustain a policy equilibrium during the
1980s, insulating the integration policy domain from the broader politics of
welfare state retrenchment during that period.
Second, research again proved crucial in the universalist policy turn in
the early 1990s, albeit with a very different configuration of the research-
policy nexus. In this period, research fulfilled an enlightenment role that
helped punctuate the structural equilibrium that had, until then, sustained
multiculturalism. In particular, WRR furnished a venue for the agenda set-
ting of a more universalist framing of immigrant integration. Thanks to its
‘scientific’ authority, WRR was considered a legitimate venue for raising a
new frame that broke major taboos in this domain. The report attracted
broad public and political discussion, but only years later were many of its
main ideas adopted in government policy. Yet, WRR’s enlightenment role
created issue linkages between immigrant integration and the broader poli-
tics of welfare state retrenchment, prompting a very different logic of pro-
blem framing. Instead of stressing the particularities of migrants, the new
universalist frame redefined migrants as citizens, focusing on their partici-
pation in general institutions rather than on group-specific measures.
Third, the recent assimilationist turn in Dutch integration policies also
involved a reconfiguration of the research-policy nexus. Immigrant integra-
tion became the crux of a broader populist challenge to the Dutch political
establishment. More than before, immigrant integration became politicised,
with Dutch politicians and government eager to respond to the ‘voice from
the street’, which populists claim had been ignored for too long. To inspire
new political impetus to the integration policy, research was used very se-
lectively to provide symbolic support to the assimilationist policy turn.
Data on social-cultural integration, such as that from SCP, now became
more meaningful. At the same time, a third WRR report developing a more
transnationalist problem framing was ignored. Moreover, the role social re-
searchers had played in policy development over the past decades became
subject of political controversy. When a parliamentary investigative com-
mittee asked a research institute to evaluate the effectiveness of the integra-
tion policy, the credibility of immigrant integration research was put openly
on the line; there were allegations of a multiculturalist bias and overly
close involvement in the policy they would now have to evaluate.
Interestingly, this boundary struggle afforded an important opportunity for
constructing the Dutch multicultural model in hindsight. The model be-
came a powerful counter-discourse against which new policy developments
were juxtaposed. Moreover, it served to disqualify various actors that had
previously been involved in this domain.
Analysis of the evolution of research-policy relations over the past dec-
ades indicates a growing disenchantment in the dialogue between
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immigrant integration research and migration policies. On one hand, there
was the tendency of research-policy relations in this domain to create what
others have described as ‘paradigmatic closure’ (Castles & Wihtol de
Wenden 2006). The Dutch case reveals a repeated institutionalisation of re-
search-policy relations around specific problem framings. In different peri-
ods, specific research and policy actors often converged on the research-
policy nexus surrounding a shared frame, while excluding other actors with
rival frames. It created not only a policy monopoly that could remain rela-
tively stable for some time (about a decade or so), but also had a structur-
ing effect on the field of immigrant integration research itself. This was
manifest, for instance, in the late 1970s when policy developments contrib-
uted to the dominant position of the minorities paradigm. It was also exem-
plified during the early 1990s, with the virtual disappearance of rival para-
digms (Rath 2001), when policy renewal also triggered boundary struggles
in immigrant integration research to challenge the minorities paradigm and
fortify the integration paradigm.
This paradigmatic closure provides an important obstacle to frame criti-
cal research-policy dialogues. When research-policy relations are institutio-
nalised around a specific frame, research-policy dialogues tend to accentu-
ate instrumental or secondary policy aspects, rather than the fundamental
framing of the problem. In situations characterised by a multiplicity of
frames, this can lead to dialogues of the deaf, where actors with different
frames have disparate selections or interpretations of ‘evidence’. This be-
came particularly manifest in the controversies surrounding the parliamen-
tary investigative committee established in 2004. Based on an independent
study that developed a universalist perspective on the state of immigrant
integration, this committee concluded that the integration process was ad-
vancing relatively successfully in the Netherlands. In particular, the study
and the committee itself pointed to evidence of progress in the domains of
education and labour participation. Yet, these findings were assessed very
differently in the political arena, where a more assimilationist frame now
prevailed, one that emphasised cultural and religious issues, matters largely
ignored by the committee. Rather than catalysing a new impetus for policy-
making, this committee provoked yet another episode in the ongoing con-
troversies on immigrant integration. It sparked widespread arguments about
policy failure or success. Here, the multiplicity of frames became manifest
more than ever, though the research-policy dialogues never achieved the le-
vel of critical frame reflection.
On the other hand, this book has also shown a budding recognition that
scientific knowledge on immigrant integration is uncertain and knowledge
claims are becoming publicly contested. Traditional (positivist) models that
adapt a fervent belief in societal steering and social science’s contribution
to rational problem resolutions are being traded in for more political pri-
macy in mutual relations and cynicism about scientific expertise. The
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growing fragmentation in the field of immigrant integration research, along
with the more open manifestation of knowledge conflicts, seems to have
contributed to this trend. This reflects a broader inclination in Dutch poli-
tics straying from traditional models of societal steering and, in particular,
away from technocracy and policymaking ‘behind closed doors’, some-
thing censured by populist politicians since the turn of the millennium.
This trend is aptly illustrated by a growing number of instances where
the credibility of migration scholars and related institutes is openly put on
the line. Not surprisingly, given the close co-evolution of immigrant inte-
gration research and policy in the Netherlands, the policy orientation of re-
searchers and institutes was often at stake in such controversies or ‘bound-
ary struggles’. This certainly applies to the second WRR report from 1989,
which was publicly denounced by ACOM as ‘non-scientific’, even though
ACOM itself was blamed for being too entangled with the technocratic
symbiosis of the minorities paradigm from the 1980s. Particularly severe
was the boundary struggle surrounding the VWJ study on which the parlia-
mentary investigative committee founded most of its conclusions. The
credibility of the involved researchers was openly called into question be-
cause of their alleged multiculturalist bias and overly close involvement in
the policy that they were now supposed to evaluate. Clearly, research be-
came entangled in the ongoing frame conflicts. Immigrant integration re-
search was now associated with a multiculturalist counter-discourse, one
reinvented after the turn of the millennium to mark the assimilationist turn
in Dutch politics.
8.3 Dutch exceptionalism?
An exploration on the relations between immigrant integration research
and policies in France, Germany and the UK has indicated that the Dutch
case of research-policy dialogues on migration and integration is not ex-
ceptional. Despite having very different national styles of research-policy
relations, there seems to be a broader tendency in these countries to co-
produce national models of integration, which may be relatively specific to
the field of immigrant integration research. The UK has witnessed an insti-
tutionalisation of research-policy relations around its race relations frame
that was remarkably similar to the Netherlands’ technocratic symbiosis of
the 1980s. Though less institutionalised, there was also a distinct co-
production of the welfare state integration frame in policy and research in
Germany; similarly, French experts and intellectuals have formed strong
support for the French Republicanist frame. This supports the claims made
in other studies (Favell 2001; Lavenex 2005; Castles & Wihtol de Wenden
2006), though the recent Europeanisation of immigrant integration research
seems to be challenging this dominant national focus.
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The tendency to look for uniquely national models of integration and
the challenge for such models to account for actual policy dynamics also
does not seem exceptional. Even in France, where the republicanist model
is perhaps even more resilient than the Dutch multicultural model, there
seem to have been various models over the past decades, as well as a
growing manifestation of knowledge conflicts among French migration
scholars. Also for Germany and the UK, this book has shown that the na-
tional models of integration (differentialist and race relations frames, re-
spectively) were the products of highly specific actor strategies and situa-
tional factors that aided the construction of these models, rather than these
models being embedded in historical structures, per se. For instance, both
France and Germany both had specific political factors that contributed to
the construction of their models. In France, the republican model was rein-
vented in response to Le Pen’s challenge to both the left and the right. And
in Germany, the differentialist frame long persisted due to a political stale-
mate between the Christian Democrats and Socialists, who both wished to
change this frame albeit in different directions. Recognising that national
models of integration were the products of specific actor strategies and si-
tuational factors advances our understanding of the often dynamic and con-
tested nature of migration policymaking. It also allows us to reconceptua-
lise so-called national models of integration as ‘discourses’ that shape our
understanding of immigrant integration problems, though are themselves
also shaped by actors and factors advocating a specific problem frame. As
the Dutch case has shown, such models can remain powerful as counter
discourses invoked to help distinguish policy failures from policy
successes.
The international comparison has also revealed more generalisable rela-
tionships between, on one hand, specific structures of policymaking and
the role of research therein and, on the other hand, specific cultures of pro-
blem framing. In the Netherlands of the 1980s and in the UK up until quite
recently, the technocratic configuration of the research-policy nexus per-
mitted a multiculturalist problem frame; it kept policymaking behind
closed doors and limited the scope to specific ethnic or racial traits of im-
migrants. Furthermore, in various instances, the rise of more universalist
frames was associated with issue linkages between integration and broader
topics such as welfare state politics. This was the case in the Netherlands
in the 1990s, but to some extent also in Germany during the 1970s and
1980s. Finally, in all the countries examined (though perhaps to a lesser
degree in Germany), a correlation was found between mounting politicisa-
tion and the assimilationist turn in immigrant integration policies. This oc-
curred in France relatively early, while in the other countries politicisation
was avoided up until quite recently, thus postponing the assimilationist turn
until after 2000.
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Though further research is required to better establish the relation be-
tween the structure and culture of migration policymaking, the relations
found across the four countries examined in this book highlight the value of
the structuralist-constructivist perspective applied in this book. Structural-
constructivism helps us reach beyond the historical-institutionalist thinking
that has become so widespread in European immigrant integration research.
It also helps us understand the much more dynamic ways in which our
framing of immigrant integration is connected to the structural settings of
our society. This seems particularly relevant for the domain of immigrant
integration, as our understanding of the problem is so deeply entwined with
policies – as this book has shown. Though undeniably associated with so-
cial-economic deprivation, discrimination, neighbourhood problems and
various other ‘real world’ concerns, immigrant integration seems, first and
foremost, a policy problem and, increasingly, also a political problem. It
illustrates how contemporary governments struggle to develop policies to
come to terms with this intractable, difficult-to-define social problem. As a
policy issue, it has challenged traditional modes of governance that were
aimed at rational societal steering and often involved technocratic processes
of policymaking. Perhaps more than any other policy issue, immigrant inte-
gration has urged governments to respond to constant public and political
swings and be more reflexive in terms of the multiplicity of frames it faces.
For this reason, advancing our understanding of migration policymaking
will not only be a challenge to migration scholars, but also to the fields of
policy studies and political sciences in general.
A structural-constructivist perspective also allows us to perceive and
interpret how our scientific understanding of immigrant integration is con-
nected to broader societal structures. As already premised by Schneider
and Ingram (1997) and many scholars of science studies, science tends to
be far from ‘exceptional’. Its findings tend to be shaped by rigorous scien-
tific methods, as well as by the social conditions in which research takes
place. This seems particularly valid for the field (rather than the discipline)
of immigrant integration research, the development of which has been so
closely connected to the development of migration policies. Social scien-
tists, too, tend to frame problems like immigrant integration. As this book’s
analysis of national models of integration has shown, their frames are also
likely to be influenced by the social settings in which actors frame pro-
blems. This is precisely why advancing our empirical and theoretical
understanding of research-policy relations is of such great importance to
the future development of immigrant integration as a research field.
286 FRAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
8.4 Towards reflexive research-policy dialogues?
A salient revelation of this study, in terms of research-policy relations and
their effect on the framing of immigrant integration, is that these relations
rarely achieve a level of critical frame reflection. This echoes the disen-
chantment that seems to have shrouded research-policy relations in the
field of migration throughout Europe over the past decades. On one hand,
researchers tend to be unaware of their own selective, normative problem
frames and how they can be socially conditioned. We see this most ob-
viously in a tendency towards ‘paradigmatic closure’ in national fields of
immigrant integration research. On the other hand, politicians and policy-
makers are becoming selective in their use of scientific expertise, cherry-
picking only those strands that fit their problem framing. Thus revealed is
an important mechanism behind the production of national models of inte-
gration. More recently, the rapid politicisation of immigrant integration
seems to have made policymakers even more reluctant to found their poli-
cies on scientific expertise. As the Dutch case has shown, the very use of
scientific expertise in policymaking has become contested, seen as a mere
relic of the technocratic modes of policymaking now vehemently rejected.
This book has therefore proposed to reconceptualise research-policy re-
lations as dialogues. Primarily, this means that rather than research with-
drawing into its ivory tower or policy reacting to the political swings of
the day, research and policy have responsibilities to stay in dialogue.
Given the uncertainty of social-scientific knowledge claims and the diffi-
culties experienced by governments coming to terms with this intractable
policy controversy, this book proposes an alternative to the dogma that
science speaks truth to power. The perspective is one of ‘making sense to-
gether’ (Hoppe 1999), whereby research and policy synergistically reflect
on various possible ‘truths’, rather than one claimed as the absolute truth.
Secondly, to be in dialogue means that no structural factors constrain inter-
action to one specific frame or model. Rather, research-policy dialogues
should be designed to cope with a multiplicity of frames and to take them
as objects of reflection rather than to take one frame as a given – as a mod-
el of integration.
Critical reflection arises only when research-policy dialogues are con-
stantly on the look out for the prospect of a ‘lost frame’ (Rein 2008). For
situations characterised by a multiplicity of frames, research-policy dialo-
gues should not advocate a specific frame but rather, various alternative
frames to be articulated and critically confronted. In this way, research-
policy dialogues can help policymakers and researchers to make sense –
together – of wicked policy controversies like immigrant integration.
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